
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THE

CHRISTIAN

DOCTRINE OF SIN,

EXHIBITED BY

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BY

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NOTICE OF THE TRANSLATOR

TO THE

SECOND VOLUME.

THE Translator omitted, in his prefatory notice to the first volume, a remark, which he intended to make for the *more general* reader, who might happen to take up this work, namely, that it will, probably, be better for him not to attempt to read the introduction, until he has read the work itself; and he is now induced, from some correspondence with which he has been favoured with respect to the first volume, to add, that the reader in general of such a book, especially when in addition to the difficulties of the subject he labours under the disadvantages of a translation, ought not to expect fully to understand everything at the first reading, much less ought he to resolve not to pass on from one period to the next, until everything in the preceding has become perfectly clear to him. He should remember, that he has not here to do with geometrical problems but with problems of speculative theology, in the sphere of which, the evidence, although in itself it may not be one whit less conclusive than in the sphere of the former, is nevertheless less palpable, and confined to a much selecter few, and this for the very palpable reason that it belongs to a sphere of truth immeasurably higher. As in the case of an individual, and there doubtless are such, to whom the axioms of geometry were not axiomatic, nothing would remain to him if he resolved to study geometry, but to take them on faith and pass on, in the hope that with an increased culture of mind he would hereafter come to perceive their axiomatic character; so here the reader must pass on, noting what is obscure and unin-

telligible to him. A second reading will clear up many of the passages thus noted in the first. In fact, a book on such a subject which could quite generally be read off hand without presenting difficulties, would not be worth even so much trouble. At any rate, "The Christian Doctrine of Sin" is not a book of this kind, on the contrary, by the very great majority of *earnest students*, it will have to be rather *studied* than read, in order to be fully comprehended. And there are few, who will not be amply repaid for almost any amount of time and thought they may devote to it, presupposing of course that the reader's own inward wants, if they have not made the pursuit of speculative theology a *necessity*, have awakened in him at least some inquiries which cannot be set at rest by any merely dogmatick reply. Beyond the sphere of this latter class of inquiring minds the present work has little chance of being read. For the *mere passively receptive reader* will find in it very little which will not disturb his mental digestion and thereby the equanimity of his disposition of mind, but surely the book ought not on this account to be found fault with, nor those who find in it nourishment and comfort (as I am given to understand has been already the case with respect to the first volume.) The book was never meant for such readers, and would never have caused them discomfort if they had not been too meddlesome. Nothing is more erroneous than the idea, apparently prevalent in some quarters, that every book is a book for everybody, or that ability and success in one department is a sure pass to every other and qualifies for giving judgment upon the same. Many are misled by such an opinion, and with the best intention of doing good not only do positive harm, but thwart the very object they have in view, scatter coals of fire among combustible materials with which they would never have come in contact in the safe grate in which they were lodged, and only burn their own fingers, in their mistaken endeavours to save those from the flames, on whom, forsooth, not even the smell of fire had ever passed but for them.

By the above remarks it must not for a moment be supposed that the Translator wishes to cloak the unskilfulness that may attach to his translation, by emphasizing the difficult nature of the subject itself. He is far too humbled by the poverty of his

own abilities, of which the study of this and kindred works have made him so fully conscious, to think of attempting any such disguisement. Nevertheless, if in presenting himself to the literary world for the first time he has presumed to do so as the translator of such a work, his courage has outmatched his skill, he is sure that just those of his readers best capable of forming a judgment of the same, will be the readiest to deal indulgently with its faults and defects, especially when they remember that the book has remained more than fourteen years untranslated, and that they will at least give him credit for an anxious, and painstaking, and he hopes not altogether unsuccessful, endeavour to reconvey the meaning of his author. Further, the Translator has to trespass upon the indulgence of his readers, in that during the preparation of this second volume for the press, it has not been possible for him carefully to examine the sheets of the first volume for the correction of those blunders and errors which, partly from inexperience, partly from inadvertence, and partly, doubtless, from ignorance, may have crept into the same—and as to this volume, it will be in the hands of the reader before it will come under his eye. He has also to regret, that for the sake of expediting the completion of the work and of keeping some degree of faith with the publishers, he attempted to do without the ordinary revises; this was soon found to be unadvisable to continue; the idea was therefore relinquished—not however before 48 pages had been struck off. However, the Translator promises to append to an analysis of this work, mentioned in his notice to the first volume, and which is already in course of preparation, a correction of those errors which a careful revision shall discover to him. And should a second edition be called for, he promises not merely to revise and amend but to recast the whole into freer and purer English. To have done this at first he felt involved more responsibility than he was prepared to sustain. He has done his best, and hopes, should God be graciously pleased to spare his life and continue his health, to render more efficient service in this sphere of sacred and scientific literature. In the meantime, may not a few of the inquiring disciples of Christ, the future teachers of the Church, find in these pages a friendly hand to help them in their conflict with the darkness which overshadows the great truths they discuss, and to direct them in

their doubtful way, so that thus aided, by meditation and prayer they may attain at least in some degree to that theoretic light of the understanding of the Divine Truth, which, although subsequent to, is nevertheless inseparable from, the practical illumination of the heart. *Oratio, meditatio, tentatio theologum faciunt.*

For a very general sketch of the argument contained in this work, the reader may consult an article by Professor ROBIE, in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for August 1848, continued in the No. for May 1849, and for a very able and candid critique (so far as it goes) of the same, the reader is referred to the *North British Review* for February 1850, as well as to a review, similar in contents to that critique, in the *British Quarterly Review* for November 1851.

HALLE a/d. SAALE,
Ascension Day,
May 5. 1853.

SUMMARY VIEW OF THE CONTENTS.

Page

Transition to the Third Book.—Results of the previous investigations. The principle which the arising of evil in the personal creature presupposes. That if there is such a principle, it must be the freedom of the will. Declining of the *Schleiermachian* notion of freedom. Remarks on *Ritter's* notion of freedom, ... 1—4

Third Book.—The Possibility of Sin, ... 5—252

First Division.—The Free Will of Man, ... 5—198

First Chapter.—Formal and Real Freedom, ... 4—39

Internal, in distinction from external, necessity. Identity of this necessity with freedom. The form, which from this point of view the notion of moral freedom takes. Confirmation, by the declarations of the universal moral consciousness, and of Holy Scripture. The insufficiency of this notion of freedom in relation to our problem. (The modifications of the same by *Bretschneider* and the dissipation of *sin* consequent upon the same.) . . . . . 4—14

Freedom as the ability of self-decision between good and evil. Authentication of this notion in the Holy Scripture. The necessity of maintaining both determinations of freedom, and of reconciling them with each other, ... 14—17

The conceptions of formal freedom, which make this reconciliation impossible. Formal freedom in the system of indeterministic arbitrariness. *King de origine mali.* The consequence of this principle. Its fundamental error. Formal freedom in the system of the *libertas aequilibrii* . . . . . 17—22

Development of the notion of formal freedom. Freedom according to its most general (not directly moral) determinations. Its kernel the highest possible self-being of the individual. Condition of this self-being, ... 22—24

Notion of the will as conscious self-determination in distinction from the self-determination of living natural existences. Freedom as predicate of the will. The unfree will. Freedom of the will as self-determination upon the ground-basis of the ability of also otherwise determining. The significance of the accidental for human life. Distinction between contingency and accidentality. The ability of variously deciding in the moral sphere as possibility of evil. The conditionateness of real freedom by this possibility. Formal freedom as conditioning real freedom, the real as the end of the formal, ... 24—29

Page

Further determinations of formal freedom. Significance of the notion of possibility for this notion of freedom. Ability and innate endowment or disposition. In how far formal freedom is freedom of choice. The analogon of this freedom in the sphere of animal life.—The causality of this freedom in the external world and its limits, 29—37.

The germs of this development of the notion of freedom according to its different moments in the controversial writings of *Augustinus* against the Pelagians, 37—39.

Second Chapter.—The Freedom of the Will in Moral Development, 40—72.

The atomistic representation of freedom in Pelagianism, denying the development. Its consequences: Inconceivability of a connective influence upon others—destruction of the notion of character—impossibility of co-operative activity for a given purpose—violation of the deepest religious interests. Superiority of determinism to this theory, still only such a determinism which has appropriated the notions of the organism and peculiarity of the individual. How such a determinism regards the origination of the decision of the will, 40—47.

Refutation of determinism by a more correct determination of the notion of freedom. The nature-basis of the spirit in the individual. The influence of the will upon the natural individuality. The religio-moral development and the freedom in it. Character as result of free self-determinations. Analogy and contrast of the notion of habit. The power of habit in the sphere of the outward and inward life. Its significance for the origination of determinate courses of moral conduct. Its inadequacy to explain the formation of a character, of a decided direction of the will. The mechanism of habit. Its being limited to the connecting together of individual activities, 45—54.

Review of the relation between formal and real freedom. Living unity of the will with the other functions of the spiritual life. The motive principle of the will. Relation of the decision of the will to the mental representations as motive grounds. The deterministic and the abstract indeterministic view. More correct determination. Result, 54—58.

The deterministic conception of the notion of moral development. Predeterminism. The error of this notion of development. More exact determination of the opposite moments which become one in every development. Authentication of this reciprocal conditionateness of being in natural development. The limits of the same. Freedom of the will, the progressive principle of moral development. The relation of the general law of moral development to the moral law. The more exact determinations of this development. Distinction of the moments condition and act. Remark on the different phases of the consciousness of freedom in its relation to the deterministic view. 58—67.

Page

Epochs and turning points of moral development. Their mobility and incalculable ability of change by virtue of their conditionateness by formal freedom. Consequences in relation to practical questions previously started. Ultimate result, 67—72

Third Chapter.—Transcendental and Empirical Freedom, 73—122

How far freedom is able to maintain itself in the development against the attacks of determinism. Deficiency of a principle of original decision. Refutation of the assumption, that in sins against the conscience are given the conditions of such a decision for the perverted development. On the representation of an *acquilibrium* taking place in the midst of the development as fundamental basis of freedom, 73—76

The necessity of attributing the original self-decision to the very commencement of moral development. The impossibility of authenticating it in the same. The manifold conditionateness of the first decision of moral significance. How little adapted this moment is to sustain the full weight of the imputation. The inability even of relative freedom scientifically maintaining itself in the development without such a point of original decision. The necessity arising therefrom of going beyond the region of the temporal in the explanation of freedom, 76—80

Unison of this result with phenomena of the consciousness. Connection of the same with the idea of personal immortality. Its confirmation by the testimony of the Holy Scripture of the condemnableness of man on account of sin, 80—82

The doctrine of *Origen* as to a self-decision preceding the earthly life of man. The bearing of the Church development of doctrine towards this view. *Kant's* moral standpoint. His notion of freedom as of an ability, extra-temporally determining itself, of commencing a condition of itself, developed from the general principles of his system. Radical evil, 82—87

The worth of this notion of freedom for the imputation of evil. Moral energy in the tendency of these determinations.—*Kant's* dualism between intelligible and empirical world. Whether *Kant* according to this was justified in referring imputation to individual actions. The phenomenal world in his system much rather the concealment of the intelligible world. Inconsistencies in *Kant's* determinations.—The onesided idealism of this view. The unsatisfactory character of the results, 87—93

Further moments in the "*Religion within the Bounds of mere Reason.*" Fresh difficulties. The impossibility of liberation for the individual affected with radical evil. Examination of the *Kantian* proof of its possibility by the conclusion: I can; for I ought. The ultimate result of the *Kantian* principles according to this side, 93—97

Contradiction of the real form of the moral life to this notion of freedom. The manifestation of freedom in the moral development. Whether the consciousness of guilt confirms the *Kantian* theory. His notice of empirical conditions of the evil act. The distinction in degree of imputation. The recognition of this distinction of degree in the doctrine of Christ and the Apostles, 97—10

Page

The radical misperception of the true significance of Time and Space, of corporeity and earthly development, of the Divine method of revealing the infinite in the limited, 101—103

Extension of the *Kantian* doctrine of freedom by *Schelling* (Dissertation on Freedom.) The two principles in God and in all beings. The different manner, in which they become one, in nature, and in man. Evil as positive inversion of the principles, ... 103—105

How it appears to follow from these fundamental determinations, that every derivation of evil from notions only extends to its possibility. Confirmation of this result from individual moments of *Schelling's* opinion.—Grounds for the opposite assumption, for the Divine necessity of the reality of evil. The natural-philosophy principle, which lies at the bottom of this method of consideration.—The dualistic conception of the relation between the irrational and intelligent principle as root of other determinations. Whether the primitive ground as highest unity is able to exclude dualism. The more real conception of the highest unity to which the doctrine impels us, . 105—110

The explanation of freedom from these principles. According to its real notion ability of the good and of the evil. Formal notion of freedom.—The determinations respecting the relation of evil to the all-conditioning will of God. The suffered working of the ground. The deficiency of a further grounding of this notion. Freedom swallowed up in the ground according to the side of its dependence on God. Whether the formal notion of freedom furnishes a protection against the same. Variance between the formal and real notion of freedom, 110—114

The more acute determinations of freedom as intelligible in distinction from *Kant*. How according to this the matter stands with the question as to the possibility of a moral transformation. The contradiction in the contents of the extra-temporal primitive decision.—The transcendental act of the Ego as principle of its collective, empirical being. How it therewith loses its peculiar fundamental basis in the consciousness, imputation in the conscience. On the possibility of deriving from such an intelligible primitive act the innate, particular determinateness of the individual according to the nature side of his being and according to his spiritual *(geistig)* peculiarity. . . . 114—120

The complications, in which this conception of the intelligible freedom becomes involved with the doctrine of personal immortality. Discussion of an objection. An attempt of its solution and its docetic consequences, ... 120—122

Fourth Chapter.—Freedom as Possibility of Sin, . . . 123—197

Setting out from the idea of God. The Divine Personality as the condition of religion. The acknowledgment of this truth even by *Schleiermacher*. The relation of philosophy to the idea of the Divine Personality, ... 123—125

The question, whereby the Divine Personality is an Absolute Personality. The personal essence as one in itself possessed of real distinctions. The general consequences which follow from the negation of real dis-

Page

tinctions in God. Resolving of some difficulties. The particular consequences in relation to the personality of God. How the deception in the older theology on this matter is to be explained. Modern direction by the principle of the immanent in God. The negative notion of the Absolute. Its exclusion of personality, . . 125—130

The conditionateness of human personality by the self-distinction of the Ego from another. The consequences of carrying over this determination to the Divine Personality. Examination of the further moments by which these consequences are said to become excluded, . 130—133

The possibility of a personality, which is not conditioned by the excision of another being.—The personality of God is absolute by the inner infinitude of the determinations of his nature. On the supposed contradiction between determinateness and infiniteness. The positive notion of the infiniteness of the Divine nature. Result for the notion of the Divine Personality, ... 133—137

The personality of God is absolute in that its freedom is the principle of that infiniteness. The *aseitas* of God. God *causa sui*. The significance of the cosmological proof for the existence of God. Consequences from this principle in relation to the arrangements of the world. Remarks on *Weisse's* assumption of a metaphysical necessity of reason as presupposition of the Divine will. Whether by the opposite view arbitrariness and accidentality are made the principles of all existing being. The most original determination of the idea of God. Reflection on the manner in which the result has been given us for the notion of the Divine Personality, 137—144

The Divine freedom as principle of the existence of another being. The notion of the act of creating. Creation from nothing. Whether this freedom becomes by the Divine love a necessity following from its nature. Insufficiency of the attempts to solve this difficulty. Solution by the idea of the Divine Trinity (*Lücke.*) The wantlessness of perfect love. The contingency of the world in distinction from the accidentality. The design of the Divine love as Creator of the world. Creaturely personality. Freedom of the will as essential moment of creaturely personality, ... 144—153

More exact development. Contradiction of an absolute self-grounding with the notion of creaturely personality. Its relative self-grounding. The moral, the sphere of the same. The ground of the interest in the notion of freedom. The Divine presupposition for this self-grounding, 153—155

Relation of the notion of freedom to the possibility of evil. Whether the Divine freedom includes in itself the possibility of evil. The initial possibility of evil in creaturely freedom. The primitive not yet decided condition of man in distinction from self-variance and neutrality. Whether according to this the creaturely freedom contained in itself the germ of evil. Result, ... 153—159

The extra-temporal character of this free self-decision, whereby created personality grounds its moral being. In how far self-consciousness in

Page

itself considered includes in it a relative superiority over time. The limits of this vanquishment of time. The surmounting the limits of time by the imperishable continued existence of personality. The power of time over the contents of its life. Time as pure form, free from impediment, for the development of created personality, . 159—162

The impossibility of transferring these determinations to God. The eternity of the Divine life. The notion of eternity in contrast to the popular representation of the same. The notion of eternity in contrast to the merely negative conception of the same. The positive notion of the Divine eternity, ... 162—165

The necessary distinction of created personality from God. The self-grounding of the same in the sphere of the (negative) timelessness. The determination of this sphere in its relation to life in time. The necessary transition into the temporal development, . . 165—168

The intelligible self-determination is not contents of our empirical consciousness. Why it cannot be so. The negations which attach to the intelligible primitive condition of personal essences, . . 168—169

Leibnitz's grounding of the self-guilt of man in sin. Comparison of his view with that here developed. *Weisse's* theory of creation, . 169—171

The extra-temporal self-grounding, the pre-eminence of personal beings. The reasons which necessitate us to this acknowledgment. Nature in its relation to personality and peculiarity. Parallel: the relation of the Old to the New Testament, . 171—174

The cancelling of the initial possibility of evil. The only way in which it can take place. The entrance of this possibility into the consciousness. The distinction of the necessity negativing its realization from the necessity of the law of nature. The consciousness of that necessity. The consciousness of the possibility of evil contained therein, 174—177

The necessity maintained of late (*Vatke*) not merely of the possibility, but of the reality of evil. Authentication of the point, where the becoming conscious of the possibility of sin and the realization of the same separate. Disturbing consequences of that view for the doctrine of the Holiness of Christ. The different formulæ which express this Holiness, ... 177—182

Comprehensibility or incomprehensibility of evil. Whether evil can be looked upon as consequence from the freedom of the will, just as in nature the effects of a power as its consequences. Relation of the free will to the determining grounds. Freedom as possibility of evil. Unequal relation of the same to good and evil. Freedom in its transition into arbitrariness. The groundlessness of evil. On the formula, that evil arises from the misuse of the free will. The incomprehensibility of evil and of good in *Kant*. The comprehensibility of the

Page

good. How far evil may be comprehended and how far not. Necessary distinctions. The objective significance of this incomprehensibility. The earlier incomprehensibility of evil and its later comprehension in *Daub*.—Remarks on *Rothe's* polemic against the incomprehensibility of evil, 182—193

Appendix on the categories of causality. Cause and effect. Causality in the sphere of the spirit and of freedom. *Kant's* negation. *Hegel's* cancelling of causality in elevating it to notion. The place which this category has also in that sphere. Distinction between cause and effect, ground and consequence, 193—197

Second Division. The Reconcilability of Human Freedom with the unlimited Volition and Cognition of God, 199—250

First Chapter.—The Relation of Freedom to the Divine Omnipotence, 199—224

Statement of the problem. Insufficient attempts of solution, 199—200

Development of the notion of the Divine Omnipotence. Discussion of the question, whether it belongs to the limitlessness of the Divine Might that it realizes every possibility contained in it. *Schleiermacher's* answer. Consequences in relation to human freedom. The conception of the Divine Omnipotence lying at the ground. On the value of the determination of the Divine Causality as an absolutely vital causality. The specifically higher nature of the causality in so far as it is *will*. The relation of the Divine Omnipotence to the nature of God. Absolute cancelling of the necessity of giving real existence to everything which is possible, 200—204

On the grounding of the opposite view by the notion of perfection. On the grounding of the same view by the notion of the Divine Love. The more correct determination of the consequences from this love, 204—208

The self-limitation of the Divine Will. The inner ground of this self-limitation, 208—209

Notion of a conditioned i. e. self-conditioning Divine volition. The respect, in which alone we can speak of a conditioned Divine Will. On the assumption of a *voluntas Dei inefficax*. More exact development of the conditioned Divine Will. On the *voluntas Dei antecedens et consequens*, 209—212

Justification of the notion of a Divine self-limitation. On the controversion of the same from the stand-point of the pious self-consciousness (*Schleiermacher.*) What the interest of piety most decidedly requires in this respect. On the supposed contradiction of that notion with the idea of God. The impossibility of Divine self-limitation in its contradiction with the true notion of the Divine Omnipotence. This impossibility in its contradiction with the notion of the Divine Love, 212—217

Whether according to this it is possible, that all personal creatures depart from God and persist in their departure. Acknowledgment of

Page

the first possibility. The inner contradictions of evil as negative point of attachment for the rescuing Grace of God, . . 217—219

The question, whether God can have purposes, which He does not attain. The sense in which this question is to be affirmed, and the sense in which it is to be denied. The limits of our cognition in this respect, ... 219—221

The notion of the Divine sufferance. Its relative truth. The necessity of completing it by other determinations of the Divine Will. The consequences of its rejection, ... 221—224

Second Chapter.—The Relation of Freedom to the Divine Omniscience, ... 225—250

The presupposition, that the collective free actions of man are object of the Divine Omniscience. Statement of the problem. The vainness of the attempts to solve the same by analogies from the sphere of human cognoscence. How far these analogies are here essential, 225—227

The attempt to solve the problem by the cognition, that the Divine cognition is no precognition, but is extra-temporal eternal. Whether it follows from this attribute of the Divine cognition, that time generally is non-existent for the same. In how far time is a limitation of human cognition. Cancelling of this limit for the Divine cognoscence. Distinguishing between that which is subjectively and objectively given with respect to time for our cognition. Whether the *Kantian* conception of time is obliged to deny this objective presence of the same for the Divine cognition. What follows from this denial, if time is the objective form of conditioned being. Relation of the Divine ideas to the temporal development. Result: that the extra-temporalness of the Divine cognoscence, correctly conceived of, cannot be more favourable to human freedom than a Divine precognition. Inutility of this distinction even over against the Socinian objections, 227—235

The formula: that God precognizes the free as free. Its truth. Its incapability of solving the problem, . . . 235—236

The objective cognoscence in God. Denial of the same by the identification of volition and cognition in God. Identification of prescience and predestination. The meaning of this identification the denial, that volition and cognition may at all be ascribed to God. *Spinoza*, 236—238

The distinction of cognition from volition in God. The Divine cognoscence as eternal production of the idea of the universe. The Divine cognoscence of the world as really existing and distinct from God. How the beginning of the world-time is to be reconciled with the eternity of the idea of the world in God. The Divine idea of the world as end for the real development of the world. Whether the

Page

cognoscence of another contradicts the notion of the Infinite nature. Distinction of this Divine cognoscence as to the world from the Divine Will. The Divine cognoscence is not causative, consequently does not cancel the freedom of the decisions of the human will as its object. But then this distinction has only real significance in relation to creaturely freedom, ... 238—244

On the distinction between the necessary and the ability of being also otherwise (*Auchanderssein-können*) and between the certain and the uncertain. The source of their being confounded, . . . 244—245

On the opinion, that the Divine precognition does not indeed cause the event to be necessary, but is a token of the same. Limited representation of the Divine cognoscence, ... 245—247

Appendix to *Rothe's* attempt at solving this problem, . . . 247—250

Transition. Summing up of the result obtained in the preceding. Determining of the problem for the fourth book, . . . 251—252

Fourth Book.—The Diffusion of Sin, ... 253—453

First Chapter.—The Universality of Sin as Fact of Experience, 253—283

The bounds of human corruption. The inclination and its motive to deny man apart from Redemption absolutely all participation in good. Apparent confirmation by the understanding. Result: negation of the capacity for redemption, ... 253—254

The tenets of the Konkordienformel on the extent of human corruption —on the inability of the free will to take an active part in conversion. How the unconditioned doctrine of predestination appears directly to follow from these tenets, ... 254—256

How the determination, that the election is conditioned by the faith which is seen beforehand, furnishes no escape from the same. The determinations on the production of the faith by the use of the means of Grace. Synergistic consequences. The provisions made against the same by the Konkordienformel and the old Lutheran dogmatick. The point, at which according to this every decision crowds, 256—259

Why this point is not at all adapted for such a deciding significance. The necessity which arises for the older dogmatic system itself to go beyond it. The manner in which it meets this necessity. The negative conditionateness of conversion on the part of man. The contradictions, which result. The necessity of recognising a positive susceptibility. The confusion, which lead the judgment of the Reformers astray on the moral elements of the natural condition. On the moral estimation of heathenism, ... 259—265

Modern attempts, to justify that judgment from a speculative stand-point. The real meaning of this opinion in its relation to the true significance of the above problem. The λόγος σπερματικός. The effects of preparative Grace. On the notion of Grace, ... 265—268

Results for the determinations of the Konkordienformel on the degree of the universal human corruption. Biblical grounding. The more correct expression for the moral constitutional character of the natural condition, ... 268—271

Page

The distinction between the moral constitutional character of individuals apart from Redemption. Sin in the life of the better and more noble. Facts of experience. Acknowledgment on the part of the attenuating theories of sin. The Pantheistic opinion. The deistico-pelagianistic view. Distinction between enormous crimes and the weaknesses and faults inseparable from human life. The consequences which follow from the non-imputation of the latter. The ground of this judgment, ... 271—275

The universality of sins against the conscience. Why violations of the conscience are oftener to be met with in the life of the better of mankind than in morally rude half-civilized individuals. The great significance of that fact. The collective character of the moral life apart from redemption—positive—negative. On the tenet that every man has his price, for which he sells himself, 275—279

Testimony of Holy Scripture for the universality of sin. The Old Testament. This universality everywhere in the New Testament a fundamental presupposition, especially in the declarations of Christ and in the development of doctrine by Paul. Discussion of a few apparently contradictory expressions, . . . 279—283

SECOND CHAPTER.—SIN AS CORRUPTION OF HUMAN NATURE, . 284—337

The impossibility of seeking sin merely in the individual action or omission. Sin as the abiding impurification and corruption of the heart, 284—285

Whether this impurity can be separated in our consideration from the pure elements of the inner life. The necessity of this separation in the notion. In real life it is only approximately possible. Authentication especially in the life of progressive sanctification. The difficulty of this separation augmented by the influence of sin upon our cognition.—The involvement of our virtues with our vices. The facility of the transition from the former to the latter. How here too sin confusingly reacts upon our cognition. Result: the deep inrooting of sin in human nature, ... 285—289

The origination of this condition. The limited truth of the representation of an individual sin-fall. The innocence of the age of childhood. In what sense it is to be maintained of the same. The declarations of Christ.—On the absolute purity attributed to the age of childhood. The contradiction in which the universal character of the further development stands with this assumed purity. The attempted solutions of this contradiction—by the freedom of the will—by the sensational weaknesses of human nature. The relation of the latter view to the opinion of the Church. Result: a propensity to evil innate in man. Justification of the expression: *peccatum originale*, 289—294

Confirmation by the certain phenomena of the moral life and judgment. The certainty that every individual of the human race has some participation in sin. The ground of this certitude. The universal course of human development—the difficulty of the good—the facility of the evil. The universal bias to degeneracy, . . . 294 297

Page

The natural condition of man. Significance of this notion.—The presence of sin even in the regenerate. Its limits. The deficiency of real purity. The character which sin assumes in them, . . 298—301

Conformation by biblical testimony. The Old Testament. Psalm li. 7. Dogmatic importance of this expression. The two-fold interpretation which is grammatically possible. Decision.—On Jobiv. 4 —Genesis viii. 21.—The New Testament John iii. 6. More important for this moment of doctrine 1 Cor. vii. 14. Most decisive Ephesians ii. 3. More exact fixation of the dogmatic result of this passage, 301—307

The nature of the innate corruption according to its positive side. Whether it consists in the disproportionate strength of the sensational impulse. The natural Egoism. The life of childhood in this respect. The negative side of the natural corruption. The weakness of the germ of Religion in the human spirit (the Augsburg Confession.) The dignity pertaining to Religion—proof from experience—from the notion of Religion. Contradiction of the reality. Perverted explanations. The true ground of this contradiction, that weakness inwoven in our nature. Heathenism. Aversion toward God as the Holy One.—The true significance of the predominant strength of the sensational impulse as an essential part of the natural corruption (*Töllner.*) 307—314

The connection of death with sin. The peculiar difficulties, which oppose the more exact fixation of the nature-relations of the Christian doctrine, 314—315

The naturalness of death for man as sensational being. The death of the natural existences. Altered relation of the individual to the genus in the sphere of personal beings. The unnaturalness of death for the latter, 315—317

The supposed solution of the problem by the spiritualistic doctrine of immortality. Opposite position of the Christian faith of immortality. The consideration of death resulting therefrom as a disturbance, 317—318

The Biblical doctrine of death as punishment of sin. Rom. v. 12 seq. 1 Cor. xv. 21 seq. The Old Testament, Gen. ii. 17, iii. 16—22. Psalm xc. 7 seq. Num. xvi. 29 seq. The Sheol of the Old Testament. How far the New Testament confirms this representation. Signification of death for the redeemed, 318—323

The difficulty, that death appears to be inseparable from the essentially constituted nature of the human body. Confirmation by declarations of the Apostle Paul, 1 Cor. xv. Solution by Genesis, especially iii. 19. The tree of life, 323—326

The σῶμα χοϊκὸν Christi directly after his resurrection. The importance of His ascension resulting therefrom. Christ, capable of death, but not subjected to it as the Holy One. The significance of His ascen-

Page

sion not lessened thereby. The glorification Christi on the mount of Galilee, ... 326—329

That death is the consequence of the sin which is rooted in human *nature*. On the significance of the ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, Rom. v. 12.

The connection of ver. 13 and 14 with ver. 12, ... 330—332

Summing up. Spiritual death as well as the second death consequence of sin as actual sin. Physical death consequence of the natural sinfulness. How far it becomes, as such a consequence, cancelled, and how far it remains for the redeemed, ... 332—334

More exact determination of the defect, which characterizes the condition between death and the Resurrection even for them. 2 Cor. v. 3. The γυμνὸν εἶναι of the soul, ... 334—337

Third Chapter.—The Church Doctrine of Hereditary Sin, . 338—398

Subject of the investigation. The connection of the dogma in its old Protestant form. The notion of *hereditary guilt*. Presupposition, the correlative relation between sin and guilt. The possibility of making good the same in an inverse direction. The stand-points unjustified in censuring the dogma in this respect, ... 338—341

The inner motive of the dogma. The substantial unity of the different spheres of human society—of the entire human race. Thus, in that sin is the character of the genus, is it the most absolute possession of the individual. The older dogmatic formula: *natura corrumpit personam*, ... 341—344

The categories individual and genus. Dependence of the individual upon the genus. Insufficiency of this relation for the grounding of guilt. Notion of personality. Further reasons in defence of that view and their refutation. The relative justification of the atomistic principle in this question. Confirmation by the anthropological and eschatological doctrines of Holy Scripture. Glance at a distorted conception of Christianity as support of that opinion.—Examination of the formula, that the nature corrupts the person. On the self-imputation by love of the determinateness of the genus, ... 344—350

Schleiermacher's solution of the problem under consideration by the notion of the collective act and collective guilt of the human race. Necessary limitation of this determination. How that it does not contain the solution of the problem, but only of the fact, from which the explanation has to set out.—Defect of the *Schleiermachian* notion of freedom and personality, ... 350—352

Modification of the doctrine of hereditary sin. The moral disturbance originated by the fall in the posterity of Adam only inculpable evil; but the free consenting to the same to be imputed to them. More exact determination of this view, ... 352—355

The double problem, which this opinion has to solve. The first, the distinguishing in the individual between that which belongs to the inculpable and that which belongs to the culpable corruption. The supposition under which alone this distinction could be carried out. Proof, that this supposition does not really exist. The imputation of unpremeditated sins. The separation of the free and unfree elements in the individual sin, 355—357

Page

The assumption, that only the premeditated sin conveys guilt with it, the unpremeditated not. The impossibility of carrying out this opinion, 357—357

The assumption, that the individual has fully to impute to himself each and all of his moral errors, because in all his will has in some way participated. The inadmissibility of this under the given presuppositions, 357—358

The second problem, to reconcile the fact of the universal culpability with the conditionateness of guilt by self-decision. The position violating the claims of both moments, in which that theory inevitably falls, 358—360

Second modification of the doctrine of hereditary sin. The innate corruption is the cause of real sin; but guilt only attaches to the latter. Historic proofs, 360—361

Proof, that, according to this theory's own presupposition real, sin is also not imputable, or, if real sin be imputable then innate sin is also imputable, 361—363

The negativing result of the examination up to the present point. The necessity of showing the participation of the whole posterity of Adam in the sin-fall, 363—364

The acknowledgment of this necessity in the old Protestant theology. The mediate and immediate imputation of the sin-fall. Natural corruption as positive punishment, 364—366

The opinion of *Placæus* and its insufficiency. Opposite extreme the Scholastico-catholic ratio docendi. Its consequence, the method of representation by *Catharinus* and *Pighius*. Its untenability. The trope of doctrine in the Lutheran dogmatick the mean between the two, 366—370

More exact development of the same. Adam the natural and the moral head of the human race. The isolated conception of the first attribute of Adam and its incapability of grounding the immediate imputation of his fall. The isolated conception of the second attribute of Adam and its result.—Examination of the combination of the two attributes. Proof, that the unity, thereon dependent, of the collective human race with Adam is not able to ground the immediate imputation of his sins, 370—374

Examination of the attempt to ground this imputation by the *scientia media Dei*, 374—375

Attempt to justify this imputation by the realistic conception of the genus-notions. The miserable involvements to which this conducts.—General result, 375—378

The serious practical consequences, which in themselves were to be expected. Refutation by experience. Practical removal of the contradiction contained in the dogma, 378—380

Page

The Biblical ground-basis of the dogma of hereditary sin. The New Testament, Rom. v. 12—19. Examination of the attempts to derive the immediate participation of all the posterity of Adam, in his sin, from the sentence: ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον. The determinations on the disturbance, arising from the fall of Adam, contained in this and the following verses. The κατάκριμα of the physical death. Whether in v. 19 anything more is contained.—Fixation of the dogmatic significance of this passage for the doctrine of hereditary sin. Whether anything further can be deduced from the parallel between Adam and Christ, ... 381—386

The Old Testament. The conception of Genesis iii. Whether the narration is to be understood as a poetically invested philosopheme. Whether as mythos. Necessary recognition of an historical kernel—without Christian theology having on this account to defend the historical character of every individual expression.—But how even according to the strictly literal conception, the origin of human sinfulness cannot be deduced from this narrative. The appealing to Gen. i. 31, ... 386—389

Whether the dogmatic doctrine of the consequences of the fall of Adam can be established by the Biblical determinations respecting the Divine image. The old Protestant conception of this notion. Its exegetical right to decline the patristico-Catholic, as well as the Socinian conception. Its grounding the tenet as to the loss of the Divine image by Col. iii. 10; Eph. iv. 24. More correct explanation of these passages. Scripture testimony for the existence of the Divine image after the sin-fall. Result, ... 389—394

The true notion of the Divine image imparted to man by creation. Acts xvii. 28. 29, ... 394—396

Examination of the inner connection of the representation of an original moral perfection of man. Contradiction between this perfection and the possibility of the fall, ... 396—398

Fourth Chapter.—The Origin of Innate Sin, ... 399—453

Starting point of the investigation. The necessity of seeking the solution of the contradiction therewith posited in the extra-temporal primitive condition of all personal essences, ... 399—401

The question, what is to lead us to the cognition of the contents of that primitive decision. Absence of an immediate consciousness of the latter. How that contents is reflected in the facts of experience. The giving way of the will itself. The selfish ground-tendency of the will as the sole nature of the natural corruption in this sphere, 401—405

The necessary spirituality of evil, in so far as it has its root in the intelligible freedom. The ground of the solicitation to this selfish primitive decision. The relation of the general dispositions of the earthly life to the same, ... 405—407

The degree of the original self-perversion of the human will. The limit of the natural corruption, ... 407—409

Why the intelligible evil cannot be ascribed to all personal creatures.

Page

The Scripture doctrine of angels and devils. Whether that evil is to be regarded as universal within the fundamental determinations of the human genus, ... 409—411

The determining influence of the intelligible act upon our empirical reality. Primitive guilt and the original real power of sin. Relation of the corporeity of the personal creature in general and of our earthy material corporeity in particular, to the primitive sin. Declining of dualistic representations. Transition to a second source of innate sin, 411—415

The peculiarity of the human individual. Its conditionateness by the nature entireties realizing themselves in the individuals and by the parents. More exact determination of the influence of the latter. The constitutive principle, the generative power of the genus. The conductor, the moment of generation, ... 415—420

Propagation of abnormal formations and of moral disturbances from parents to children. Proof, that here too the moment of generation is the conductor. How that it by no means follows therefrom, that the sensational fellowship of the sexes is in itself that which is sinful. The exclusion of the natural generation from the commencement of the human life of Christ. The universal significance of the moral disturbance propagating itself by natural generation, . . . 420—425

The temporal primitive condition of the human race. Latent ground the timeless primitive fall. The undisturbed harmony in the relation of the different powers. Mediation of this determination with that primitive sinfulness. The significance of the temptation. The serpent of Paradise. Satan as the tempter of the first of mankind to sin. The sin-fall, ... 425—433

The disturbance of human nature entering in with the fall. The nature of this disturbance. The question as to the equality or inequality of hereditary sin in the individuals. The specific equality of the same. The different degrees in the strength of the natural sinfulness. Its conditionateness by the moral character of the parents, . . 433—437

The way in which the universal sinfulness is connected with the sin-fall of the first parents. Examination of the mediation by a positive punitive act of God, ... 437—438

The different theories respecting the origin of individual human souls. How the controverted question is to be decided upon our stand-point, 438—440

Relation of the doctrine here developed to the Holy Scripture. Relation to the ratio docendi of the old Protestant dogmatick and the confessional writings. On esoteric doctrines of theology. On the treatment of the question in the general teaching of the Church, 440—445

Appendix. Summary characterization of the premises to the assumption of an extra-temporal primitive decision. Defence of the conception of

Page

the notion of guilt lying at the basis, against *Rothe's* protest. The defect in *Rothe's* conception of this notion.—*Dorner's* determinations respecting the relation between individual and genus in this question. The full guilt in the sin of the natural condition, . . . 445—453

Transition. Enhancement in evil and its presuppositions in regard to the relation between our empirical existence and the intelligible primitive decision. Satisfaction of the scruple, which presents itself, from the nature of sin, against a distinction of degree in the development of sin, ... 454—456

Fifth Book. The Enhancement of Sin in the Development of the Individual, ... 457—488

The development of the abiding condition from actual sins. The power of the Divine order of the world over sin. Causal and caused sins. Influence of actual sins upon the nature-ground of the life. The bondage of the will by its own perversion. The bondage of the sinful development by the law of graduation. The captivating power of the external circumstances, by which sin becomes seized, . . 457—462

Critick of the doctrine of the different states of corruption. More correct form of its stages, ... 462—465

Obduratenes. Its inner possibility. The Divine efficiency in the hardening of man. The real significance of the question. The mediacy of the Divine causality of obduration. The conditionateness of the same by the Divine Revelations, ... 465—469

Sin as punishment. Difficulty of this notion. The limitations under which it is to be acknowledged as valid, ... 469—471

Mortal sins and venial sins. Justification of this division under the presupposition of the old dogmatick. The still more favourable result for that division.—The flowing nature of the same. The true ground-basis of the distinction in the degree of the culpability attaching to individual sins, ... 471—475

Blasphemy of the Holy Ghost. Its relation to the development of sin in the individual. The inner nature of this sin. Examination of the opinion, that it consists in contemptuous indifference toward the good. Whether a perfect indifference is possible. The particular conditions of sin against the Holy Ghost. The inner motive of the same. 2 Thess. ii. 3. 4. The opinion, that only the regenerate can commit this sin. Truth and error of this view. Heb. vi. 3—6. 1 John v. 16—18. The subjective presupposition of sin against the Holy Ghost, ... 475—482

The unpardonableness of the blasphemy of the Holy Ghost. Its inner ground. The restoration of all things. Its relation to the fundamental determinations of the Christian Eschatology. The chief supports of this representation and their insufficiency. The great promises which lie hidden in the declaration of Christ with respect to the sin against the Holy Ghost. Endless damnation testified therein, . . 482—488

Conclusion, ... 489—490

TRANSITION TO THE THIRD BOOK.

THE task, which, the results, we have hitherto won, set to the continuation of our investigations cannot be a matter of doubt. The existence of evil, as a positive contrast against the good, can just as little be denied away from human life, as explained by a necessity grounded on the Divine plan of the world; which, in truth, is only another way of denying evil. Such a contrast then to the good exists, and indeed not merely for our consciousness, and therefore merely as an appearance which disappears upon the absolute stand-point, but also for God Himself, so certainly as He condemns evil in the conscience and in the judgment of the world, and is incessantly destroying it in all those who become recipients of the power of Redemption; and yet this contrast does not exist *by* Him, *just for the very reason* that God condemns evil and destroys its power. Therefore sin, as it is only in the creature, can only by the creature have its existence.

But the creature according to its notion is entirely dependent upon God, and whatever possesses reality by the same, necessarily appears, on that account, to have its ultimate ground in the will of God. Evil is such a reality, and we are by this thrown back again to the very point, from which we strove to keep ourselves as far removed as possible. If we are to succeed in breaking through this circle, it can, manifestly, only be done by our pointing out in the very nature of the creature, in which the evil exists, a principle of such independency, that the causality of the same is able to make a *new beginning*, and therewith to set a *boundary*, beyond which, the origin of sin is absolutely not to be sought for. The theories hitherto examined have failed to furnish such a principle for the explanation of sin; and for this reason, evil, according to them all, is not a wilful falling away of the creature from God, by which it sets itself at variance with the Divine plan of existence, but, in so far as they do not dualistically

conceive of the same, is, either the consequence, or the condition of certain moments of this plan itself. Thus they purchase their explanation of sin, with the destruction of its very idea.—

There is nothing easier than firmly to assert the appearance of contradiction between these two determinations, which indeed the dullest eye must see, and then directly to maintain, that such an independency absolutely contradicts the very idea of a creature. By the following investigations it will be shewn, that thereby not only the true significance of human personality becomes lost, but that a very poor honour is paid to the Omnipotence and Love of God. A more productive, it is true, but also incomparably more difficult, task, is the undertaking, in which we behold the modern speculative tendencies, which do not regard the absolute dialectic process as the highest, almost as a body co-operating, to point out such a principle, in the very nature of man, as shall explain and justify our consciousness of evil, without indeed losing the Personal Creator of the world. We will only remind the reader here of *Schelling's* deeply profound Treatise on Freedom *(Abhandlung von der Freiheit)*, *Steffens' Christian Philosophy of Religion (christliche Religionsphilosophie)*, *Baader's* writings, especially the *fermenta cognitionis* and the lectures on speculative Dogmatics. In different directions, *J. H. Fichte* in his Praemeditatorium of Theology *(Vorschule der Theologie)*, and in some articles in his Journal *(Abhandlungen in seiner Zeitschrift)*, *Weisse* and *Fischer* in their exhibitions of the idea of the Godhead *(Darstellungen der Idee der Gottheit)* and in other writings, *Sengler* in his Introduction to Speculative Philosophy and Theology *(Einleitung in die speculative Philosophie und Theologie)*, and *A. Gunther* in his original religio-philosophic labours, concur in the same endeavour.—

If there is such a principle in the nature of man as we have required, as the condition of the consciousness of guilt, and for the exclusion of sin from the Divine causality, it can only be *the will;* and the independency of causality which must be attributed to it, if it is to answer to that requirement, can, clearly, only be that which one is accustomed to denominate its *freedom.* Accordingly, if freedom is the highest Egoity *(Selbstsein)*, and sin, as we have seen from our investigations of the first Book, in its inmost root is selfishness, what can it then be other than

self-perverting Freedom? It is therefore *the Freedom of the human will*, its idea, internal possibility and connection with evil, to which we must now direct our inquiry.

From the position which *Schleiermacher's* theory of sin occupies in the course of our investigations, it is clear, that we cannot attribute to it any value for the solution of our task. According to him, freedom is the highest amount of the internal activity of temporal causality, only differing in degree from the vitality of natural existences; and, in relation to the arising of evil, its notion only insures this two-fold result, that we may neither regard sinful action as the product of an external influence, nor as the mere result of the nature common to man.[1] According to *Schleiermacher* human freedom has only significance in relation *to other finite causes;* in relation to *God* the dependence of free causes is just as unlimited, as those of the causes of nature.[2] In this conception of human freedom there is nothing in its notion either to keep the causation of evil far removed from God, or to explain to us the declarations of our consciousness of guilt. If it is to do this, there must be attributed to the independency of the human will, even *in relation to God*, some kind of reality.

Similarly to this does the matter stand in relation to the notion of freedom, which *Ritter* developes, in his work *on evil*, in opposition to this doctrine of sin. Freedom, according to p. 24, 25, is, according to its original signification, to be looked for in *deeds* or *conduct;* its notion refers only to the relation between subject and predicate in the expression of such tenets, which treat of actions and active things. The expression, that an act is free, fully attributes the same to the subject; it declares that the act we attribute to the subject, could not really and truly be attributed to any other thing, but simply to it.—These simple determinations appear to furnish all that we want, and indeed, at first, more than we want, namely, not merely a freedom, which affords a substantial, *fundamental basis* for *imputation*, but a freedom, which is at once *identical* with imputation. And yet this excess, when more exactly considered, is a deficiency. For when we are told: an action is free, in so far as it can be really and truly attributed to the subject, of which it is predicated,

[1] *Glaubenslehre*, § 81, 2 (vol. i., p. 491 seq.)
[2] L. c., § 49 (vol. i., p. 272 seq.)

we just want to know with what right this action may be thus attributed to it; what we wish to see is, the possibility, or much rather the necessity of this attribution in the full, earnest sense of the word, since it is clear, it has great difficulties in relation to an essentia (*Wesen*), dependent in its existence and given condition; our question, therefore, is directed to the freedom of the formal relation of the predicate to the subject, directly to the manner in which the predicate, the action, realiter proceeds from the subject. It is only such an investigation which can conduct us to a notion of freedom, in which we have a real *ground-basis*, a principle which shall explain the imputation in the conscience.

When *Ritter* then, on the contrary, in different ways, p. 29, 47, 52, 60, ever comes back again to the positioning of freedom in this relation of the predicate to the subject, there is therewith furnished us, in itself considered, no qualitative distinction of human freedom from the spontaneity presented to us in the sphere of nature, nothing which might not also be ascribed to the living existences of nature, in which indeed the idea of guilt is out of the question. That the tree bears blossoms and fruit, that the carnivorous beast lies in wait for its prey, and the herbivorous animal seeks the pasture—these all, are predicates, of which, on this stand-point it is not to be seen, why they are not to apply to their subjects, just as essentially, as to man, the actions which he does. On the contrary, it decidedly breaks through the sphere of these analogies, when *Ritter*, p. 51, denominates man the transcendental ground of his act. But if in the region which herewith presents itself to us, there should be contained the peculiar significance of freedom, by which it is able to ground the consciousness of guilt, and to exclude evil from the Divine causality; that denomination of man, as the transcendental ground of his action, would not so incidentally, and without any real relation to the idea of freedom, make its appearance. Moreover it is just opposed to *Ritter's* opinion, that, in the notion of human freedom there should be contained the possibility of anything at all proceeding from it, *which is excluded from the Divine causality*. For he troubles himself, in a singular endeavour, p. 48, seq., to show, that there is nothing contradictory in referring a given act, as predicated notion, equally to the subject of the human, and to that of the Divine will.

THIRD BOOK.

THE POSSIBILITY OF SIN.

FIRST DIVISION.

THE FREE WILL OF MAN.

FIRST CHAPTER.

FORMAL AND REAL FREEDOM.

Generally man only becomes conscious of an inward necessity, in those moments of his life in which the determining power of the same is an *external* one. Only when he meets with a limitation and finds himself hindered in some endeavour, to which he is not actively but sufferingly related, does he feel the power of necessity over his life. He is only conscious of necessity, in so far as it is *constraint.*

It needs, however, but a little observation of the phenomena of human life, everywhere to be seen, to be convinced, that besides this external necessity, limiting the sphere of human action, there is also an *inner* necessity, arising from the agent himself. The soul of man is not originally *tabula rasa*, as *Locke's* empiricism supposed it, but may more correctly with *Herbert von Cherbury* be termed a closed book; it contains in itself from the first, a fulness of determinations, and these are not the same in all, but are different and peculiar in the sexes,

races, nations, and individuals. It is an inward necessity, with which already in the plays of children the contrast of sex and the peculiarity of the individual are revealed. If the youth embraces a calling for life, he is to be regarded as happy, if he is led to the decision, not by reflections which compared it with other occupations and pursuits, but by the certainty of a higher instinct, by an undoubting consciousness of his peculiar destiny. The artist, the poet, vacillates not, chooses not, in the original conception of his creations, but feels himself borne onward and entirely pervaded by the still necessity of nature with which Genius works in him. The more perfectly he succeeds in his design, the less does it occur to him that he could have executed it otherwise. Such are the great and powerful personalities, who early, as if it must be so, devote themselves to a given object, and with undivided, unhesitating energy hold it fast for life. In civil communities those constitutions are the best, which have organically and unconsciously grown up out of the historic life-impulses of the people, or which owe their powerful, legislative existence to the inspiration of a great man, who was conscious of being just as much the organ of the Divine will, as the bearer and representative of the national spirit;[1] standing widely separate from these, are those constitutions, which a calculating reflection has prepared, weighing and balancing everything and choosing every individual determination out of many possibilities.

If there is everywhere, in the phenomena of human life, observable, a *necessity* of the kind just illustrated, which excludes all indifference and all vacillation of choice between opposed cases, it is clear, that this necessity must, notwithstanding, at the first blush of the matter, be regarded as *freedom;* for the act of choice proceeds out of the very nature of the subject. Directly and originally the real contrast of freedom, together with which it cannot consist at the sametime in the same subject with respect to the same object, is *dependence,* in so far as it is not imposed

[1] Not of a national *will* as is now-a-days required. That a people, apart from moments of an universal enthusiasm for a given idea, which are so seldom in history, has, even in an approximating sense, one will, especially when one adds, with respect to the questions of legislation, is a perfectly pure and empty fiction; but still a national spirit lives and is operative in it above and beyond its determination and consciousness.

and constantly affirmed by the subject of the same. But where in the act of choice here spoken of, is such a dependence to be discovered? It is not a power foreign to man, but his own inmost nature by which he in this case determines himself. Truly, this inmost nature, from which he acts and is operative, is already a determined one, and in the individual, indeed, differently determined; but in this determinateness just his own concrete self consists. If he should wish to withdraw from the same, he must think of himself, as this given individual, as not at all existing. In so far as the subject determines itself there is indisputably to be attributed to it a freedom of the will, the freedom, the notion of which is the power of the subject, to realize his own inmost nature in his act. Accordingly, man is not free, in so far as he is determined by a power foreign to himself. Freedom and necessity, inward necessity, are here one.

This is the notion of freedom which is found also in *Spinoza* —*ea res libera dicetur, quae ex sola suae naturae necessitate existit et a se sola ad agendum determinatur, Ethics*, P. I., *defin.* 7.[1] And at this point, not a few also in more modern time, remain standing, who adopt with zeal the notion of freedom, and regard themselves as far removed from the pantheism of the substance.

Let us now carry over the above determinations into the *moral* sphere. First of all, we shall here denominate such an action free, which unrestrainedly expresses the moral constitution of the subject, the determinate state of his moral being, whatever that may be. When any one, on the contrary, under the constraint of violent power, really exercised or only menaced, acts better

[1] This *res*, it is true, is the substance alone, God, as *natura naturans* considered, P. I., prop. XVII., coroll. 2, cf. prop. XXIX. schol. The will, on the contrary, be it conceived of as finite or infinite, cannot, according to *Spinoza*, be denominated free, but only a necessary or constrained cause, because in its existence and working it is determined by another cause, P. I., prop. XXXII. Comp. P. II., prop. XLVIII., P. V. praefat. Everywhere, according to *Spinoza's* mechanical opinion of the world, there is only determination from another to be met with, God excepted, namely in so far as He is considered not according to His modifications, as *natura naturata*, but as *natura naturans*. Therefore there belongs to the nature of God, according to him, will, just as little as knowledge, P. I., prop. XVII., schol. prop. XXXI., XXXII., coroll. 2.

or worse, than his dispositions and intentions are, he is in such an act not free. It is true, this non-freedom is never a total one; for a constrained act, strictly speaking, is a *contradictio in adjecto*, for just to the extent of the constraint there is only suffering, the very opposite of action; also the difference in the power of the psychological impression, which the means of violent constraint produce in the individual, is itself co-conditioned by the moral constitution of the same; however, from powerful influences brought to bear upon the sensational nature, the product, the given result, may nevertheless become retarded, a different one to that which the moral constitution of the agent would furnish, had it been able unrestrainedly to manifest itself.

But here the question further arises: Does then this factually given, moral, condition of man always stand in such a relation with *his true nature*, that an action, which the former unrestrainedly puts forth, can with confidence be regarded as corresponding to the latter? The very beginning of our investigations taught us, that sin, just as we meet with it as a co-determining element of human life, is *hindrance* and *disturbance* in relation to the true nature of man, and its actualization in its temporal development. We cannot therefore here remain standing by this or that determinate moral condition as if the self-revelation of the same were sufficient for this notion of freedom; the conduct of man, and, since in this the inward constitution, which has been once established, is accustomed directly to express itself, this very constitution must be adequate to his true moral being, if there is to be attributed to him a freedom of the will in this sense. Freedom, accordingly, consists in this, that the true inmost nature of man, as moral personality, reveals itself in his determination and conduct. But evil cannot belong to the true nature of man—otherwise he could not, through evil, come into variance and dissension with himself,—therefore also not an aequilibrium between good and evil, but only the good, love to God, agreement with His Holy Will. Man is not truly free, when his will is turned away from God, also not, when he finds himself equally drawn towards, attracted by, the evil, which is foreign to his true nature, as towards the good, and just as little is he free so long as his will remains relatively undetermined, empty as it were in a moral respect, but then is he, in the highest sense,

free, when he, with full decision, wills the good, and his conduct wears the impress of that inward necessity, which excludes every thought of even the possibility of the contrary.

Also general moral judgment, however firmly in other respects it is accustomed to maintain the freedom of choice, by no means declares man to be in the best, and most perfect, state, when he chooses between good and evil, when his soul is the scene of a doubtful struggle between good and evil. Much rather does the moral judgment in general, regard that, not merely as the happiest, but, as the most honourable and exalted condition, when all the torment of choosing has been brought to an end, in this sphere, by the good *having become a second nature* in man, and by his obeying everywhere, in his determinations and conduct, the voice of his conscience, not as if he did thereby anything especial, but as if it had become for him a matter of course so to act and determine. And when this condition has become so complete, that we no longer experience any imperative ought *(Sollen)* because our determination has so become its exact counterpart, that the sentences: that is allowed which pleases, that is allowed which is proper, have for us the same significance, who will venture to maintain, that then, our will has become unfree?— As to the way, in which freedom *in God* must be thought of, we cannot yet enter upon. But when, as assuredly we must, we ascribe the highest freedom to the blessed, whose redemption has also become subjectively perfect, this freedom can only be identical with holy necessity. We have already (vol. i. p. 112 seq.) seen that the true inmost nature of Christian virtue, and therewith the eternally enduring contained in it, is love. But where do we behold this identity, of freedom and necessity, more evidently than in love, while, where virtue predominates in the form of subordination to the command of duty, there, it is ever to be seen in the consciousness, together with the possibility of another, than the virtuous, course of conduct?—

With this conception of moral freedom, that made prevalent by *Jacobi*, which has found especial applause in the rationalistic theology, appears essentially to agree. According to this latter, freedom consists in the *independency of the will with respect to passion*, or as the same notion has been otherwise well expressed, in the ability of the will to determine itself according to rational

grounds independently of sensational impulses.[1] In fact both conceptions have a fundamental feature in common; freedom, according to both, is said to have nothing to do with evil, but only with good; evil can, if freedom is nothing else than what the one or the other of these notions teaches, only have its ground in an absence or limitation of freedom. However, notwithstanding this agreement, the distinction is not to be overlooked. If on the one hand, the adherents of the latter conception of freedom already imagine to separate it from fellowship with evil, by determining it as the independency of the will of the sensational impulses, we are no longer able to appropriate the same, after what we have already seen as to relation of sin to sense. But we perceive another distinction therein, namely, that the advocates of this conception of freedom are wont to ascribe this independence of the will with respect to the passions, to man, just as they find him, while we, according to what we have just developed, must consider man's independence of the determining power of such impulses, which contradict the ideal, inmost nature of the will, in respect to the present condition of humanity, as a task, as something which man has first of all to acquire.

And quite in this sense, the idea of freedom here developed is confirmed by the Holy Scripture. In those passages in the New Testament where the designations ἔλεύθερος, ἐλευθερία refer to the inner sphere of life, they do not express anything belonging to man in general, to man in his natural condition, but a possession in which he participates only by *virtue of appropriated Redemption.* The fundamental notion is, the self-dependence of the Christian life, developing itself from within outwards, the independence of the same of every power foreign to it, and its superiority to everything external, as such. But this inward state, which

[1] *Ueber die Lehre von Spinoza* 1789 (on the doctrine of *Spinoza*) p. XXXVII. XXXVIII. comp. *Von den göttlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung* 1811 (of Divine things and their revelation) p. 97. When *Jacobi* also expresses his notion of freedom thus: Dominion of the intellectual over the sensational, nature, it only becomes thereby clearer, as *Schelling* very justly maintained, that such a freedom may, not merely possibly, but very easily, and indeed more determinately, be derived from *Spinoza, Philosophische Schriften*, vol. i. p. 412.—That it sustains another relation to *Kant's* notion of freedom, which at first also appears to find a place here, already follows from our Appendix to the second chapter of the second Book.

makes man free from the binding authority of the external, is not an empty void, or a state of fulness of self-chosen, capricious contents—such an inward state might furnish, that abstract freedom, the unbridled caprice of subjectivity, just as it, by an interpretation corresponding to its own nature, has often made the Biblical doctrine of freedom advocate its theory,—but one consisting, by the efficiency of the Holy Spirit, in the fellowship of God, in being united and one with His Will. In so far as this freedom of the Christian, according to its negativing side, as independence, refers to the letter of a law, which comes to him from without, since he is conscious of possessing in his inward nature the productive principle of the fulfilling of all moral commands, it is *freedom from the law*, from the outward letter. Also this freedom is not to be arrived at by a mere γνῶσις, 1 Cor. viii. 1—4, 8—13, but only by an act of love, by resignation, to God, in which the Christian willingly makes himself serviceable to the salvation of the weaker brethren. To this freedom, of which no one, next to *Paul*, has spoken more powerfully and clearly than *Luther*, such declarations refer as are found in 1 Cor. x. 29; 2 Cor. iii. 17; Gal. ii. 4, v. 1, 13; 1 Pet. ii. 16. Here we have directly to do with Christian freedom only, in so far as in it the determining power of *sin* is removed. The notion of freedom is especially so conceived of in John viii. 32, 36, where the δοῦλος τῆς ἁμαρτίας is expressly put in contrast with the ἐλεύθερος, comp. Rom. viii. 2. This freedom, says Christ, he only has, to whom He communicates it. In like manner the Apostle James denotes the law fulfilled by Christ as νόμος ἐλευθερίας i. 25, ii. 12, for this reason, namely, because it makes him who obeys it free, releases him from the service of sin.[1] But this side of Christian freedom stands in the closest connection with the former; the two reciprocally condition each other. The Christian cannot be free from the exernal yoke of the law, if he is not free from the ruling power of sin. But he could not be free from the power of sin, if the law stood over him as a merely external authority. In germ, the redeemed possess this principle already in the midst of the warfare of the present

[1] Rom. vi. 18, xx. 22, does not so much belong here—ἐλεύθερος, ἐλευθεροῦν is used quite formell and indifferent, as much so with respect to righteousness as to sin.

life; in its completion it will first of all reveal itself, together with the perfect liberation of the body in its glorification, in the kingdom of heaven, Rom. viii. 21, 23. But since freedom from sin is essentially at the same time resignation to God, obedience to his will from an inward impulse, the New Testament often denotes this condition positively as δουλεία τοῦ θεοῦ, Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, τῆς δικαιοσύνης, and expressly places both designations, as equally justified, side by side, 1 Cor. vii. 22, (ἀπελεύθερος κυρίου—he, for whom the Lord has procured liberation from the slavery of sin—is the same, who from another point of view is δοῦλος Χριστοῦ), 1 Pet. ii. 16. Now in this freedom, an ability of choice is not thought of, but a condition of the firmest decision. The identity of the same with that inward necessity is testified in Scripture, especially by the doctrine, that the true principle of sanctification, received into the inner life, cannot but produce a corresponding action, Matt. vii. 17—20, xii. 33; 1 John iii. 9. Such an action is accordingly truly free and equally necessary at the same time.—

But however rich in contents, and deeply significant this notion of freedom may be, it is nevertheless evident, that, in itself considered, it furnishes nothing for our purpose, which is to find in man, the essential condition of the origin of evil, or more generally, in the personal creature in general, and indeed, a condition, a power, of such intensity and independency as, in its working, to be able, to make an absolutely new beginning, and thus, to separate the origin of evil from the Divine causality. In order to answer this requirement, there must, so it appears, be shown in the freedom of the will, perhaps an ability of the same to bring forth from itself, *as well evil as good.* But by the above notion the possibility of sin is excluded from freedom.

Those therefore, who will absolutely not hear of any other notion of freedom than of this *real* freedom,—whether in the form here sketched, or, according to the just above explained conception, as mere independence of the sensational impulses, appear not at all to have considered the great interests here treated of. To them there remains over, if indeed they might scarcely be inclined to throw themselves into the arms of dualism, nothing else than to tame down evil as much as possible, in order to be able to derive it from a necessity resting upon Divine order.

In this way, *e.g.* we see *Bretschneider* proceeds, who, in expressly rejecting the form of freedom of the will here required, places it strictly in this, that man determines himself according to the law, or the will of God,[1] or, as it is expressed in another passage, in the ability of man to determine his conduct from representations of the reason (in distinction from sensational impulses, comp. vol. 2, p. 19, seq.)[2] But whence then comes the evil? *Bretschneider* answers us, "as human reason is not so perfect as the Divine, the will of man cannot be in absolute agreement with the will of God. Man will therefore, according to the self-dependence (?) lent to him, act—sometimes agreeably to the will of God—but also sometimes, since still other impulses operate upon his will than the reason, contrary to the Divine will—and this is his unworthiness and guilt."[3] If there be any ground for the "therefore" in the preceding sentence, the ground of sin will be, accordingly, none other than this, that man is man and not God, wherewith the notion of guilt, however it may be retained in name, according to its real nature is destroyed.—In the section on the *Theodicee*, sin is more definitely derived from the *gradual development of man to freedom*; it is the "developing (*Werden*) of human development—the transition point to virtue—a passing, vanishing means to the end."[4] Also when the process of the development of freedom does not appear to succeed, it nevertheless remains on account of immortality, that "sin objectively referred to the development to freedom ordered by God, is not evil; for just as obedience it is a way to freedom, only that it conducts us to the end over thorns, while the path of obedience to the same is one of roses!"[5] If we look into the real back-ground of this method of representation,

[1] *Handbook of Dogmatics, (Handbuch der Dogmatik)* vol. i., p. 645 (ed. 3.)

[2] L. c. p. 407. Here this ability is expressly denominated a *one-sided* one.

[3] L. c. p. 412, 413.

[4] L. c. p. 639, 640. Comp. *die Grundlage des evangelischen Pietismus* (the ground-basis of evangelical piety) p. 424.

[5] L. c. p. 642. Thus also to this theologian sin is "the pains of travail, by which morality is born," L. c. p. 640, while, according to the Holy Scripture the pains, which precede the birth of true morality, are, on the contrary, those of the repentance of sin and of conflict against sin in the *μετάνοια*, but in the pains of travail of sin nothing else than *death* is born. James i. 15.

it does not in the least surprise us, to find that this thorny road ultimately conducts to *Spinoza*, and that on the way is discovered the knowledge, that sin "does not cleave to the act itself, but—is something merely relative," that "in the kingdom of objective reality every act is neither virtue nor sin, but links itself, as cause or effect, in the series of all results,"[1] only we do wonder to know, how one who has made this his conviction, is then, notwithstanding, able to take the field in the name of Theism and Morality, against pantheistic Philosophy.—

Now there is another view of the moral freedom of man, which is just as deeply rooted in our common consciousness, as its validity in science is the most extended, and which seems perfectly to satisfy the want which the former notion left unsatisfied. Here freedom is regarded as a power of choice, belonging to the original nature of man, *between good and evil*, or as one may otherwise more exactly define this notion; the essential is ever this, that the action which is said to be free could either have been omitted or exchanged with another of even an opposite character, and that the decision between these possibilities rested entirely in the acting agent. This notion of freedom has therefore its very nerve in the *exclusion of necessity*, not merely of external, but also of internal, necessity. It is not so perfectly absurd, as it has been maintained to be, with this fundamental grounding of this notion, to speak of a freedom either merely to evil or merely to good; for even in this there is ever left to the decision in the individual, the choice between different possibilities (as *libertas specificationis.*) However, without doubt, this notion of freedom has its most peculiar significance entirely in its relation to the contrast of good and evil; only in so far as it in any way makes clear to us the presence of the moral duality in human life, does science take a deeper interest in it.

From the Holy Scripture this view of freedom does not seem so capable of proof as the other. That by freedom it never means a power of deciding between good and evil, would not much

[1] L. c. p. 641. That besides *Bretschneider* does not at all allow himself to be hindered by the "all" from grounding, in other passages, *e.g.* vol. 2, p. 7, both imputation and guilt, upon freedom (or according to p. 21, upon the self-power of man, which is only another expression for formal freedom), was observed above (vol. i., p. 327, cf.)

signify; it might, without having the name, still furnish instruction respecting the thing itself, respecting the nature of this ability of choice, and how it conditions the origin of sin. But for any such express instruction we seek in vain. However, this may also be accounted for by the practical fundamental character of the Gospel, which everywhere finds man in the bondage of sin, and does not offer him a first choice between good and evil, but brings to him a redemption from the consequences of perverted decision already made. It everywhere constantly appeals to the consciousness of guilt in man as an undeniable fact of his inner life, and quietly leaves it to the further development of Christian thought to make clear to itself the *necessary presupposition of the consciousness of guilt.* Is now this presupposition no other than that freedom of the will, by means of which alone man can be the responsible author of his sin, then all those moments of Christian doctrine, which in the second subdivision of the first Book guaranteed to us the truth of the consciousness of guilt, form at the same time the bases for this idea of freedom; and in this sense we maintain with *Nitzsch*, that the Gospel is the strongest testimony of that original freedom in which man has been created by God.[1]

But if one desires a *direct* confirmation of this idea of freedom from the Holy Scripture, there is a decisive factual acknowledgment of its truth contained in the narration in the book of Genesis of the Fall. Not merely the preceding prohibition and the subsequent punishment, but also the process itself, the reaction against the temptation to transgression in the lively consciousness of the prohibition and of the resolve to, and commission of the, sin notwithstanding this reaction—this all presents man to us as one who has the power to decide between good and evil. But, moreover, in the present condition of the human race, this freedom of decision, the Holy Scripture, which in its announcement of a redemption teaches us to consider the bondage of the will through sin as a relative one, variously acknowledges as being still in some way present. It does this in the sphere of its *legislation* not only by the books of the law containing commands and

[1] *System der christlichen Lehre* (System of Christian Doctrine), p. 194 (4th ed.)

prohibitions, together with promises for the obedient and threatenings for the disobedient, but also by their express testimony, that the decision between obedience and disobedience, between life and death, is placed in the choice of man, Deut. xxx. 15, 16. But in the sphere of *redemption*, in the Gospel, a willing and seeking on the part of man, be it nothing more, in its inmost ground, than a voluntary self-yielding to the drawing of the Father to the Son, a non-resistance of the Divine grace, John vi. 44, Rom. ix. 16, is manifoldly denoted as the condition of its efficacy, *e.g.* Matt. vii. 7, xi. 12; Luke xi. 1—13; Heb. iii. 8, and the resultlessness to the offers of Divine mercy is ascribed to the unwillingness of man, Matt. xxiii. 37; John v. 40; Acts vii. 51.— And lastly, it may not be superfluous to mention, in view of a mechanical determinism, that the Holy Scripture variously acknowledges the freedom of choice in the external sphere of life; for our interest we need not detain ourselves with the proof.—

But by the determinations here obtained we become complicated in great difficulties. These two ideas of freedom seem, according to their nature, mutually to cancel each other; so that, so far as the first freedom, which, as the unity of the will with its true contents, we may call *real* freedom, belongs to man, the second or *formal* freedom must be denied to him, and *vice versa*. And yet we feel ourselves obliged firmly to retain both of them and in an equal manner, the one, because in it we first find the expression for the true self-dependence of our spirit for its independence of every power foreign to it, the other, because the consciousness of guilt and faith in the Holiness of God require it. Without the first we cannot conceive of the *completion* of the human life in Christ and in ourselves; with the loss of the second, we cannot explain the *present form* of our life. If now *e.g. Herbart* determines to have freedom only in good company,[1] it may be quite consistent upon the stand-point of determinism, so far as he is at the trouble in his own way of appropriating this notion, but we should be immediately obliged to declare our problem insolvable, if freedom did not also own its acquaintance with bad company.

1 *Zur Lehre von der Freiheit des menschlichen Willens*, p. 41, 42.

Therefore we generally see both of the conceptions made valid in the deeper and more vital discussions of the doctrine of freedom, often, too, without their contradiction being resolved, and in some without its being attempted.[1] Even *Schelling's* treatise on freedom, which first of all lays down the ability of good and of evil as the real, vital notion of freedom, but further on explains the true idea of freedom as being identical with holy necessity, leaves the contradiction herein contained and expressed unresolved.

The question which now arises is this, How are these two definitions or determinations of freedom to be reconciled with each other?—

It is indisputable, that the notion of formal freedom has been often so conceived of, as to render impossible every mediation of the same with the notion of real freedom. One has sometimes laid down the freedom of the will as consisting in its being absolutely groundless, in the individual acts of the same as standing in no essential relation to any existing objectivity independent of them, that in every act of the will there is an absolutely new beginning from itself, which is only to be explained and understood by remembering, that the determining subject wills, to reveal the

[1] This remark applies, in modern time, *e.g.* to *Kant* in his "*Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft,*" compared with his "*Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten,*" and with his "*Kritik der praktischen Vernunft,*" to *Daub* in his "*Darstellung und Beurtheilung der Hypothesen in Betreff der Willensfreiheit;*" on the other hand points of mediation are to be found in *Baader, e.g.* in isolated hints in different places of his *fermenta cognitionis,* more definitely in his "*Vorlesungen über speculative Dogmatik,*"—in *J. H. Fichte* in his "*Sätzen zur Vorschule der Theologie,*"—in *Fischer,* in his work, *Die Freiheit des menschlichen Willens im Fortschritt ihrer Momente dargestellt* (1833), in his *Metaphysik,* and especially in his *Untersuchung über den speculativen Begriff der Freiheit,—Fichtes Zeitschrift für Philosophie und speculative Theologie,* vol. 3, part 1,—in *Passavant,* in his work, *Von der Freiheit des Willens und dem Entwickelungsgesetze des Menschen* (1835),—in *Weisse,* in his dissertation on *The three ground-questions of the philosophy of the present day—Fichtische Zeitschrift,* vol. 1, part 2,—in *Göschel,* in his treatise, *Erstes und Letztes—Bauersche Zeitschrift für speculative Theologie,* vol. 1, part 1.—in *Billroth,* in his posthumous lectures on the *Philosophy of Religion* (1837.) It will be seen that the opinion about to be developed in this and the following chapter comes most in contact of agreement with the treatment of the idea of freedom by *Baader, Fichte,* and *Fischer.*

unrestrained mobility *(Beweglichkeit)* of its will, and to become conscious of it. For in this it experiences its highest self-enjoyment; man's will is his heaven. Free essential being *(Wesen)*, as such, has absolutely no contents which announces itself to the consciousness, as being in and for itself good and necessary; everything is in itself indifferent and void of determination to the free will; what out of this indifferent mass is to be to it of value, and of how much, it has itself first of all to determine. The will does not determine to choose anything, because it is good, but it is first of all good by its making choice of it. It appoints itself given ends in order to exercise in single, isolated acts its infinite ability; but these ends have only significance and importance in that it appoints them. Even this free determination, as the activity of the power of limitless self-determination, is to itself absolute purpose or end.

It is not to be denied that this is the definite meaning of Bishop King in the remarkable work already quoted, *de origine mali*.[1] The principal of the sentences above laid down are to be found in this work, in the same or similar words; for example, the following is an oft-repeated fundamental thought in *King: non eliguntur res, quia placent, sed placent, quia eliguntur.*

But henceforth all objective moral truth appears to be lost in the abyss of an arbitrariness void of intelligence; for the free will employs this, its ability, just as much in the choice of that which we denominate evil, as in the choice of what we call good; and the satisfaction of the subject, to which, in this eudaimonistic

[1] Also in modern literature we may, from time to time, observe this notion of indifferent freedom lifting its head again. Thus *Bockshammer's* doctrine of freedom takes, in individual points this direction, still without firmly retaining it, or carrying it out. The freedom, which contains the possibility of evil, is said to be the highest good of man; the independent (self-dependent quite formally understood) development of moral natures is said to be the highest end to which creation strives, comp. his work: *Die Freiheit des menschlichen Willens*, p. 111, 137, 139,—an opinion which *Augustine* controverts at length in his antipelagian writings, especially in the *opus imperf. c. Jul.*, in a more connected manner in *Enchiridion*, § 105. With this representation of freedom there stands in close connection in this work the singularly strange maintenance, that, if the possibility of relative badness (of moral evil!) should be avoided, man would necessarily become something absolutely bad, a machine destitute of all morality.

theory, everything is ultimately reduced, appears in both self-decisions necessarily to be the same.

The peculiar manner in which *King* seeks to avoid these consequences, without giving up his principle of the absolute value of an exclusively self-determining freedom, absolutely indifferent towards the objects of its choice, is, as forerunner in a certain respect of the *Kantian* grounding of the moral law, worthy of observation. *King* acknowledges that only God can possess this indifferent freedom in an unlimited manner, and even God,—he further on limits inconsequently truly, but necessarily,—only in *prima electione*, in case of their being any reason in the world, since the subsequent decisions of the will are determined by their necessary connection with the first. Within certain limits, however, God vouchsafes this freedom to man, in order that he may have something *in quo sibi placeat* as indemnification for the constraints which things otherwise exert upon his spiritual and physical ability. As now the freedom of the will shows itself the most gloriously, and furnishes to man the highest self-enjoyment, when, running counter to all other impulses, it reveals itself as the alone and absolutely determining power, there must be *laws* which form a contrast to the impulse of nature.[1]

The contradiction in which *King* involves himself is clear enough. For if the will is to be only so far free, as there is, apart from it, no estimate of the things among which it chooses, the *moral law* must, as being in itself good and regulating the will, so far as the consciousness of the same extends, destroy the freedom of the will, just as much as if distinctions as to value existed among the objects of *desire*, before its decision and choice. At all events, the consistency of the principle allowed, the manifold variety of the possible objects for the choice of the creaturely freedom of the will, to be limited; but unconditionally required, that, so far as this choice extended, everything to be to it equally indifferent. Setting out from this notion of indifferent freedom,

[1] *De origine mali*, cap. V. sect. 1,—especially p. 145 seq. of the Bremin ed. of 1704. A lengthened critick of *King's* doctrine of freedom is to be found in one of the appendixes to the *Theodicee;* comp. also *Sigwart*, The Problem of the Freedom and Unfreedom of the Human Will, *Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie*, 1839, No. 3, p. 43 seq.

one can, as *Bauer* very justly observes,[1] only place the absolute measuring rod of good in the creature subject. It is now self-evident, that from a freedom so formally conceived, there can be no transition to that freedom which we have denominated the real.

The error, in this indifferent notion of human freedom, lies first of all in the confounding of the *objective* and *subjective* significance, of the distinctive value among the possible objects of our determination. The human will can of course make, in its own estimate, the lowest and worst, the highest and best, if it only chooses to reject the noble and the good, to become absorbed in the worthless, and to nourish passions which seek the lusts of the moment, nay which often, as if by enchantment, throw the subject of the same into the enslaving arms of that which can afford no gratification even to lust. In this way it has, assuredly, the power, by its own perversion, gradually to suppress in the consciousness even the suspicion of the truth. But in this very acknowledgment of a *self-perversion* of the will, there is contained the admission, that before the decision of our will there exists not merely indifferentism and indeterminism, but an objective law of valuation and arrangement of things, to which the will *ought* to attach itself, which it *ought* to appropriate to itself.[2] If the free

[1] *Der Gegenstatz des Katholicismus und Protestantismus*, p. 128, (Ed. 2d).—Among the schoolmen, *Duns Scotus* and his school placed the nature, of both creaturely and Divine freedom, in the perfect groundlessness of action, comp. his commentary to the *Sentencs*, lib. ii. dist. 25, qu. i., and vol. i. p. 95 seq. of this work; and, as a whole, there is great similarity between the theory of this Anglican Bishop with that of *Scotus*, but more especially in this notion of the Divine freedom. To that principle of *King's:* res placent quia electae sunt, the sentence of *Scotus* corresponds: omne aliud a Deo ideo est bonum quia a Deo dilectum, et non e contrario. In both, there is together with the Divine will the Divine understanding, which presents to it an infinite number of objects, but without in the smallest degree determining it thereby in its choice, just because all those objects before they are chosen are equally indifferent.—After this, the indifferent notion of human freedom was defended by *Molina* and his adherents in opposition to the rigid *Augustinian* method of thought, and then bears also here, in the Jesuitic Morals, its natural fruit, namely, the dialectic desire, which seeks its pleasure in disturbing as much as possible the objectivity of the moral law, and in making it a matter of subjective caprice.

[2] *Bauer*, from an entirely different theory of the will, falls into the

will occasionally asserts itself in a groundless, capricious arbitrariness as possessing the privilege of being chimérique, as *Leibnitz* aptly expresses this conception of the same,[1] it is still not to be imagined that it is contained in its notion.

Another form of this notion of freedom, namely the *equilibrious*, maintains the solicitation of the will before its decision, from motives of which, on the one hand, some are directed to the good, and some, on the other hand, to the evil, and which have therefore already their distinctive value in themselves; but according to this notion, wherever there is an act of free determination of will, those opposite motives counter-poise each other, just as equal weights in the opposite scales of a balance, in order that the will may, as it were, turn the scale purely of itself. Now, as far as this opinion regards freedom, thus formally conceived of, as the inalienable possession and peculiar dignity of man, it manifestly becomes the function of his will perpetually to hold itself in suspension between good and evil, or indeed, from every deviating act of decision, immediately to return back into that *aequilibrium*. But according to this form also of the formal notion of freedom, it is impossible to mediate its reconciliation with that real freedom.

Moreover, we need not here enter into detail to show, that if man possessed such a freedom he could only seldom exercise it, and that even such exercise of the same, would be entirely conditioned by the favour of circumstances, and therefore must be regarded as *unfree*. If its notion is not to run off into that first purely indifferent freedom, it could manifestly only then find an opportunity for its expression, when different motives excited the will, in the same moment, to contradictorily opposed actions, and that too, with quite equal power, so that they mutually destroyed each other's influence.

same error as *King*, when he l. c. assumes, that every opinion, which finds the last ground of the decision of the will for good or evil in the free determination of man, must lead to this indifferent notion of freedom, and therewith further to a merely subjective estimate and norm of good. What he says in justification of this in his reply to *A. Günther's* sagacious controverting remarks, l. c. p. 177—180, does not at all improve the matter.

[1] *Theodicee*, part 1, § 48. The passage is especially directed against *Molina's* notion of freedom.

But to this that abstract method of representation is necessarily driven, which conceives of the will, which indeed is only real in union with the consciousness, as separate from all elements of representation and sensibility, from all motives and impulses and the like, and, nevertheless, as far as any one class of motives prevails either on the one side or the other, binds it in its decision to such prevalence or predominance. And how indeed are we to regard in a freedom, to which it is essential, consciously to hold itself in the very middle between holy and unholy impulses, by virtue of which, man is said to preserve himself just as independently from the service of God as from the slavery of sin—how, we ask, are we to regard such a freedom, as the highest dignity of man, nay, more, as the very signature of his relation to God? If man is possessed of a power, one side of which is the ability to maintain a negative procedure against the commanding will of God, it cannot, thus considered in itself, but only on account of its connection with some other, belong to the exalted position of man, which places him infinitely above all creatures of which experience makes us acquainted.

In seeking better to determine the notion of this formal freedom we may very properly set out from the general use of language. This considers man to be free in so far as he *can, what he wills.* His will therefore is free, who is not hindered in its actualization, and which is able to execute itself, whatever its contents may be. The will, first of all, eagerly seeks its freedom in the sphere of the *external;* it wishes over against this to be perfectly independent, it would like things, as persons, everywhere to obey him. But quite apart from an examination of this desire, in a strictly moral point of view, experience, and reflection soon teach him, who is susceptible of the instruction, that there is another sphere, lying much nearer to him, in which to make good the freedom of his will, namely that of *his own inward.* He cannot conceal it from himself that the power of his will, in relation to outward things generally, is one that is very limited, and that, the degree of his success, within certain limits, in making the circumstances and relations of the external world correspond to his will, or his will independent of them, is very especially conditioned by the

measure of the full reality which his will is able to give itself in that inner-world. It becomes therefore all-important to appropriate the powers and activities of this inner-sphere to the will as completely as possible, that in its self-determination, whether it be a decision having respect to an individual act, or an abiding tendency of the will, all elements of the spiritual and psysical life may readily and easily concentrate themselves. In this respect *the* will is denominated free which so far possesses this power over its own inward, that no hindering influence from the same causes itself to be experienced by the determining subject.

In this view, the *strength* or power of the will is its *freedom*. Outwardly then this freedom reveals itself as the unrestrainedness of the will by external things and relations, as the power of the same to change with the objects, by virtue of which its becoming determined by the objects is only the reflex of its self-determination, by which it has placed its interests in them. By this it is clear, that this freedom is capable of development and extension. Nevertheless it has still no positive moral significance; the strength of the will, the ground basis of that which we are accustomed to denominate character, may just as well be found in the most perverted tendency as in the upright and true. Indeed it is often a testimony of the power of something good in man, when a will, a resolve, comes into collision with internal hindrances, which will not allow of its execution; although, it is true, in such a case, more closely considered, the will is one which is at variance with itself, one divided into different tendencies.

That which man really loves and seeks in this freedom, is manifestly the *highest possible degree of self-being*. The more the determining power of his will is hindered from realizing itself by a power, which seems to him as foreign, so much the less does he feel his self-hood, without which, he could not be personal being; the more his will is outwardly and inwardly determining, so much the more does he become vitally conscious of his own being and of being himself. But if he more closely considers this his self-being, he must soon be convinced, that the decision of the question, whether such an one applies to him, lies deeper than this. Hitherto, in the question as to the freedom of the will, the will was considered as such an one which has embraced some given direction of activity, as one which is inwardly

determined; here the further question arises whether man in this determination of the will is himself, truly he himself, *i.e.*, whether it is the necessary consequence, of the presence of anything without his co-operation, of something which is for him a given thing independently of him, or whether he was in any way able to avoid making it. Only in this second instance, can he, in full earnest, regard himself as author of his decisions and actions, while in the first instance, he must look upon himself as the mere transition point and organ of the cause, which appoints that by which his determination is necessarily determined. Herewith the question has respect to its very inmost centre, in which the contrast between formal and real freedom first of all obtains its significance; on the contrary the freedom of the will, which consists in the power of the same to realize its determination, so to speak, as one already presupposed, appears, although this realization may be only referred to the inner sphere of life, as one relatively external, and from which we must especially hold ourselves removed in the progress of our investigation. It is freedom in the origination, not in the execution, of the act of the will, with which we have immediately to do.

Will is, as we have already—in the first chapter of the first Book—seen, *conscious self-determination*, the self-determination of an Ego. There is no real self-determination where the self-consciousness still slumbers, just as there is no actual self-consciousness without activity of the will. Both, self-consciousness and self-determination, make their appearance together, as if by a charm of magic. Nevertheless, when modern Philosophers, *e.g. Weisse* in his work: *Idea of the Godhead (Idee der Gotheit)*, and elsewhere, ascribe to the unconscious child, nay even to the embryo in the womb, a determination and working by the will, they are certainly perfectly justified in considering that the soul, even in its consciousless existence, is possessed of an active and producing efficiency, and indeed efficient according to the peculiarity given to it as a certain individual (namely an efficiency formative of its body.) But this is not a *determination* of will, but only a blind waving impulse, a plastic nature-power of the soul, which in its silent work is, as immediately, as every other power of nature, subordinated to the law of nature.

Is now the freedom, which makes man the responsible author

of his actions, already contained in the self-determining power of the will? We cannot deny a certain *self-determination* to natural existences in so far as they possess organic life. The plant developes itself from within, and has the positive ground of its individual expressions of life, *e.g.* the sprouting forth of the germ and the unfolding of the leaves and blossoms, not from without, but within itself; in so far they are therefore determinations which it gives to itself. Nevertheless this development is entirely bound to an immutable necessity of nature; its self-determination completely regresses into, determination from some other than self, a being determined. There is only real self-determination in the sphere of the spirit, because there is only in the sphere of the spirit a real self. But this self may be thought of as determinate essential being, essence; indeed we are not otherwise to think of it, in every given point of essential existence, than as so determined, and if then further, its self-determination is only to be represented, as just the necessary activity and consequence of this determinate essence of being, there is nothing of real freedom to be found in its self-determination. There may also very well be maintained with the same a constant development of self-hood, the changing alternation of self inseparable therefrom. It must be admitted that the moments external to the subject, which are different and changeable, excite and urge to ever new self-determinations, and the further determinations of self arising from the same, might be the common product of those external moments, and of the self-determination, in which the given determinateness of self at each point manifested itself.—Or is the *consciousness* to be that moment in the notion of the will, which elevates the self-determination to freedom? But on this account the question just becomes, whether the consciousness of the self-determination, as self-determination, *so far as it remains standing in the same*, mere self-determination, is not a mere self-delusion. But if in the consciousness of self-determination there were also the knowledge of being determined, how would it be able to transform the necessity into freedom? Much rather the consciousness of this necessity, unless, perhaps, it, at the sametime, carries in its bosom the promise of its removal, will only double its constraining power, since it gives over to its dominion a new sphere of human existence, namely that of self-consciousness.—Conscious self-deter-

mination is nothing more than an empirical psysiological fact; freedom is a notion of an essentially transcendent significance.

From this it follows that it is by no means a mere abstraction, but expresses a real distinction, when we regard *freedom* not as something which is necessarily involved in the idea of will, but as something which the will can be destitute of without its ceasing, in the respect in which it is thus deficient, to be *will*. It is easy to understand, that theories of freedom, which, in defending this notion, resolve it into a speculative determinism, should stand upon the identity of the notions: will and freedom; the deciding moment, by which the notion of freedom transcends the mere form of volition generally, has no significance for their system of logical necessity. But Scripture, Church, and experience speak of a *servile*, enslaved will, *servum arbitrium*. The will which cannot, by its own power, again withdraw itself from the ruling power of sin, or resist temptation, is, in a moral respect, not only destitute of real—which is self-evident—but also of formal, freedom. If there is in such a man still a volition which resists that ruling power of sin, even only a *velleitas*, a volition, which cannot carry itself into execution, as in the state described in Rom. vii. 14—24, he will feel the want of freedom as a heavy burden, as the sick man feels his pain so long as his constitution reacts against the power of disease. But has that resisting volition vanished, and the will wholly given itself up to the power of selfishness, then the slavery of sin is no longer felt by such an one, but is still, notwithstanding the consent of his will to it, only so much the more completely present. The *voluntarium* remains, the *liberum* is lost.[1] It is a hazardous but perfectly justifiable expression, when *Augustine* speaks of a *servum propriae voluntatis arbitrium*.

That which strictly constitutes the notion of formal freedom, can only be the *ability of also otherwise determining (Auchanderskönnen.)*

[1] Thus, the theory which *Vatke* in his often quoted work on human freedom, developes according to *Hegel*, especially according to §§ 4—28, *der Rechtsphilosphie* (of the philosophy of right.) As here in the determinism of the absolute process, so is it also in the determinism of *Schleiermacher* with respect to absolute causality, only just the denial of freedom from which arises the maintenance that an unfree will is not at all conceivable, comp. his treatise on the doctrine of election (*Abhandlung über die Erwählungslehre*) p. 83.

If it ultimately is in the power of the will to determine itself otherwise than it does determine itself, the willing subject is free and entirely himself in his volition; his self-determination is in no way resolved into a mere being determined *(Bestimmtwerden.)*

In this sense the older metaphysics attributes to the freedom of an action its *contingency*, since they understood nothing else thereby, than that it must be possible for the subject to act otherwise. And it was quite right in holding fast to this determination, in so far as it is allowable to seek formal freedom in the individual action; on the other hand of course, those, who placed freedom only in the development from itself of the individual essence, and its efficiency from within outwards, and who accordingly find it everywhere, where an individual being is not merely determined by another, but in return also determines, resolve to know nothing of contingency in freedom. To them, the negation of compulsion, constraint, of the determining power from without, is sufficient for their notion of freedom; the negation of the inner necessity they think not at all requisite.—Then in the German language that metaphysics was accustomed to express contingency by *casus, accidens (Zufälligkeit.)* In this we have an ambiguity of our use of language, which in the very treatment of the notion of freedom has not seldom led to misunderstandings and false consequences. Not merely, in ordinary life, but also in the philosophical use of language, is an event denoted accidental, which stands out of and apart from all rational connection. It is the reckless breaking in of an irrational and groundless element, upon the course of our life ordered according to a given and determinate purpose. No one is able to keep himself entirely removed from this element; if it asserts itself only in the trivial insignificant concurrence of circumstances not calculated upon, one is not accustomed to regard it; but if it makes itself widely prevalent, and exercises a powerful influence on human affairs, it makes of course upon him, who regards it as the highest task of man to hold perfectly under his own control every condition of his development, a gloomy and sad impression, as if it wished to make all intelligent arrangement of our conduct indifferent, and to hide our way in impenetrable gloom. But indeed that groundlessness of the accident cannot possibly so be conceived of, as if there were at all wanting in the accidental occurrence, a

producing cause. For then the accident or chance were a perfectly absurd idea, and could only perhaps denote the subjective ignorance of the cause. The deficient cause in the accidental, is not the efficient, but the *final, cause;* the accident is a teleological, namely, a negatively teleological notion; the connection which it negatives, is that with our intentions and plans, in so far as it can be an object of our calculation. From this it self-evidently follows, that the notion is only a relative one; that which for us is an accidental occurrence may be, for an Intelligence governing far above the whole, subservient to a determinate end.—May we now venture to apply this notion of the accidental to human conduct, in as far as it is free, and as such contains the possibility of another course than the one determined on? In this way of course those proceed who very much wish to make the freedom of the will of bad repute, for who would be proud of an ability which could only reveal itself in plan and purposeless activities? But there is nothing whatever contained in the idea of formal freedom which could justify such a procedure, the existence of different possibilities does not prevent the will in giving reality to the one and not to the other, from pursuing a determinate purpose; much rather without such a purpose no free volition whatever of positively or negatively moral significance can be thought of. We shall have therefore to distinguish, just as the *contingens* from the *fortuitum* (the ἐνδεχόμενον from the συμβεβηκὸς of *Aristotle*), so also the *ability of otherwise acting* from the *accidental.* To formal freedom of the will contingency essentially belongs, but in no sense accidentality.—

If now the moral law,-the will of God to man, can only by a free obedience become realized by him, there must be involved in the same, as the inseparable reverse side of this freedom, the possibility of disobedience. This ability of otherwise acting determines itself, in relation to the unconditional norm of the will, as *possibility of evil.* But in the very existence, for the will, of such an unconditional norm, freedom is shown exclusively to exist in union with the same; the possibility of disunion with it, in the realization of which man equally disunites himself from God and from himself, attaches to this freedom, because only in this way is the union, as being essentially free, possible; but this possibility is only there in order that its realization be constantly

excluded by the self-decision of man, and thereby become superseded and removed even as possibility. The personal creature must make its beginning from the relatively indeterminate, in order to make an end of the indeterminate, by self-determination and self-decision. The will were not what by virtue of its formal freedom it ought to be, namely, the power to determine itself from itself, if it were not able to set itself as determinate, so that from this determinateness, conceived of in its completion, the moral character of the individual acts of the will followed with infallible necessity. The starting point is therefore a freedom which is not yet inward necessity, but the possibility of another, of acting differently, the goal is *the freedom which is identical with necessity.*—

This discussion furnishes us with a preliminary insight into the intimately close connection of both notions of freedom—but only a preliminary one; its deeper ground and consummation we can only then discover, when the inmost nature of creaturely personality and its relation to God shall become the subject of our investigation. Real freedom, the entire decision of man for the good, which excludes every possibility of evil, were not at all conceivable and especially as freedom, as the highest self-being of man, not at all to be understood, if it did not proceed out of the formal freedom; the one is the essential presupposition and condition of the other. But formal freedom has, in the moral sphere, no other destination than to pass over into real freedom. The former, is only means to the latter, as end. But if the relation is what we have described it to be, it is altogether incongruous to speak of two notions of freedom, for both are only moments of one and the same notion, and indeed the first, such as is destined to pass over into the realization of freedom. When the free will has perfectly filled itself with its true contents, the ability of otherwise determining still, in a metaphysical respect, retains its significance, but in relation to the moral contrast it is entirely destroyed.

In the above definition of formal freedom, we have made use of the notion of *possibility*, and in the sense in which it is now often set aside, as an entirely abstract conception, namely, with

the decided separation, of the sphere of the merely possible from that of the necessary and real. As presupposition of free self-determinations, we regarded possibilities, which might be just as well, not realized, as realized. But it may easily be seen, that for our doctrine of freedom the notion of a posssibility, which is still indifferently related to real being *(Wirklichsein)*, is of the utmost significance.[1] If the possibility be conceived of as the germ of a given, determinate reality, as a potency ever engaged in the transition from potentiality to reality, it is nothing else than a *concealed necessity*. If the requisite conditions are completely given—for an event never proceeds from an individual condition, but always from many—the reality must come forth from its possibility, from its potential condition, and under the relations here presented, there can absolutely nothing else follow than this determinate reality. But if the possibility be already the beginning of the reality, therefore standing with it in concrete unity, we have here the investment of the well known logical definition, that necessity is just the unity of possibility and reality. —But the pure possibility, consisting in itself, as a transcendent sphere resting over each developing reality, consequently as a sphere whose contents of capable being cannot contain the positive ground of this determinate reality, is the inseparable presupposition of the freedom of the will. It is only free, able to decide itself, in there being, besides the determinations, which it really gives itself, others which are possible for it. This is not the mere logical possibility of contradictorilessness in thought, and also not that possibility, which continually produces from itself the reality, but a possibility, for the realization of which there is given the perfectly sufficient condition—*namely, the will*, but a condition, which has it quite as much in its power just to leave this possibility in its possibleness as to give to it reality. We readily grant that such a possibility, purely separated, and distinct from the reality, but nevertheless real possibility, cannot at all be transferred to other spheres; for so strictly does it attach to the free will,

[1] It is a productive distinction which *Trendelenburg* makes between the possible, which arises from the operative, working cause, and the possible, which determines the end, "*Logical investigations*" (*Logische Untersuchungen*) vol. ii., p. 108. We have here only to do with the possibility of the first kind.

that the free will is never found without it, and it is never found apart from the free will, therefore apart from the spirit, for which alone it has significance, since every activity of the spirit is essentially brought about by the will. The *act* makes the transition from this possibility into the reality; this is the only transition, another does not exist.—If this possibility of *non-ens (Nichtsein)* or *heterens (Anderssein)* is nevertheless also to be predicated of lower grades of existences, where one cannot speak of freedom, still it can only occur in *relation to freedom*, namely, in relation to that in which they have the ground of their existence, in relation to the creative freedom of God.

If now we may understand by *ability (Vermögen)*, to which the common derivation of the terms indicates, the *possibility (Möglichkeit)* placed in a subject, more exactly: the pure, *i.e.* unmixed with necessity, possibility of a determined occurrence or event, or of a determined kind of event, thought of as attribute of a subject, this denomination applies in the strictest sense to the freedom of the will. But from this determination of the notion it also self-evidently follows, that we may not ascribe to the ability an impulse to realize everything contained in it, and of course still less to the subject of the ability, the function or task of setting the same in activity according to all the directions present in it, in the form of the possible. From this ability we must well distinguish the *innate endowment or determination (Anlage)*. This latter bears in itself the positive tendency to certain determined activities, and already possesses the impulse to set them in movement towards their consummation; and if the development of the innate predisposition into these corresponding activities does not always take place, the possibility of this, apart from external hindrances, is just because the innate predispositions of the spirit are subordinated to the ability of the freedom of the will, in this negative manner at least, that it is able to prevent the development of the same.

At this point of our investigation, we may answer a question, which at present is perplexing to many, by too narrow a conception of the notion under consideration. The question is this, whether there belongs to the nature of this formal freedom the *act of choice*.

We must here, in treating of the requisites for the constituting

of formal freedom, distinguish between three moments.[1] The first is the *objective presence* of a plurality of possibilities for the self-determining will. The second is that of the *consciousness* of these different possibilities, either before or in the act of decision. Still more than this mere consciousness of different possibilities, the third contains an actuating influence of these possibilities upon the will, namely the *vacillation* and *doubt* between opposite determinations, which often precede the good or evil decision. We have already seen that there can be no freedom without the first of these. But we are now to consider the third, in which the mere mental representation of the one and of another possibility enhances itself to an inclination towards the same, and thereby brings the mind into disunion with itself, as an integrant moment of formal freedom? By what could we be justified in so doing? An undecided vacillation, a hither-and-thither attraction of the mind is indeed no doing, no act of the will, but an unfree condition of being determined, which man has to put an end to, therefore to negative, by a free act of the will. The free self-determination is just the negation of this undecided condition. Or are we to say, that this undecided vacillation between opposite impulses even as that, which is to be put an end to by the decision, belongs to the freedom of the will? What sort of a freedom would that be, which, in each of its activities, were essentially bound to a preceding divided dependence upon the objects of the same! If we refer the question directly to the moral sphere, freedom would, if there belong to its notion such a vacillation between good and evil, prior to the self-determination, according to its very nature, have in it an element of evil, and therewith, in so far as it were set by the will of God, make Him the author of evil; for this vacillation of the will clearly evidences some sort of inclination of the will to evil.—The mechanical representations derived from the balance, of which, in more ancient time, the Pelagian *Julian*, in more modern time, *Wolf*, gladly availed themselves, in order thereby to make definite and clear the nature of this formal freedom, and to which, *Baur* in

[1] For a fourth—which in this series would be the first,—in so far as it appears to some to be sufficient for freedom, if the determining subject only had the inward conception, although illusive, of other possibilities, we need not as a mere illusive idea take into our consideration.

controverting this doctrine of freedom, has wished to bind the same,[1] are most entirely to be banished from the whole of this consideration. Analogies drawn from the sphere of mechanism, are least of all able sensationally to represent, in any congruous manner, the elements and relations belonging to the spiritual sphere; but that this comparison is especially unadapted to exhibit the self-determining of the free will, that much rather, strictly kept to its word, it directly leads to determinism, self-evidently follows from our previous discussion, of the notion of freedom.

It might appear, as if for the notion of formal freedom we did not even require the second moment, the consciousness of different possibilities, but that the objective presence of the same was of itself perfectly sufficient. For no one under this presupposition will hesitate to ascribe this freedom to an action, although the rash resolve, the enthusiastic devotion to the determined purpose suppressed every thought of the possibility of any other. If in our consideration we isolate the individual action, this is also perfectly correct; the considering subject completes, in such a case, as it were by his knowledge, the representation of another possibility, not present in the consciousness of the acting agent. But if this freedom is to be at all a predicate of the will, of conscious self-determination, the objective ability of a different self-determination (*Auchanderskönnen*) must, considered in general, come to the consciousness of the subject, without however its being necessary that this should take place in every individual action.

There are those now who will only there recognize a *free choice*, where not merely the negative state of not being decided precedes, the resolution of doubt, the decision, but where indecision, as by opposite factors of a certain condition, precedes. Thus conceived of, we must of course decline the identification of formal freedom with freedom of choice. But indeed conceived of in this way, the choice, by which the free self-determination is directly said to be guaranteed, would much rather prove injurious to freedom. This is however an unjustifiable limitation of the

[1] *The contrast of Catholicism and Protestantism* (*Der Gegensatz des Katholicismus und Protestantismus*), p. 127 sq. and elsewhere.

notion of choice. Choice is everywhere, where there is volition with the express consciousness of other possibilities being present. In this sense formal freedom is of course to be denominated as *freedom of choice.*—

An analogon of this freedom, a dawning ray of its light in the dark kingdom of impersonal creatures, is exhibited to us by animal life in the conditions of playful caprice, which we behold especially in the higher class of animals. When we contemplate these manifold movements, every moment changing according to pleasure and whim, we have, however concealed and enigmatical the inmost of animal life may ever be to us, nevertheless, the immediate impression, that it is here governed not only by no outward, but also by no inward necessity. But this arbitrariness only there expresses itself in the animal as purposeless play, where the earnestness of its life as it were finds a momentary cessation; therefore it also bears in itself entirely the character of the accidental and the disconnected, and is nothing more than arbitrariness, caprice, not once will and freedom, which among all earthly existences can be applied only to man. For in every thing, which refers to the natural determination of the animal, it obeys the blind power of instinct, and cannot do otherwise than obey it. If the object of the impulse, or even the possibility of its satisfaction, is given, the impulse immediately produces in the animal the activity directed to the same. This irresistible natural power of the impulse is felt by the animal not as an impulse foreign to it, as a compelling force exercised upon it, for it is just *its own* impulse, its very nature consists therein, it has no other more inward self than this impulse, which entirely attaches to its objects, *i.e.* it has no real self. On the contrary, in man such a natural power of impulse, by which it immediately produces the activity directed to its satisfaction, must assuredly become felt as force and constraint; for he is only thereby man, that in the deep of his most real being there exists an inward unity, an independent centre, which lays down that, which constitutes the nature of the lower spheres, for the *substratum*, out of which he builds himself the organ of his manifestation, not merely in the good but also in the evil. This central point is the *will*, and, where it really is, there all activities proceed from it; the impulse is no longer their producing cause, but is only taken up into the

resolve of the will, as excitant and impelling agent, and if, in the individual case, it entirely forms the contents of an endeavour, or activity, it has this power from the will. Therefore is it, that when in developed human life we meet with such a mere nature-violence of the impulse, *e.g.* in the uncontrollable avidity with which coarse, uncultivated men, under the pressure of hunger, fall upon food when it is presented to them, it excites in us such a peculiarly disgustful, repulsive feeling, which is clearly to be distinguished from that of moral abhorrence at real evil. It is the obliteration of the separative distinction between man and the beast, which, in such phenomena, awakens in us such abhorrence and disgust.—

The free will is not a mere empty agility, the movements of which become resultlessly exhausted in itself, but a working cause, a determining principle. If we now just look for a moment at the productions of this principle, we have to seek for the same, according to what was remarked above, in the inner sphere of life. The first and directly immediate creation of the will is that of *the moral being of the determining subject himself*, the determinate form of his moral life, the fixed, abiding direction of his disposition of mind, his *character* in the good and in the evil. The character would be degraded to a mere determinateness of nature and therewith its notion entirely destroyed, if it had not for its condition, nay more, for its determining principle, the will of the subject. It will be the task of the following chapter, more closely to consider this inner world and how it originates in freedom.

Concerning the causality of the will in the *external world*, and its power to exert a determining influence upon it, it is a matter self-evident that this causality and power of the will are limited in a determinate manner. If it were not so, the human will were almighty, and could as such of course only exist in one individual essential being. The world also is not an absolutely undetermined mass, which first of all waited to receive from this individual will its determination and form, but this will finds it everywhere as one, although not completely determined, but capable of further determination, still as being already manifoldly determined, which for this very reason, in so far as it enters into the empty universal and boundless, surrounds it with a thousand

oppressive and burdensome limitations. If the human will wishes to bring about any result in the sphere of nature, the very first condition of its so doing is, that of its attaching itself to its immutable law as to the presupposition of its efficiency. So long as it, in this sphere, asserts itself as unconditionally free, it will find itself everywhere hemmed within, and restricted to, certain fixed bounds; in order to feel itself as free, it must place itself under conditions.

But, just as evident as the adventursomeness of an opinion which denies these limitations, is the impossibility entirely to deny the power to the human will of realizing itself in the outward world, and therewith of placing in it determinations which, without it, were not there. For where in all the world should we find a real causality, if the will in itself determining, which, according to its most real peculiar notion, is altogether activity and causality, was not able to work, to effect, anything? One must, first of all, have resolved all finite causality into empty appearance, and have degraded the collective entirety of individual existences, by the representation of a great world-machine, to the deadest passivity, in order at last to bring death also upon the will, if one denies it the power of producing any change in the external world by its self-determination, and regards it perhaps merely as the conductor of an impulse which other motive-powers give to it.—

Moreover, for the purpose of our investigations concerning freedom, the question, how far the free will, as such, is able to be outwardly active, has only a subordinate interest. We need not therefore here further discuss the relation of freedom, and of the effects proceeding from it, to the *legitimately established course* of external nature receiving these effects. We will only further remark on the same, that, if the creating God has honoured the finite spirit to be the very inmost wheel and centre of the universe, it is presumptively certain that nature, with all her arrangements and laws, is established with respect to it, and cannot therefore destroy the free activity of his will. At any rate, it is a very doubtful means, or, if one will, an exaggerated gallantry of the spirit in favour of nature, if it, in order to preserve the order of nature in unimpaired self-dependency, lowers itself to nature by the denial of its own freedom. That is already naturalism, when nature and the order of nature is said to be more secure,

more certain, than the spirit, and its exaltation and power over nature.—

If now this notion of freedom is able to maintain itself in the face of the arguments of determinism, as well as against the persuasive remonstrance of the religious consciousness of our dependence upon God, it furnishes us that which we sought as necessary presupposition of the undeniable truth of the consciousness of guilt, and of the certitude, that sin cannot originate from God. Namely it is contained in this, the power of the will to make of itself a beginning, absolutely to ground its determinations by its own decision.

The germs of the distinctive parts of the notion of freedom developed in this chapter are not to be overlooked in *Augustine*, nor is it to be overlooked that he is not clearly conscious of their mutual relations, and therefore sometimes becomes inexact and vacillating in the distinction and combination of the different moments. *Augustine*, in his controversial writings against the Pelagians, and in the letters written at this time, employs the notion of free will (*liberum arbitrium*) in a three-fold sense. First of all he employs the term freedom as the general *form of spontaneity* attaching to the human will as such, in contrast to outward compulsion, as well as to the natural violent force of the animal impulse. This freedom or self-activity pervades all conditions and stages of human life; man possesses it in evil[1]—of course in so far as it is in the will—as in the good, before the fall, in the fall, and after the fall, also in the process of his salvation, at the commencement and in the completion of the same; it is dependent on this, according to *Augustine's* opinion, which we are of course far from acceding to, that man can bring guilt upon himself and acquire merit. But this freedom by no means excludes the most perfect necessitating of man in the essential

[1] Still even here *Augustine* is not free from vacillation. In the *Retractations*, lib. i. c. 15, he regards it as being safer to denominate the will of the fallen and unredeemed man by CUPIDITAS than by *voluntas;* which indeed, strictly taken, must bring down upon him the reproach of *Möhler*, which falls upon the Reformers, namely, that "by the fall a piece of human nature has fallen out," been lost.

character of his volition and conduct; nor must this necessity be solicitously distinguished from compulson and force. *Augustine*, both in his earlier writings (*e.g. de lib. arb.*) and in his latest (*e.g.* often in his *opus imperf.*) especially loves to explain this relation by the illustration of the universal desire for happiness, which is not at all a matter of compulsion, but of our freest will, and yet it is absolutely necessary. In the same manner, the sin of the natural man is also *voluntaria*, and yet in all he does he cannot do otherwise than sin, thus too the holiness of the perfected is *voluntaria*, but he can, notwithstanding, in all the expressions of his life be nothing else than holy. It is from this side of the notion of freedom, which *Augustinus*, especially in the first chapter of his work, *de gratia et libero arbitrio*, at the commencement of the treatise: *Contra duas Pelagianorum epistolas*, and in the first book of the *op. imp. c. Jul.*, exhibits.

According to *Augustine* then, the free will of man is his ability to determine himself *in the alternative of good and of evil.* This ability he ascribes to the first of the human race before the fall, naturally without, in the further and more exact determination of his notion, consenting to the Pelagian representation of the libra and the original equality of inclination towards both the sides. If assuredly there is contained, from the beginning, in the *liberum arbitrium* the possibility of evil, *Augustine* derives this side of the notion of freedom in this way,—that, because man, according to his better part (the soul), is created out of nothing, that spontaneity, which is only lent to him, in order that determining himself he may be able to determine for the good, is also able to turn to nothingness, to evil.[1] But when *Augustine* regards this moral alternative, originally existing for the free will of man, by no means as a higher perfection, but much rather as a weakness and imperfection of this will: there is also already contained therein, taken together with the third signification of

[1] Also according to *Augustine*, as according to *Schelling*, in his tractate on freedom, there is in the freedom of the creature an ability to evil, only in so far as it has, in some or other respect, a root independent of the absolutely good God; only that *Augustine*, in connection with his negativing conception of evil, finds this root in that negative *nothing*, while *Schelling*, on the contrary, in a *ground of the essential existence of God* working for itself and sending forth from itself a fulness of positive determinations.

the notion of freedom about to be given, the recognition, that this alternative was destined, from the beginning, by the free decision of the will for the good and with help of the *adjutorium* of the Divine Grace, without which the *continuance* in this decision is not possible, to become *destroyed.* This freedom of the will has, according to its positive side, as power of the will to determine itself of itself for the good, been lost by the fall, and that which remains of the same, the negative side, is just the mere form of spontaneity in evil, which indeed, as well as the freedom of man, which *Augustine* maintains in the reception of grace which is irresistibly efficient, resolves itself into a subjective appearance destitute of any real causality.[1]—This side of the notion of freedom *Augustine* especially develops in the sixth book of the *op. imperf. c. Julianum* and in the work *corruptione et gratia.*

Lastly—and most frequently and with the greatest preference —*Augustine* understands by freedom, according to the declaration of our Lord: if the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed, the *resoluteness of the redeemed for the good and holy,* which, in the earthly life of the same is still together with a *posse peccare,* but in the completion of salvation will be exalted to a *non posse peccare,* to a *felix necessitas boni,* and therewith to resemblance with the freedom of God.[2]

[1] Comp. *Neander's Kirchengeschichte,* vol. 2, division 3, p. 1302.

[2] These distinctions in *Augustine's* notion of freedom have by no means justice done to them in *Wigger's Attempt at a pragmatic exhibition of Augustinism and Pelagianism (Versuch einer pragmatischen Darstellung des Augustinismus und Pelagianismus)* p. 131—138, 178 seq., and are not made sufficiently prominent in *Marheineke's Ottomar,* third evening, p. 121—173. With more exactness the distinction between the first and second conception of the notion is developed by *Ritter* in his *History of the Christian Philosophy (Geschichte der Christlichen Philosophie)* vol. 2, p. 341 seq.

SECOND CHAPTER.

THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL IN MORAL DEVELOPMENT.

Neander finds one of the roots of the Pelagian system to consist in its conception of moral freedom as the ability to determine in each moment and in an equal manner, between good and evil.[1] The emphasis in this sentence must be laid upon the clause, the ability, *equal in each moment.* If one attentively considers what it really was which prevented the sagacious and earnestly inquiring spirit of *Julian von Eclanum* from obtaining the correct insight into the present condition of the human race, and of its relation to the grace and salvation of God, he will find the preventing cause especially to consist in this atomistic representation of the nature of the free will. Perfectly indifferent towards its own acts and works, this free will is in every moment present as the possibility, ever equal and the same, to turn itself either to the one side or to the other. Although this freedom, as the perpetually balancing *æquilibrium* between good and evil, as a never-resting oscillation, is the true *perpetuum mobile* in man, it is nevertheless absolutely not able to come from its place in order to become filled with true eternal contents, but, while everything about it changes, throughout all aeons remains standing there unchanged as this moveable-immoveable *possibilitàs peccandi et non peccandi,* which decides everything, and is nevertheless absolutely unable to bring about any decision. The individual action is thereby thought of as entirely isolated; there is no perception of the law, according to which the individual act must produce a moral condition, namely, the perception into the thereby arranged, momentous power of the evil decisions of the will, to communicate to the will itself a determinate tendency and character, from which again, under given circumstances and exitations, there

[1] *Church History (Kirchengeschichte)* vol. 2, p. 1259.

proceeds corresponding actions; in a word, it fails in the notion of *the moral development* in the good as in the evil, in the individual as in the race. The deficiencies of the *Augustinian* notion of freedom were in part just above hinted at, the most significant of them will hereafter again come under our consideration; but it is decidedly superior to the *Pelagian* deficiency, in that it contains in itself an impulse of progress, a source of development. *Pelagius* and *Julian* content themselves here with a notion, which, more deeply investigated with respect to its nature and extent, had assuredly been sufficient to perplex them in their doctrine of freedom,[1] but which, being only resistingly adopted and retained in an external and superficial form, must remain without any deeply pervading influence,—we refer to the notion of habit.[2]

And with this, even in the present day innumerable representations of the freedom of the will are in agreement. Their authors conceive of the same as an in-dwelling ability in man, ever equal and the same, to form and carry out good or evil, holy or unholy, decisions. In the light of this notion, they cannot of course doubt, that every man in every moment, by virtue of his freedom of will, has the power, from henceforth to refrain from all sinful conduct. That a given individual in a given case does good or evil, is said to have its real ground in the groundless caprice of his free will. The immediate consciousness of the ability also otherwise to determine itself, which, if it does not really accompany every decision, *might* accompany it, must especially serve to support this notion of freedom. One only requires to suspend the decision, for a moment, in the process of its completion and to ask himself, whether the decision which is all but completed is the only possible one, in order immediately to call forth that consciousness. Just so the facts of the consciousness of guilt and of repentance are said to express, that the man had been able to leave undone the individual actions to which they refer.

What strange, in part absurd consequences result from such a conception of freedom, has already been manifoldly shewn by

[1] What *Augustinus* also recognized, *op. imperf. c. Jul.* lib. iv., c. 103 and elsewhere. Comp. concerning this *Pelagian* representation of freedom *Jacobi, Lehre des Pelagius*, p. 35 seq.

[2] *Epist. ad Demetr.* c. 20. *Op. imp.* lib. i., c. 69.

others. We shall satisfy ourselves here by placing together the chief points.

All anxious endeavours to work upon the disposition of mind and conduct of others, which, in the family, form the ground of education, in the state, lie at the bottom of legislation, accompanied with punitive punishments for all offenders, and in the Church, are the basis upon which the spiritual functions are exercised, and among them, most decidedly that of the public ministrations of the Gospel, necessarily proceed from the presupposition that it is possible, by representations to the minds of others, to exercise an influence upon the determinations of their will. Where this efficiency is directed to a single individual or to a company of individuals, one still further especially requires that it shall acquaint itself with the already existent moral character, mode of thought, prevalent inclinations and habits, of the same, and that it shall exercise its function accordingly. But if one conceives of the free will, upon which all morality is said to rest, as an ability, which, in the real principle of its operation is at every point absolutely undetermined and indifferent towards all motives and in relation to its own earlier determinations; then all those endeavourings can at the utmost only have the significance, of presenting all kinds of representations to the understanding of man, and thereby to condition the *possibility* of their obtaining some regard and consideration in the self-decision of the will. But of any *probability* of their effecting anything definite, that they, upon the decision which perhaps has already corresponded to them ninety-nine times, will not be in the hundredth time entirely without influence, there is not the smallest ground. Then too, upon this presupposition, is the precept to adjust and adapt our ethical influence upon another, according to his character and spiritual constitution, an entirely empty one and void of meaning, since indeed, in such a case, his character and spiritual constitution, can never in any instance be a *determination for his will*, but this in its decisions is said to be absolutely independent of every thing, which is external to it.

But we shall further see how this doctrine of indifferent freedom must also deny a notion, which life will never allow itself to be robbed of at the pleasure of an abstraction, the reality of which is vouchsafed us by daily experience, namely, the notion

of *character*. A tree is known by its fruits; every one acts according to his character, and in his conduct his character becomes manifest. It is true the character does not at all exclusively rest upon a *determinate tendency of will;* it is also conditioned by elements, contained in the natural innate determinateness and endowments of the individual; in the character, natural peculiarity and personal volition enter into the most intimate combination with each other, nevertheless, so, that the latter is the governing principle. Character is, according to this its principle, as *Fischer* has justly termed it, the educated will; presupposing in the same the will's capability of cultivation. But if there be in the will merely the present without the past and therefore also without the future, if it be essential to it, apart from the real act, to be absolutely undetermined, and if all individual decisions and actions issue forth without being in any way connected, from the abyss of indifferent freedom, the idea of character is altogether out of the question; the conduct of man formlessly and destitute of all connection fluctuates about hither and thither as if governed by chance, and is never able to exhibit a fixed, continuous impression.

And for this reason, such a freedom is further altogether incompatible with *any common united action, any community of co-operation for a specific object.* The possibility of such a co-operation depends upon the mutual confidence of those about to engage in the same, that under given presuppositions they will all act correspondingly among each other and in relation to the common end which they have in view. But here it were perfectly uncertain, that suddenly from the most considerate—in so far as this notion, as that of a fixed moral quality, retained upon the soil of this freedom any meaning at all—the most inconsiderate conduct would not proceed, whether the co-operators will not in the next moment relinquish the object which they at this moment pursue, and whether then their will, in its inaccessible freedom, will at all regard any inward or outward impulse whatever. Where everything is dependent upon this absolutely indeterminate and indeterminable freedom, which may ever with equal ease prefer the most worthless to the most intrinsic motives, there in co-operation with others the most thoughtless and capricious demeanour is quite of equal value with the wisest and

purposely ordered conduct.—From this point of view it may easily be shown, how this idea of freedom makes altogether unintelligible the *subsistence of any community of being* whatever; for it necessarily presupposes as its condition some capability of calculating upon human conduct.

And no less does the *religious interest* become violated to the last degree by such an idea of freedom. For the efficiency of the Divine Grace, if indeed it is to be conditioned by freedom, immediately, supposing such a notion to be valid, loses all truth and certainty. Also no one would have any right to regard it as improbable, that, any one who to-day is a regenerate Christian, shall to-morrow have transformed himself into a reckless villain, that the angel before the throne of God will in the next moment have become a devil, and *vice versa*; for to this indifferent freedom the departure from a chosen course, is at every point fully as near at hand as the continuance in the same. For the same reason, this insecurity, making everything questionable, must continue to all eternity; it could only be removed by the negation of this freedom of choice, which is said to belong, not indeed merely to the nature of man, but to that of the personal creature in general. More closely considered, the notions of a state of growing holiness and that of the service of sin, of the regenerate and the unregenerate, of angel and devil, of the kingdom of God and that of the world, of heaven and hell, lose all their significance; for they all refer to states and conditions, which depend not upon determinateness of nature, but upon a decidedness and steadfastness in the tendency of the will. But according to this doctrine of freedom there is not such a tendency or direction of the will, but every individual determination of the will, is an absolute beginning, altogether unconditioned by any preceding development of being or course of conduct. From such a doctrine there would much rather follow, in open contradiction against the declaration of Christ, Matt. vi. 24—no man can serve two masters—the possibility of a constant double service (if indeed service is not here out of the question), or that of a continuous instability between good and evil; this freedom were just the very μετοχὴ and κοινωνία between righteousness and lawlessness, between light and darkness, which Paul denies, 2 Cor. vi. 14.

That therewith too the notion of *redemption* is destroyed, is a

matter self-evident. First of all, in the consistent application of this notion of freedom, any subjectively felt *necessity or want* of redemption, must be out of the question, for it would be in the power of every one, we cannot say to redeem himself, because this would presuppose a state of bondage of the inner life, which is altogether without meaning upon this stand-point, but from any moment henceforth only to do that which is good and holy. But no less would vanish, if this moment is to be an essential moment of human nature, every *capability* of being redeemed, in as much as it wishes to ground a condition, in which every point for the attachment of evil in man is destroyed, and whereby he is eternally confirmed in the good.

It is not to be denied, that this doctrine of indifferentism in relation to freedom has a decided advantage over that of *determinism*, in that while it is not more prejudicial to the interests of morality and religion than the latter, it in any case furnishes a better satisfaction to the interests and requirements of science and practical life.

Certainly we do not mean such a determination, which, *e.g.* by the *Système de la nature*, and from *La Mettrie's l'homme machine*, becomes grounded upon the idea that all human activity is merely the result of external causes which exercise an influence upon his soul from without. This mechanical opinion of the world and of the will, which sees everywhere only determinateness and passivity and nowhere determining power and activity, nothing but absolutely dependent transition points proceeding from a first primal impulse, has been once and for ever abolished, by the notion of *organism*, discovered and exhibited by the more modern philosophical science of nature (*Kant's Critick of the Judging Faculty —Kritik der Urtheilskraft*); no one will now any more think of wishing to fix man to a gradation which the very plants have below them.[1] The knowledge which especially excludes that coarse form of determinism is two-fold. On the one hand it presents to us an entirety, a whole, consisting of living, relatively independent

[1] Also *Daub* in his "*Darstellung und Beurtheilung der Hypothesen in Betreff der Willensfreiheit*" (p. 74—76), directs attention to the power which the notion of organism possesses against such a determinism, a work which, for the critick of the different forms of determinism furnishes —not the highest, but important, contributions.

members, each of which is again in itself a little whole, and therefore, although means in relation to the greater whole to which it belongs, is nevertheless at the same time its own self-end. That of being such a living member in the entirety of the world, must assuredly first and foremost belong to the human individual. On the other hand that notion furnishes us with the view of a development, which, proceeding from an inward centre of vital energy, everywhere presupposes itself and to which all external potencies are no longer related as real causes, but only as presenting the occasioning, stimulating means of nourishment. If therefore every instance of even organic life has in itself an independent principle, and by virtue of this its self-development, does not allow any determination coming from without immediately to exercise an efficiency within the sphere of its life, but first of all buries it deep in its own dark laboratory, in order again to send it forth from the same transformed and assimilated to its peculiar nature: how much more true must this be of all *spiritual life.*

To this there is further to be added, that this independent peculiarity, only explicable from itself, not from another, not perhaps from any relation of combination, which appears in organic nature as *species-character*, applies to the sphere of personal beings, and belongs to the *single individual*—a moment in the notion of personality, which even the antieleutheric theories must recognize, unless they altogether deny this notion, and resolve to blind themselves in view of the most openly avowed facts of experience. For that the procedure of the personal individual under given conditions, is not merely the result of our common human nature, of the character of the human species, that two individuals, under precisely the same external circumstances, even when the very same representations find entrance into their souls as motives, nevertheless often act quite differently, are undeniable facts which every more thorough deterministic consideration must itself take up into the connection of its theory. It must therefore, in order to explain the origination of an individual decision, take into its consideration, and that too as chief factor, the peculiar constitution of the subject, especially this determinate degree of inclination to the good or evil, this particular tendency, in which the one or the other inclination is present in the given instance.

Under the recognition of all this, a more enlightened determinism supports itself by maintaining, that man, when he comes to any decision, is previously *determined*, and does not act from a groundless freedom of choice, but from this his peculiar nature, to which his moral determinateness, namely, the particular character of his will, belongs. According to this opinion therefore, his conduct proceeds in all self-dependency by virtue of which it essentially belongs to him as this given individual, nevertheless always with rigid necessity from causes, which, in the moment of decision are not under his control; it is, if we regard it apart from the ever present, but always subordinated, co-operation of external circumstances, the infallible product of the entire collective character of his inner life. If in the moment, when he is summoned to a determinate decision of will, his entire inner condition could be presented to us as in a painting, clear and perfect to the very lightest, faintest trait, his ideas of right and unright, his fundamental tenets and dispositions, the strength and peculiar character of his feelings and passions, his most secret, perhaps not even to himself distinctly conscious, inclinations and interests, we should be able, presupposing the necessary power of judging did not fail us, with absolute certainty to say before hand, how, in the given case, he will decide.

It is this form of the deterministic opinion, which *Romang* in his work on the freedom of the will and determinism (*Willensfreiheit und Determinismus*, 1835), attaching himself especially to *Schleiermacher*, defends, not however without sometimes falling back upon a lower form of determinism, and it is a part of his peculiar controversial tact, that he sets over against this ennobled and spiritualized theory of determinism, an entirely coarse, uncultivated, and inflexible notion of freedom. Also upon the same stand-point stands *Sigwart's* sagacious investigation of the problem of the freedom and unfreedom of the human volition,[1] which, apart from the intelligible freedom, controverts the notion of the same only in its atomistic form.

But if this determinism is victorious against that indifferent

[1] *Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie*, 1839, *drittes Heft*, p. 1—222. *Die Abhandlung ist auch besonders abgedruckt.*

freedom, will it also be victorious against a more enlightened, cultivated notion of freedom, against such an one which stands in agreement with the irrefutable facts of steadfast moral constitutions, of decided dispositions of mind, and of *determined characters?*—Before we seek to answer this question, we must more closely consider a distinction in the nature of man, which is here of a deeply pervading significance, namely, the distinction between the life of the self-conscious, free spirit, and the nature-basis upon which it rests.

Now to this *basis of nature* there not merely belongs the physical side of our existence, but just as much the psychical life; nay more, even in the sphere, which we are accustomed to regard as the spiritual, in the narrower sense of the word, it appears in the form of innate talents and corresponding inclinations, which, with the consciousless necessity and certainty of a natural impulse, pursue their objects. Before personality is awakened, when a moral volition is out of the question, is this nature-basis existent, and when the Ego makes its appearance, becomes *aktuell*, it finds already beforehand a naturalness developed to a certain degree, which co-determines the contents of a self-consciousness, and presents matter and incitement to his will. Neither is this nature-basis as such a merely universal, human potency, equal and the same in all, but it specializes itself in the narrower spheres within that of the species, and individualizes itself in its single instances. Each one is born not merely as man in general, but as this particular man, placed in the contrast of sexes, bearing in himself the particular impression of one of the human races, belonging to a determinate peculiarity of people, expressing the type of a family in stronger or fainter outlines, and distinguishing himself from all other individuals, by this physical and psychical formation peculiar to him, by these determinate, innate endowments and inclinations, and by this infinite, manifoldly varied, web of his original organization, which in no other is repeated in precisely the same manner. We may accordingly, with greater precision, denominate this nature-basis as the *natural individuality* of every single human subject, which, as living, innate determination, as expanding germ, including in itself a fulness of peculiar powers and impulses, precedes every activity of the self-consciousness and of the will. The individual man, when he awakes to conscious

self-determination, finds himself already manifoldly determined; and whatever may be the determining power of his will, so much is, at the very threshold, presumptively certain, that he can neither destroy this individual determinateness, nor neutralize it for the progressing development, and this least of all by an individual primal act. The real basis which finite personality requires is at the same time its limitation.

If now, as some maintain, man had no other task than *the development and exhibition of his natural peculiarity*, a rigid naturalistic determinism would be fully justified. The will could then be nothing more than the form, in which, that inner, already determined, natural peculiarity, called into activity from external influences, develops itself after the manner of all organic life of nature—nothing more than the necessary out-birth of individuality from itself, in order to impress its form upon another being. But it is very evident that then we can no longer speak of a nature-basis; the basis is no longer basis, if it is one and everything. This method of thought knows of nothing more than nature, and denies, it may be in a very sagacious, ingenious manner, the spirit. A more thoughtful, enlightened determinism will perceive a religio-ethical task imposed upon man, stretching far beyond, and rising above, the mere exhibition of his natural individuality, and with this task it will recognize the self-dependent significance of his will. Then in the light of a present will the natural ground-basis of our higher self-consciousness, no longer wears at all the appearance of a complete, fully determined, individuality, which stands over against the will as being inaccessible to, and proof against, its influence, but as being only the design or plan for a full human individuality. Instead of the will being merely the self-less means for calling the natural individuality into activity, it becomes much rather, by the direction which it takes, and the varied degree of energy with which it pursues the same, co-determining principle of its development. It is true the will is not able to transform the ground-plan or fundamental design of the natural individuality, but the full completion of this design cannot be attained without it. Thus too in this respect the spirit, as will, is, within certain bounds, Master of the natural being.

Over this nature-basis, still in the most intimate union with it, the higher development of man elevates itself as his *moral-nature*.

His relation to God in doing and knowing, and as springing from this, his relation to the world, to man and to nature, are contained in this region. Conceived of as to its very central germ, this development is nothing else than the development of the human will. And in this development we must look for freedom, not in the isolated atom of an individual action, or determination, but in the process of the moral self-evolution, in the living movement of this development. Freedom is self-development in the highest sense of the word, development by means of free self-determination. Freedom is power to actualize being, to develop being, by and from itself.

If one conceives of man in the moment of his deciding on an action of moral significance, he must be admitted, as moral being, to be already in some way determined, and determinism has very little trouble in showing that here, in the region of the moral, pure self-determination from out of the absolutely undetermined is never to be met with. But so far as the present moment of life, in a moral respect, is already a determined one, it points back to earlier self-determination as its condition. To whatever powers the will inclines, those are they which operate upon it; if it affirms the immediate product, in its inner life, of this working, those working powers to which the will inclined begin to take possession of it; the inclination *(Neigung)* thus gradually becomes a disposition of mind, an established inward affection *(Gesinnung)*; but on the way in which the will, the self-movement and self-determination of which by no means immediately resolve themselves into this disposition of mind, stands related to this transition from the inclination to the disposition, in other words, to its development, whether it always decidedly yields itself to the power, to which the inclination preponderates, or whether side by side with this inclination, there is also an endeavour to avert it; on this it depends, whether these or those dispositions, the easier and more quickly, or more difficultly and slowly, become fast-rooted in it and obtain the full mastery. If then one acts in the given case under the influence of this thus confirmed disposition, we only need to look beyond the limits of this conception, restricting itself to the single moment, to the consideration of the entirety, the whole of his moral development, in order to perceive that even such an action,

let it follow ever so necessarily from that disposition, is nevertheless to be regarded as free. Character is certainly, a *principle* of individual determinations of will, but originally regarded it is itself again the *result* of determinations of will; character is never innate, but always acquired by development, and its development is conditioned therefore by self-decisions of the relatively, not yet completely characterized will. The corrupt tree, says Christ, Matt. vii. 17, 18, bringeth forth evil fruit, it cannot bring forth good fruit, and nevertheless He everywhere regards man as answerable for the commission of evil and the omission of the good. And for this reason, that not only is that which immediately arises from our free volition, *i.e.* from our volition which had the power otherwise to determine itself, to be imputed to us, but also that which follows with necessity from a condition grounded in such a volition.

That which very easily perplexes the Judgment in this matter, is the fact of there being so many individuals, whose wills appear to be in a moral respect so little at all determined, that a progressing development, either in the one direction or the other, cannot be perceived. However, we should presumptively expect to find very great differences in the distinctness of the expression of a determinate disposition. But these differences of degree are themselves conditioned by the will; moral indifferentism, directionlessness is also a direction, which as much has a graduated course of development, as, it may be, any passion whatever.—

The idea of *habit*, furnishes us from another sphere, a parallel, which, by analogy and distinction, explains and illustrates this self-development of the will to a permanently and fixed moral tendency, to a determinate character.

Even in the sphere of the *merely physical*, there arises by the frequent repetition of certain movements and activities, which according to their nature proceed from an act of the will, an impulse again to repeat them from time to time, which the soul mechanically obeys, without an especial act of the will. Thus the act passes over into, and becomes, habit. Therefore we can but suppose, although it lies beyond our perception, that after the very first act has taken place, it must have produced and left behind it, a minimum of that impulse or excitant for its repetition;

but the excitant acquires strength and the gratification of the impulse becomes involuntary, in proportion to the repetition of the act. The activity may be entirely without purpose and void of significance, and may be based upon no want or necessity whatever; but then its frequent repetition produces of itself a kind of want and necessity. If on the other hand, it was first of all occasioned by some want of the sensational nature, habit generally and gradually subjects the arising of the same in determinate desire to a certain rule. Habit has this singular ambiguousness in it, that it deadens the pleasure of the sensational enjoyment, accordingly therefore the desire, and nevertheless in another form produces it. But indisputably the power of habit extends itself to activities of *directly spiritual significance.* Thus in the one, instruction, in another, the making of verses, in a third, in the moral sphere, the giving of alms, and the like, becomes a habit; under given occasionings, these actions respectively execute and complete themselves of themselves, without requiring for the same any given decision or resolution.

Indeed not merely in external actions is this power to be found, but also in *internal, abiding activities of the life of the soul.* If the soul at certain regularly returning occasionings always forms the same series of representations, this determinate association gradually becomes habitual; this being the case, without observing its own activity, even perhaps with its conscious interest otherwise occupied, the soul at the given impulse runs through that series of inward representations or mental ideas. Thus by mere repetition, functions, which in themselves are conditioned by the free will, may withdraw themselves from the same; in this way a direction of activity which the soul gives to itself, often acquires a power in it so great, that it continues itself not merely in the absence of the will's volition for the same, but in spite of the resistance of the will. These are already facts, with which the atomistic notion of freedom, which makes the individual actions to arise from the absolutely undetermined, can never come into agreement.

The power of habit is a matter so evident, and of which we have such immediate perception, that it is not at all to be wondered at, if psychologists have often wished to explain the

arising of certain determinate methods of moral conduct, of permanent, abiding tendencies of will and of dispositions of mind, of good or evil character, entirely by this notion. Without question, the power of habit is a very significant moment, for the correct understanding of the steadfast development of a given moral or immoral conduct by frequent repetition, for the arising of virtuous and vicious *methods of action.* But does it also explain the formation of the disposition, of the character? Men of habit are generally not at all men of definitely marked character and of decided tendency of will, but on the contrary, such as preponderatingly incline to passivity, and who allow themselves to be governed by obscure impressions and affections of mind. Therefore we find the power of habit in general most prevalent in children and in early life, and then again, still from another ground, in more advanced age, and further, in such characters in which the moral and spiritual life are the least developed towards self-dependence. Habit operates, in so far as it, as a power, runs against the individual self-determinations of the will, in a mechanical manner,[1] as a nature-power petrifying life; it is the sphere of the consciousless, in which, and by the power of which, it prevails. *Custom,* which is also an established development *(Festgewordensein)* of an automatic activity, stands higher than habit, inasmuch as it does not possess the consciousless, mechanical character of habit, but, regarded as determining power, may be very well reconciled with spiritual self-dependency; wherefore one does not speak of the customs, but of the habits of animals. Habit is a power which degrades the moral to the merely natural. If we say of an individual, that he has been determined in a course of conduct, which is in itself of a moral character, by mere habit, we intend thereby to characterize the moral impression of his conduct, as being obtuse and hebetated thereby. But who could thus characterize the same, in so far as it arose from his disposition of mind and character?

The peculiar sphere of habit are the *individual actions* as such, which it conforms to an uniform and fixed rule. To explain the originating process of a fixed and established tendency of will

[1] *Hegel* denominates habit the mechanism of self-feeling, *Encyclopädie,* § 410.

and of everything in the inner life which stands in connection therewith, namely of a prevailing condition of mind, of certain determinate persuasions, by the idea of habit, is nothing less than to deduce that which is internal and inmost from that which is relatively external. One can do much and many things with man by the power of habit, but he can never thereby be made a child of God nor a child of the Devil. If we consider the power of sin as an established abiding tendency of will, we find it to be a matter not of the simple repetition of a given act, in which habit entirely consists, but that of a great variety of activities, all of which however, proceed from one and the same perverted principle. Man appropriates this perverted principle, when he for the first time, with conscious self-determination, acts according to the same; the appropriation constantly becomes more intimate and inwardly fixed, the oftener it is affirmed in the decision; thus this principle extends its dominion over the different spheres of life, so far as it finds in the natural inclinations a point of attachment for the particular directions in which it unfolds itself; how is this development to be explained from the monotonous law of habit? The hardening of man in sin, which drives him in defiance against God and His holy law, is something more than an evil habituation.—

That the freedom of the will has discovered itself to us in the progress of moral development, precisely corresponds to the relation between formal and real freedom, as we discovered it in the previous chapter. Man must set out from formal freedom, in order to arrive at real freedom; the mediation can only be formed by gradual development; if now in this development nothing of freedom were to be met with, according to its formal moment, how could it bring about a mediation between the starting-point and the goal?

It is only necessary for us here to beware of violently separating the free will from its living union with other activities of the spiritual life, and of placing it in an external relation to the same; which would inevitably conduct us again into the dilemma, of either representing it as indifferent towards all these elements, of denying their real existence for it, or of making it thereby to become determined in an unfree manner. Much rather as the soul makes use of the body as its organ, and subjects all its members,

muscles, and nerves to its unity, and is present pervading all of them with its determining power: so the feelings, inclinations, interests, convictions, principles, which make up the contents of our practically spiritual life, collectively form as it were an inner body for the free will; the will itself is their real, proper soul, their forming and moving principle, the spirit of the spirit, and the heart of the heart.

But that the will is this, inseparably one with all other elements of the personal life, just as its inmost determining centre, the very use of language confirms. Even consciousness and reason, it ventures to denominate as something which the Ego *has;* while it directly identifies the will with the Ego. No one will say: my will has determined this or that, just as he says: my reason, my immediate consciousness has taught me that.[1] The will is very man himself, just as *Augustin* says: *Voluntas est in omnibus; imo omnes nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt.*[2]—

By a just estimate of this relation, the old instances of the common determinism, that the will in each one of its decisions is determined by certain *representations*, as *motives*, that these therefore produce the resolve and bring about the act, by the will as their instrument, will scarcely be able any more to place us in embarrassment. That would be truly a strange psychology, which regarded the conceptions, mental representations *(Vorstellungen)*, as the only strictly active and efficient agencies in the soul, and on the contrary gave to the will a merely receptive, or, to speak more correctly, *passive* position.[3] That is in reality to deny the will, which indeed is nothing if it has not real causality. But it is no less false, to represent motives and will as two powers in the inner life, which mutually exclude each other, so that, when

[1] In a few incorrect, bad forms of expression, which one might adduce to the contrary, will, stands for a certain determinateness of the will.

[2] *De civ. Dei*, lib. xiv. c. 6. It is true, *Augustinus* extends the notion of the will, and therefore also the above maintenance, by the nihil aliud quam, somewhat further than is here the case.

[3] Compare what in this respect *Herbart* says on *Wolf's* method of representation, L. c. p. 35 seq.,—himself an advocate of determinism, but of a determinism full of moral earnestness, and formed by an entirely different psychology than the *Wolfian*, in which the will is more than a ball, which the mental ideas throw hither and thither.

the motives do not suffice to produce a definite decision, the freedom of the will turns the scale. If the freedom of a decision of the will, is in inverse ratio to the degree in which it is determined by motives, determinism always has the game. It will be easy for it to show, how such determining motives are also present even when in the moment of the decision they escape the notice of our consciousness. Therefore one may not represent the will, as something to be added to the motives, as if the motives conducted the decision to a certain point, and the will completed what was deficient. But in whatever way one divides the two sides, the point of view with this external combination must always be an entirely misplaced one. But even supposing that, under this presupposition, it were possible to maintain the freedom of the will, it would in any case follow, that man is only then free in his decision, when opposing motives have thrown him into some doubt before his decision, and that he manifests his freedom the most essentially when he decides without motives or even against them. But every one looks upon it as something unworthy, to decide in high and exalted matters without, or contrary to, all motives, and therefore to decide groundlessly and arbitrarily; and no one feels it as a want of freedom, but on the contrary that he has just then the strongest feeling of freedom, when in any instance he is moved to a definite decision quickly, and without all wavering, by the force of powerful and clearly perceived reasons. This indisputable fact of itself ought to have led the Determinists, as well as the adherents to the doctrine of an indifferent, or equilibristic freedom, to a more correct track. Are then determinate mental representations as such, motives, impulses for our will? The question is not, whether they ought to be, but whether they factually are so? No, answers experience, but they first of all *become* so, by our placing our *interest* in their contents, and then making it the object of our desire.[1]. But the contents in which we place our interest, and the different degrees of strength attaching to the interest therein placed, depends upon the sphere of life with which we have to do, ultimately, and decisively however, upon the inmost tendency of our will. That one *e.g.* with tolerable certainty, is able to influence and direct an

[1] *Herbart* also admits this, l. c. p. 37, 53.

individual by representations which only refer to the results of his conduct in relation to his sensational weal and wo, has its ground in the self-perversion of his will, whereby the objects of such representations have become his *prevalent interests*. Inversely: to order one's self in his conduct altogether according to moral motives, to resolve to obey therein the moral judgment, is an earlier inward decision, which, springing out of the very centre of the will's freedom, precedes the influence of a determinate higher motive upon the resolve. The principle of selfishness generates from itself its own system of motives determining the will, in which one member or part sustains and supports the next; it imparts to objects of innumerable representations the greatest importance and worth in relation to the subject, which in themselves, and therefore in relation to the principle of obedience toward God, are valueless and destitute of significance. The motives are always only the self-mediation, not the producing cause of the free volition; they belong to that inner body, which the will out of pre-existent stuff forms for itself, in order to reveal itself therein. The will attracts and encircles itself with the representations and feelings, which correspond to its germinating tendency, not as by a definite resolve, but as with the power of magic, operating unobservedly, and thus constitutes them the permanent determinings and determinate tone (*Bestimmungen und Stimmungen*) of the inner life, by which it is actuated, or by which its volition is mediated in the individual act. As therefore the conditions of, and changes transpiring in, the soul become known in the expression and movement of the body, so does one recognize in the nature of the motives, by which man determines himself, the fundamental constitution or character of his will, present at the time, and which he cannot have derived elsewhere than from himself. His will is entirely in them, the motives are very moments of his will; but thereby is it not in the smallest degree deprived of its freedom. Also the individual act of the will, is never *dependent* upon the motives, strictly taken, but may very well be so upon the tendency immanent in the will itself.—

Romang, in order to be able to reconcile the notion of freedom with the system of determinism, defines it as follows: We shall denominate an essential being free, in so far as it, *according to its peculiar determinateness or nature*, self-dependently works and is

active from out the very inmost of its essence.[1] Now, attaching ourselves to this form of explanation, we should say: An essence is free in so far as the inmost centre of its life, out of which it works and is active, *is conditioned by self-determination.* And that only in this way does the notion of freedom furnish that which is requisite for the ground-basis of moral *imputation*, is clear from the development of the latter notion in the second subdivision of the first Book. The limitations to which perhaps the juristic treatment of this notion must limit itself, are of course not those of the ethico-religious consideration. It is to close the investigation where it really first of all begins, when *e.g. Romang, Sigwart*,[2] earlier *Hume*,[3] are of opinion, that for the notion of imputation the recognition of the action in question being the action of the given individual, that the deciding agent in the resolve is the very man himself, his own essential being, his own character, are sufficient. For the notion of imputation more is required, namely the proof, that this his own essence issues forth from his own volition, that it is the product of freedom in the moral development.

But it is just the notion of *development* which determinism has not seldom appropriated to its service, and it may therefore regard it as strange to find that it is to be controverted by means of the same. In every development the present moment, according to all its contents, proceeds with rigid necessity out of the preceding one, and this again out of the still preceding, and so on. When, according to this, the acting agent, placed in such a development, is determined by his own collective past, he possesses in no moment of his life that freedom which has its nature in self-determination from out the indeterminate, in the *facultas aliter se determinandi (Anderskönnen.)* In this rigid continuity of connection there is nowhere to be seen a loophole through which such an accidental freedom could slip in. But allowing it ever to remain undecided as to how the very

[1] *Ueber Willensfreiheit und Determinism*, p. 73.
[2] L. c. p. 138 seq.
[3] *Untersuchung über den menschlichen Verstand, in Tennemann's Übersetzung*, p. 222 sq.

commencement of this development is conditioned, and supposing too that the free self-determination might be shown, freedom were nevertheless during the entire development nowhere a really present, but everywhere a *past* freedom.

In this way determinism is more exactly defined *predeterminism;* freedom is therefore denied, because man in every present, is dependent upon a past moment, which, although it be ever that of his own life, nevertheless in this, the present moment absolutely does not stand in his own power. The successive development, in which man, as existing in time, can only realize his moral nature, is said to make the realization of the same, as of a free essence, impossible. It was just this form of determinism, as is well known (although not carried out in precisely the same manner as here), in which *Kant* regarded it, when referred to our time-life, therefore for our empirically intelligent consideration, as insurmountable.[1]

But more closely considered it is a perfectly one-sided conception of the notion of *development*, which lies here at the ground. If every moment were nothing else than the necessary result of the preceding one, and therefore was contained in it, how could it ever become another, how attain to a *progress?* In such a case every succeeding step were only a repetition of the preceding; indeed it were not at all, as a particular step; for it would have no peculiar contents which could really distinguish it from the preceding; it would be the same step, only set in another time and modified perhaps by being placed in other relations. It is clear that therewith the notions grade, development altogether lose their significance. The moments of a real development never stand in connexion with those preceding them, simply according to the law of *analysis*, but everywhere living *synthesis* is found to be therewith united. Then too it is not from the beginning an already prepared formation, which the

[1] *Critick of pure reason (Kritik der reinen Vernunft,)* in the "solution of the cosmological ideas of the totality of the derivation of the historical events of the world from their causes." *Critick of the Practical Reason (Kritik der praktischen Vernunft)* in the "critical illumination of the analytic of the pure practical reason." Comp. *Religion within the Bounds of mere Reason,* p. 58 *(Religion innerhalb der Gränzen der blossen Vernunft)*—ed. 2nd.

development may have to carry out simply perhaps by a series of different external conditions, but this peculiar formation first of all arises in the development itself, by the indwelling, determining, and from within outwards, impelling principle.

From the other side it is no less contradictory to the notion of development, if every successive step is to be *only another and entirely a new one* in relation to the preceding, without connexion with that which has already become developed and making an absolutely new beginning from itself. Therewith the unity in the variety would be lost, and the all-pervading identity, which unites the individual moments to an entire whole, would no longer exist; it were a developing without a determinate development, therefore no longer a developing, but an arbitrary springing from one to another, a chaotic pell-mell of isolated movements, void of all ground and purpose.

There are accordingly in every real development two tendencies in reciprocal, indissoluble union—the one, the *conserving* tendency, which preserves the connexion of the different moments with each other, the sameness and continuity in the change of development, the inner chain, which links together the different steps, in a word, the conservative principle; the second is the tendency which builds that which is new in the development, or the *new-building* tendency, by which at every step, together with that which belongs to the connexion with the former, and in which this only progresses, a new beginning, a formative moment peculiar in itself, makes its appearance, in a word the progressive principle, which conducts the development through the most manifold metamorphoses and hides the inner unity behind a fulness of forms. If the former of these tendencies seeks to retain in the present the past and the most intimate, inmost connexion with it, the latter, strives to impel forward and to unfold out of the present the living germs of the future. Each of the two tendencies requires the other as its necessary complement; each would directly destroy the self-developing life and therewith itself, the one by its torpid rigidity, the other by dissolution, if it should displace its contrast in order to give exclusive validity to itself. Not merely the unlimited negation of the conserving principle is destructive, but also the unlimited negation of the progressing principle.

This fundamental law of all living development, this mutual conditionateness of permanence and change, of rest and motion, of being and becoming, is also everywhere easily shown in the sphere of *organic nature*. In the development of every organism there is operative on the one hand, the principle which holds fast to, affirms, and continues, the contents of the preceding, in that of the succeeding moment. Upon this principle or tendency rests the steadfast connexion of all developing the moments, by virtue of which in every succeeding one the continuation of the threads of the preceding may be shown, no one of which is capable of being understood, without the knowledge of all those preceding it. In every such development there is operative on the other hand, an onward—impelling tendency, which strives to make every moment as self-dependent as possible in relation to all the preceding. From this tendency arise the new, peculiar formations, which are not to be regarded merely as an unfolding of the previous step.

In *nature*, the entire development is directly governed by the peculiar type of the given kind of existence. The progressing principle, it is clear, is the really determining, deciding principle; for the conserving principle can preserve nothing more than what the new-building principle transfers to it. Now in this principle, the formative impulse of organic existences—or however one may otherwise denominate this *qualitas occulta*, which is recognized in one form or another by every opinion of natural science,—there is contained that peculiar type, the image of the whole which is impressed upon each of its successive steps, and although there are hindering limitations, misformations to be met with even here, because the individual existence is placed not merely under the law of its kind, but equally under the control of general potencies, which are indifferent towards the self-purpose or design of the organic individual, still, this peculiar formative-type nevertheless realizes itself in the manner of a rigid necessity, if we consider it strictly in relation to the power ruled by it.

What concerns *human* development, we must, in the first place, bear in mind our distinction between the *natural side* and the *moral being* of man. Upon the formative impulse, which determines the development of that nature-basis, there is not merely the type of the species, as well as the particular sphere within the

same (of race, nation, etc.), impressed, but also a peculiar type of this individual as such, which generally preserves itself, according to its fundamental features, in its development amid powerful disturbances, and in spite of deformations and mutilations, which here depend not merely upon the co-determining influence of more general potencies, but also upon the indissoluble unity with free personality. In moral development the *progressive principle* is just the *freedom of the will*, in so far as it is the ability of the Ego, of itself, to determine itself from the indeterminate.

But even to this highest formative impulse, there stands related a prescribed formative type, namely, *the moral law*, which contains the ideal of the perfectly moral man. But here, just because the working principle is freedom, it is not directly and determiningly impressed upon the same; if this principle may be necessitated in its external manifestations to maintain a certain agreement with this type, it is inwardly able, not merely in a partial manner, but in relation to the very ground tendency of its efficiency, to sever itself from, and oppose itself to, the same.

Nevertheless in this contrast, no less than in the agreement of freedom in its fundamental tendency with that type, does it remain bound to the *general law of development.* It is not permitted in relation to the free subject to remain destitute of results; its self-determinings condense themselves to determinateness of self. The progressing principle, whether it progresses in the normal or in the perverted direction, is not a mere unlimited power of motion, but it transfers, what it produces from itself to the preserving principle, which implants it in the inner life, in the very will.

The twofold character of the law herewith discovered for the moral being of man is a relation too remarkable for us not to be allowed to tarry for a moment in its consideration. If we compare both laws with each other, the first is the norm for the free essential being as free; it has no other necessity than that of moral obligation; it only determines the normal moral being and doing of man, and not also the abnormal. The second governs the morally abnormal, as well as the normal, being and doing of man; it chains the creaturely personality to itself by a metaphysical necessity; it executes itself in it even when its will offers resistance, as an insurmountable limitation of its

freedom. Nevertheless the determining power of this law is in general not at all felt by man as compulsion. The first law must, as we have already seen, vol. i., p. 28, 29, just *as law, as moral imperative*, for this very reason retire into the inner back-ground of the consciousness, because, on the one hand, according to its notion, it must leave open the physical possibility of transgression, and yet, on the other hand, it cannot relinquish its determining power. On the contrary, because this transcendent law of moral development does not leave any such possibility open, it remains behind the consciousness exercising, from the other side of it, its secret power over human life. It is not discovered to us by an immediate feeling, but only by a deeper consideration; therefore is it that only a few have ever had any presentiment of its controlling power. Man in his moral activity is also not at all to trouble himself about this law; while God has given to him the moral law for his actualization, He has reserved to Himself the realizing of that universal world-law as a holy right of majesty; our moral development is subordinated to this law in a manner analogous to the subjection of our physical development to the law of nature; it is not law for us.

It rests upon this universal law of the world, that the evil as well as the good act, gives to the will, from which it proceeds, if at the first ever so slight and imperceptible, an inclination to the objects, which the one or the other has made for its contents, that further this inclination, the longer the will yields itself up to it, becomes so much the more strong and established. If experience teaches, that the service of the good, possesses a power confirming in the good, this holds true to a much greater extent on the side of the evil, and this from grounds which will have to be developed in the second chapter of the fourth Book.—

As in all development the progressive principle is necessarily the first and commencing one, so in the moral development of man, the free self-determination of the will must absolutely make the beginning. And that with this commencement, the self-determination does not immediately pass over into pure determinateness, we have already seen. Most assuredly the will is at every point of the moral development, that first self-decision excepted, to use the words of *Herbart*, already in some manner characterized, but in the earthly life never fully or completely—

if it were completely characterized in the fundamental direction willed by God, man were then a saint, a holy one—but ever increasingly so. And these further determinations, which the will gives itself, according to their real causation, do not come from the determinateness which it already has—for however little this is effectless in the moral development, the inner progression in the same can still not be its product—but from the will itself, in so far as it is still relatively undetermined. Behind those dispositions and confirmed attributes of character, which owe their existence to the self-determinations of the will, it has always still a concealed sphere of incalculable self-movement. The working power of this self-motion is, in relation to that acquisition of dispositions and characterizations, not at all unlimited; but still the new determinations proceeding from it co-operatingly and in a modifying manner, enter into the course of moral development. So easily the will's moral ability of self-determination is not exhausted, that all the moral moments of life after the period in which the character of man is accustomed to decide itself, are to be regarded simply as revelations and activities of the character thus decided in that point of time.

Accordingly we shall have to distinguish in all moral development, two moments, namely, that of the *condition—habitus*—and that of the *act—actus*.—To regard the moral development merely as an aggregate of nothing but individual actions, so that it never brings about any determinate moral condition, or that the condition brought about, remains destitute of any result and void of all influence upon the further conduct of the subject, is to destroy the notion of development; but it is no less destructive of this notion everywhere to regard the determinate condition as the original, the *prius*, and every moral act and every moral decision as being strictly the necessary expression and consequence of this condition. Much rather, the condition first of all receives a moral significance, only in so far as it has its root in an act, conceived of, as purely internal, as the free turning of the will to a determinate moment, in its ultimate relation, as the voluntary turning of the will to the principle of moral truth or of its turning away from the same, in other words, as the reception of this principle into the inmost disposition of the mind, or as the shutting up of the heart against it. By such

internal decisions, in which consciousness and the power of action are compressed into a single point, an abiding, permanent condition is founded; the will has thereby given itself a determinate tendency, from which again at the requisite occasionings, whole series of individual actions or omissions proceed.[1] In these series accordingly, so long as they are not broken off, nor receive a new direction, by a new ground-decision, and regarded in relation to their immediate origination, the retentive principle decidedly preponderates; self-determination from out the indeterminate is present in the same, as negative factor, only in so far as it excludes all necessity from the real consequences of the individual actions and omissions resulting from that ground-act. But new ground-decisions, which again commence whole series of determinations, are excited in the will, by the new relations and spheres of influence with which it comes in contact, in the progressing development of human life.

The act in this sense is the producing cause, the condition, the product; but there cannot be wanting in the latter the tendency to maintain and reveal itself in corresponding actions. The words of Christ, Matt. xii. 33, embrace both moments together. As from the nature or character of the tree the determinate character of its fruit follows of itself, so do the good and evil conduct of man proceed from the good or evil condition or character of his heart; but this condition or constitution of heart is itself again conditioned by the ground-decisions of his will—*ποιήσατε τὸ δένδρον καλὸν—σαπρόν.*[2]—

We shall allow ourselves here to halt for a moment in the progress of our consideration, in order to direct attention to the different phases which the consciousness of freedom is accustomed to pass through in its relation to determinism. *In the first place*, upon the stand-point of the natural consciousness, the free self-determining moment is revealed, the moment of the deter-

[1] In an instructive manner, *Thomas Aquinas*, in the *Summa, prima Secundae*, qu. 51, art. 2, 3, after the example of *Aristotle*, occupies himself with the question, how a *habitus* of the agent can arise from his actions.

[2] *ποιεῖν* is here used in its real, strict sense, and must so be taken, especially as when one translates: if you admit or suppose that the tree is good, you must also admit the fruit to be good, and so on—the grounding of the same by: *ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ καρποῦ τὸ δένδρον γινώσκεται* is not at all congruous.

minateness is concealed. Man relies entirely upon the immediate feeling, which either accompanies the individual resolve upon an action, or which he is able in every instance immediately to call forth in himself, namely, that he is just as much able to choose the one as the other among the objects of choice. With this feeling, it remains concealed from him, that in every individual resolve, the previously existing determinateness of his inner life exercises an influence, and that, that consciousness of his indeterminateness may also rest upon the mere non-perception of the determining grounds. *Then*, in the second place, upon the stand-point of a more sagacious, intelligent consideration, the relation becomes inverted; freedom conceals itself, and determinateness surrounds the consideration of the origination of the individual resolve, as a brazen chain, of which no one link is wanting. Freedom saves itself here from the doubts of the understanding, unless it becomes abandoned to them, behind the bulwark of a credible presupposition, to which we are necessitated by conscience and the Holiness of God.—It is easy to understand, that a determinism, which with this is concluded, should readily make itself valid as the only scientific mode of thought. By its most modern advocates this superiority on its behalf is expressly laid claim to, namely by *Romang* and *Sigwart*. But an opinion which sacrifices, to the greater ease of formal scientific construction, the highest moments of the contents, which scientific thinking endeavours to embrace as a whole, an entirety in itself connected together, those moments, which most of all spur on the human spirit to restless inquiry and to the extension of its notions—such an opinion renders no true satisfaction even to the requirements of science. If any one tell us: he cannot accept the notion of freedom, because it introduces division into the unity of his scientific thinking, we are only able to conclude from the same, that the sphere of his unity is too narrow and requires therefore extension. One is most of all surprised at this talk about the exclusive scientific character of determinism, when, as is the case in *Romang's* doctrine of natural religion, the earnest trouble to firmly retain, together with the deterministic method of consideration and its consequences, those highest contents of human life, conducts to a series of contradictions, which one cannot exactly consider as requirements of a scientific opinion.—As the *third phase*, we can

only regard that which is presented to us upon the stand-point here opened up to view, upon which the determinateness of the present moment by preceding moments is not denied, but receives in part prescribed bounds and in part becomes reduced to earlier self-determination. If the doctrine of freedom is able to maintain this twofold assumption, it retains and maintains its integrity against its opponents; but it no longer excludes determinism altogether and absolutely, but recognizes somewhat of truth therein and first of all obtains its own full determinateness by taking it up in its connection.—

Every development, that of the moral, as also that of organic life, has its *epochs*, the nature of which, consists quite in general in the progressive principle having at such periods, the decided preponderance over the conservative and identical principle. New impulses of development break forth irresistibly, and displace in rash change the consisting formations. Where these epochs are the most significant they appear to found an absolutely new beginning, and to wish to sever every connexion with the previously developed state. But it, is very soon seen, that in the concealed inward parts, a thousand delicate, but firm threads, maintain the connexion even in the most severe separation.

In the moral development, it is especially in these epochs, in which the *freedom of the will* of man reveals the energy of its self-determination. Now in the sphere of organic life, where the development is immediately and inseparably bound to the law of nature, these epochs necessarily preserve the one direction to the completion of the entire organism. It is otherwise with the moral development of man. Within the bounds of his earthly existence there is always, according to the above, behind the already developed moral character, a concealed sphere of incomputable self-activity of the free will, and only in so far as such a sphere still exists are we able to speak of epochs in the moral development. Since such an epoch by the excitation of the inmost spiritual life, powerfully excites at the same time this free self-determination, the epochs *may* here become turning points. Two different courses present themselves to man between which he must choose, and the direction he here gives to his moral life, that it will maintain until perhaps a new turning point takes place.

Truly, in the absolute sense, there is only one turning point for the development which has once been disturbed by sin, namely the decision between the continuation of the old life, or the commencement of a new one, in regeneration. But this absolute turning point cannot here become the subject of consideration, if for no other, for this reason, because its possibility attaches to conditions, which absolutely lie beyond the sphere of human freedom. However, we cannot deny that such epochs and turning points in a subordinate and partial manner, are to be found apart from, and prior to, the entering into a conscious and self-dependent participation in the redemption by Jesus Christ. Most commonly they take place in those periods which, at the same time, form epochs in the natural development of man. It is for instance at the entrance upon the riper age of youth, which, the well-known allegory of *Prodicus* respecting the choice of *Hercules*, justly represents as an especially conspicuous turning point. Still these moments in the spheres of moral and natural development do not always, or at all necessarily, coincide. The physiological and psychological crises may, just as remarkable changes and convulsions of the external life, only operate as *excitants* and *impulses* to a thorough self-decision; but it depends upon the will, whether it will heed them or not. And in innummerable instances they leave not a trace behind them, while quite independent of them, there are other periods, when the entire inner life of man concentrates itself in a determinate resolve, when he, with distinct consciousness, either affirms, and with deeper, more independent feeling appropriates, the hitherto developed contents of his volition and endeavours, or denies and rejects it, in order to turn himself in another direction. The more mature and established the moral life of the individual becomes, so much the more seldom do such epochs take place, and the life becomes proportionally given over to the decided dominion of the conserving tendency contained therein. It then mainly consists in the carrying out of the principles established within, in all the relations of life, and in maintaining the same against the manifold temptations to infidelity. As however in this sphere, there is no external extension, without an inward concentration and strengthening, there is not at all to be separated from the maintenance of an already appropriated contents, that also of a progress in the appropriation.—

If now moral development results only from *progressive self-determining*, which cannot be regarded as merely the product of the determinations which the will has already given to itself and to the collective inner life; we must maintain, in opposition to the deterministic opinion, that the decisions of the will of one individual ever, strictly speaking, remain for another, although he may be in possession of the most exact knowledge and capable of forming the most enlightened judgment, before they are actually conceived of and revealed, an incalculable magnitude, a magnitude which cannot be reckoned upon.[1] Therefore the very best adapted influence exercised upon others, or the result which is thereby conditioned, can never positively secure a certain given result. We do not here speak of influencing any collective body of individuals, with respect to a definite external act or course of action—for with respect to such an associate body, it may be quite possible for one, who only knows how sagaciously and powerfully to excite the egotistic interests, not to err in his calculation of his influence upon the mass,—but only of such decisions of the will, which have essentially to do with the inner course of the moral development of the individual. That, in this respect, the relation of the means to the end ever remains an irrational one, we learn from experience even there, where the object of our influence is the most dependent and determinable, namely in the *education* of children. There is scarcely a more remarkable evidence of the pertinacity of self-deceptions, which flatter our conceit, in the very face of the most manifest and thousand fold repeating facts, and of how incalculable the power of arbitrariness is in the production of even groundless *opinions*, to say nothing of perverted actions and *methods of conduct*, than the boastful confidence, with which many pedagogues seek to celebrate their own praises by maintaining, that from their education, if one only attended to it, the virtue of youth must as certainly proceed, as a given work of art from the hands of the mechanical artificer.[2]

[1] *Kant*, it is true, although anything rather than a necessarian, thinks otherwise, comp. especially, *The Critick of the Practical Reason*, p. 144 (ed. 6th). How this stands in connection with his notion of causality and of intelligible freedom will hereafter come under consideration.

[2] It is especially strange to find similar presumptuous hyperbolical expressions in *Fichte's Addresses to the German people (Reden an die deutsche Nation)*, since his doctrine of freedom, which maintains *e.g.*

Just as little, with respect to the already *developed character*, is one able before hand to say of another with absolute certainty how he will, in a given case determine, and this too, not arising from the merely subjective ground of the incompleteness of our knowledge, both with respect to the individual about to decide and the manifold determinateness of the given case, but also from the objective ground, that the character, within the sphere of its earthly development, is never so positively established, so absolutely settled, that it could not receive, from the inexhaustible primitive fountain of the will's freedom, still new, even alterative determinations.[1] Is it only in the drama of art and not also in the drama of life, that individuals occasionally fall from and act out of character? If we call to remembrance some one, whose holy disposition of mind is well known to us, and conceive of him as in a situation in which he becomes tempted to a low nefarious villany; we should not hesitate a moment to declare it to be impossible for him to yield to the temptation. We may therefore at a given presupposed case feel ourselves justified in forming such a *negative* opinion. And even in such a case, if we wished to lay down a more thoroughly and exactly adjudged maintenance, we should immediately feel the necessity of cautiously and carefully limiting and conditioning our judgment. For even supposing there was nothing wanting to the completeness of our knowledge of the given individual, supposing that the texture of the inner life lay exposed to us, down to its very finest, most delicate threads; dare we to presume to be able to predict with infallible certainty, in what manner, and with what degree

no man, nay more, no finite being is confirmed in good, *i.e.*, safe and secure of his morality (*Syst. der Siltenlehre*, p. 254), ought to have conducted him to the very opposite conclusions.

[1] When *Schiller's Wallenstein* maintains the opposite:

"Let me but search the inmost core of man,
And then I'll know both how he'll act and will;"

it only belongs to that very false confidence, which overthrows him.

Most remarkably this uncertainty shows itself in the conduct of whimsical, characterless individuals, who are generally controlled in their decisions by the occurrences and thoughts of the moment; just as one is accustomed to characterize individuals of this class, that you can never count upon them nor upon what they may do. But to a certain degree this holds univerally good in this our earthly life, and indeed no less of the most decided villain than of the most noble and best of mankind.

of ease, quickness and resoluteness of energy the temptation would be rejected? and how the matter would stand in relation to any other strong temptation, which according to his peculiar nature came closer to him?—But that the certainty of such a determination beforehand is never an absolutely perfect one, that, strictly speaking, it is ever limited to mere probability, becomes very clear, just by changing the negative form of the judgment, into the *affirmative*. Or may we also lay claim to the ability, under the above presuppositions, to calculate with absolute certainty as to the result, which, in a given case, would arise from the solicitation of a friend to some act of self-denial? Who shall guarantee, that in the very moment, in which this solicitation or requirement is made upon him, that one of those turning-points, arising out of the unfathomable depth of his free will, and which severs many of the threads in that web of the inner life, and attaches new ones to the same, may not arise in his moral development? That just that very excitation to good or evil, will not become the occasion of such a turning point? But therewith every calculation, *which can always only proceed from the development which has already taken place*, ceases to be infallible. If one tells us, that he knows for certain, that his friend in a given case will so and so, and not otherwise, act, this confidence does not arise from a necessity recognized by the understanding. In accordance with this, the Apostle Paul warns the newly regenerate Christian of that self-confidence, which supposes itself to be no longer in need of care and watchfulness (1 Cor. x. 12, Let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall), and exhorts him to work out his salvation with fear and trembling (Phil. ii. 12.). Our subjective will never, within the sphere of our earthly life, becomes perfectly one with its eternal idea, with the objective good; therefore our confident hope, steadfastly to abide in the good, ought ever to have as its dark back-ground, the consciousness of the possibility that in the formal freedom of our will, arbitrary caprice may again lift its head.—

We may at the close of this chapter briefly sum up the result of our critique of determinism and of the main points of the doctrine of indifferent freedom, in the following. If freedom according to its formal moment is the self-determination

of the will of itself from the indeterminate, there is no place for determinism, for this reason, that it—in its spiritual form—while admitting a self-determination of the will of itself, yet only does so with respect to one which springs out of already existing *determinateness;* and the doctrine of indifferentistic freedom becomes excluded, in that while it maintains the indeterminateness as the presupposition of the act of the will, it does not recognize a real self-determination of the will of itself, from which, if it is such, there must proceed some kind of determinateness of the same.

THIRD CHAPTER.

TRANSCENDENTAL AND EMPIRICAL FREEDOM.

According to the results of the preceding chapter the notion of freedom is not merely able to maintain its ground against that mechanical determinism, which knows only of outward determinations of actions, but also against the more spiritual form of the same, which reckons the *peculiar essential being of the acting agent* among the determinations of the action, nay more, allows to it the most decided influence in the origination of the act of the will. It is freedom in the living moral development which has the power to get beyond even this. Indeed an exact and true insight into the nature of moral development has nothing to fear even from *Predetermination*, which, according to *Kant*, is the most dangerous point of the deterministic mode of thought. *Kant* supported it upon experience and the understanding, with his principles of constant connection and immanence; but neither the experience nor the understanding allows the moral development to be so conceived of, as if every present moment were only the necessary consequence of the preceding.

But have we therewith really won, what we sought for, namely, a principle of such independency, that its causal power is able to make a new beginning and therewith to set bounds, beyond which, in the inquiry after the origin of sin, we may not, from objective grounds, proceed (p. 1)? We have first of all a successive development, in which every moral moment appears as a *mixed result* of *free* self-determination and *dependence* upon the previously developed. We recognize in this development therefore an element of freedom, without which it cannot at all be understood, according to its appearance; but this freedom is at every point only a limited one, it is a freedom divided and broken up, in the successive moments of time over which it extends. Even those *epochs* of the moral development, the significance of which we learnt in the preceding chapter, do not form exceptions to this general relativity of character; for

however much the energy of the free will may be augmented in them, and may thus outweigh the influence of the past, they are ever distinguished from the other moments of the development, merely by plus and minus.—In order to satisfy the requirement of our task, freedom must clearly have its root *in the region of the unconditioned.*

As the great matter which especially concerns us, is, to find *the origin* of sin in freedom, the question arises, whether, *sin against the conscience*, against the clear consciousness of present duty, is not perhaps able to furnish that which we seek, namely a pure beginning which destroys the determining influence of earlier committed sins.[1] However, it must make us distrustful of the absolute significance of these individual sins, that the boundary which separates them from others is in reality a flowing one, and that not merely in relation to the judgment of others, but also for the consciousness of the sinning individual. Of many sins,

[1] Sins against the conscience are of two kinds, sins of *consciouslessness* and sins of *infidelity against the conscience*. In the latter, the supremacy of the conscience is recognized, and therefore also in a certain measure asserted; but the resisting tendency of the will is the stronger. The first are the sins of abandoned separation from the authority of conscience. From such a separation of the will from the conscience, there is also naturally developed in the consciousness, by little and little, a relative suppression of the conscience, so that it remains silent with respect to many sins, at the moment of their committal. But, on the one hand, this suppression is never a total one, and on the other, one may still denominate such, as sins against the conscience, in as much as they must at first have overcome an admonitory warning of the conscience, although by their frequent repetition conscience may have been reduced to silence—for only in so far as this is the case, do they indicate that the authority of the conscience has been broken loose from; on the opposite supposition of their not being regarded as sins against the conscience, they would, however great the objective violation of the law might be contained in them, nevertheless, according to their subjective character, belong to the sins which occur not in opposition to the conscience, and indeed to the sins of ignorance. Accordingly we must conclude, that also those sins which bear the impress of audacity and obdurateness are to be reckoned among the sins against the conscience, and this notion then coincides with the earlier discussed notion of *premeditated sins* (vol. i. p. 197 sq.), and the two kinds of the same denoted above with the two kinds of the latter (l. c.) But at the same time we perceive the relative justice of a more limited use of language, which only denominates as sins against the conscience, such as, in their individuality or singleness, were only committed after a conflict with the resisting conscience.

we are able decidedly to say, when we become conscious of them, that they were not sins against the conscience; of others, we just as decidedly perceive the contrary; but between these two, there are a manifold variety of transgressions bearing a doubtful impression.

How could it be otherwise? Is not the clearnesss of the consciousness, upon which the distinction depends, evidently a relative determination? Sinful lust is also shrewd; it knows how to envelope the soul, before the resolve, in that dim twilight in which all definite outline disappears. We are here reminded that whoever in any temptation hears the *No* of the conscience, becomes in that very moment conscious of an *unconditional obligation*, which at once gives all those relativities to the winds. There can be no disputing that the obligation is objectively unconditional; but the manner in which it is present in the consciousness of the individual man, the clearness with which he recognizes it, the strength of the impression which it makes upon him—these are all subjectively conditioned, and dependent upon conditions which have their presupposition in his whole previous development.

And does not experience teach us that one sin against the conscience, is commonly followed by many others in the same direction, and not merely such as bear the character of being perfectly voluntary and of free will, and therefore may be considered, if need be, as purely new beginnings, but also such as are committed with inward conflict and struggling, in which man feels the chains by which he is made captive and in bonds by his own deeds, but which are nevertheless sins against the conscience? Neither have sins against the conscience any letter of dispensation from the striving of a power of every given tendency to continue itself, nor from the power of habit; neither are they pure self-determinations of the will independent of all the contents of the past, but *self-determinations limited by a certain degree of determinateness.*

Notwithstanding there appears still another expedient to present itself, which we may not here, where the task is to save a great spiritual endowment from great perplexity, pass over in silence, this too must excuse the use of apparently despairing means. It is the opinion that there must be in the progressing development of every man, some one moment in which there must arise a

perfect *equipoise of oppositely determined impulses*, the strength of which in the individual is just the result of his past development at the time being. By this equality, the determining influence of everything which had been prior to this moment, would be cancelled, and the man be placed in a condition in which to exercise his unconditioned self-decision, by which there were won for his further moral development a *fundamental basis of freedom*.—Apart from the fact, that according to this hypothesis, the life of man, after he has been awakened to moral conciousness, would be divided into two periods, in the second of which he were morally answerable, but not in the first; in the second evil might be found which had arisen in freedom, in the first, on the contrary, evil which had some other unknown origin, and allowing it further as probability to hold good, that in the vacillations of every life, such a momentary equipoise at some time or other occurred, what sort of freedom were that, which is to be in this way saved? A freedom which were at the same time the most complete dependence upon external circumstances, as was earlier shown to be the case with the equilibrious theory in general. But it is also a purely arbitrary presupposition, that the power of one's own past, manifests itself merely in the determinate energies of different impulses, but that the will itself is excluded therefrom.

If then there is nowhere here any open ground to be found, for the procedure of the free act from the unconditioned, nowhere the *Archimedian* point, from which the principle of freedom might in an original manner determine the development, then that reference to the past, which is said to conceal in its bosom the germ of the present, urges us incessantly backwards from one moment to another, until we arrive at the *commencing point of the conscious moral development* of the individual, in proximity to which, if not perhaps coincident with it, the first real sinning of the individual is surely to be met with. However decidedly we may feel obliged to reject the natural necessity of that predeterminism which *Kant* regarded as insurmountable in the empirical sphere, we cannot nevertheless conceal from ourselves that every successive moment is in some way conditioned by the preceding. If therefore there is to be maintained, in relation to human life, an unconditioned freedom in the inner self-

determination, a pure procedure of the self-decision from the state of indecision, it must be capable of being shown in that commencing point. If it can here be shown, the consciousness of guilt, which imputes every sin to us fully and entirely, receives therefrom its sufficient explanation. However much the consequence of the sinful condition may be in the sinful act, which we in the present moment have not at all in our power, this sinful condition has its root again in that first commencing sin. If then in the immediate further course of development, there is at every point, only a limited freedom, mixed up with a degree of dependency, this element of unfreedom, which we here meet with, resolves itself again into freedom; for it is grounded in that original act of free self-determination.—

But indeed this expedient too is denied us. For if there were at the very porta of our conscious existence, such an *individual sin-fall*, as the stepping forth of the will out of a state of pure indecision into a sinful decision, as a subversion of the course of development, which up to that point had been normal, this dark deed with the nightly shadow in which it envelopes our entire life, would form the irremoveable back-ground of our memory. But who is able to say definitely when, and how, he, for the first time, acted in contradiction to his awakening moral consciousness? Certainly our memory, if our attention is only early enough directed to this point, carries us much farther back than we are commonly accustomed to suppose, and many a one will be conscious, when *e.g.* the first thought of hatred, of envy and of revenge were enkindled within him, and what a wild tumult they excited in the soul of childhood. But if we descend deeper into the shaft of self-recollection, we discover behind these earliest moments still others, by which they were prepared, and which must therefore have been of like character; and if we seek to fix these, yet other similar emotions loom up in our memory which, when we would hold them fast, loose themselves again in an uncertain twilight. To a pure beginning, to an original determining act it is absolutely impossible in this way to attain. But we are not able to find such a beginning, because in truth it is not existent. However significantly important the epoch of the awakening moral consciousness may be, it has everywhere a past behind it, which is not without a co-determining influence upon the conduct of the child at that turning-point.

The freedom therefore of the *first decision*, to which we are able to attribute moral significance, is not at all an unconditioned one; indeed it is not *everywhere equally conditioned*. Or is it perhaps to be a matter of indifference with respect to this moment, how the child prior to this point has been trained and disciplined, whether one has accustomed it to observe the will of its parents, in which the moral command has hitherto clothed itself, to control its passions, to respect the established regulations of its narrowly limited life, or whether such training and discipline have been entirely wanting? If educating influence cannot yet communicate the *principles*, it can nevertheless assuredly be no superfluous work, in relation to the future moral development conditioned by self-determination, in the meantime, prior to the commencement of the moral development, to elaborate the *stuff* as much as possible. It also becomes clear, how that in the all-mutable, all-transforming stream of time, that first moment itself, in which the firstling of conscious sin becomes born, will, in different individuals, be very differently determined in its circumstances, and the relation of the same to the deciding of the will. If now even for one of riper years the different degrees of temptation, and whether the moment of trial finds the inner life gathered up in itself and equipped, or whether it takes it by surprise in a moment of heedless unpreparedness, are indisputably of co-determining influence—in the manner *e.g.* that we should expect with the greatest probability, that an individual, who, according to his moral constitution was not strong enough to resist a determined, for him especially powerful temptation, would reject another less powerful one—how is the child in the first moment of its moral majority to be elevated above the influence of these distinctions?

And here the question presses itself upon us, whether it is at all conceivable, that the very highest decision with respect to the form of the moral life, would be entrusted to the weak hand of *childhood?* We say: *the highest decision;* for whatever change may take place in the further course of development, by virtue of the continuous working of freedom within it, the general direction of the development must nevertheless, according to the connection of this opinion, be given in that first decision. Certainly an extraordinarily hazardous assumption! We know very well, that with the awakening of the moral consciousness, an absolutely

new, from the preceding steps of the development, inexplicable *principle*, presents itself. But this principle in the inner life of man is, undoubtedly, *according to its development* by graduated distinctions determinable; who now is prepared to maintain, that it is a matter of indifference, whether that decision is entrusted to the highest step or degree of this development, or to the lowest, to a step, upon which the soul has as yet no definite idea of the real significance of its resistance against the voice of conscience? No one doubts, but that there belongs to the act of childhood, a smaller degree of imputability, than to the act of manhood; and according to this assumption, a decision of the will of childhood, is to be the only one upon which the full and undiminished burden of imputation falls!—

According to this then, it is a vain endeavour to seek to find, for the pure self-grounding of our temporal being by means of freedom, in our life in time, an unoccupied position, quite unconditioned by everything which has preceded. And nevertheless it is only such an *original self-decision*, lifting itself out of a perfectly indeterminate state of being, which is able to explain and ground that participation in freedom, which we have found in the progressing moral development. Without such a pure beginning by self-determination, but which we have found to be impossible within the development of man in time, this limited and divided freedom unsteadfastly and untenably flits about in the air; on the ground of a practical empiricism, *i.e.* a mode of thinking which seeks for the subjective conditions of the moral constitution of man only in the sphere of empiricism, the doctrine of determinism can never thoroughly be refuted. If therefore, there is not here to be found a beginning before the beginning, the mind will nevertheless assuredly ever closely abide by the testimony of the moral consciousness, in spite of all the doubts of the understanding, that man is free; but how the notion of the same is then to be maintained upon scientific ground, is not to be seen.

Thus the course of our investigation compels us to *step beyond the region of the temporal*, in order to find the source of our freedom of will. If the moral condition in which, irrespective of redemption, we find man to be, is to rest with himself, with his self-determination, if there is to be truth in the testimony of conscience,

which imputes to us our sins, if there is to be truth in the declaration of religion, that God is not the author, but the enemy of sin, then the freedom of man must have its beginning, in a sphere beyond the domain of time, in which alone pure, unconditional self-determination is *possible*. In this region is that power of original decision to be sought for, which precedes and preconditions all sinful conditions in time.—It is certainly very remarkable that a Philosopher of *Herbart's* tendency, just as disinclined to the bold wings of speculation, as given to the careful observation of psychological phenomena, finds himself notwithstanding necessitated, to transfer the origination of evil in man, to a region beyond the sphere of phenomena, and to appoint it a place, in a kind of intelligible world, although of course not in the Kantian sense, in the inner conditions of the simple essences, which "are not temporal but persistent, and only liable to a mutual limitation, when namely various and opposite conditions meet together in one and the same essence."[1]

In determinations such as the above, the unfathomable depth of our consciousness of guilt first of all discovers itself to us, and only herein do we find the solution to the riddle of that inextinguishable melancholy and sorrow, which forms the concealed ground of all human consciousness, and which is the most deeply felt just by those possessed of a more noble nature. The animal is joyous and contented with the satisfaction of its natural wants and security from outward disturbance and danger; in the human consciousness that dark background casts its shadows even upon the brightest moments, and amid the sounds of heartiest inmost joy, a tone of secret lament makes its way. We may not here dilate upon, but only hint at, how many peculiar traits in the arts and mythology of ancient times, and in the people's poetry and song of modern times, may here find their ground. Moreover, that anxiety and sorrow, which modern philosophers have wished to regard as the pervading and constant character of animal life, is, when generally maintained, scarcely anything else than a reflection, which the sorrow of the human self-consciousness throws upon the animal world. But if in some animals this essential shyness and timidity is really inwoven in

[1] *Gespräche über das Böse*, p. 161 sq.

their nature it stands together in connection with their life or their freedom, being constantly threatened by powerful enemies. Only *Personality* has in itself this original source of pain and discomfort, and it alone can have it, because Personality alone has a beginning of its existence without the bounds of time.

But in this self-determination, without the bounds of time, of personal beings, is contained the surest inner guarantee, for the *imperishableness of the existence* which belongs to them, in distinction from the mere existences of nature. They have not arisen in time; how shall time be able to take away with it their existence? We are indeed very far from appropriating the words: that which originates in time, also perishes in time, as a self-evident axiom, for which it has more recently often been passed current.[1] The *necessity* of re-annihilation does not follow from the temporal beginning, but certainly the *possibility*. That which once was not, must clearly also be able again not to be. The religious consciousness, if it were obliged to admit the possibility of annihilation, would nevertheless not forsake its faith in the continuance of the existence of all personal essences; it would consider this possibility as one whose realization would ever be excluded by the positive will of Divine love. But upon the ground of philosophy, the conviction of personal immortality, is only then able to be established, beyond the reach of doubt, when the germ of personality is recognized in its *origin without the bounds of time*, in other words, when the guarantee of immortality is found in the primitive creative will of God, by which creaturely personality has its essential existence.

Whether the Holy Scripture teaches the reality of an *eternal damnation, i.e.* a damnation endlessly extended in time, or whether it allows us to hope in a future return of all fallen beings to God, will hereafter, in a later part of our investigations, have to be discussed. But in any case, it forms a part of the essential consciousness of the Christian, that he, through Christ alone, alone through redemption and grace, shares in the blessed fellowship of God. The negative expression for this is his consciousness of having fallen down to unblessedness and condemnation, from which, without this redemption, he would never be able to extri-

1 *E. g.* By *Romang, System der natürlichen Religionslehre*, p. 584, seq.

cate himself through all eternity.[1] This consciousness is not the gloomy melancholy feeling of a weakness and limitation, which alas attaches to the phenomenal existence of man, but where it has once been awakened as the feeling that his natural life is deserving of condemnation before God, there it penetrates through the very joints and marrow, dissevering the very heart of the Ego.—But how an eternal damnation is at all (morally) possible, how a created being should be able to make himself deserving of such a damnation, will first of all become intelligible, when we have learnt to recognize the *transcendental* significance of freedom, and with it, a primitive guilt transcending time.

That many philosophers do not like the notion of freedom, because it disconcerts their system, is quite natural; but when theologians too, who are sincerely devóted to Christian truth, imagine themselves to be only able thoroughly to establish and confirm Protestant theology against Pelagianism, by laying aside the notion of freedom, they may well see to it, whether they are not tearing down what they wish to build.

Many among those who have directed their inquiry to the origin of evil, and also others, have adopted the opinion of a *self-decision lying on the other side of this earthly* life, by which, the moral constitution of man, within the same, is conditioned. The *Platonian* opinion,[2] in which it is not quite clear, what merely belongs to the mythological form of representation, and what, to the contents itself, we pass over. Similar uncertainty rests upon the further development of *Plato's* thought by *Philo*. For when he, in the principal passage,[3] denominates the air as the original

[1] *Kant* upon his standpoint agrees with the expression of this consciousness, *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, p. 95.

[2] The principal passage is found in the *State X.* 617 (*Bekker's* ed.), P. iii., Vol. i., p. 508 seq. Even *Plotin* misses in *Plato's* expressions the proper agreement, on this subject, *Enneade* 4, vol. 2, cap. 1.

[3] In the treatise *de gigantibus*, *Pfeiffer's* ed., vol. ii. p. 360—364. Comp. on the Philonian representation of the primitive fall of souls, *Dähnes Judisch-Alexandrinische Religionsphilosophie, Division I.*, p. 306, seq., and *Gfrörer's Philo, Division* I., p. 371, 374, seq. The pre-existence theories of the rabinico-jewish theology, belong less to this part of our investigation. For although they have the advantage of the Platonico-Philonian opinion, in that they are free from the dualistic conception of the human coporeity (until the Cabbalists

element of the either ascending or descending souls, it might be difficult to show the agreement, between the representation therein expressed, and what he elsewhere teaches of the human νοῦς, as ἀπόσπασμα of the Divine soul or nature, and of Heaven, as its original place of abode. With greater philosophic definiteness, this idea is carried out by *Plotin*,[1] who makes especial use of it, for the explanation of many distinctions among individual souls. Still his opinion, of the universal necessity of evil, prevents him from deriving any real advantage, from that knowledge, for the justification of the doctrine of imputation in the moral consciousness. Entirely from this interest, that thought had been earlier taken up, and further developed, in the Christian Church, by *Origen*. However, the point, where the difficulty really lies, he has not recognized, on the contrary he seeks it, where it does not exist, namely in the existence of the material world and in the manifold variety of created beings. Further, while *Origen* neglects, on the one hand, to guard his pre-existence-doctrine against temporal conditionality, in that he describes it, as a being temporally preceding the earthly life, on the other hand, he attributes to it too much. For it does not content him to denominate it a perfectly holy and blessed life: but he makes these spirits, in their primitive condition, share in the very essential substance (*Wesenheit*) of God.[2] But thereby, apart from the unclear, emanatistic representations, which are here to be

who generally fall back again upon this representation), they nevertheless do not embrace the thought ethically, as that opinion does, since they do not at all explain therefrom the moral impurity of the soul in its earthly life. The chief passages from the Rabbins, on the pre-existence of the soul, are to be found in *Eisenmenger*, Part i. p. 467, seq., Part ii. p. 8, seq.; with which may be compared *Flügges Geschichte des Glaubens an Unsterblichkeit, etc.*, vol. i., p. 45—74.—The manner in which the *Book of Wisdom* alludes to the pre-existence, cap. 8, ver. 19, 20, appears to intimate a twofold and opposite constitution or character of pre-existing souls, and a corresponding contrast of their bodies.

[1] Comp. especially the fourth *Enneade*, vol. ii., cap. 1—6, and the striking remarks on *Plotin's* doctrine of imputation and his notion of freedom, by *Vogt*, *Neoplatonismus und Christenthum*, p. 74, 87, 91 seq.

[2] *Origen's* method of representation may be seen from the work περὶ ἀρχῶν, II. cap. 9, 6, comp. with II. cap. 1, 1, I cap. 8, 2, and 4, IV. 36, in the summary repetition. Compare *Thomasius' Origen*, p. 154 seq., 160 seq., 290 seq., also p. 329 seq., the interesting parallel with *Philo's* opinion of the primitive condition and fall of souls.

found, the difficulty, of conceiving of the fall of this spirit-world, is enhanced to impossibility.

The Church development of the doctrine, was so much less at liberty to appropriate that fundamental thought, since it found it in very questional connection with other representations, the hetorodox origin and character of which could not remain concealed from it. In the rigid *Augustinian* tendency therefore, it completely forced the presuppositions of the moral depravity and guilt of the individual, into the *fall of our first parents;* in the tendency more or less inclining to *Pelagianism*, it endeavoured still to prove that there is a freedom in the temporal life of the individual, as the principle of individual culpability. The opinion of a pre-existence of spirits, conditioning this earthly life, became a dreamy fancy of individual, isolated theologians, as of *Scotus Erigena*[1] and of smaller isolated parties, as of some of the Catharists. Not until more modern time, at the more thorough investigation of the notion of freedom, and thereby, at the recognition of the difficulty of explaining, from the merely temporal life of man, the consciousness of guilt grounded in freedom, could the deeper significance of that thought be again brought to view.

Precisely at this point, was the notion first of all again taken up by *Kant*. We may here, as in many other respects, regard it as a matter much to be desired, that our philosophic theology should again more closely attach itself to *Kant*, that it should never forget, notwithstanding the untenability of his results, how

[1] It is true *Scotus* represents man *in primo homine* as falling or sinking down, from his intelligible being, into this temporal, sensational life. As, however, he does not consider the particular fall of the first man as real history, *de divis. naturae* l. iv. c. 15, and on the other hand, assumes, that man was originally destined by God to multiplicity of number, only not by means of sexual propagation, l. c. l. iv., c. 12, there appears, if that transition, from the intelligible into the sensational being, is at all to have any real significance, to lie at the bottom, the idea of an intelligible, primitive condition of individual spirits—ex prima conditione—although *Scotus* has nowhere expressly represented it. On the contrary, the expressions of the Mystic *Eckart*, which run in a somewhat similar strain, cannot be regarded in the same sense (comp. *bei Martensen*, p. 27, 126). For what *Eckart* means, is not a purely spiritual being and doing of man, preceding and conditioning this earthly life, but a union, of the mystico-speculative thinker with the Absolute by an intellectual intuition, transcending everything temporal.

much there is to be learned from his energetic spirit. The harvest day of a future closing epoch might easily show, that what he has rendered, in spite of the limiting formalism of his ethics, has borne better and more enduring fruit for this science, than what has been brought forth upon the ground of *Spinoza*, in opposition to *Kant*. It will then equally become clear, how the consequences of his philosophy, practically considered, tend, with a much more powerful impulse, than *Kant* himself, and still more his school, has recognized, to *Christianity*, to real Christianity, and not to an emendation of the same, by moral or speculatively allegorical interpretation. The subjective tendencies in the further carrying out of this practical philosophy are, it is true, preponderatingly those of the negative enlightenment at that time; in its principles, in its objective spirit, it stands high above the frivolous and superficial notions, which then wished to sway everything in this sphere.—

The Critick of Pure (theoretical) Reason had led to the negativing result, that the reason was not able to know any object as it really is in itself. That behind the connection of things, which it cognizes, there lay such a kingdom of things, which in themselves, according to their essential nature, were to be regarded as determining ground of the same, passed as certainly valid; but the *nature* of the thing in itself, therewith therefore, also the manner in which it is the determining ground of that connection, prove themselves to be absolutely unascertainable. It is true the possession of *synthetic judgments* was *à priori* vindicated in favour of the reason, as opposed to mere empiricism and scepticism; but these synthetic judgments *à priori* with their logical fundamental basis, the pure conceptions or categories of the understanding, were still only to be regulative principles for each possible experience, they were only to be of service immanently but not transcendentally, that is to say, in no way adapted, by being applied to objects of a supersensational, intelligible world, to extend our cognition beyond the empirical world. But as there is no experience possible otherwise than under the ground forms of space and time, and as space and time, although of an aprioric nature, are still not anything attaching to the things in themselves, but only subjective forms of our sensational perception, we may not ascribe to this our empirical world any objective reality, but

have only to regard it as a legitimate connection of our inward perceptions or ideas, in some way excited by the things in themselves, as a world of *phenomena.*

In this phenominal world, to which we also with our entire empirical existence belong, there is prevalent with inviolable power, as the indispenable condition of the possibility of any experience whatever, the *necessity of the causal connection* which affords to freedom, to the ability really to commence a series of changes, not the smallest room. This necessity of the causal connection, by which freedom is entirely excluded from the empirical sphere, is not so much the determination of the volition by inward sufficient grounds, as much rather, that law of the phenominal world, which is given with its dependence on time, and which necessitates us to seek the full causality of every event in another *preceding it according to time.* Supposing even this other to be always a given, determinate condition of the acting subject, it still follows, that the subject in the very moment of action has no longer the decision in his power, consequently is not free.

But *the consciousness of an unconditioned authoritative law for our conduct* is a fact of our reason, which of itself necessitates our recognition. The great significance of this law is this, that it, purely of itself, just by this form of unconditionality and universal validity, in opposition to all impulses arising out of the phenomenal world, determines the will, the maxim, according to which the will decides itself. But if this law determined our maxim materially, by its relation to any object, we could not become conscious of it as of an unconditioned law, since such a law could only be empirically given us, therefore only in the sensational world, and every thing sensational is at the same time conditioned. Accordingly we have in the consciousness of this practical law, the irrefragable guarantee, that we belong not merely to the world of sense, but also to an *intelligible world,* which is exalted above time and space, although we are not at all able, from our position and condition, to lay down any theoretic maintenance respecting its constitution. But if we are not able to avoid the recognition of such an unconditional authorizing law, we must ascribe to ourselves also a will, independent of the nature-law of phenomena and the conditions of time, *i.e.,* we must ascribe to ourselves *freedom.* If now the phenomena were things in them-

selves, freedom would nevertheless remain inconceivable, because then our conduct would in truth be completely determined by the mechanism of nature. But because that which things as phenomena are, is only in our inward perception or idea, but has its ground however in the intelligible, it is not contradictory, that an action, which, as phenomenon considered, stands entirely under the law of the necessity of nature, has at the same time an origin, independently of the causal connection in time, in the intelligible, in the pure, not empirically determined will, *i.e.* is free.[1]—

We have already convinced ourselves (vol. i., p. 366 seq.), that *Kant*, if he resolved earnestly to abide by the intelligible origin, as ground basis of freedom and imputation, with respect to conduct *according* to the law, he must also of course extend this origin to conduct *against, contrary to*, the law. This is the fearful irony of the intelligible world upon the great thinker, who in the vast consciousness of human dignity robs it of its secret; digging down into the deep, he breaks through the crust of the phenomenal world, in search of the pure, autonomic will, and discovers *radical evil.*—

We have in this *intelligible freedom*, indisputably an entirely different ground basis for the *moral imputation of evil*, from any which the empirico-psychological notion of freedom is able to furnish us. Our conscience imputes to us not merely individual immoral actions, but if we begin to make excuse respecting them, that they necessarily arose from a perverted tendency of our inmost being, which has now become a second nature, it makes nothing of these excuses, by immediately imputing to us this very perverted ground tendency. And if we again seek to screen ourselves behind the fact, that this perverted tendency has existed

[1] This exhibition is especially taken from the following of *Kant's* writings:—Aus dem Hauptstück der *Kritik der reinen Vernunft:* Von dem Grunde der Unterscheidung aller Gegenstände überhaupt in Phänomena und Noumena, aus dem Abschnitt derselben: Auflösung der Kosmologischen Ideen von der Totalität der Ableitung der Weltbegebenheiten aus ihren Ursachen, aus dem Haupstück der *Kritik der prachtischen Vernunft:* Von den Grundsätzen der reinen praktischen Vernunft, sowie aus der "*Kritischen Beleuchtung der Analytik der reinen praktischen Vernunft,*" aus dem Abschnitt der "*Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten,*" über den Begriff der Freiheit als Schlüssel zur Autonomie des Willens.

within us from before the earliest period which our memory is able to reach, when it retraces the course of our development in search of its origin, which loses itself in those dim periods of our existence, in which we are not at all able to distinguish between self-determination and determination from others, our conscience, pertinacious notwithstanding all, continues to impute to us this tendency with all its consequences. Now to this otherwise unintelligible procedure of the conscience, the intelligible freedom furnishes us the key, the evidence or proof that its judgment is just. Also the ground determinations of this notion of freedom, discovered by *Kant*, allow us to anticipate that only by it will it be possible to escape the consequence of those of the antieleutheric systems which do not deny the idea of God, namely that of the collective determinations of the human will, therefore of course the evil as well as the good, falling back upon God, either as upon the true subject acting in the same, or as upon the unconditioned author of the absolutely dependent creature.[1]—

It is very significant, that *Kant*, after he had—in the *Critick of Pure (theoretical) Reason*—entirely surrendered the spirit captive to the world of sense, was able, in the midst of the loss of all higher cognition, firmly to retain the unshaken, and immoveable consciousness of an *absolutely valid practical truth*. The regardless character of his progress in his course, of which he makes boast in the *Critick of the Practical Reason* (p. 154) might have convinced him, that, if his critical operations had really the power to destroy all theoretical cognition of the supersensual, no fact of the consciousness whatever—and nevertheless upon such a fact his recognition of an unconditioned, authoritative, practical law rests —would be able to stand against them, if for no other, for this, reason, because such a fact can never be entirely separated from theoretic judgments. In the violence of the consequences, which also in this sphere pressed on to a negativing result, we are able to estimate the strength of the moral consciousness which allowed not the doubt, with respect to that practical truth, even to arise.

[1] Still we must admit that the method in which *Kant* himself applies the notion of intelligible freedom to the solution of this problem, *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, p. 148, 149 (sixth edition), is perfectly unsatisfactory, indeed he does not even touch the real gist of the difficulty.

But this recognition due to the noble spirit of *Kant*, to his earnest love of truth, cannot be allowed to hinder us in the calm investigation of the question, whether his conception of the transcendental notion of freedom, in its more exact determinations, is tenable.

We have here a freedom in an intelligible sphere, which is completely on the remote side of our empirical existence and consciousness, and separated from them by an immeasurable chasm. Indeed the two kingdoms are not merely entirely separated from each other, but their *principles* are directly *contradictory* to each other; in the sphere of the intelligible, freedom alone is prevalent, while in the empirical sphere, nothing is to be found but rigid necessity of nature. But if this be the relation between the two spheres, we have certainly no right whatever assertorily to refer some individual matters of empiricism, in distinction from some others, to this intelligible freedom; and it must appear as a mere assertion of *Kant* simply upon his own authority, when he makes *every individual human action* proceed, according to a maxim which has a relation to the moral law, immediately from the intelligible freedom. For the origination of the consciousness, in relation to the moral law, to act in unison or in contradiction with it, absolutely requires, according to *Kant's* fundamental tenets, as every other event or occurrence in the inner, no less than in the outer life, an absolutely immanent explanation, therefore an explanation from the empirical causal connection. If a single link is here wanting, it cannot arise from the thing itself, but only from some unskilfulness, or if one will, from the necessary limitation of the party explaining the matter. Let us only remember how *Kant* conducts us to the discovery of this intelligible freedom. The determinate transition from the world of sense, into that of the understanding, is not made by the consciousness of self-determination in the individual action, neither by the self-imputation of our actions, to which we are necessitated by our conscience, but by the consciousness of being determined by an unconditioned, authoritative, practical law.[1]

[1] In the "*Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*" this transition appears to be otherwise effected. "This freedom of the will," it is said, p. 124, "practically, *i.e.* in the idea to underlay as condition all its arbitrary actions, is a rational essence, which is conscious of its causality

From this may be derived, if we grant *Kant* all that he demands, a *universal ground of intelligible self-determination* for the temporal life of personal beings; to determine anything further thereon would be more than a modest critical philosophy conscious of its limits, could allow itself to do.[1] To ascribe to the *individual action*, as such, because it is perhaps accompanied by that consciousness of the moral law, the intelligible origin in a distinctive manner, would be to exclude from that origin the permanent, abiding condition, the root of the inward character and disposition of mind, to which indeed, apart from all determinate action, that consciousness may be no less related; but how were the *Critick of the Practical Reason* in the smallest degree justified in this negativing judgment?

It is not the consequence of his scientific principles, but of an atomistic tendency or direction in *Kant's* ethical opinions, independent of the former, when he only refers the requirement of the moral law to the maxim in the formation of the *individual action*. Nevertheless he is not entirely wanting in the consciousness, that the absolute impossibility of determining anything respecting the moral value or worthlessness of human actions, follows from this perfect remoteness, separateness of the intelligible world and its freedom, from our empirical existence and consciousness. "The real morality of actions (merit and guilt)," it is said in the *Critick of Pure Reason*, "remains wholly concealed from us, even that of our own conduct. Our imputations can only be referred to the empirical character."[2]

There further follows from this abstract separation of the two spheres, that the empirically moral life, the moral character of man, can no longer be considered as phenomenon, as the *mani-*

by reason, consequently of a will (which is distinguished from desires) without further condition being *necessary*." But if this is not to be a completely empty tautology, there can only be understood by this consciousness of a "causality by reason, consequently of a will," only the consciousness of the practical law of reason which determines the will.

[1] Compare *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, p. 125, 126.

[2] L. c., p. 429.—Certainly to refer our imputations only to the empirical character, is just as impossible, according to *Kant's* ground tenets, and directly contradicts what he himself says only a few pages on, p. 432. In the empirical as such, according to these ground tenets imputation could have no place whatever.

festation of that intelligible, true being;[1] how could that which is true freedom make its appearance, in its very opposite which excludes all mediation, namely in the inflexible rigidity of a "nature-mechanism?" The phenomenon much rather becomes the most effectual *disguise of the noumenon,* nay more, the severest *contradiction* against the same, although it is said to have its ground wholly in the intelligible, so that "another intelligible character (of the individual man) would have given another empirical character."[2] In fact the intelligible being conditioning our existence in time, can only appear in our empirico-moral life, on the condition, that this empirico-moral life is more than *mere phenomenon,* on the condition, that it has the power *to carry out* that which was originally posited in that existence by free self-determination. On the contrary, if, as *Kant* and others conceive of transcendental freedom, everything behind the scene of this earthly life is absolutely prepared and finished, then the phenomenon, the manifestation, is resolved into mere empty *shine (Schein).*

If we here preliminarily, without being able to determine the relation more exactly, attach to the transcendental notion of freedom, the results which were furnished us by the investigations of the previous chapter, *respecting the nature of moral development,* it follows, that, that principle which *Kant* discovered reveals itself, in the midst of our time-life, much more determinately and powerfully as that which it is, as freedom, than he himself will allow. And this real entrance of the intelligible into our empirical life and therewith the more real significance of the latter, presses sometimes so urgently upon *Kant,* that he seeks, not merely in the *Critick of the Judging Faculty,* to throw a bridge across the chasm between the supersensational and the phenominal, but in the *Critick of Pure, and of Practical Reason,* he sometimes entirely forgets the cleft and so speaks of the intelligible self-determination in relation to what is moral, as if it were entirely of like nature to the empirical causality and its events. This is the reason of *Kant's* often denoting the *intelligible* character of man as his *modus cogitandi*

[1] *In der Kritik der reinen Vernunft,* p. 430, *Kant* calls the empirical character, the *sensational schema* of the intelligible character.

[2] L. c. p. 432.

(Denkungsart) in distinction from his *modus sentiendi (Sinnesart) i.e.* his *empirical* character. It is of the same character, when *Kant* in the *Critick of Pure Reason*, p. 429, *separates* freedom and nature (the innocent defect, or the fortunate constitution, of temperament) in the working of different actions[1]—a method of representation, which, judged of according to the true principles of *Kant*, would prove equally fatal, both to the notion of nature and that of freedom. We must also place to the same account, the method of consideration, earlier touched upon, according to which, evil is derived from an *inability* of man, as intelligible essence, purely to exhibit himself in the empirical life; for if the empirical causality is to have power in itself to limit the intelligible, both must be *essentially of similar nature.* These however are only individual inconsistencies, which have arisen, whatever the value of this method of representation in other respects may be, from the feeling, in itself perfectly correct, of a more vital attachment between the two spheres; from this just feeling *Kant* always returns back again to his real standpoint, on which the intelligible has in the empirical, only its absolute contrast, in that the former is entire freedom and self-dependant essence, while the latter is only necessity of nature and self-less phenomenon.

We have in the above already intimated in what the fundamental error of this entire view of this subject consists. It is, namely, the *proud contempt of our empirical*, therefore in time developing, *being and consciousness*, which since the time of *Kant* and by the influence of *Kant*, has become prevalent in the idealistic tendency of our philosophy. It is an unjust contempt of the empirical entirely to sever and separate the essential cognitive forms of its consciousness, from God and His true revelations, and to chain it fast and entirely to a world of sense, which is said to be nothing but appearance and shine. Has the being of man then besides that timeless intelligible, no other, contents than a sensationalism, analogous to mere animal life, and no other form than an unspiritual mechanism of nature? Does all experience

[1] Also according to the *Critick of the Judging Faculty*, Introduction, p. xviii., the two spheres of the nature-notion and of the freedom-notion are said continually to restrict themselves in their effects in the world of sense!

arise merely from the union of the sensational perception with the formal operations of the understanding? Is there not an experience, which is of the highest, directly spiritual significance? The treatment of this notion in the *Critick of Pure Reason* will certainly know nothing of this; and yet it is by the expression: *Factum of the reason*, with which *Kant* denotes the irrefutable consciousness of the unconditioned, authoritative moral law, only slightly concealed, that to him himself something, which is directly a *fact of the inner experience*, must build the transition into his intelligible world.

If this transition were so successful that man could really possess himself of something from the intelligible world, he would then be easily able to dissipate his painful feelings at the degradation of his empirical world, nay more, at the loss of the same by its resolution into a purely subjective, although necessary, conception. But the acquirement of possession in this sphere is also denied him; he does not get beyond the mere *immanent imperative and postulation in relation to the practical (Sollen und Postuliren in praktischer Absicht)*; if reality be denied the sphere of the mechanism of nature, the world of sense, "freedom too is then only an idea of reason whose objective reality in itself is doubtful."[1]

How singularly strange is the result of this philosophy! It exposes to man, and opens his eyes to view, the nothingness of his empirical world, but at the same time reveals to him how fast bound he is to this nothingness. Beyond, in the heavenly region of the intelligible, it proclaims, truth must reside, but with the same breath, it announces to him, his inability to elevate himself into this region of the true. Thus poised he oscillates between heaven and earth, by both reciprocally attracted and repulsed, only conscious of his forms of cognition and of their subjectivity.

It is the peculiar progress, which *Kant* makes in his *Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason*, that he in the correct anticipatory feeling, of the mere postulation of the intelligible "in relation to the practical" being, even in practical intent, too little, obtains some further determinations respecting the

[1] *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, p. 114.

act of transcendental freedom, in which our empirico-moral constitution is said to be grounded. But do we thereby receive real assistance?—According to *Kantian* ground tenets it is absolutely impossible for freedom, as belonging to the intelligible sphere, to become determined by anything whatever in the phenomenal world.[1] Consequently, if the free will of man has, in an extra-temporal manner, given himself a determination, then *no event* in time, of whatever character it may be, is able to produce a change in the same. Man has, by an intelligible act, inverted the maxims of his conduct, since he has subordinated the maxim of obedience to the moral law, to the maxim of self-love, and just in this inverted subordination radical evil consists.[2] If it is so, then he is absolutely unable again to be liberated from this inversion of the maxims *in any period of time whatever.* Indeed he could not free himself again even supposing, if it were conceivable, that at any time this subjective form of cognition belonging to time, should altogether lose its significance for him; for since it contradicts the notion of the intelligible to suppose the removal or revocation of an intelligible act by means of a second succeeding the same, the supposed inversion, which is also a perversion, of the maxims by freedom, must *eternally remain so.*[3]

Nevertheless *Kant* maintains the possibility of a restoration of

[1] Comp. *e. g. Critick of Practical Reason,* p. 142. There is to the subject, in this his (not standing under the conditions of time) existence nothing which precedes the determination of his will, but every action and especially every changing determination of his existence, agreeable to his inner sense, even the entire succession of his essential existence as sensational being is, in the consciousness of his intelligible essential existence, nothing as result, and never to be regarded as determining ground of his causality as *noumenon.*

[2] *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft,* p. 26 seq.

[3] Predicates which controvert and stand opposed to each other, may, nevertheless, be attributed to the same subject in the same respect; the *time* furnishes and conditions this possibility. If now the intelligible being is essentially timeless, it loses the means and condition of this possibility. Therefore there cannot be two decisions ascribed to the same individual, according to his intelligible character, of which the one cancels the other; although it is very well conceivable, that, according to this his intelligible being, he is one, in so far as he depends upon the infinite principle conditioning him, another in so far as he depends upon his own decision; for here it is just the *diversity of relation* which forms the mediating condition.

man, and that too in this his existence in time, and indeed entirely by his own power;[1] but he has done nothing, no not the very least, in order to make this opinion—I will not say, intelligible, but merely to free it from the manifest contradictions which burden it. It is not by a gradual reform but "by a revolution in the disposition of mind, by a kind of regeneration equal to a new creation, that it is said to be brought about that man in the midst of his time life receives reverence for the moral law, *sufficient* in itself as motive of determination for the volition;"[2] but in vain do we look for a principle which may accomplish this wonderful change, since that transcendental freedom, whose self-decision has absolutely determined the existence of man in time and his empirical character, has taken up into itself this very *perversion of the maxims.*

Kant appeals to the fact that *duty* commands this revolution of the mode of thinking, and that therefore, according to that well-known canon, *I ought, therefore I can*, it must be also possible to man.[3] But this ground will convince no one who has not forgotten the earlier determinations of *Kant.* That radical corruption of the disposition of mind by the perversion of the maxims is indeed not a *non-ability*, a not being able, not a result consequent from the limitations of our nature, but a *not being willing*, in itself, in relation to man as noumenon,, perfectly free, and only for his empirically moral being and doing necessary, in so far as the same are entirely determined by the intelligible decision of the will. If *Kant* had only once concluded, from the imputation of evil which he found rooted in human nature, that, in spite of this its being rooted in the nature, it has its origin not in an inability but in the *intelligible act of freedom*, he could not a *second time* have used the axiom, which thereby is laid at the ground: I ought (to avoid the evil), therefore I can, in order thereby to prove the opposite, the possibility of overcoming that radical evil.—Thus, over against the condition of man held in bondage by sin, the *can*, derived from the moral idea, immediately becomes again an *ought.* If to such an one it is said in the name of the practical law of reason: thou oughtest to be holy in each moment of thy

[1] L. c. p. 48, and other, many other places.
[2] L. c. p. 52, 54.
[3] L. c. p. 49, 54, 60.

life; therefore henceforth, from this very moment, thou canst be so, he would answer you: truly I ought to be able, but I cannot.

Kant more definitely determines his opinion of this "can" as follows: "Evil, as natural propensity, is not *to be destroyed* by human power, because this could only take place by good maxims, which indeed cannot take place, if the highest subjective ground of all maxims is presupposed as corrupt;[1] nevertheless it must be possible *to be overcome*, because it is met with in man as a free agent."[2] This and similar assurances may be in perfect agreement with the Pelagian tendency of that time; but they can never be shown to be the consistent, consequential development of the fundamental thoughts. According to these the extra-temporal act of freedom becomes the unalterable predetermination for the entire course of time;[3] the idle dream of self-redemption

[1] Why, if undoubtedly the requirement of the moral law proceeds upon the entire avoidance of evil, did not *Kant* in this case conclude: I ought therefore I can—? For this reason, we reply from the standpoint of the *Critick of Pure Reason*, because, if, in consequence of such a can, of such an ability, perfect holiness become realized in a human life, the phenominal had here become *equal* to the supersensational, the empirical reality of the idea, wherewith *Kant's* entire metaphysic or theory of cognition, which is completely built upon the permanent separateness and distinctness of the two spheres, would fall to pieces. We do not at all require to take the question objectively; it is enough, that according to this theory of cognition, the human spirit is deficient in an organ for the recognition of such an equality, and its expression in a judgment, which indeed, while it would be a theoretical one, nevertheless would proceed upon the constitution of an object furnished by experience. Therefore such a man, if such an one existed, must be so judged of, not merely in the consciousness of others, but also in his own consciousness, as if there were also for him still existent an immanent imperative, an ought, different from his moral being. Accordingly if there must be for the human consciousness such an ought, essentially transcending the can, the ability, then that axiom: I can, for I ought, is perfectly overthrown. If on the other hand it is to stand, then the theory of cognition contained in the *Critick of Pure Reason* must be given up. For as the consciousness of the moral law makes the transition from the phenominal, into the intelligible world, so the axiom: I ought therefore I can, makes, consistently carried out, the perfect regress, endowed with the possession of the intelligible, from this world into that of the temporal and empirical. But such a regress that theory of cognition absolutely cannot allow.

[2] L. c. p. 35.

[3] *Kant* understands by predetermination simply this, that each individual action, empirically, therefore as an occurrence, considered, has

and regeneration by one's own power has no better fate than that good, well-intentioned supposition of moralists from *Seneca* to *Rosseau*, that the world constantly progresses from bad to better;[1] man continues to lie irretrievably in the abyss of radical evil. *Kant* himself admits this according to the real principle in the passage just adduced, and in his doctrine of Religion, the *propensity (Hang)* to evil is often regarded as absolutely indestructable in human nature. But independently of his notion of intelligible freedom, another side of his system necessitates him to this recognition, namely, his dualism between idea and reality, which does not allow of the complete removal of evil from the empirical existence of man, but only the so called *endless approximation to the same.*— And this unavoidable, ultimate result of the *Kantian* thinkings will not surprise him, by the comfortlessness of the doctrine, who considers, that to so earnest a conception of sin, Christianity alone is able to furnish the hope of real Holiness and Blessedness, by means of Redemption.

Further, it is easy to see that the *real form of moral life*, decidedly contradicts the notion of intelligible freedom thus conceived of. Candidly considered, that reality, as we have seen in the previous chapter, neither shows us the *absolute freedom*, which *Kant's* practical reason seeks and postulates, nor the mere *unfreedom and necessity of nature*, which his theoretical reason discovers, but a *conditioned and limited freedom*. We saw that in the midst of this temporal life, the self-activity of this freedom asserted itself as *progressive* principle of moral development. But with this *neither* the *Kantian* notion of freedom, *nor* that of the causal connection of everything temporal, is compatible. And just as little can this notion of freedom be brought to accord with the *conservative* side of the moral development which preserves and maintains the constant connection of its moments; it denies this side in quite the same manner as the empirical notion of freedom that of indeterminism. Each individual act of the will, in

its complete causality in conditions which precede according to time, and therefore are no longer in the power of the subject in the moment of the action. But from his determinations respecting the relation of the intelligible to the phenominal there follows still quite another, and much more powerful predeterminism. The extra-temporal volition becomes for all volitions in time the most invincible fate.

[1] L. c. p. 5.

so far as it is regarded as a moral act, imputable to the subject, breaks forth out of the abyss of transcendental freedom, absolutely without connection with the preceding, and therefore also without significance for the moral future of the subject. *Kant* expresses this very significantly as follows: each evil action, when one seeks the rational origin of the same, must be considered as if the individual had fallen into it directly from a condition of innocence.[1]

Have we now first of all still to show that the judgment of the *consciousness of guilt*, however strongly, when more carefully analyzed, it affirms the very germ of the *Kantian* theory, does not all agree with its wider extension and development of the same, inasmuch as it does not keep itself, without making any distinction whatever, to the mere abstract fact of a transgression of the known moral law? We do not wish here to repeat what has been so strikingly said upon the stand-point of an intelligent determinism by *Herbart* in his Psychology, as well as by *Romang* in his work on the *Freedom of the Will and Determinism on the Ground of the Phenomena of the Moral Judgment*, against the opinion that imputation presupposes in every act of the will, as such, an absolute freedom. Only allow us to add a few remarks.

Kant, in a few passages of his writings, finds a strong confirmation of his notion of freedom, in that we impute the criminal act of a man entirely to himself, and that we consequently judge him as absolutely free, although we should be obliged to regard his act, empirically taken, as the necessary result of various circumstances, which could not be imputed to him, of bad education, bad innate ground of temperament, evil company, and the like. Ought the unprejudiced moral judgment to proceed in this way? Of course it imputes the evil act, even when committed under such circumstances, to the agent of the same; but, at the same time, it is far from recognizing it as the *necessary result of these circumstances*. Much rather it supposes that the self-determining of the actor is the *limiting* power for the co-determining influence of those moments, that the real decision lies in the tendency of his will, which has its ground in his self-determination whether in the present or in the past moments of his life, and that upon this it depends whether he yields to or resists the powerful temptations. But because it admits a co-operative

[1] L. c., p. 42, 43,. Kr. d. r. V. p. 432.

influence from those circumstances independent of the self-determination, it universally makes, so far as it is aware of the same, *distinctions in the degree of imputation*. Where indeed the will resisted the temptation, but the temptation, as the result of all these circumstances, was so powerful, that an extraordinary power of resistance of the will had been necessary to surmount and overcome it, there the measured judgment moderates and softens down its expression respecting the guilt of the committed act. On the other hand, the guilt is found to be doubly heavy, when it knows of the evil doer that all those circumstances stood in a favourable relation to his moral culture. So little does the moral judgment, uncorrupted by the one-sided doctrines of imputation of the schools, coincide with the *Kantian* abstraction! It can only sometimes wear the appearance of confirming it, in that the true relation of those outward conditions of the moral development of the subject sinning is *never*, strictly taken, fully known, often entirely unknown, to the person judging, so that he, in so far as a judgment is required of him, perhaps as to the conditioning of a given action, is obliged to limit himself to the act in its isolated individuality. Even the confession of the subject may indeed discover to us the inward genesis of the transgression, but can never fully disclose that relation, since the subject himself is not able perfectly to acquaint himself with the same, and still less able to institute a safe comparison with the form of the same in others. But even within that restricting itself to the action in and for itself the moral judgment does not at all hold itself, as it must do if it acts consistently with the *Kantian* notion of freedom, to the mere naked *fact of the transgression of a moral command present to the consciousness*, but it still recognizes distinctions in the degree of the guilt, which partly rest upon the objective distinctive value of the violated duties and the distinctive magnitude of the violation, and partly upon the distinctive degree in the clearness of the consciousness of the duty presenting itself.

Christianity attaches itself to and confirms these facts of the moral judgment. It first of all does justice to that abstract method of consideration by everywhere presupposing in man the moral consciousness, and by making him *absolutely responsible* for every transgression of the moral law. This presupposition so

thoroughly pervades the entire New Testament that it would be quite superfluous to instance individual passages. The Apostle Paul recognizes this inextinguishable spark even in the dark heathen consciousness, and therefore ascribes also to the heathen responsibility for the things which they committed, Rom. i. 32, ii. 9—16. May not perhaps these adjudged declarations of the Holy Scripture be so interpreted as to have their real object and subject in that extra-temporal act of freedom, which according to the *Kantian* conception must assuredly make all the sins of man, at least all conscious sins, absolutely equal with respect to their imputation? That all sins have a specific equality with each other, in their originating from one and the same common perverted principle, follows from the very fundamental views of Christianity, so certainly as there is contained in the same the strongest antithesis between good and evil. But within this essential equality Christianity recognizes the strongest *distinctions in the greater and smaller amount of guilt* incurred in an offence. It knows of a sin, which, in express contrast to all other sins, will never be forgiven, Matt. xii. 31, 32, of another, also in contrast to other sins, to which the brotherly prayer is not to be extended, 1 John v. 16. But these critically decisive sins are manifestly not that radical evil which is said to be universal and extra-temporal, but individual acts of individuals in time. They are also developments in time, by which men are able so to enhance the enormity of sin in themselves, that the Divine grace withdraws from them, and they are given up to their perverted minds, Rom. i. 24 seq. and elsewhere. Further, Christianity knows of distinctions of amount in guilt which rest upon the different degrees of the *consciousness* of the significance of the sinful act, and the binding authority of the opposing moral norms. He who does not know these norms, as of his Lord's will, and violates them, is also deserving of punishment, because he ought to have recognized their universally binding authority even without this in his conscience; but he is deserving of double punishment, who thus knows them, Luke xii. 47—48. To whomsoever much is given of him shall be much required; with the augmentation of the consciousness the curse upon the perverted act is enhanced. Therefore there is a κρίσις directly attached to the appearance of Christ in the history of the world. Sodom and

Tyre and Sidon have fallen on account of their sins, under the judgment of God; but in a much greater degree those Galilean cities which thrust from them the Son of God. For if the works had been done in Sodom and Tyre and in Sidon, which were done in those cities, they had repented and changed their minds, Matt. xi. 21—24. There is therefore not merely distinctions in the amount of guilt, but the same are also conditioned by circumstances which lie within the bounds of *time;* and these too do not apply to the limitation attached to human imputations, but to the *Divine imputation;* how does an opinion agree with this, according to which all guilt and imputation only stand in relation to the decisions of a freedom without the bounds of time, to which everything happening in time is said simply to bear the relation of consequence and result?—

It is a two-fold cognition whose deficiency made the just conception of the relation between the intelligible being of man and his empirical time-life impossible to *Kant.*

On the one hand, he misperceived—truly not he alone, but those in general of that spiritualistic tendency, considering space and time as a limit foreign to the essential nature of the spirit, which has often enough made its appearance in philosophy and theology—that all derived, conditioned being requires in some manner space and time *for the full reality of its essential existence.* The created spirit cannot possess itself, the concrete contents of its being, at once as with a blow so to speak, because it possesses itself not from itself, because it has a dependent beginning to its existence; therefore it must become, in order to be, what it is according to its idea. But the form of becoming, of development, is *time.* The created spirit can further, by virtue of its conditionality, not have itself without excluding from itself another conditioned being, spiritual as material, without separating itself from another not self,—for spirits are by nature as impenetrable as bodies, only that the former are able to overcome their impenetrability by means of love as the *communicativum sui.* This essential limit requires its determinate expression, and finds it in a *corporeity* adequate to the spirit. If the finite spirit loses the power to express its immanent limitation in this determinate externality objective to

111728

it, it is then also deficient in the ability to operate upon, and reveal itself to, another nature of its own kind. Accordingly as time and space separate the created being as individual, they also again unite and bind the separated as conditions of empirical cognition,[1] wherein the spirit receives up into itself the fulness of the particular being.

We are not at all justified in the maintenance, that the determinate form, which time and space, our successive development and our corporiety, have at present for our perception and consciousness, is the *only possible* one, and the one which is always and everywhere valid; but we are justified in considering the entrance into the now and the here, into time and space, as a *progress* in the being of the individual spirit, as that whereby it is first of all able to attain the full determinateness of its essential existence. Philosophy seeks the lowly and the exalted estate of man in false places, so long as it seeks the former in the time-and space-form of his existence, the latter in the timelessness and the so-called pure spirituality of the same. As the true Master shows himself great in the small and the limited, so God has not disdained—this is the *other* truth which *Kant* has misperceived—to entrust to this existence enclosed by time and space the very highest contents. It is universally the Divine method not ostentatiously to expose its great thoughts; it much rather holds them in concealment, extinguishing their beams to bold presumptuous eyes, and hides its highest works in an humble form. When the genuine artist knows how, within the narrow compass of the human frame, to reveal an infinity of beauty and significance, from whom has he learnt it but from the creative Master? Time, which the critico-idealistic philosopher holds in contempt, God has so greatly esteemed, so as in it, and indeed at a determinate *point* of *time* (Gal. iv. 4) to complete the Incarnation of His Son and the Redemption of the human race. Not far from thee, that thou shouldst have to ascend into heaven

[1] The *Critick of Pure Reason* has, as *Trendelenburg* in his *Logical Investigations*, part i. p. 128 seq. excellently shows, certainly proved that time and space are subjective conditions *a priori* of our perception and experience, but by no means, that they are *only* subjective, that they are not also forms of the things.

or descend into the abyss, but near to thee, within the limits of thy earthly existence is the word of righteousness by faith (Rom. x. 6—8), and in the midst of time the possession of eternal life is presented to thee (Joh. vi. 47.)

The notion of freedom and of its relation to moral evil as developed by *Kant*, was essentially given up by his immediate disciples and followers. *C. Ch. Erh. Schmid* would know nothing of a *positive ground of evil* in the sphere of the intelligible, of a self-determination of *freedom* to evil, but deduced the same from a limitation of our moral freedom.[1] It is true this limitation was an original one, and therefore to be ascribed to the intelligible substratum of our empirical character. *Fichte* satisfied himself with an explanation of evil, which is not essentially different, from the derivation of the same from sensationalism, the principle of which, although he is at great pains to give it a positive significance, resolves itself just as inevitably into a mere limitation and negation, as its origin from sensationalism does; he finds the general ground of evil to be the "*vis inertiæ (Trägheitskraft)* of nature."[2] *Schelling* was the first to take up the thread of the investigation where *Kant* had dropt it, in a work, which, without question, is not merely the most significant effort of modern speculation in its investigations of freedom and moral evil, but also one which, in depth and wealth of thought, in dignity and power of representation, is equalled by very little in the entire mass of our philosophic literature.—The work alluded to is, as is well known, his "*Philosophical Investigations on the Nature of*

[1] *Versuch einer Moralphilosophie*, p. 335, 336, 379. Ed. 2nd.

[2] *System der Sittenlehre*, p. 262 seq. The otherwise unimportant work of *A. C. Ch. Heydenreich, über Freiheit und Determinismus und ihre Vereinigung*, 1793, holds more closely to the original significance of radical evil. Still this too ultimately entirely perverts the *Kantian* theory, by taking up radical evil into a *Divine plan of education*, by virtue of which "the pupil of Providence—must commence from evil, in order that his personal dignity and the legislative majesty of his good spirit may acquire greater power in conflict with the same, and by this his self-active strugglings from the darkness to the light—he may make himself worthy of the rewarding goodness of God"—p. 130, 131. *I.e.* man has the task of making again good what God had designedly made bad.

Human Freedom, and the subjects therewith connected."[1] As this treatise does not discuss the doctrines of human freedom and the origin of evil in an isolated manner, we must of course consider its determinations with respect to these subjects in their connection with the fundamental principles developed in the same.

In order to explain freedom, this treatise sets out from the contrast of *two equally eternal principles*, of light and darkness, of the real and the ideal, of the particular and the universal, of egoity and of the understanding. The union of these two principles is the condition of all life; idealism requires a living realism for its basis. Consequently these two principles are also found in God, inasmuch as we must distinguish in Him, *God as existing from the ground of His existence*, which He as *causa sui* has in Himself, but nevertheless as an *essentia (Wesen)*, as the *nature in God*, to be distinguished from Him, the essentially existing.[2] Only in so far as in God the ideal principle is united to a ground independent of the same, to an absolute essential existence, is he *Personal*.[3] As the absolute indifference of the primitive ground precedes this dualism of principles, so the absolute identity of the spirit elevates itself above this dualism; but the original primitive ground *(anfängliche Ungrund)* is above the spirit, inasmuch as it is now gloriously transformed to love, which is all in all.[4]

In the creatures of nature these two principles are everywhere,

1 *Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit und die damit Zusammenhängenden Gegenstände (Philosophische Schriften*, vol. 1, p. 399—511); with which, his "*Memorial of the work of Jacobi on Divine things (Das Denkmal der Schrift Jacobi's von den Göttlichen Dingen)* as well as his letter to *Eschenmayer (Allgemeine Zeitschrifft von Deutschen für Deutsche*, p. 79—129), may be compared. On the other hand, we must leave unnoticed the eventual modifications in *Schelling's* system, which may have since taken place in relation to this problem, because that publication of his present opinion, from his lectures as taken down by his pupils in the class room, and which boasts of being verbally faithful and trustworthy, has signalized itself in such a manner as to make its use unworthy of an honourable literary conduct.

2 Ibid. p. 429 seq. *Denkmal Jacobi's* p. 94 seq., p. 91. *Br. a. Eschenmayer*, p. 84 seq.

3 Ibid. p. 481, 487, 501. *Denkmal Jacobi's* p. 98 seq.

4 Ibid. p. 497 seq.

only in a given degree, one; only in personal beings can they become perfectly one.[1] In God this identity *cannot be resolved;* in man it is an identity which is *capable of being separated,* and indeed must be so, because if it were in him unresolvable as in God, man would not be at all different from God, and God as Spirit and Love could not reveal Himself.[2] But the contrast of these two principles is not identical with the contrast of *good and evil;* much rather the principle of egoity (*Selbstheit*), remaining in the ground or in potentiality, is a moment of real good, its necessary basis.[3] Moral evil only originates by a *positive perversion of principles* in which the egoity separates itself from the intelligent principle and elevates itself above it.[4] The possibility of this perversion for man is contained in the separability of the principles. In the creatures of nature these principles are necessarily and inseparably bound to each other.[5]

If we pause here for a moment and look at the results of our statement, we shall find that evil, in the above decisions, is decidedly regarded as *positive contrast to good,* as a principle of disturbance and division, enimical to all order and harmonious connection. In this, the direct recognition is contained, that here every deduction of moral evil from notions goes absolutely no further than to account for its *possibility,* that by this method its *reality* can never be reached, which can only be found from experience. Indeed, as *Schelling* himself expressly admits,[6] moral evil is not merely the severance of the bond uniting the two principles—if it were merely this, one might conceive of a teleological necessity for the same, namely, that man might become conscious of the different nature of each of these principles in its separation from the other, as the condition of the most perfect union of both—but the perversion of their true order; but this perversion would cease to be perversion, if it were the very condition of perfect order.

And in this sense *Schelling* in very many expressions determines the relation of evil to good, and indeed not merely there, where the investigation treats, first of all, of the *possibility of evil,* but also after its transition from possibility to *reality* has been

[1] Ibid. p. 436 seq. 450.
[2] Ibid. p. 438, 451, 452.
[3] Ibid. p. 439, 440, 450.
[4] Ibid. p. 440, 474, 488, 489.
[5] Ibid. p. 450.
[6] Ibid. p. 448.

made. Thus the necessity of a general ground of solicitation to evil has first of all its only support in the immanent necessity of man becoming conscious of both principles.[1] Then too it is said of the will of the ground, that it has no desire to dissever love, although it may often appear so;[2] accordingly we shall not venture to ascribe to this will, which is said to condition the manifestation of love, a real earnestly intentional opposition to love, by which it first of all becomes an evil will. The activity (*das Wirken*) of the ground, and consequently the human self-will, is only so far the condition of the good, as it remains in the ground (*i.e.* in nature) and indeed so remains in it, as not to cease to be in conformity with its own notion, in other words, as not to cease to be subject to the ideal principle;[3] as then too the striving of the ground, in the created essence, to realize itself for itself, *i.e.* independently, must ever remain a vain endeavour.[4]

Therefore man is said to have in himself the source of self-movement to both good and evil,[5] which indeed is void of sense, if he be *obliged* to move himself exclusively to one of the two, or to both perhaps in succession. That this is not the meaning is plain from p. 439, where we find the following sentence; by the egoity—in man—*being spirit*, it is free of both principles. In accordance with this it is also said, further on, that it is almost necessary for man to make the attempt to come out of the centre to the periphery, since he must be dead to every attribute in order to be able to live there;[6] there is contained in this, that man is powerfully solicited, but not really necessitated, to evil. Therefore in the immediately following connexion evil is denoted as the choice and guilt of man.

But still there is another method of conception which everywhere breaks through this train of thought and conducts us to an opposite result. If "the good consists in the subjugated

[1] Ibid. p. 452.
[2] Ibid. p. 454.
[3] Ibid. p. 439 seq., 488. So *Schelling* says, p. 441, also of sickness, disease, "the true counterpart of evil," that it only arises by the striving of that which only has its freedom or its life for the purpose of remaining in the whole, to be for itself, independent.
[4] Ibid. p. 458.
[5] Ibid. p. 452.
[6] Ibid. p. 463.

egoity, consequently in its restoration from the state of activity to that of potentiality,"[1] it follows that the egoity, in order that good may arise, *must* step out into this activity, into an abnormal peripheric position. But it is just this, its assumption of this position which is *evil.* In accordance with this, the treatise maintains the necessity of evil for the revelation of God, that every essence can only be revealed in its opposite, love only in hatred, unity only in strife ;[2] the will of love must find its contradiction in which to realize itself ;[3] in the kingdom of the Spirit there must also be a principle of darkness, the spirit of evil, *i.e.* of the *separation* of light and darkness[4]—by the severance of the second principle from the first ; the mystery which sin seeks to profane ought to be revealed ; for that innermost bond of the dependence of the thing and the very essence of God, which is as it were *before* all existence and therefore awful, only reveals itself in the contrast of sin.[5]

We believed, and certainly with good ground, that we might regard this determination in the Divine arrangement of life and its development as only furnishing the *possibility* of evil, the point of attachment, which its origination has in the principle of egoity, so that its becoming a reality might remain *arbitrary* and *contingent, i.e.* grounded in no rational connexion, and in no teleological (just as little of course in a causal) necessity. But here we perceive that the *reality* of evil is also said to be comprehended in this Divine necessity. If the *ethical* principle predominated in the former method of consideration (with respect to the possibility of evil), as must be required in an investigation concerning the idea of evil, in this latter opinion a *natural philosophical* mode of apprehension prevails. Evil becomes a cosmical potence which, as excitant of all powers, is just as active in nature as in man,[6] indeed the understanding of good and evil in man is expressly made dependent on the knowledge of this universal evil.[7] At the basis of this, lies the natural philosophical idea of the identity of spirit and nature, which makes the former proceed from the latter only by quantitative

[1] Ibid. p. 489. Comp. *Br. an Eschenmayer.* Ibid. p. 103.
[2] Ibid. p. 452.
[3] Ibid. p. 454, 455.
[4] Ibid. p. 457.
[5] Ibid. p. 476.
[6] Ibid. p. 451.
[7] Ibid. p. 462.

distinctions and elevations. With the appearance of the spirit—in man—there enters no new principle into the sphere of the creature life, as indeed the Book of Genesis distinctly intimates, cap. i. ver. 26, cap. ii. ver. 7, but the principles are the same which were previously in nature; their manifestation has only become more perfect. Nature illustriously transforms, sublimates itself to spirit, or the spirit elevates itself out of nature, by analyses or separations ever more and more radical, and by the higher and more intimate union of the working of those principles, thereby made possible.—As it would hardly be of service to theology in general, if, in obedience to the urgent exhortations of distinguished men, *Steffens*, *Baader*, recently too of *Rothe*, it should wish to renew its strength by an amalgamation with speculative natural science, so we cannot believe that the understanding of moral evil in particular is anywhere better to be arrived at, than in the sphere in which there is only *one real evil*,[1] in the sphere of the *spirit and of freedom*. If "ominous foreshadowings" or "counterparts" of evil are to be met with in nature, they can only be understood by the previous acquaintance with evil in the moral sphere. This is the ground upon which the problem must be solved or it remains insolvable.

Together with these two methods of conceiving of the relation subsisting between the irrational and the intelligent principle, we meet with in many places, still a *third*, which is essentially *dualistic*. In this third method, the contrast between the ground and the ideal principle assumes the attitude of an earnest combat of independent powers, in which each seeks the destruction of the other. The ground (natural will—Tr.) reacts against the freedom, and anticipating the approaching light (in history), calls forth beforehand, every power from its state of indecision, in order to meet it in full array.[2] But with equally decided enmity the ideal principle appears against it; the uniting of the universal will, with a particular will in man seems a contradiction whose reconciliation is difficult, if not impossible. For the centre of the universal will in which man has been created, is for every individual will —consequently for the principle of egoity, for the willing and

[1] The treatise itself essentially recognizes this, p. 456.

[2] Ibid. p. 460, 462. Comp. p. 494.

working of the ground by means of which man first becomes an individual, particular essence—consuming fire.[1] Just so it is said of an *independent isolated working of the ground*, from which creations are said to have proceeded, which however had not the power to continue in existence,[2] and at p. 503 it is said, quite in general, that all positive existences in nature have mere being in the ground, or in the initial longing not yet in unity with the understanding, while we according to former determinations—and we venture to add, according to the ground notions of *Schelling's System of Identity*—are obliged to maintain that in each positive existence of nature both principles are combined.

Can we be surprised at the strong tendency to dualistical consequences in connection with this opinion? It presents two equally eternal principles, relatively independent of each other, indeed in conflict with each other, and standing over both of them as primitive unity or oneness,—consequently as some guarantee for the victoriousness of the intelligent principle and the overthrow and subjection of the ground, inasmuch as this security is to be taken not purely from experience—the absolute indifference, the *primitive ground* or *unground (Urgrund oder Ungrund)*, which has no other predicate than that of being *predicateless*.[3] If the ground was pregnant foreboding night, rich in concealed forms, and locking up in its dark depth a gleam of dawning light, then the unground is primitive night in which each and every trace and determination disappear. Such an indifference cannot render us the required security. If it is itself indifferent towards the contrast of good and evil, we cannot see, in so far as any working can be ascribed to it, why it should not be able to bestow sovereignty upon the ground just as well as upon the ideal principle. Neither does it satisfy this consideration, that the treatise denotes the unground at the same time as *love*. For however independent of *time* the elevation of the unground to love may be, it is at any rate according to the treatise, the *result of a process*. But that is just the difficulty, how any process is able to proceed from this unground, which is "nothing else than the *non esse (Nichtsein)* of all contrasts," in which we are just as little able to conceive of an impulse to become anything, as of a will to create

[1] Ibid. p. 463. [2] Ibid. p. 458, 459. [3] Ibid. p. 498.

anything. And no less a difficulty is it to show how the essence of this unground is to give us the certitude, that the eternal result of the process will be love. The latter difficulty—and at the same time the first—the treatise appears to obviate by setting this result as the immediate *design* of the unground—its own words are as follows: "The unground divides itself into two equally eternal beginnings only in order that the two, which could not be in it as unground at the same time or in union, become one through love, *i.e.* it divides itself only that there may be life and love, and personal, essential existence."[1] But in order to the unground being able to give to itself this purpose of love, it must be something more than mere unground, more than the absolutely predicateless essence, it must be already an essence self-conscious and loving, consequently it cannot first of all proceed, although in an eternal manner, as spirit and personality, from a process set in motion by that determined purpose.

Thus this doctrine breaks through its own bounds, and presses on to a result beyond itself, in which it accords with the Christian religion in the recognition of an Absolute *Personality*, which is exalted absolutely above the world-process, which it conducts to its appointed ends; still, not without working upon it from without in full earnest, to cause it to give in to these its given determinations. In this Personality, then, we have also obtained a unity, which is strong enough to subjugate to itself the powerful contrasts which hold conflict in the world, while, if these contrasts be referred to the Divine Being Himself, the unground is a much too abstract an essence to be able to ward off the dualism, the entire separation of these two principles in God Himself.—

As to the notion of *human freedom*, which is the real subject of this treatise, we find, in accordance with the same, that it is necessarily supported by the dualistic element of this opinion. After a recognition of the idealistic notion of freedom in its truth, but at the same time characterizing it as insufficient to solve this problem, since it is only general and formal, the real and living notion of freedom is laid down as the *ability of good and evil*.[2] But against this there arises the difficulty how there could

[1] Ibid. p. 499. [2] Ibid. p. 422.

proceed from God, inasmuch as He is the most perfect essence and pure goodness, an ability to evil. If therefore the freedom is an ability to evil, it must have its *root independently of God.* And it is just from the requirement of this definition that the investigation constructs its path from the notion of freedom to the establishment of those two principles, of which the one is that which verily is in God, but is not God, *i.e.*, that which is the ground of His essential existence.[1] It is by this that man, since he has his origin from the ground of God, from an essence inseparable, it is true, from God, but still distinct from Him, has in himself a principle which in relation to God is independent,[2] and it is only by virtue of this origin that He possesses a freedom which is essentially also an ability to evil; but, on the other hand, evil can only then be understood as something positive, when "there is cognized a root of freedom in the independent ground of nature."[3]

If in the above we have the fixation of the *real* notion of freedom,[4] in the following we have the determination of its *formal* notion. According to this formal notion of freedom, man is primitive and ground-will, which makes itself something, constitutes itself.[5] As spiritual essence, he has no being (*Sein*) prior to, and independent of, his will.[6] If therefore his individual actions follow directly, with inviolable necessity, from his determined essential nature, this inward necessity is itself freedom; the essence, the nature of man, is essentially *his own act.*[7]

But is the difficulty which attaches to the relation of evil in the creature to the *all-conditionating will of God*, the knot in which all other difficulties are drawn together, in this way really solved?—Evil as such can, of course, only have its rise in the *creature;* but its becoming a reality presupposes the excitation of the dark nature-ground and its separation from the ideal principle, in order to work independently for itself in the creature, and to

[1] Ibid. p. 431. [2] Ibid. p. 437, comp. p. 429. [3] Ibid. p. 448.

[4] It will be scarcely necessary to remind the reader, that in the first chapter of this division the notion "*real* freedom" is taken in another sense, because the conception of the notion of freedom in general is not the same.

[5] Ibid. p. 468. [6] Ibid. p. 471. [7] Ibid. p. 467.

re-act against order and unity;[1] "evil is nothing more than the primitive ground to the essential existence, in so far as it strives in the created essence to actualise itself."[2] Now, in order to save the freedom of God, and to ward off dualism from it, there must be on the side of God, as spirit and love, an *allowed or suffered working* of the ground corresponding to this independent working, which is said to be the only conceivable notion of *sufferance (Zulassung).*[3] But then it is clear, that this *suffered working of the ground* becomes the point at which the same difficulties accumulate, which, just as *Schelling* has sketched them at the commencement of his treatise in a few bold outlines, crowd upon the attempt to reconcile the existence of evil with the principle of Theism. How can God suffer the ground in the created essence to strive to become actual, when in this striving evil is given, a will striving against God?

Or is this question to be answered by the proof that there must be a ground of essential existence in God which is different from God, the essentially existing? But this proof goes no further than to show the necessity of the ground *in its unity with the essentially existing God*, of the ground in so far as it is, that which it, according to its notion, ought to be, *i.e.*, only ground, bearer of the light principle. The necessity of a ground which goes out of its true position in order to be a dominant principle, working independently for itself, is by no means proved. If even that proof held good for the perversion of the ground, it would follow, notwithstanding the above warding off, that moral evil were, as universal principle, the condition of the existence of God. But this would stand in open contradiction with the express anti-dualistic tendency of the treatise. If then it cannot be maintained, that God was either obliged, or was able, positively to determine, this elevation of the ground to the ruling principle, although only in a conditional manner, namely, as condition of His existence, the notion of *sufferance* retains of course its strict meaning, that of not preventing a given activity proceeding from another cause, which the individual suffering it was able to prevent. But then it is no longer to be seen why this notion of sufferance ought not also to be applied to a principle elevating itself entirely in the *sphere of the creature*, by the independent working of which

[1] Ibid. p. 453, 461, 462. [2] Ibid. p. 457, 458. Ibid. p. 454.

minations posited in the world, *i.e.* it has no contents whatever; every determination would necessarily fall in the world, which is nevertheless according to this notion not the absolute as such, but its realization, actualization by its making itself finite. This negative absolute, which is at the same time said to be the ground of all things—the Bythos of the Gnostics, the Sige of God transcendent above all being, who can only become known by negations, according to *Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita*, the eternal nothing of the speculative mystics,—is nothing more than the ability of the human spirit to abstract itself from all and every determinateness in order then in imagination to cause all determinateness again to proceed from this boundless abstraction. The ground of things it can only in so far be, as it is the abyss, which devours them all.

That with such a notion of the absolute neither the knowledge of God as of the Personal, nor indeed any knowledge whatever of God can consist, we must assuredly admit. It is therefore not at all an unskilful tact of the *Straussian* Dogmatics, when it endeavours to urge on all determinations of the Christian doctrine of God in its historical development, in so far as they seek to distance themselves from the anthropomorphous extreme, towards that abyss of the negative absolute. And certainly it cannot be a difficult matter to an adroit dialectic to make this result, if the otherwise perfect resultlessness can be so called, appear as a necessary one in the steady course of the transitions, by which the different steps of the process of thought are attached to each other. As however, this absolute only obtains reality as a process accomplishing itself by means of the finite, therefore only by its cancelling itself as absolute (*i.e.* by its being again abstracted from the abstraction), the very notion of the same admits that it is not the real absolute, but only the unreal. God is the *Absolute, which really essentially exists.* But if one will only vindicate the category of the reality in relation to the world—as perhaps in the sentences: God is the truth of the world, the world is the reality of God—then of course every endeavour to be rid of, and freed from pantheism, must remain vain. But in order really essentially to exist as Absolute, God must have in Himself, independently of every relation to the world, the fulness of positive determinations, absolutely self-sufficient by their inward

infiniteness—a πέλαγος τῆς οὐσίας, as *Gregory of Nizianzen* denominates God in a sermon on the Christmas festival.—

Now in man there is inseparably bound with this tendency to comprehend his own being in his self-consciousness, by which he is personal essence, another tendency excluding another being, and separating himself from it. Although we are not justified in making the essential existence of other Egos the condition of this self-comprehension of the individual Ego, nevertheless we have no notion of how the individual Ego could become conscious of itself, without distinguishing itself from another being. If the spirit in the other individual did not furnish the condition of its original awakening, this counter-pressure of the other which elicits that lightning flash of self-recognition, then nature would furnish this condition.—As the self-consciousness of man, so also his self-determination has an essential relation to another being, only in an inverse direction. If self-consciousness is the self-retirement of the Ego from another, self-determination is the self-extension of the Ego to another, in order to possess in this other itself.

If we should resolve to carry over these determinations directly to the Personality of God, one must only be careful not to allow himself therein to be deceived, so as not to suppose that therewith the Absoluteness of God would be certainly sacrificed. For if God requires another essence, in order to be, what according to His essence or nature He is, namely personal, then He is not Absolute, but conditioned, which appears so much the more definitely, in proportion to the real earnestness in which the idea of the "other" is taken.[1] And if this other is one developing itself in time, God Himself is thereby in the realization of His personality in some manner *temporally* conditioned and subordi-

[1] Truly if this other is immediately withdrawn again—perhaps by the determination, that God regards the same as Himself, and relates Himself to it as to his own essential nature—then the violation of the idea of the Absolute is on this side avoided, but only by the identification of the essential nature of the world with the essential nature of God, *i.e.* only by the destruction of that idea. A God, who must come out of Himself into nature in order then in Spirit to find the way back to Himself, such a God is anything rather than Absolute. Compare the thorough refutation of this representation of the absolute from the very idea of the Absolute in *Dorner's Entwickelungsgeschichte der Lehre von der Person Christi*, p. 432—451.

nated to a *becoming*, a development. But he to whom the idea of the absolute is truth, unless perhaps he wishes to separate from this idea that of the God-head, will leave the essence of God unconfounded with the *becoming*, in which the developing being has in itself at every point of its progress some one or other non-(real)-being of what it essentially is.—If now this becomes more definitely determined so, that that condition of the Divine Personality is said to be *the essential existence of the finite Spirit*—as of a Thou for the Divine Ego—then the consequence is in no way to be avoided, that there must have been a time when God was not yet personal. For whether one seeks the finite spirit merely upon earth, or also upon every heavenly body, this is unanimously admitted by those who make it the condition of the Divine Personality, that it has everywhere nature for its necessary presupposition, and that too not merely theoretically, but also as its empirically real presuppositon, preceding it in time. But then it unavoidably follows, that in some period in the past, the essential existence of the finite spirit, and therefore also the Personality of God, were yet future.[1]

Neither is this conditionality of the Divine Personality by the finite to be reconciled with His Absoluteness by the further determination, that God Himself is the author of this conditionateness, that He only mediates Himself by another being, in so far as He sets it, constitutes it; it ever remains by the result absolutely incompatible with Theism, that if perhaps the substantial essence of God had not finite being in the above acceptation for its temporal *antecedens*, this must nevertheless

[1] In this contradiction the *Straussian* doctrine of God is involved. For although it denies the Personality of God, it is nevertheless said to be contained in the notion of the absolute to personify itself in the finite (*Dogmatik*, vol. i. p. 524), namely, in the finite spirit. But as the finite spirit presupposes nature, not merely ideally (in which respect the relation is much rather inverted), but really, therefore as actually preceding it, according to time, there must be the adoption of some time, in which the absolute had not yet personified itself in the finite spirit, and therefore did not yet correspond to its notion—from which it surely further follows, that it is also not able to correspond to its notion in the time succeeding the same, just because this subsequent time were one subsequent to a defect of the absolute, *i.e.* that this notion of the Absolute is one which is destructive of itself. That the appeal to the intelligent inhabitants of other heavenly bodies (comp. *Dogmatics*, vol. i. p. 673) is here perfectly vain, follows from what we have above said.

assuredly be the case with respect to his essential existence as person, at any rate as His theoretic *antecedens*. If one fully admits, as *Fischer* himself appears to do,[1] that finite persons absolutely dependent upon God in their *essential existence* are only able to have this conditioning relation to the Divine Personality, in so far as they are not merely dependent upon God, but are self-determining, then the violation of the Absoluteness of God stands out more prominently to view; for according to this, God is conditioned by a being, which He, in the respect in which it conditions Him, does not absolutely determine. To this there may be still added, that, more closely considered, this other being, by whose exclusion from Himself, God is said first of all personally to exist, be it ever allowed that this other being is produced by God Himself, could nevertheless only have *this significance* for God as that of a being *thrust* upon Him. For if we should suppose that it was posited by God, *to the end that* He might have in it the negative condition of His self-consciousness, we should have fallen into an apparently profound, but in truth absurd circle, since only a personal essence can set itself purposes. God must prior to the setting of this purpose (if not according to time still according to the notion), have already possessed that which is said to be the end or design of His producing the finite, *i.e.* most assuredly: He had not really this purpose.

God were not truly unconditioned, if His essence or nature were not *a compact whole perfectly comprehended in itself*. His nature is only this by the distinctions, without which it could not be living unity, being immanent in it in an eternal and absolutely self-dependent manner. The Divine Personality can only be thought of as absolute, when God has the conditioning of His personality, not in another being, but *absolutely in Himself*.[2]—

[1] *Die Speculative Dogmatik von Strauss, geprüft von Fischer*, part i. p. 40.

[2] And to remark in passing, neither can the notion of the Trinity furnish us this condition of the Divine Personality, at least not so long as with the hypostatic distinction, the other church, fundamental determination of the identity of essence, is firmly held, in which that notion is alone compatible with the principle of Monotheism. For if Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are only to be conditions and moments, from which in the process of the Divine self-consciousness, the unity of the

But how is the possibility of the self-consciousness and self-determination of God *not* being conditioned by His distinguishing Himself from another being, to be understood?

Let us examine more closely, on what it depends, that human personality cannot be conceived of without this self-distinguishing from another, from a not-self. The relation of personality to the categories: relative and absolute, is first of all determined by the *nature of the contents*, which is to be taken up into the self-consciousness. If this contents is exalted above all relativity, the Personality is an Absolute one. There would therefore, even supposing the notion of the human species were—according to a phantastico-realistic method of representation already alluded to—at the same time to be conceived of as a personal essence consisting in itself, attach even to this personality an insurmountable relativity, because the contents of its self-consciousness were referred, if to no other, nevertheless, essentially to God as the primitive source, other than and distinct from itself, of its essence and essential existence. But the essential relativity of human personality already follows from its only having existence as that of the individual, in distinction from the species. Therefore the contents of this self-consciousness is never an All, in itself self-dependent, absolutely compact and exclusively complete in itself, but a contents which is separated, belonging to another, in some manner limited, a part of finite being. To deny this and to assume absoluteness for the personal individual, were the veriest extreme of monadological atomism, which of itself falls to pieces.[1] Then there further follows, that this moment of the human

same proceeds, they are not hypostases. But if the Son or Logos is regarded as the second being, whose contrast is said to mediate or furnish to the primitive being in an eternal manner, the consciousness of Himself, then, on the one hand, the identity of essence between Father and Son is given up, and, on the other hand, it is not to be seen how, from this stand-point, the eternal self-consciousness of this second being is to be derived. That the Trinity of God must stand in connection with the true notion of His Personality is easy to perceive; but the connection is a different one from that here adopted.

[1] Towards this extreme, among modern writers, *Frauenstädt* is especially to be mentioned, as being in the most direct road, in his work on the *Freedom of Man and the Personality of God*, in his *Studien und Kritiken*, and particularly in his exhibition and criticism of the chief points in *Schelling's* Lectures. He denies the creation in the interest of human freedom; but the way in which he makes the

essence and life, which makes up the particular existence of the individual, can never be referred to the centre of the Ego in the self-consciousness, without the exclusion of another which is not self.

But in God those presuppositions of this excluding function of the self-consciousness do not take place, but that which forms the contents of the self-consciousness in God, is an *internal infiniteness of determinations*, a totality, *cujus centrum*, according to an expression much used by the mystics of the middle ages, ascribed to *Hermes Trismegistus*, which however is also defended by even such a theologian as *John Gerhard* against *Scaliger*[1]—*ubique, circumferentia nusquam.* For that the *determinateness*, which is herewith expressed of God, is incompatible with His *infinity*, can only be maintained by those who identify the notions of the *indeterminate* and the *endless*, of the *indefinitum* (*ἀόριστον*) and the *infinitum*. Upon this identification rests the celebrated axiomatic expression of *Spinoza: determinatio est negatio*, in so far as this negation, identical with determination, is taken as real; and certainly it is in this sense that it is found at the basis of the system of *Spinoza*, although not expressly and openly laid down. The strangest thing in this system is, although by closer consideration easy to be understood, that this philosophy by the exclusion of all determinations from its absolute—the substance purely as such—in order not to be obliged to attribute to it negations, is nevertheless not able to free it from its perfect Negativity.

If the matter really stood thus, as those maintain, if God could only be infinite, in so far as He were the absolutely indeterminate, predicateless essence, we would obey the Platonic monition: 'do not call God the infinite essence, for to the infinite essence existence stands opposed. Then there only stood open to us the dilemma, apart from the asylum of the entire incognizability of God, *either* pantheistically to set the finite determinations of worldly being in God Himself, perhaps as moments in the

notion of substance, essentially determined according to *Spinoza*, the ground basis of freedom and personality would, consequentially carried out, also necessitate him to deny the generation of the personal individual.

[1] *Loci theol.* tom. i., loc. ii. *de natura et attr. Dei* c. v. 91.

process of His essence, *or* to ascribe to God, even in His distinction from the world finiteness and therewith existence in time and space, just as, since the time of the Socinian Theologians and *K. Vorstius, K. B. Th. Voigt* has done in the most zealous manner and with not a little formal sagacity.[1]—But in reality there is no contradiction whatever between determinateness and infiniteness; the infinite not only admits the determinate, but its positive notion requires it; it requires a fulness of determinations, which are in no way limited from without by another being, nor inwardly related among each other in an excluding manner. There is of course, in that these determinations of the Divine essence are distinguished from each other in God Himself, set in God a moment of negation and finiteness—the necessary presupposition for the Divine production of a world of the finite, in which the distinction hardens itself to the diversity of reciprocally excluding essences;[2]—in that these determinations—to retain the abstract expression—are

[1] *Ueber Freiheit und Nothwendigkeit aus dem Standpunkt christlich-theistischer Weltansicht (On Freedom and Necessity on the Standpoint of the Christico-theistic view of the world)* 1828, § 27 seq. It seems very strange when this author too boasts of his representation of a finite God, existing according to his essence in time and, by virtue of his visibility (p. 67), of course existing also in space, that by it the thought of God first of all obtains proper determinateness and rational intelligibleness, while he is only able to preserve this representation from running off into manifest absurdities, by not permitting it to come forth from its cloudy indefiniteness. We will say nothing of the spaciousness of God, and just as little on the fact, that essential existence in time would necessarily include a gradual development of God; but we should like the adherents of these representations earnestly to ask themselves, whether an essence or nature existing in time, could at all be thought of as being original and unconditioned. For if its existence in time has had a beginning, it is manifestly in this its beginning, since before its existence in time it was not so as to be able to set itself, set by another and not by itself. But if this temporal existence is said to be beginningless, it is nevertheless in each moment, however far back we may go, ever conditioned by the preceding moments. By this regressus in infinitum therefore, the resolution of this conditionateness into absolute self-conditioning is made an impossibility. But if conditionateness is not to be understood as conditionateness by itself, then it must be considered, unless one perhaps wishes to deprive the entire relation of every conceivability, as conditionateness by another. But therewith it appears, that to this doctrine in its intention of speaking of God, the world has imperceptibly substituted itself in his stead.

[2] In so far as this diversity also holds good of the relation of the

taken up into the purest unison, which excludes every outward separation, the moment of the finite is in an eternal manner cancelled by being absorbed in the Divine Infinite. But God were not the really Infinite, if He were destitute of all determinateness in Himself; for then the Infinite in God would have in the determinate being its external contrast and its essential limitation. God is the Infinite, because the fulness of the Divine Essence, unlimited from without, and undisturbed in itself, is perfect harmony, in which one element does not negative, but confirms the other. The world, if it could also be conceived of as extensively boundless, in time as in space, would nevertheless ever remain, conceived of even as a whole, a qualitatively finite world, because between the individual existences in it there is this separateness, by virtue of which, each one only is, in that it excludes another from the sphere of its existence; wherefore the inner *Unity* of God is also a specifically higher one than that of the world.

Consequently, this conditionateness of the self-consciousness by the exclusion of another, is not contained in the idea of personality itself, but in the *particular limitations* and *relations*, which attach to the personality of man, to his self-consciousness according to the peculiar nature of its contents. God therefore, by virtue of the infinite fulness of His Divine Essence, does not require another being, in order by its exclusion or cancelling to become manifest to Himself; He is self-revealed to Himself in an eternal and unconditioned manner.[1] If *Jacob Böhme*, on the contrary, teaches: nothing can become revealed to itself without adverseness *(Widerwartigkeit)*; for if it has nothing which opposes it, it ever proceeds from out of itself, and does not again return back into itself; and if it does not again return back into itself, as into that from out which it originally proceeded, it knows nothing

substance of the world to the substance of God Himself—the essence of the world is not the essence of God—is dependent on the same the capability of the so-called categories of reflection, as of causality, to furnish us with real knowledge in this sphere.

[1] In this we find ourselves in perfect agreement with *Rothe's Ethic* vol. i., p. 87 seq., as we also do not believe that a Theistic speculation which is at all conscious of its principle and its true motive, could find it very difficult to overcome this attack upon the Divine Personality.

of its primitive condition; and thus God also requires a *contrarium*, in order that His secret will may become revealed to itself[1]—and when *Schelling* considers a negativing, repelling power, which necessarily works against the affirming, extending power, as conditioning all self-consciousness,[2] we will not, in relation to created being, dispute the truth and depth of these views; but so directly to apply them to God we must regard as too wide an extension of the analogy of the Divine to the creaturely nature.—The personality of God is directly an absolute personality, in that the *contents* of the Divine self-consciousness is an *infinite totality, absolutely self-satisfying and self-sufficient.*—

But it were not to be seen, how this contents could be perfectly revealed to the Divine self-consciousness, how God could be to Himself nothing but light and clearness (James i. 17), if he were conscious of this contents, consequently of his very nature, as of one *independent of His self-determination*, and preceding His will by virtue of an eternal necessity. Man is never able fully to penetrate with his consciousness the obscurity in which the beginning of his inmost nature is concealed, because he is not absolutely from himself—according to the saying: *ea tantum scimus, quae facimus.* Just so the Divine Personality would rest upon the ground of a reality impenetrable to it, the light of the eternal self-consciousness would not send its illuminating beams down into its inmost deep, even the spirit of God would not be able to explore this depth (1 Cor. ii. 10), if the determinate essence of God preceded every self-determination in Him according to causality. Indeed as long as we only know God in an absolutely original respect, according to this one-sided realistic view, as the necessary essence, as the *primitive being*, so long is our idea of God involved with itself in an insolvable contradiction. For that which lies on the other side of the freedom of God, is clearly for God Himself, something which is *given* (something found by His self-consciousness), and cannot lose this character by a mere formal self-affirmation of God as of the absolutely perfect. But if the essence of God were for God

[1] *Der Weg zu Christo*, book 7 *(von Göttlicher Beschaulichkeit)*, cap. 1. (This reference is incorrectly made according to the last edition of Bohme's complete works (Schiebler's Leipzig 1831—46), and the edition used by the learned Doctor is not at hand.—Tr.)

[2] In his *Treatise on Freedom* and in his *Memorial of Jacobi.*

Himself, that which is given, the question: from whence given? cannot be averted; the essence of God must then have its ground in another, without not within Him—with which the notion of God were completely destroyed.

If the attribute of unconditionality or independency *(independentia)*, as it is generally applied to God, is to contain an intelligible thought, we must convert the negative conception, by which our older theologians, *Quenstedt*, *Baumgarten*, and others, intentionally remained standing, into the positive expression, that He is the self-conditioning, self-grounding essence (*ens a se ipso*—hence *aseitas* by the Schoolmen, *αὐτοουσία* by the later Greek Church Fathers). Herewith the determination, that God is *causa sui* receives another, more positive sense than it has in *Spinoza*, according to whom it denotes, as is well known, the complex contents *(Inbegriffensein)* of the *esentially existing* contained in the notion of the substance, but with this there is not in the smallest degree procured for this essentially existing substance either vitality or freedom. Its true significance is this, that the nature, essence, of God is absolutely his own *act*.[1] The separateness of cause and effect, of determining and determined, which attaches to the relation of causality in the sphere of the finite, is here completely cancelled, and the determining power is preserved as the real germ of the notion of causality. But how can an essence be *causa sui* in any other way than by its producing itself by conscious self-determination? For if we are to represent to ourselves thi seternal self-producing, after the manner perhaps of a consciousless impulse, of a dark restless longing, we should set in it an original suffering condition, a determined state of being, which is not at all to be thought of as an absolutely first, but at which we should be obliged to seek for a determining principle in another original essence.

[1] The *voluntas necessaria* of our older dogmatists, which they, as the will of God directed to his own nature, placed in opposition to the *voluntas libera* directed to another than Himself, appears to express the same. Still, the denominating of this *voluntas* as *necessaria* points out the distinction of this representation from the sentence above laid down; by this will, which is said to be absolutely determined by the Divine essence, the only thing that can be thought of is a self-affirmation of God in His eternal self-consciousness, which one, since nothing is thereby determined, could only very incorrectly call a will.

There is herewith a peculiar direction given to the *cosmological* proof for the existence of God, according to which one cannot deny it a speculative significance. In its most simple form, this proof, as is well known, concludes by virtue of the law of causality, from the existence of finite, not self-existing things, since an endless regression of causes is an absurd representation, the existence of a primitive essence which is *its own cause*, and at the same time, cause of the world. But why must this primitive essence necessarily be a personal God, separate and distinct from the world? What is there to hinder the adoption of the opinion that this primitive essence is the world itself, of course not as this complex whole of finite things, but as immanent principle of the world, as impersonal world-ground? It is clear that this argument, so constructed, does not necessarily lead us beyond *Spinozism;* for *Spinoza* regards the substance as the immanent cause of things, of their modifications.[1] Also the more exact determination which *Leibnitz* gives to the proof, by concluding from the contingency of the world, from the possibility of its non-being, the existence of a necessary essence, which has the ground of its existence in itself, furnishes us here no decided aid. For the maintenance of the contingency of the world is only directly of itself obvious, in so far as it refers to everything as individual in the world; but why should not the necessary essence be just the essence of the world itself, which, in the complex whole of all individual things, becomes phenominal, unfolds itself, gives itself expression in order to find itself, to possess itself, or however otherwise pantheistic modes of thought may conceive of this relation?

For the interest of Theism the cosmological proof first of all obtains importance by the perception, that there can only be a real thought in conjunction with the notion of the *causa sui*, when it is quite really and positively taken, and it is made to contain, according to the above, that all determinations of the essence of God have His absolute will for their principle. If, therefore, the cosmological proof by the inconceivability of that endless regression sends us away beyond the entire sphere of causes, which are themselves again effects, to the recognition of the all-conditioning primitive essence, which is *causa sui*, we are

1 *Ethic* i., prop. xviii.

necessitated by the significance of this notion just recognized, to conceive of this primitive essence in its inmost ground as self-determining intelligence, *i.e.* as Absolute Personality, and therewith as an essence which has its being in itself and which distinguishes itself from the world.

Moreover, this conception of the absolute self-dependency of God is not new in the Christian Theology. Even *Lactantius* expresses this in one passage by the words: *ipse ante omnia ex se ipso est procreatus*,[1] in another better thus: *ex se ipso est—ideo talis est, qualem esse se voluit.*[2] Similarly *Hieronymus* says: *Deus ipse sui origo est suaeque causa substantiae.*[3]—

From the present discussion it becomes clear, that the Personality of God distinguishes itself from human personality, not merely with respect to the *nature* of the contents, which both embrace in their self-consciousness, but also in relation to the generating *principle* of this contents. In the sphere of relative personality, freedom is only co-determining cause of the particular *essentia*, by which the individual is just this one, and none other. The Personality of God is the Absolute Personality, in that freedom is the unconditioned principle of His Divine Essence, in His being what He really is by self-determination. The presuppositionless, primitive beginning of all being is freedom, act. "In the ultimate and highest instance there is no other being than volition. Volition is primitive being."[4]

Holding fast this result in all its rigour we should be obliged to maintain of the truths, which have for us the highest necessity, formally considered, and with the denial of which we should sever every connection of our thinking—of the ground truths of mathematics and metaphysics, that they have their ultimate ground in the absolute self-determination of God, the origin of all essence. *Cartesius* was quite right in that he would not deduce these truths from a necessity independent of the will of God; only thereby does his right become unright, that he posited the Divine Essence before the Divine Will, and then, notwithstand-

[1] *Div. instit.*, l. i., c. 7. *Lactantius* laudatorily adduces here the formula of *Seneca*, unskilfully constructed in two respects: Deus ipse se fecit.

[2] *Div. instit.*, l. ii., c. 8.

[3] *Epist. ad Eph.* 3 (*Opp. ed. Martianay*, tom. iv. P. i., p. 356.)

[4] *Schelling's Philosophical Writings*, vol. i., p. 419.

ing this, makes the Divine Will to determine itself with perfect indifference as to the Divine nature, and *e.g.* to ground the laws of Mathematics.[1] For by these representations, the world-arranging will of God becomes degraded to a self-severance from the essence of God and eternal reason, to a caprice by which the truth of the Divine Essence and Reason are continually denied. Without doubt these mathematical truths are a revelation of the eternal order and harmony of the Divine Essence, a reflexion or mirror of the same in the sphere of the finite, of the existing in time and space. But that His essence or nature is pure harmony, does not depend upon a self-governing necessity, but upon His freedom.[2]

An ingenious philosopher of the present day, *Weisse*, in a similar inquiry as to the knowledge of the Divine Freedom, but in express contradiction to the absolute originality of the Divine Will, attaching himself to *Leibnitz*, gives to this will as ground basis a region of pure thought, of *metaphysical necessity of reason*, an absolute form, since he believes that only in this way real philosophy can receive the basis of a pure metaphysic. This necessary fundamental basis he then more definitely determines as the merely negative presupposition of the Divine Freedom, as a region of the non-being, an unreal shadowy kingdom of mere possibilities, by the cancelling (*Aufhebung*) of which the Divine Freedom and its non-ability, or ability, of also otherwise determining (*Auchnicht-oder*

[1] Comp. especially the responsio sexta to the objections against his meditationes under No. 6.

[2] According to the form of these sentences here presented, in which this new edition has not altered anything, they are manifestly only intended to defend this, that the Divine Essence in its deepest ground is not determinate being—were it this, then the essence of God must be a given object for His eternal self-consciousness, just as our essential nature relatively is for our self-consciousness; which contains the contradiction just above pointed out,—but will, volition, self-determination. The possibility of another is therewith in God neither set nor negatived; for this is for us, whose being and very thinking have their ultimate principle in that absolutely primitive will, a representation perfectly empty and absolutely incompleteable. Therefore Professor *Zeller*, as defender of the system of logical necessity, in opposition to this opinion, might have spared his consequence-making as, "that three times three might very well be ten, if God only so determined," and the like (*theol. Jarbücher* 1847, p. 210); these withering remarks only hit a caricature of the above thoughts which he himself has fabricated; the thoughts themselves they do not touch. Comp. also p. 154, 155 of this volume.

Auchandersseinkönnen) realize themselves.[1] But neither by this method of representation is it to be seen how the absolute freedom of God is to be saved. For if God not only *can*, but if He *must* cancel those possibilities contained in the sphere of the metaphysical necessity of reason, in order to realize His freedom, then freedom originally has a possibility independent of it over against it, or much rather for its *prius*, by which, although it never becomes a reality, it is conditioned as by an eternal fate. In a certain sense we too must admit, that the human reason, or as it will be better to say, the spirit cognizes the *prius of the Godhead*—the primitive principle, which precedes the determinations of its essence according to the notion—still indeed not in the sense in which *Weisse* maintains the sentence. But in this sense, apart from our inability to complete the representation of such a world of absolute forms consisting entirely for themselves, we are neither able to harmonise it with the absoluteness of God, nor with the knowledge, that the world is absolutely conditioned by God.—*Weisse* very properly considers the strife between *freedom* and *necessity* as the highest problem of philosophy in its immediate future. But if one makes necessity, in whatever way it may be done, the absolutely first, freedom must eternally remain engulfed in its dire abyss; for essentially bound to the law of identity, necessity can never give birth to the Free, but for ever can only bring forth the Necessary: while freedom contains, according to its notion, everything in itself, in order to constitute that which is different from it, even an infallible necessity.

The objection, that in declining this metaphysical fundamental basis, arbitrariness *(Willkür)*, or *accidentality (Zufälligkeit)* becomes set up as the principle of all existing being, cannot indeed apply to the opinion itself, but only to an unskilful exhibition of the same. *Arbitrariness* is the severance of the volition from the rational connection, therefore presupposes such a connection as already existing, while indeed all rational connection is primarily rooted in the Divine primitive volition. Just so *accident*,

[1] According to my knowledge, *Weisse* has first of all expressed this thought in his *Metaphysic*, especially in the first chapter of the introduction, then in his recension of *Romang's* work on freedom and determinism *(Heidelberger Jahrbücher* 1836, Nos. 62—64), since then often in an occasional manner, and quite at length in his letter to *Fichte*, on the philosophic problem of the present day.

(Zufall), as we have already seen, (p. 27 seq.), is a negative and indeed a negatively teleological notion; it excludes in relation to a given event the finale; we can therefore only speak of accidentality, where an event occurs which is indifferent towards, or void of relation to the appointed end in a given sphere of existence, but not there, where the primitive beginnings of all purpose-setting lie decreed. In the deep of this origin of all essentia those notions from which the absolutely presuppositionless freedom, as principle of the Divine essence, is controverted, have still no significance whatever.—

Accordingly if all determinations of the essence of God are absolutely posited by Himself, we shall have to conceive of Him, in His *primitive ground*, considered as it were before His determinate essence, as the *determinateless Being*, but which is at the same time the *unlimited power to determine itself*, the ability to be what it will. This conception would be subject to the objection, that God was herewith thought of in His principle as Nothing, from which the absolutely predicateless being is most certainly not to be distinguished, if this indeterminate being were not at the same time the limitless power of self-determination. Thus conceived of, there is just this contained in it, that God in the primitive ground of His essence is nothing else than *Will* and *Freedom*. This primitive volition is now the very source of an infinite fulness of essence in God Himself, in that it absolutely wills life and love; had it not willed this—therefore for itself conceived of, and not as principle of an eternal universe in God Himself,—it were by this abiding sunkenness in itself the silent, deep abyss of that negative absolute, in which all determinations and distinctions disappear or much rather never appear, in which there is neither light nor darkness, neither thinking nor being, neither understanding nor will, neither I nor Thou, neither Self-hood nor Love.—

In the previous discussions we have already stepped beyond the task which we had appointed ourselves. It was to prove only the *possibility* of Absolute Personality, the reconcilability of absoluteness with personality. As result we have to acknowledge on the one hand the impossibility of representing the Absolute according to the true contents of this notion as τό θεός (*das* Gott) as *Jacobi* with striking wit has denominated

this impersonal ground-essence, and on the other hand the *necessity* of recognizing in it God conscious of Himself and freely determining Himself. It is also easy to be seen, how the proof of the possibility is not here at all to be separated from that of the necessity. For in order to demonstrate this possibility, the notion of the absolute must be more closely entered upon, in doing which the determinations of the same present themselves, which not merely permit, but *demand* personality. These determinations present themselves, when from the notion of a merely negative absolute the progress is made to that of a positive, really existing absolute. If this progress is a justified and necessary one, if the latter notion of the absolute is really the higher in relation to the former, then we have no longer the necessity *of distinguishing* between the Absolute and God. This is the way *Schelling* adopted in his treatise on freedom, and in his work against *Jacobi*, in order to reconcile the idea of the Personal God with that of the Absolute,[1] and thus to reconcile religion and philosophy with each other in the very deepest centre; but it is not to be seen, how a Personal God, who is not Himself the Primitive Being, who is conditioned by a primitive ground of Himself and of all finite being, which is in some way independent of Him, is able to be the real object of the full, undivided resignation of the human heart and of its doubtless confidence, that He will conduct all essential existences which are dependently attached to Him to their completion. If God, Himself as such, is not the Alpha, it is then too not absolutely certain, that He is the Omega; the τὰ πάντα ἐξ αὐτοῦ is the guarantee for the τὰ πάντα εἰς αὐτόν.

There is contained in the developed notion of personality as that of Being compact and definitive in itself, that it has for the determining of its *eternal* working the self-determination of will. If God is personal, another being cannot proceed from Him by virtue of a constraining necessity of His nature, but only by means of His free will. Therefore the well known proverbial words: He thinks and it is done, are false or at least may be very easily misunderstood,

[1] *Schelling* expresses himself definitely in reference to this in his memorial of *Jacobi*, p. 112 seq. And in his letter to *Eschenmayer*. p. 86. Earlier he entirely rejected this distinction, comp. *Philosophie und Religion*, p. 8 seq.

evil might arise, since the absolute dependence of the creature, which one might urge against it, would by this very sufferance, in a given respect, no longer exist. If, on the contrary, the Divine sufferance of evil be said to pass over ultimately to a *positive determination* of the same, in order that God as love may, by virtue of its contrast, be able really to exist, it is opposed, as we have already elsewhere in this treatise satisfactorily shown, by the impossibility of deducing evil from the Divine Will, without either destroying the notion of evil or that of the Divine Will.

If on the one hand, as we have seen, *the doctrine of the ground* affords no means for the solution of this universal difficulty, of which corresponding ones are not to be found upon the soil of Theism, although of course differently deduced, so on the other hand, we find it presents to us another difficulty in the way of human freedom in evil as the ground-basis of imputation, which is peculiar to that doctrine. According to its fundamental notions, man has only in so far an ability of evil, as his freedom is rooted in the ground distinct from God Himself, and he becomes excited to the real determination of evil, by the solicitations of the ground, by the resistance of the same against unity. It is true provision is here made for a relative independence of the ground and its working, in as much as the Divine sufferance of this resistance to realize itself in the creature essence, is taken in the most real sense, therefore, as a Divine self-limitation, and therewith equally is provision made for the independence of man in determining himself for the evil. But how is this to form the basis of freedom and imputation, when man is only *so far* free from that determining power, unconditioned in itself, as he becomes possessed by another eternal, universal principle, which excites in him egoity and makes it supreme? Thus the human will remains the sport of the impulses and strifes of universal cosmogonic potencies, of which, when one has retired, another immediately occupies the place, so that there is no room left for the self-independence of the created essence.

On the contrary, one has not to go far to make good, from the development of the notion of formal freedom, by *Schelling* himself, that man has in himself in an equal degree, the *sources of self-movement* to both good and evil, that his egoity, as spirit, is free of both principles, that if he has decided for the evil as the

perversion of the true relation between the two principles, it is his own act, a stepping out of an original state of indecision. Be it so, but if we hold fast to these determinations, there is no longer any existing ground for conditioning the freedom of the will, by means of *two, mutually opposed, principles.* But then the real definition of freedom contained in this treatise, as the ability of good and of evil cannot possibly be an original, but merely a derived determination of its notion.[1] For is it not an entirely different thing to give to creature freedom a double principle, than to ascribe to it the necessity of determining between the possibilities of good and evil presented to it?

But to be brief, the *formal* and *real* notion of freedom—according to the technical language of this treatise—do not strictly agree. It is seen in this, that the stepping forth of man from the state of indecision is explained as impossible, unless there were a general ground of temptation to evil which calls forth the egoity and the contrast, in order that when the will of love arises it may meet with a resistance in which it realizes itself.[2] If we correctly understand this explanation it sacrifices the formal notion of freedom to that of the real, in which, nevertheless, we are not able to find real freedom, but only that resolving of our moral consciousness and will into a general cosmical process. In general we may say it can never be granted to a doctrine of freedom, which wishes to support this notion upon a dualistic element, to succeed in satisfying the expectations which it will first of all excite, directly in the ethical interest of freedom.—

Let us now see how *Schelling* more definitely determines this formal side of the notion of freedom.

The contradictions in which *Kant* had involved himself in his treatment of this idea of *intelligible freedom,* in its relation to moral life in *time,* could not escape the piercing glance of his eye. And of the contradictory principles on which *Kant* had taken up the investigation, *Schelling* resolutely carried out that one which was in harmony with his own principles, while he passed by those representations which he found incompatible with

[1] This deduction is still thereby confirmed, that evil, according to p. 493 seq., will at some time end, consequently freedom is said to cease to be ability of evil.

[2] Ibid. p. 452, 454.

them. *Kant* had already declared that "*the sensational life*, in consideration of the *intelligible consciousness* of its existence (of freedom), has absolute unity of a phenomenon which must be judged of according to the absolute spontaneity of freedom,"[1] he had denominated the empirical character, not of individual actions, but of man, the sensational schema of the intelligible character.[2] If we are to regard this as expressing something determinate, it certainly contains this, that *the individual decisions of the will*, which even in the same subject are manifoldly contradictory, cannot be directly referred to the intelligible freedom as such—which nevertheless *Kant* generally does—but that *the entire moral being of man* is to be regarded as the temporal reflex of an intelligible primitive decision, produced as it were by the breaking and dividing of the simple ray in the element of time. From this point of view, *Schelling* conceives of the act of self-decision, by which the life of man is determined in time, and which does not according to time precede life, but passes through time (untouched, uninfluenced by it) as an *act which is eternal according to its nature*.[3] Man who here appears decided and determined, has in the first creation given himself a determinate form—namely, as is shortly afterwards said, that of egoity and selfishness—and as such, which he has been from eternity, becomes born. He acts here, as he has acted from eternity and already in the beginning of the creation.[4]

The rigid predetermination of all moral conditions and actions in time by the intelligible self-decision, which *Kant* was ever able to conceal from himself as the strict consequence of his idea of freedom, *Schelling* sets up as expressly to be maintained, but in such a manner that the freedom of the human will thereby wholly destroyed, should be entirely saved. *Kant* remains standing, according to his prevalent method of consideration, by *a double origin of individual actions*, the empirical and the intelligible. The one which is absolutely necessitating, but as only belonging to the phenomenal world, and is at the same time without reality, he discovers in the temporally preceding causes, to which he also

[1] *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft.*
[2] *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, p. 430.
[3] Ibid. p. 468.
[4] Ibid. p. 470, 471.

reckons the already existing, empirical, apperceptive character of the acting agent. The other origin, which is the true, and according to which man has always his action perfectly under his control, he discovers in the transcendental freedom. *Schelling* allows the individual action to follow from the inward of man, only according to the law of identity, and with absolute necessity, since he takes this necessity in real earnest and will not allow that man has in any way the possibility of acting otherwise. But this inward necessity is to him freedom; the essential existence of man is *his own act*,[1] grounded in his eternal self-decision.

It is of itself clear, that the reasons which would not allow us to adopt the form of the idea of intelligible freedom as conceived of by *Kant*, are not removed by this more consistent development of them, but rather receive a more decided character. The inviolable necessity for the appearance of the moral in time, which this conception leads us necessarily to expect, is neither confirmed by the first impression, nor by a more deliberate investigation of the empirical moral development and of the moral judgment.

There is *one* point especially, at which the difficulty is increased or much rather revealed in its magnitude by this more consistent development of the ground thought. *Kant* had committed the inconsistency, after recognizing a radical evil as arising out of intelligible freedom, of requiring from man, as he exists in time, that he should overcome the evil; and of declaring the fulfilment of this requirement *as possible*, without making as the basis of this possibility, a self-decision of the intelligible freedom. But it is clear that if such a transformation of man is to be possible, it must also be already in some way contained in that transcendental act, by which the empirical existence of man is previously determined, because otherwise the highest act *of freedom*, which is said to have its place *without and above the temporal sphere*, may be consummated *in the midst of time*. Therefore *Schelling* teaches: that man allows this influence to the good spirit which determines him in his transformation from evil to good, does not positively shut himself up from it, is already contained in that commencing act by which he is what he is and no other.[2]

[1] Ibid. p. 466 seq. [2] Ibid. p. 473.

How is this maintenance to be understood? It is easy to conceive that the abandonment of man to evil in that transcendental act, was not total, but only *partial* and *limited*, so that this limit were the susceptibility of his conversion by the Divine aid. Accordingly human life, in which this conversion took place, would be divided into two periods succeeding each other, the first, that in which the affirmation of evil in that primitive act realized itself in time; the second, that in which the limit of this affirmation, and of the conditioning thereby of the possibility of the Divine aid, became realized in an opposite form of the empirical moral life. But how does this idea agree with the ground opinion of the relation of the intelligible to the temporal? According to it that primitive act is in a moral respect *absolutely determining* for the empirical life of man, so that this latter can only exhibit what is contained in the former. How now could there be room for a determination by the side of this which should be opposed to it in principle, although brought about by Divine aid? That primitive act "does not precede life even according to time, but passes through time untouched and uninfluenced by it, as an act which, according to its nature, is eternal." If accordingly *all* moments of life in time have the absolutely *equal* relation to this primitive act, how can it be divided into two periods, in one of which, the primitive act prevails, in the other its negation? Consequently, if according to that fundamental opinion, such a "transmutation" is said to be possible, we shall be obliged to ascribe to the transcendental act itself, a twofold contents, namely, that of the decision for the perversion of the two principles that the egoity may prevail, and then the decision for the right order of the principles that the egoity may be subordinated. But that is not merely a duplicity of contents, but a perfect *contradiction*, which has been already shown to destroy the idea of that transcendental act. Besides, if this extra-temporal, primitive decision were so constituted, one must not expect as its revelation in time a moral renovation of man, after a life governed by the principle of egoity, but a perpetual fruitless struggle of conflicting tendencies.—

Schelling, according to the principles of his system, and in agreement with its idealistic side, extends the grounding power of intelligible freedom of man still further. In order to look at this

power, apart from its relation to nature and only in relation to man, not merely is his moral being said to rest upon that eternal self-act, but his *entire empirical existence;* this his entire present mode of being is regarded as its result. This reality is no longer, as with *Kant*, a mere phenomenon, a mere representation, under the subjective, cognitive forms of time and space, behind which is the unknown world of "things as they are in themselves;" it is recognized in its reality, and the destructive contradiction in which, according to *Kant*, the "reality of phenomena stands with freedom,"[1] is resolved by *transferring this entire sphere into the region of freedom*, and by making this intelligible freedom of man, and its eternal self-determination, the creative principle of this his present mode of essential existence. From this point of view, *Schelling* not only maintains that this free act precedes consciousness as it does the essence, but that it first of all *makes* it, so that its appearance in the consciousness is clearly impossible.[2] Even the very character and constitution of the corporisation of man—indeed without doubt of the individual—is determined by this extra-temporal act.[3] After this, how can we doubt whether or not the inward individual peculiarity is to have its ground in the same? The treatise, it is true, does not expressly say so much; still, it says quite generally: the essence, the nature of man is his own act;[4] his essence, his nature and life are determined by the intelligible act.[5]

It often occurs in the history of the human mind at the discovery of a new principle, before the strict limits to the sphere of its operation have become known, that it is applied to objects, and set to the solution of problems, for which it has no adaptation. In this way we can very well understand the powerful incitement which allured even *Schelling* and some of the profound adherents to his philosophy to employ the idea of transcendental freedom, which idealism made known to us, as a principle of explanation, for all the limits and hindrances of our empirical existence. But by stretching its application beyond the dark enigmatical phenomena of moral life, which receive light from that idea, its recognition imperceptibly loses its firmest basis, namely, the *imputation in the*

[1] *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, p. 418. [2] Ibid. p. 469.
[3] Ibid. p. 470. [4] Ibid. p. 467. [5] Ibid. p. 473.

conscience. For who, on the one hand, imputes to himself natural bodily defects or innate disproportionateness of spiritual organisation, while on the other hand, does not the conscience of every one reproach him on account of that which is contradictory to moral requirement, without making its condemning judgment dependent on whether the propensity to the same were inborn or not? Then too there are no less decided facts of experience which make the extension of that transcendental act beyond its own, to other spheres of life, positively contradictory. If the "corporisation" of individual man, with respect to its character and form, is determined by that act, what explanation can be given of the body standing in innumerable instances in ironical contrast with the spirit inhabiting it? Does not *Socrates* himself furnish a contradiction to one of his own axioms, in its inverted form, namely, that a beautiful body must be inhabited by a beautiful soul? It cannot be replied to this, that wealth of spirit and nobility of disposition, know how to give expression to their concealed beauty in the very midst of contradictory forms, and invertedly, that the common soul and empty mind, must betray themselves by ugly lines even in the most beautiful countenances; for where, if this be the case, does the original contrast come from whose solution beyond this is only intimated at in the manner just mentioned, and not really effected?—And as to the *spiritual peculiarity* of the individual, it cannot be denied that, apart from its temporal development, and simply in reference to its original endowments, that as a rule, they are partially determined by the national and family type and parental peculiarity—moments, which will not allow in any way of being referred back to the intelligible self-determination of the individual thereby determined. Thus this opinion, which violates the idea of creation, and transforms the most positive act into a mere permission, also involves itself in contradiction with the idea of generation. Now if we still add to this attempt to explain the temporal existence of man in all its determinations by that eternal self-act, the above sentence, that the very "transmutation" of man in his life in time must be grounded in the determination of that act, how is it to be explained that at the moral conversion of man there is not at the same time a corresponding transformation of *his intellectual and physical peculiarity?*

How powerfully are the advocates of this opinion in its own connection admonished by these facts, to distinguish in principle between the sphere of freedom and the sphere of necessity in human life!

Finally, we must just cast a glance at a problem which is in itself very difficult, but which, according to this conception of the notion of transcendental freedom, appears *altogether insolvable.* If the entire temporal existence and consciousness of man are only consequences of a perverted extra-temporal act of freedom, of a *primitive fall,* must not the intelligible being, which is just entirely freedom, be regarded, in relation to the empirical being, as the more perfect, and the empirical being as a *diminished being,* as a being sunk down into a condition of bondage? Most undoubtedly. How now, according to this, are we to think of the *future life, the after-earthly life* of man in relation to this contrast? The treatise does not specifically raise this question; not even there where it treats of the question whether evil comes to an end and how? but contents itself with general observations, and employs expressions all of which are certainly not to be strictly taken. Still it is perfectly clear from a few occasional expressions that it admits the doctrine of a personal immortality, than which nothing else is conceivable with the adoption of an intelligible essentia *(Wesenheit)* of the individual man, constituting itself by that primitive act. If now the evil is to have an end—with the consideration of which one may still leave undecided, whether for *all* personal essences,—the diminution of being grounded in the same must be removed, by a restoration of the essence, freed from evil, to the *extra-temporal mode of essential existence.* But it is a self-contradictory idea that an essence should pass out of the temporal being into an extra-temporal, that it should ever change the former mode of essential existence for the latter, and therewith *in time* begin to exist *out of time.*

We must here expect to be met by the reply that the contradiction which we have pointed out, is to be found at another point, in our own opinion, since we too adopt, on account of human freedom, the idea of an extra-temporal self-grounding of the essence existing in time, and consequently must also adopt a transition of the free essence, if not from the temporal into extra-temporal existence, still from the extra-temporal into the temporal.

But that the non-temporal existence of an essence becomes cancelled by its entrance into time is not at all contradictory. The temporal existence of the conditioned essence as another and, as we shall presently more clearly see, more real existence, negatives the non-temporal and thrusts it into the back-ground; by its own beginning it makes it its *presupposition*, and in so far removes it into the past; thus it imparts to it a determination, which it has not in itself, but only by *means of* and *for the sake* of the *temporal* being and consciousness; for in itself it is truly just as little past as present and future. On the contrary, if the temporal existence of an essence is constituted the presupposition of its extra-temporal essential existence, so that the former must cease in order that the latter may begin, then we receive an extra-temporal existence, which can only begin at a given moment of time, and which just therewith, since according to its notion it is said to be *independent of time*, would be absolutely *dependent on the time*.

Nevertheless we have perhaps only to take one step further, in order to find the contradiction solved, namely, to remember that this existence independent of time, which *succeeds* the temporal life of man, is also at the same time—according to the notion—*preceding*, in relation to this temporal life. Now, in order to conceive of this, one must not set out with the crude and absurd representation of the temporal life *disuniting* the unity of the extra-temporal life, and thrusting itself in between its two divided parts, so that the extra-temporal life ceased where the temporal began, and where the temporal life ended, the extra-temporal again commenced. Much rather this relation is to be conceived of in this way, that the extra-temporal being entirely penetrates through the temporal, and determines it, but keeps itself uninfluenced and undisturbed by it *in eternally equal self-dependence*,[1] so that the essences which share in it, when their temporal life is completed, cast it from them as a limiting encasement in order henceforth as previous to—or apart from—their becoming temporal, purely extra-temporally to exist.

If now this idea of the relation is to be firmly retained, we

[1] In this sense it is surely said—Ibid. p. 468—The act by which the life of man in time is determined—does not precede the life according to time, but goes through time (uninfluenced by it) as an act, according to its nature, eternal.

cannot attribute to the temporal life in relation to that higher truth of our being, our intelligible existence, *any purpose whatever;* otherwise *on this stand-point* the absurd representations of an extra-temporal existence becoming determined by the temporal life were of course in no way to be avoided, indeed a separation of the same into two moments, that namely of its primitive independence and that of its resulting from the temporal life. But if the temporal existence be without purpose in relation to the intelligible, then is it no longer, as already followed from other determinations of this doctrine, merely a *diminished being*, but inevitably sinks down as with *Kant* to a mere *appearance or shine-existence*, to a passing shadow, which, in a manner incomprehensible, that only true being casts. And indeed how powerful is this shadow, if an empirical consciousness and self-consciousness of the intelligible essence can arise in it, which entirely *conceal* their true essential existence—for this indeed is only to be fathomed by speculation—and reflect nothing but that shine-existence!—With this representation of the temporal existence of man the true incarnation of the Logos would of course be irreconcilable; it would necessarily together with the resolution of the human earthly life into mere shine, itself be resolved into a *docetic* representation.—

While we must decidedly recognize the fundamental ideas of transcendental freedom and of intelligible evil, as the true key for the solution of the enigma of the imputation of evil in the conscience, and in the judgment of the Divine forgiveness and punishment, consequently as the abiding fruit of Idealism, especially in its deepened form as moment of *Schelling's* system, we are just as decidedly obliged to decline the more determinate form of those ground ideas in this treatise on freedom for the reasons here developed.

FOURTH CHAPTER.

FREEDOM AS POSSIBILITY OF SIN.

Sensualistic, materialistic, and especially atheistic modes of thought have the indisputable advantage of being able to dispose of the problem of evil much more easily than it can be disposed of by the Theism of the Christian religion. As in general, from such stand-points, the mountains and vallies disappear and leave the prospect into the waste plains perfectly open and free, so with respect to the subject of the problem under consideration, evil is for them so good as non-existent, while, on the other hand, it burdens with its entire weight those modes of thought which recognize the eternally self-perfect, self-conscious God, as the absolute principle of the finite. The great difficulty oppressing the existence of evil, rests, according to a previous observation in the former chapter, upon its *relation to God.* Accordingly if it is our especial object to endeavour to understand (creaturely) freedom, in so far as it includes the possibility of evil, the investigations of this chapter will have to set out from the *idea of God.*

In our time the adversaries of religion appear to unite themselves together, with those who recognize in it the only salvation of the human race, in the conviction, ever becoming more general, that it cannot be what, according to its nature, it is, without the consciousness of God as of the self-conscious and self-determining *personality.*[1] Of what service to piety would a God be who is too exalted, or much rather too abstract and destitute of all reality in order to be personal? Religion is fellowship with God; but with an absolute, which is not in itself an Ego, therefore not a Thou for our prayers, there cannot be any real fellowship; love, which according to the very nature of its notion,

[1] *Strauss, e. g.* in his *Dogmatik,* commences his discussion of the Personality of God with this recognition, § 33.

presupposes personality in its object as well as in its subject, loses here all significance, and in the place of free child-like confidence, trust, and resignation, which at the same time carry in them the certain hope of a perfect solution of everything enigmatical, we have the self-constraint of subjection to inflexible fate, and the necessary connection of causes and effects, or that negative sinking of self into the bottomless ground of all things, as if in anticipation of the future absorption and perishing in the same, to which the consciousness believes itself to be destined.

Thus too that theology, which thought to be able to form the system of Christian Dogmatics, independently of the notion of the Divine Personality, has been obliged decidedly to recognize its indissoluble connection with the immediate reality of religion. While, on the one hand, *Schleiermacher* speaks of "*essential imperfections* in the idea of a Personality of the highest essence," he nevertheless considers it, on the other hand, as an *almost immutable* necessity for the highest form of piety to appropriate to itself this idea, especially whenever one would attempt to interpret to himself or others the immediate religious excitations, or where the heart is directly engaged in direct converse with the Highest Being.[1] There lies at the bottom of this, it is true, that subjective Dualism, according to which man is said to be obliged to use mental representations, even in the interpretation of his religious emotions or excitations *for himself*, which he has often in other respects regarded as inadmissible ;[2] but the inference which we shall make from this expression is that it contains the admission, that religion is scarcely conceivable without the presupposition of a personal God.

There is also in the sphere of language a holy right of possession which commonly avenges its violation by a miserable confounding of ideas. If the name of God originally without doubt belongs to the sphere of *religion*, then one might venture

[1] *Lectures or Discourses on Religion.* (*Reden uber die Religion*). Ed. 3d, p. 199.

[2] For we are not able to see that this variance really becomes reconciled by the determinations of the *Schleiermachian* Dialectic respecting the distinction between the philosophic and religious conception of the idea of God, comp. ibid. § 225, especially p. 168, and supplemental remarks E. li. lii., especially p. 528.

to presuppose, that, whoever used it, would not employ it in a sense absolutely foreign, or essentially opposed to religion, and that therefore he would recognize that determination of personality radically essential to religion; for the expression of an entirely different notion he was surely free to employ another term.

But this is not at all meant to convey the opinion, that the notion of the personal God is necessarily inaccessible to the philosophical stand-point. Much rather we are of the decided persuasion that the purely philosophic consideration, independently pursuing its own course, will be driven to this notion, and without it will never arrive at a conclusion which furnishes a steadfast basis to the restless progress of inquiry.[1] Never will it be able satisfactorily to explain finite reality, and especially the highest reality of the finite, the finite spirit, so long as it has not learnt to find the origin of these essential existences in a personal principle. Just as little will it ever be able to show, that the mental representation of a super-personal essence is a real thought, without necessarily, so soon as it attempts more definitely to determine it, falling into that of a sub-personal essence.—

But personality is not something which exclusively belongs to God; by what then is the Divine Personality distinguished from the human? In other words: whereby is the *Divine Personality* an *Absolute one?* From the answering of this question it will at the same time be seen whether Christian Theology has any cause to abandon to its opponents the possibility of an Absolute Personality, just as it has in modern time been denied, particularly by *J. G. Fichte*, and then by some of the disciples of *Hegel*, and especially by *Strauss*,[2] on account of the supposed contradiction between the notions: absolute and personal.

Truly there is essentially contained in the idea of personality, this, that the personal essence *distinguishes or discretes itself in itself*, and indeed not merely formally, since in self-consciousness the subject sets itself at the same time as object, but also in

[1] *Im Denkmal Jacobi's* (in the memorial of Jacobi) p. 64. *Schelling* denotes the perfectly established opinion of the essential existence of a personal essence as author and governor of the world, as being the last fruit of the most enlightened, cultivated, and most comprehensive science. This prophecy will one day be fulfilled, however impoverished the philosophy of the present age may be, in relation to the same.

[2] *Dogmatik* l. c.

a real manner. In self-consciousness a plurality and discrete severality are referred to the unity of the Ego, and are recognized as determinations of the same. In this powerful concentration the separateness of the individual elements of life and conditions is removed; wherefore personal essences are capable of an entirely different unity in themselves to that of the impersonal (therefore also assuredly of an infinitely deeper disunion.) But this unity is not and cannot be without a plurality which is posited as unity.

In the application of this knowledge to God we find ourselves certainly in positive contradiction to the opinion, which, originating in the patristic development of Christian doctrine, has been most prevalent both in the more ancient and more modern theology. Terrified at the apprehension of being directly obliged to admit, with the notion of distinctions in God, that also of the Divine Essence consisting in or being set together from parts, it conceived of the *simplicitas essentiae divinae* so abstractly as to exclude from the Divine Essence or Substance all real distinctions which became referred to our subjective inward representations or ideas. But as, in case of the *distinction* of the determinations or attributes of the Divine Essence being void and unreal, *they themselves* by their notions, as *Strauss* very properly shows,[1] no longer furnish us with the smallest knowledge of God, so this opinion becomes consequentially and necessarily driven to the maintenance of the perfect incognizability of the Divine Essence or nature of God. With the intention of exalting God to the highest, it deprives Him of the realities, without which, as it is itself obliged to confess, we cannot really think of Him. That this negative result just as decidedly, as the assumption of an absolute knowledge of God, contradicts the Holy Scriptures, which especially teach that God becomes revealed in Christ, as it does that of the simple Christian consciousness, may be too easily shown for it to be requisite that we should here enter upon the same; it is also of itself clear into what a strange position theology must fall by the renunciation of the knowledge of its essential object. But as to that fearful apprehension of an

[1] *Dogmatik* § 35. (vol. i. p. 540). comp. *Baur, die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit und Menschwerdung Gottes in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwickelung*, vol. iii. 332 seq.

essence of God being *set together or composed from* His attributes, one must really wonder how a man of such fine and delicate perceptions and power of thought as *Schleiermacher*, should have been able to have shared in the same, since, to say nothing of higher spheres, even organic unity in relation to the manifoldness which it essentially includes in itself, is already beyond the external category of composition, or mere external setting together.

But this prejudice as to the incompatibility of real distinctions in God with the simplicity of His essence, has become so deeply rooted in modern theology, that many, when they hear of a plurality and totality of the determinations of the Divine Essence, are not at all able to conceive of this as being said in any other than in the pantheistic sense. But the truth is much rather that pantheism will ever and again break forth with power from Theism, so long as it shall remain in the opinion that the Divine Essence first of all possesses a determinate being severally distinct in itself, in its transition to the world. Its power then lies in the necessity of the progress from abstract unity through the plurality and severality to concrete unity, its true vanquishment therefore in the knowledge, that God has in Himself the Life, therefore, as life is not without the unity of a manifoldness, the fulness of being and the immeasurable contents of positive determinations (John v. 26), and consequently is in no need of the world in order to be the eternally living God.

Just as little, without this cognition, can the notion of the Divine *Personality*, which is pretty generally regarded as the specific difference between Theism and pantheism, be firmly maintained. If God were the abstract simple essence excluding from Himself all real distinctions, what those views would most entirely make Him—as a very supplementing counterpart of pantheism which only finds real determinations possible in God by virtue of an apotheosis of the world—there were also in God Himself nothing posited by a *will*. For will is self-determination by an act, immediately by a purely inward act; but where nothing is *distinguished* there nothing is *determined*. Then too the will of God is just as little able to be understood as a causality proceeding externally; for if God is not able to determine Himself, he cannot by self-determination call forth

or produce other effects without Him. Indeed how can one according to that fundamental representation earnestly speak of a will of God in *distinction* from His *cognoscence* primarily as self-consciousness conceived of? And this *self-consciousness*, what is there for it to comprehend, if God is only the distinctionless, simple being (ἁπλῶς ἓν)? Of what should God be conscious save of just this His self-consciousness, so that His Personality would consist in the empty Ego = Ego?—

If we behold the older theology embarrassed in the endeavour to resolve all determinateness of the idea of God into an abstract notion of identity, we may justly extend to it the excuse, that the injurious destructive consequences of this tendency were just as concealed from it, as they are now clearly manifest to us. It was able to deceive itself, as to the internal contradiction, in which this notion stands to its fundamental consciousness of the Personality of God, by conceiving of this simple unity, this essence excluding all real distinctions at the same time as *separate, distinct from the world*, consisting for itself, then too that this relation of God to the world, different, distinct from Him should be the *fundamentum in re* for the attributes not discrete in God Himself. Holding fast the distinction of God from the world it thought therewith to make sure of the conditions of its notion of God as of an intelligent determining essence. But that God may be able to distinguish Himself from the world, if He does not distinguish Himself in Himself, and that too not merely hypostatically, but also essentially, this is what can never be shown. If God is in Himself the distinctionless essence, He first of all receives determinateness of being in the world; but how then could God know Himself as an essence distinguished from the world, therefore in this distinction in any way possess determinate essence?

That this is impossible, becomes now fully admitted, indeed even where the absolute is conceived of as the identity, in which all distinctions disappear, still only as understood according to the principle of the *immanent*. But therewith too the mere negativity of this notion of the Absolute appears in its full light. For it only thereby arises, that all determinations in their distinction from each other, *i.e.* in their determinateness become cancelled and set down as identical. Thus then this absolute as such has absolutely no other contents than just this solution of all deter-

as the Scripture says the same much rather of the Word of God as the operative outgoing of His will: He commanded and it stood fast.[1] God's conception of the world is an eternal one; but from this there by no means follows the necessity of a world and time without beginning, but He thinks and wills both in their mutually inseparable relation as such, which have a beginning. Further, if the Personality of God is the Absolute Personality, no inward necessity or want can urge Him to set another being. In order therefore to derive the essential existence of a world from God, we have neither the mathematical necessity of *Spinoza*, as he very emphatically expresses it in the first book of his *Ethics*,[2] nor the dialectic necessity of more modern philosophers, by virtue of which God is said first of all perfectly to realize Himself in the world or by means of the world; but only *the freedom of love*, of the will, which in the production of another being makes solely *this itself* its purpose, that it may participate in the goods of existence, and so far as it is receptive for the same, in the highest and perfect good in fellowship with God Himself.

The very notion of *creation* essentially includes the production of another being by volition, by conscious self-determination; creation can therefore only be ascribed to a *personal* essence. Further, the notion of creation contains, that this production in distinction from every other is an absolute conditioning, that it is not a production which is limited by anything external to the

[1] When *Strauss*, in his *Dogmatics*, vol. i. p. 564, finds in the words of *Thomas*: necesse est, quod sua scientia sit causa rerum, secundum quod habet voluntatem conjunctam (*Summa*, p. i. qu. 14, art. 8), the subsequent clause to be impure, we for our own part are much rather obliged to regard the primary clause as indicating a disturbed, unclear consciousness of the essence of Christian Theism, in the secondary clause on the contrary we recognize the correct thought.—Also *Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre*, vol. i. p. 487, comp. p. 222 in God thinking and producing are the same.

[2] *Propos.* 17. *Schol.* Ego me satis clare ostendisse puto a summa Dei potentia sive infinita natura infinita infinitis modis, hoc est, omnia necessario effluxisse vel semper eadem necessitate sequi, eodem modo ac ex natura trianguli ab aeterno et in aeternum sequitur, ejus tres angulos aequari duobus rectis. Only, if the comparison is to hold good, it is still incongruous of a result of things from the Divine power to speak of an effluxisse, so certainly as no one will regard the three angles = two right angles as a Being derived from the triangle.

producing agent, but an unconditioned one; absolutely dependent upon itself; and the fixation of this idea was the only intention of that old formula of *creation from nothing*. The Church Fathers have of course never united with the same the absurd representation of a becoming, a process, a development of the world from nothing, so that the nothing contained the cause of the existence of the world. Therefore it is strange to seek to refute this determination by the old canon *ex nihilo fit nihil;* but just as strange is it to deprecate the application of this canon to the question of the creation as pantheism.[1] The true notion of creation has much rather on its part nothing at all to object to the canon: *ex nihilo fit nihil;* according to it the will of God is the cause of the existence of the world, and in His will as the unlimited, infinitely powerful principle of all reality, non-entity has least of all a place. Accordingly if creation is an unconditioned conditioning, then only *Absolute Personality* can create. Now that which can determine God, absolutely sufficient in Himself, in the production of a being distinct from Himself, is love alone; consequently the creation is nothing else than the free self-communication of God Himself, who could be exclusively in Himself, but wills it not, in order that others may have being, and, in fellowship with Him, eternal life.—

Nevertheless this freedom seems directly to resolve itself again into necessity, if we call to mind, that love is itself a *fundamental determination of the Divine Essence*. If then the world is the essential object of this love, does not the existence of the world follow with rigid necessity from the essence or very nature of God?

The distinguishing, according to *Leibnitz*, between *metaphysical* and *moral* necessity is indisputably a true and productive thought; the latter is really a higher necessity than the former, much more mediated and spiritualized, namely by its having in it the moment of *design*, which is foreign to metaphysical necessity. But inasmuch as the matter treated of is not yet that of the determinate constitution, but simply of the being or non-being, of the world, the rigidity of the connection between ground and consequence is, under the presupposition, that the love of God

[1] *Hegel* often does this, *e. g. Encyklopädie* § 88, *Logik—Werke*, vol. 3, p. 80 sq., although without express reference to the idea of creation.

was only able to realize itself in its relation to the world, in the moral necessity not at all less than in the mere metaphysical.

The difficulty is just as little solved by the cognition which we have above won, namely that all determinateness of the Divine Essence—therefore also the Divine Love—*is grounded in the Divine self-determination*. Assuredly God is Love, because He wills to be Love. But what justifies us to maintain, that He could not be love without the renunciation of His freedom? But it is not sufficient for absolute freedom that an essence is not dependent upon another, for to this there also belongs that the essential existence of another essence does not of necessity follow from it —or much rather: that we do not purely get that independency, if it is obliged to mediate itself by means of another being, although this other being be always dependent upon it. If now God could not by virtue of His love be without the world, then absolute freedom, which is the source of the determinations of His essence, must have nullified itself in its product, since it would follow from His nature, that He found Himself in a necessary relation to another being. He were then not the absolutely self-satisfying, in Himself sufficient—*θεὸς αὐτοτελὴς, ἀπροσδεής*.

This problem only becomes solved by the idea of the *Divine Trinity*. Its inmost significance is this, that God has in Himself the eternal and absolutely worthy object of His Love, independently of every relation to the world, John xvii. 24, comp. ver. 5. To this the unity of the essence belongs just as much as the distinction of Persons. For without the personal distinction, without an I and a Thou, there can be no love whatever. But without the unity of the essence there would follow from the Love of God a necessary relation to an essence distinct from God. The commencement of the prologue of Saint John equally intimates both, the personal distinction by the *ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν*, the essential unity by the *θεὸς ἦν*, which he declares of the Logos. But just therefore because it is the Logos, by which the immanent love of God eternally realizes itself, is He also the Mediator of the Love which proceeds without, *i.e.* of the efficiency and self-revelation of God which relate themselves to other beings, by which the world is created, preserved, and conducted to its completion.

Indeed without the Logos, without the eternal, personal dis-

tinction, by which God as essential love is absolutely self-sufficient, it is not at all to be comprehended, how the Divine Love could manifest itself by the world and in the world as such, therefore as absolutely perfect.[1] For he only is capable of an absolutely

[1] *Dr Lücke* has, in his letter addressed to *Nitzsch* on the immanent Trinity, *theol. Stud. u. Kritiken* 1840, p. 63 seq., deemed a few expressions on the true significance of the Divine Trinity, contained in the first elaboration of the doctrine of sin, but in perfect agreement, according to the sense, with the above, worthy of consideration and controversion, p. 106 seq., 109 seq. I must resist the temptation to explain, in my defence, how I understand this deep doctrine, as this, owing to the magnitude and fulness of the subject, could not be done, without entirely interrupting the arranged progress of our investigations. However, from the above more complete exposition of the connection of thought, in which these intimations are now presented, my honoured friend will perceive, that I do not share in some fundamental presuppositions which, in his conception of my former expressions, he laid down. Thus at p. 107 he says: God as absolute Spirit must certainly be conceived of as possessed of infinite manifoldness, also self-determinations, but still only in relation to the world, wherein the manifoldness is first of all truly real; otherwise the pantheistic danger is not to be avoided. If now this is not to lead to the formula: that God first of all realizes Himself in the world—wherein certainly there is no protection against pantheism—I can only understand it in this way,—that God in Himself, entirely apart from the world, is, although distinctionless, nevertheless absolutely real unity. But how a unity, in which there is nothing united, is said to be a real unity, that is just what I am not able to see. *Lücke* says, p. 108: "Where we discrete, set and again cancel distinctions there we have a process, a becoming, a development (*Werden*) and time." If this inseparability of all distinction from development and time really held good, *Lücke* would of course be quite right when he directly concludes: "The absolute allows of no immanent distinctions."—The positioning and again cancelling of distinctions is for us, who do not consider the universe as a dialectic process of self-moving thought, only the activity of the thinking subject and truly falls in time; but that there are only to be distinctions at all in the succession of time, therefore out of time only a distinctionless, consequently absolutely predicateless being or thinking or both in undistinguished unity, is most certainly no metaphysical axiom.—Neither can I grant to the celebrated commentator of the Gospel of Saint John, that John xvii. 24, comp. verse 5, "can only be understood, in the connection of the gospel of the trinity of revelation," p. 110; I much rather find in the *πρὸ τοῦ τὸν κόσμον εἶναι, πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου* the very opposite. *Lücke* will for certain agree with me, that *πρὸ τοῦ τὸν κόσμον εἶναι* is not time but eternity; for if with the *πρὸ* a determination of time, nevertheless again insinuates itself, he will undoubtedly apply to the same his own beautiful and true words of the "natural irrationality between thought and word in the sphere of the supersensuous," p. 68. If now this is so, then it undeniably follows from

perfect love to another essence who stands over against this other as *absolutely self-dependent and self-sufficient*. Where this condition is wanting, there love is still in some way in connection with necessity and want, and therefore never free from egotistic relations, in which desire and passion ever anew inflame themselves. Only where there is no longer want is that perfect, unselfish love possible, which is entirely, purely freedom, and yet as true and reliable as the most infallible necessity. The perfection which human love is able to attain, is according to its nature relative, a perfection of its kind; for if it is conceivable that the reciprocal wants of individual existences will one day, after they have fulfilled their appointment as impulses of union, have ceased to be a temptation to the egotistic separation in society, and a school for the culture of victorious overcoming love, still man by virtue of his creaturehood, will never cease to be in want of God. If therefore God *required* the world, and consequently was in need of a being distinct from Himself, in order to His being what He, according to His nature, is, namely love, then even this love were not absolutely perfect. Only in so far as He is, by virtue of the personal distinction in the unity of His essence, the absolutely self-sufficient, is His love able to be the pure self-communication and condescending self-sacrifice, which reveal themselves to us in Jesus Christ.—A Godhead, necessitous and deficient, may be welcomed by the romantic fantasy of the middle ages, in order to carry on its play with religion so full of mystic interest; but the earnest sense of truth of Protestantism will never take such misty, cloudy, imagery for reality.

From this it follows then, that no necessity is ascribed to the

John xvii. 5, taken together with verse 24, that the Logos is in an eternal manner with the Father, and indeed as the eternal object of His love. But that this love essentially includes in it the personal distinction, *Lücke* nevertheless appears also to recognize—therefore the eternal being in God, independent of the world, of an I and a Thou. When, therefore, *Lücke* asks: "if the world is the collective contents of the undying immortal images of God, if there is also included among them His Holy, only begotten Son, why do we seek further for a more worthy object of his love?" p. 111.—I must confess my inability to agree with him, because, if only on account of those expressions, John xvii. 5, 24, I can never more regard the Son in His original being as creaturely existence (*Weltwesen.*)

world in relation to God, that also from the stand-point of the essential love of God, it remains false to say: God were not God, if the world were not. It sounds very religious, when one says: since it is the very nature of goodness and love to communicate themselves to others, God could not be without the world. And nevertheless there is in the same only too easily substituted for this love a perfectly foreign metaphysical determination, which not only does not presuppose the personality of God, but cancels it according to its true notion, namely the immanent dialectical process between the infinite and the finite.[1]—If therefore the accidental is opposed to the necessary, so that its notion does not express of its object the deficiency of a ground or purpose, but only the possibility of its non-being, the existence of the world is certainly to be denominated an *accidental* one, just as in this sense theism has always received the doctrine of the CONTINGENTIA *mundi*. Or does the Holy Scripture teach differently on this matter? It is much rather the very ground-tone of the Old Testament that the world is in need of God, but that God is not in need of the world; that it is the work of His freest will, and depends upon the breath of His mouth; that also the race of man, and in its midst the chosen people of God, is indebted for what it possesses of greatness and glory only to His free gift, to His promise, to His covenant; that to Him alone the honour is due. And this fundamental view of the relation of the world to God, which most certainly does not lead to a necessity of the same, the New Testament has so little abolished, that it is much rather made the presupposition, from which it everywhere sets out. Nevertheless it remains inapposite to denominate the existence of the world as *accidental;* for the accidental, according to our previous interpretation (p. 27 seq.), is surely to be distinguished from the simple ability of also not being *(Auch-nichtseinkönnen)*, and just for this reason not to be set over against the necessary but the *intentional*, therefore we should only talk of accident in relation to intelligent essential beings who are capable of setting themselves purposes. If now this is the significance of the notion in question, then by the freedom of the Divine Love,

[1] Thus in *Martensen, Meister Eckart*, p. 70, 71—in the good faith that the idea of personality and love are to be *earnestly* retained.

in which the existence of the world is grounded, the accidentality of the same is just as certainly excluded as its necessity. Indisputably love has its *purposes* in the creation of the world; its cognition in relation to its doing is wisdom; but just because it is the absolutely perfect love, the purposes of its external working are not at all contained in itself, but entirely in the being which is thereby posited. Therefore it can of course only conduct to erroneous results, if one applies the general determinations of the notion of design to this relation, without duly observing the peculiar determinateness which the same receives from love as that which sets the purpose. God does not resolve by His external working to obtain anything for Himself, which He required for the realization of His essential nature, but the being which He thereby produces, is to obtain everything which is in any way compatible with its notion, and the limitations absolutely inseparable therefrom.

This Will of the Divine Love, that there may be essential existence without and beside God, and that it may be as perfect as is consistently compatible with the notion of derived being, determines itself more closely as the will, that there may be essential beings, who are in resemblance to God, and thereby capable of His fellowship in love and knowledge. But to both these essentially belongs the highest possible *self-hood* of the creature. For the self-less is so entirely distinct from the essence, which is able thoroughly to comprehend and to determine itself, that while indeed it may, by virtue of its absolute dependence upon Him, reveal His eternal power and His thoughts not to itself, still to other essences, it cannot in any manner be His image. Just as little is an essence able to cognize God which does not cognize itself, or to give itself to God in love, when it does not possess itself. Real being and life in God includes in itself just as much the consciousness of some kind of *self-dependency in relation to God*, as the consciousness, that the distinction of essence, which conditions the possibility of this relative self-dependence, is *absolutely no longer a separating limitation*. If therefore there are said to be in the sphere of the created, essences who are capable of being in God, they must not only have a being from God as the existences of nature, but also a being in and from themselves. Thus the

Apostle Paul ascribes to man Being in God—Acts xvii. 28—and according to the connection of the passage, as a peculiar pre-eminence, as something resulting from their Divine offspring. Because God wills the highest unity, He creates the highest individuality (compare vol. i. p. 113 sq.)—It is only by *the fundamental elements of personality* that, as on the one hand, the resemblance of another being to God, so on the other, his fellowship with God, is made possible. If therefore it is the will of Divine Love to bestow upon one external to Himself, the most glorious being, which another essential existence besides God Himself can possess, in accordance with the same He constitutes *creature Personality*. Consequently the creative Will of God is entirely directed to personality; that it may realize its essential nature, is the real design of the creation of the world.—

In this will of God, that there may also be in the sphere of creaturely existence personality as copy of the Divine Personality, as eye and heart of the world, the will is at the same time contained, that there may also be besides God essential essences, which as undetermined are able to determine themselves and in so far of themselves to ground themselves as *causa sui*. The strict proof of this is contained in what we have previously said, in explanation of which we add the following. Without a self-determining, which at the same time is *real self-causing*, the second moment in the notion of personality necessarily loses its significance. It is an incompletable representation, if we endeavour to imagine the implanting of self-consciousness in animal life without such a self-determination. Man were not able really to distinguish himself from all that which he is not, his consciousness would ever have a somewhat flowing character, if he had not a principle of free motion in himself, if he did not possess the power as a willing agent to determine himself of himself, and thereby to set a boundary to every mere process of being determined from without. But there were there only a self-determining, deficient in the power really to produce anything, and consequently which was not at all able to come out of its place, where an essentially existing being were already, prior to and independent of its self-determination, absolutely determined, so that everything which might perhaps fall into his consciousness as self-determination, could in truth only be the

necessary consequence of its determinateness of being. Causational self-determining is only there, where not merely the conduct, but the very *being* of an essence is in some way *conditioned by original self-determination.* And this is its *freedom.* An essence is free, so far as it attains to its determinateness by self-decision from its original indeterminateness or undetermined state.

This notion is certainly one of the most difficult in the entire system of Christian Theism; for it is one of the deepest and of fullest contents.

To make the freedom of man the *unconditioned principle of all the determinations of the human essence,* therefore to consider the totality of its determinations as self-determination, is most certainly contradictory to the notion of its derivation of being. As therewith the distinction between the absolute and relative personality would be destroyed, so, under this presupposition, the determinateness of the human essence given in experience, the limitations which attach to man, would be perfectly unintelligible. It would also, since human personality is only real in the individual, be altogether inexplicable how the individuals become possessed of their *species-character* which essentially unites them together. For that the reference to the natural conditions, under which the temporal origin of human individuals stands, can furnish us no help here, is in itself clear, since according to this opinion this very conditionateness of their temporal origination must at the same time be regarded as product of self-determination.

The self-grounding of conditioned being is only possible upon the basis of certain *fundamental, radical determinations of its essence,* within the bounds appointed it by God. That is the distinction between God and man, that in man the self-conditioning is a conditioned one, while in God it is unconditioned. In God there is absolute freedom; in man freedom cannot be otherwise than as limited by necessity; and the limitation is only removed in that man knows himself to be one with God by love and by his fully affirming himself in this love in which he is posited by God. Not the totality of the human essence, but only a determinate sphere of the same, can human freedom have for its immediate, creative principle—it can only have *that* sphere, in which the capacity for the love and Divine peace is

contained, by the power of which the existing limitations are at the same time *as limitations* cancelled.

This sphere is the *moral*. That which man as moral essence is in his natural condition, apart from that which he may and will become by means of Redemption, has its origin in the unconditioned state, *i.e.* in his self-grounding.

Therefore the human spirit only takes a true interest in the question of the freedom of its will, in so far as it has respect to the *moral*, to the contrast of good and evil. Considered in its isolated phenomenon, a morally indifferent volition and action appears to arise in the same manner as one which has a moral significance, namely by means of choice where the ability of otherwise choosing and acting was consciously present. Nevertheless a careful observation of the procedure of our spirit shows us, that in that indifferent volition and action it only seeks freedom, in as much as it forebodes and presupposes a hidden moral significance, a connection with the moral in it. Were there nothing else given us than that *immediate consciousness of the ability of differently self-determining* oneself, which accompanies the movement of the will to the decision, let the contents be what it may, this would assuredly still be no decisive ground for the adoption of a freedom in the plain sense of the word, a self-determining which does not again become resolved into a mere being determined. The grounds which first of all justify us, nay necessitate us, in the adoption of this opinion, are essentially of a moral nature. From these grounds too the maintenance of that universal *(metaphysical)* freedom is first of all justified, of which only the *possibility* is to be proved upon the ground of metaphysics. It is on account of moral freedom necessary that there should be metaphysical freedom. Freedom must in its individual manifestations overstep the bounds of the moral sphere and enter into all the spheres of conduct, in order that the grounding of the moral in freedom may be able actually to reveal itself in life and conduct.

But even in this moral sphere, human freedom is not without a *presupposition*, to which it must in some way stand related, although it is not thereby determined and bound in its self-decision. Wherever we may have to seek the first decision of human freedom, one thing is certain, that it is preceded by *God and*

His Will, that the human will by freedom may abide in fellowship with Him. Thus the freedom of this primitive decision concentrates itself in, or reduces itself to, the choice between fellowship with, and departure from God, in the choice, whether man shall determine to abide by or sever himself from his origin in order to be absolutely in himself. The *absolutely original and presuppositionless volition* is that of the Divine volition as producing cause of the particular determinations of the Divine Essence, and such a volition can absolutely only be ascribed to God. But God has given to man a *reflection (Abglanz)* of His absolute freedom, in that He has lent to him the power to condition himself as moral essence by choosing between the different possibilities which present themselves to view.—

Still, in order to avoid the objection being made against us, that we have too hastily seized upon a result which is of great importance for the connection of our consideration, we must discuss this point somewhat more closely.

The *possibility of evil* is in no way essentially contained in the notion of *freedom* in and for itself. Of God, in so far as He is the absolutely Free, to predicate the possibility of His falling away from Himself, from His nature, which is love and goodness, is not merely an empty, but an absurd idea. Most assuredly He is only perfect love, because He wills to be it, and not from any necessity of metaphysical notions, but we are only able to understand and to know that He is perfect love by virtue of His revealing Himself in real being. But He wills, in an eternal and immutable manner, the absolutely perfect in Himself and nothing else; therefore also His doing and working can but correspond to His perfection; it is an inviolable necessity, that the Divine attributes of Goodness and Wisdom, of Holiness and Righteousness, express themselves therein, but it is that positive necessity which entirely rests upon freedom and self-determination. A metaphysical necessity, from which the commonly so-called moral attributes of God proceeded, which will allow God, the eternally self-determining One, to be merely physical essence, there is not and cannot be. But, quite apart from the revelations of God in history,—even our own essential existence, the very essence and volition of our spirit, nay even the idea, inseparable from our self-consciousness of

a higher perfection, the Divine would be, so conceived of, is testimony to us that God is also moral essence, *i.e.* that He is love. If accordingly we must most certainly recognize, in the depth of the absolute self-determination, in so far as the determinate essence of God Himself grounds itself in it, the possibility of His determining Himself not as love, but as an essence shut up in itself, the possibility, that by this self-determination of God, the personal distinction in Him and every other being without Him would be excluded, this possibility is notwithstanding by the eternal reality of His will absolutely destroyed.

The case is different with the self-determination of *man*. He is not able to lay the foundation of the good in himself in an absolutely original and self-dependent manner, and therefore does not possess it as his own essence, but he can only be good by his relation to an essence different and separate from him, conditioning him in his inmost existence, namely to God. But because man has the good not as his own essence, in him by virtue of his self-determination the possibility and the immanent imperative of the good are found together with the *possibility of evil*, of departure and falling away from God.

Indeed, according to the truth of human nature, God is not foreign to the very inmost, the essence of man, His Holy Will is not something external; it is the *determination*, the appointment of man to make his will so fully one with the Divine Will as to render every further possibility of separation impossible; and only in the completion of his appointed destiny can he possess the consciousness of being perfectly one with himself, with his idea, and therein, of being perfectly free. But if now the fulfilment of this destiny is essentially achieved by self-determination, then man, regarded *prior to all self-decision*, in his immediate immediacy, in his pure naturalness—which is very different from his present naturalness—cannot be in this manner one with God, and therein is contained the primary possibility of evil, of the fall.

But if only the *possibility* of the fall is therein contained, it follows, that man does not make his beginning from an original disunion with God, and therefore with his own idea; but what then is just as certainly impossible, as this beginning, is this, that what man is prior to all self-decision has no conditioning

which was not set by the Divine Will. On the other side of the original self-decision, there can be nothing else than, on the one hand, the non-determinateness of personal essences, on the other hand their essentially existing by God, therefore by virtue of the same, since as yet no separating decision has intervened, their adherence to their eternal origin, but such an adherence, which, just because it is affirmed by no self-decision, has as yet no moral significance. Consequently an original *neutrality* between fellowship with God and departure from God is out of the question, just as much so a *vacillation* between love to God and selfishness—for as the first representation is only an empty abstraction, the second includes a power of evil in man, therefore a sin before the sin;—and yet man in his origin is a *morally undetermined, not yet decided essence*, and by virtue of his personality can only be such an one.

Had God, in order to leave no room for this undecidedness, and therewith the possibility of a perverted decision, not willed the existence of *personal essences*, the universe were not merely an insolvable enigma—for this indeed would presuppose, that the secret solution of this enigma had been *somewhere or other* deposited and preserved—but nothing but darkness and silence, hidden from itself, as its Creator were hidden from it. But if God willed that personality should be the centre of the world, He was obliged to allow it to ground itself from out of an undetermined beginning.

We have already recognized the power of free self-determination as the highest *self-hood*, of which the creature is capable, still this self-hood of the creature is by no means to be considered in itself as a *germ or beginning of evil*, of selfishness. It is much rather the necessary condition of the truly good in the creature, of love to God and of everything holy and perfect which unfolds itself from this, in relation both to God and man. This self-hood is assuredly not immediately one with its true contents in its reality; it looks upon it as its still future *determination*, its unattained *destiny;* but it is also not at variance with it; the state of not being one *(Nichteinssein)* is truly to be distinguished from the being at variance *(Uneinssein.)* And if by this state of not being one, the possibility of disseverance and disunion, the

possibility of self making itself instead of God, the absolute focus of its volitions and strivings, is conditioned; this transition from natural and innocent self-hood to selfishness can nevertheless only take place as the source of all sin, by an *inversion* and *self-perversion* of the will, and not merely by a limitation, by a non-progression of the development. An able and sagacious naturalist, *Passavant*, expresses "the entire process of development of the free creature in its three moments" in this way: I *will*, *I will*, I will *God's will*,[1] in that he adds: the standing still of the second moment, and the hereby originating: *I* will, is evil. But in fact this: *I* will, is by no means a mere standing still of the: *I will;* the former distinguishes itself from the latter in the designation here chosen, quite as much as a particular moment (if the expression were here admissible), as the latter distinguishes itself from the: I *will*. *That* self-hood, which has its justified position in the normal development, already finds its expression in the first moment: I *will*, in which however, according to the notion of the Will the second: *I will*, is already immediately contained. If therefore the natural and innocent self-hood is expressed by: *I will*, there is thereby presented to the same the choice, whether it wills to advance to the: I will *God's will*, or to pervert itself into the: *I* will, in which the will of the creature only revolves itself in an unnatural manner about itself.

Thus there attaches to the determination of man to the good, which he is only able to fulfil by the free conscious uniting of his will to a will which, prior to this union is another will, as negative condition the possibility of evil; just for this very reason therefore, that he is called to the perfect fellowship of God is he capable of turning away and disseverance from God.[2] From this it becomes self-evident, how mistaken a notion it is, when, according to the precedence of *Hegel*, in his *Philosophy of Right*, freedom, with which man may also do evil, is spoken of

[1] *Von der Freiheit des Willens und dem Entwickelungsgesetze des Menschen*, p. v. of the preface.

[2] Therefore *Basilius* in his *ὁμιλία, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν αἴτιος τῶν κακῶν ὁ θεός*, very properly says: *ὁ μεμφόμενος τὸν ποιητὴν ὡς μὴ φυσικῶς κατασκενάσαντα ἡμᾶς ἀναμαρτήτους οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ τὴν ἄλογον φύσιν τῆς λογικῆς προτιμᾷ καὶ τὴν ἀκίνητον καὶ ἀνόρμητον τῆς προαιρετικῆς καὶ ἐμπράκτου.* (*Opp. ed. Garnier*, tom. ii., p. 79.)

as of something contracted, as of a narrowness in human nature, when in distinction from the freedom which has become one with the absolute contents it is denoted as the *bad* freedom.[1] Indisputably there is contained in the reality of evil the deepest degradation of man; but it is only just from his exalted position that so deep a fall can be possible. It is the unfathomable energy and depth of self-being in personality, which includes in itself the ability of the Ego to make itself the centre of its world. Even in the degeneracy of freedom, in its filling itself with perverted contents there still rays forth a glimmering of its essential exaltation. And if it is an exaggeration to speak of man in his fallen sinful state as of a fallen demi-god, it nevertheless ever approximates nearer to the truth, than to speak of him, as materialism does, as of a demi-beast, which, in spite of all endeavourings permanently to exalt itself above the sphere of mere animality, ever pitiably falls down again under the sway of its demi-brother.—

Now the causality of God in which it is grounded, that there is freedom and self-determination besides His own, is a true *creation*; for it is a consciously free, self-conditioned conditioning of another being. But at the same time it contains a restraint, a holding in within itself *(Ansichhalten)* of the will of God in its causal efficiency, and thus the free permission to this other being of setting his own contents, as moral essence by self-determination. It is the absolutely only character of causality by which creaturely freedom exists—a producing, in which the highest unconditionateness of the agent is shown in that the product is not a moment further conditioned, than is absolutely necessary for the bestowment and preservation of its essential existence.

An earlier investigation (p. 73—79) has convinced us, that such an act of free self-grounding, which originally decides the tendency and constitution of the moral being, can only be an *extra-temporal* one.

Indeed all *self-consciousness* appears in itself, not merely in an

[1] *E. g.* By *Marheineke* in his rescension of *Möhler's Symbolick*, p. 31, 32, of the separate reprint.

objective respect, in so far as it is able to make that which is exalted above *time* its contents, but also in a subjective respect, to be a victory over time. Entirely abandoned to the dominion of time are only those creatures which exclusively live in the present moment, without any ability of attaching to the same either the preceding or the succeeding, without remembrance of the past and without anticipation of the future. We cannot entirely deny to some of the higher animals an ability of retaining the past by memory, and of apprehending the future beforehand by anticipation; for without both they would be entirely insusceptible of domestication and discipline. But this ability is not merely a narrow and limited one as the entire existence of these creatures, but it is clearly in kind absolutely conditioned by the natural necessity of instinct and by external occasioning. Only with the arising of self-consciousness is the wonderful power presented to us of making, by consciously free activity the past and the future, the present of our mental representations. The forgotten, which seems to have tracelessly vanished in the dark ground of the individual's own life, may again, by the aid of memory, be drawn forth into the light of consciousness; and the unknown future, which as yet has no existence, the spirit is able by deductions and combinations to see beforehand. Thus with surpassing power the self-conscious spirit bids defiance to time and powerfully fastens together in one that which it divides and holds apart.

Still, although the victorious spirit thus breaks through one and another limitation and wins from time, in individual instances, many an advantage, he must nevertheless experience that even in these partial victories he remains subjected to the more general laws of time. His own future he is never able fully and clearly to see through, indeed with infallible certainty he is never able to determine respecting a single moment. But he becomes still more sensible of the invincible, predominant power of time in his not even being able fully and perfectly to retain the possessions he has already acquired, that his memory is not at all able to control his entire past, and freely to arrange and dispose all the moments of the same. He would very much like neither to do nor to experience anything in vain, that every present moment should be as a step preserved by memory for the future, and thus the whole form one connected development; but how in his conflict

with the different impulses of development which crowd and throng about him is he driven on in the dark, without knowing whither. But directly thereby, that he troubles himself in vain to retain that which vanishes with the time, does he first of all become conscious of the power of time as of a limit, while the beast knows nothing of time within whose power it stands.—

As we have hitherto considered the consciousness, so let us now look at the *being*, of created personality in its relation to time. Most assuredly, as we have already seen, is personality, even that which is conditioned in its existence, according to its nature imperishable. Is now personality hereby the victorious power which subordinates time to itself? We can only answer the question in the affirmative, in case of the mere continuance, the endless extension of naked essential existence being a real conquest of time. If we first of all direct our consideration for a while to the sphere which we, by the aid of our experience, are are able to survey, to that of our earthly, temporal existence, we shall become sensible of this as being a compressing limit that the culminating point of the individual life, at which it reveals its full vigour and energy of power, is only a passing moment. That which *Göthe* somewhere says of the beauty of the body, that even the most beautiful is only beautiful for a moment, holds good quite generally of human power and activity. Before its bloom breaks forth, it is still an imperfect bud, a moment after it has already begun to fade. This moment is the true *present* of our earthly time-life; a moment since it was future, a moment hereafter it is past; why are we not able to command the past and the future that they be as the present? Time must undoubtedly leave us existence; but it is our earthly limit in that it consumes the contents, the constitutional property of this existence in the constant change of becoming and again passing away.

But when that which at present oppresses us as a limit shall be taken away, will therefore the *form* of *time* itself also have disappeared? If we conceive of those limits as having been removed, we remain possessed of a life of imperishable duration in time, which does not grow old, but abides in each moment in unweakened energy and in undecaying fulness, of a consciousness which loses nothing which it once possessed, and which is able freely, without let or hindrance, to call up

from the shaft of memory the remotest past. We perceive that such a being, fixed and moveable, simple and manifold, becoming and remaining, active and restful, must even subjectively carry in itself the purest satisfaction, be capable of the highest blessedness, and be a clear mirror for the countenance of God. Time had then entirely become the immanent form in which life moved itself with the most perfect freedom, but it were nevertheless *life in time*. Thus then that which is now felt by us as the *limiting power* of time—the powerlessness of our spiritual life to hold itself in ever equal energy and vigour, the painfulness of being obliged to lose that which we had once acquired, the bitterness of advancing onward over ruins,—is only the particular mode of our present life in time; time itself is the pure measurement for the movement of our being in its self-unfolding. The power which incessantly hurries us along, and which we therefore realize as a constraining violence inflicted upon us, is not the *time in itself* and the unbroken succession of its moments,[1] neither is it the *change*, the vicissitude of our conditions in itself, but it is this, that this vicissitude governs us, that it is not for us free self-exhibition, but rigid necessity of nature.

Nevertheless we are only able to consider that which must appear to us as the *essential form* for our own being, if we wish to refer it to God, as a *limit* incompatible with His perfection. Where there is at all a succession of time, there it is also impossible, that the Ego should possess in the given moment the past and the future equally as the present. Assuredly together with the unimaginable speed of the flight of time, which is really nothing else than the impossibility of setting a determinate bound to its divisibility (its infinite divisibility according to the general expression, which however misuses the notion of the infinite), one can conceive of the ability of the creature

[1] Also not the endlessness, of this succession, as one perhaps might believe according to *Jacobi's*, well-known narrative of the fearful impressions which the representation of endless continuance made upon him in his childhood. (*Briefe über Spinoza*, p. 328 sq.) This impression rests upon the arbitrary abstraction of all contents from time, upon the—"from all religious notions entirely independent"—representation of endless duration as of a perfectly empty form, just as on the other hand the horror which *Jacobi* had at the same time at the thought of annihilation arises from the representation of time as being filled with a rich contents.

existing in time, quiet and undisturbed by its restless motion and flight, firmly to retain every condition corresponding to its nature, and every adequate activity, just so long as it pleased. Therewith is no less reconcilable the ability of such a creature entirely to pervade with its consciousness, every moment of its past which it wishes to call back. Nevertheless it would ever remain for such an essence that only the every present moment were the *full reality of its existence*; past and future would on the contrary retire as really no longer, or not yet being; and if even every moment of one's own existence, to which attention was directed, were fully transparent to the consciousness, it would know it, and therewith its own being in a determinate relation, still just as already past or as yet future, *i.e.* in another and less perfect manner than the moment, which is immediately present to it. For if such a distinction were absolutely non-existent, the *temporal* form of the consciousness had already passed over into the *eternal*. With *duration* therefore there is necessarily given *change;* the past is as the future always a *minus* in relation to the present; a certain separation of the moments, an approaching and withdrawing is *essentially* contained in the notion of time. But the conditionate being is essentially determined to existence in time, because in its very beginning a separation takes place between its procedure from the Divine Will and its subsequent continuance in being by means of its own activity. That only is the absolutely—not merely in relation to the mode, limited extent of a determinate essence—perfect being and consciousness which comprehends in itself an infinite fulness, but undivided, without that separation of the moments, which extends itself over an All *(ein All, universum, τὸ πᾶν*—Tr.) but at the sametime concentrates it to the most intimate inmost present, to a present, which has not, as that of existences in time, the past and future according to their contents in any way out of itself, but absolutely in itself. This leads us to the notion of *eternity*.

The popular representation of eternity as of a *boundless extended duration of time* we need not first of all in detail refute. It is of itself clear, that a succession of moments of time, which has not for its contents some development or other, a transition from one condition into that of another, is something purely void, a nonentity; but that it is reconcilable with the absoluteness of God,

to ascribe to Him development and change, or that—what indeed is in reality only the reverse side of what has been just expressed—real essential existence cannot be conceived of without development and change, no one will be able to show. Indeed the Holy Scriptures themselves contain direct intimations, which exclude that idea of the eternity; thus when an eternal being is sometimes denoted by the absolute *praesens*, John iii. 13, viii. 58, surely i. 18 also. That is the truth of the *Kantian* theory of time and space as subjective *à priori* conditions of our cognition that all visible representation paints its objects involuntarily upon the tables of time and space; but to bind speculation *entirely* to visible representation, as *Jacobi* has occasionally expressed this as maxim (*Maxime*) of his philosophizing, would be nothing else than to annihilate speculation.[1]

But while the development of the idea of God casts off that inadequate representation of eternity, it is in danger of falling into a merely *negative* conception of this notion. One supposes to arrive at the notion of the eternity of God by the simple omission of all temporal determinations, which in fact is not much better, than if one should wish to understand the freedom of God from the limit of space by the help of the representation of the geometric point. By our conceiving of the being of God as that of an absolutely non-temporal being, we have by no means conceived of it as exalted above time, as an eternal being.[2] If this merely negative method has been once adopted for the comprehension of the most Positive, it naturally follows

[1] Also the faith and hope of the Christian will never allow themselves to be deprived of an object simply because, according to the present type of our empirical cognition, it does not allow of a visible representation, and whoever without further ceremony will have such elements banished from the Christian consciousness as abstractions, may well see to it, how he then intends to save himself from the philosophy which makes this side of existence the absolute, and which admits its fundamental variance with Christianity itself. Also in *Jacobi* that maxim stands in connection with his own confession, that with his entire disposition of mind (*Gemüth*) he was a Christian, but with his entire understanding he was a heathen,"—a variance, from which this philosophy frees itself in its own manner, by simply cancelling the testimony of the disposition of mind.

[2] For this reason it is not at all a good use of language to denominate metaphysical and mathematical truths eternal.

that the representation of the Divine Being as of the eternal, believes itself obliged to empty it of all the fulness of contents which even conditioned being merely in the form of time possesses, and to reduce the same to abstract, distinctionless simplicity.[1]

The concrete notion of the eternity of God can only be comprehended in the unity of the same with the *absolute self-production of God*. If this is its form, it follows that it does not exclude, but includes the infinite fulness. God has the beginning of His being in Himself, and the beginning is by no means the fulness but determinateless simplicity; but because He is the eternal He is able without requiring time to produce Himself as this infinite fulness. As now time embraces for our consciousness an inexhaustible fulness of determinations, so does eternity in the Divine consciousness; but not in the imperfect manner of the former, in which they are divided and mutually excluding, so that when one fills the present all others are driven into the past or future, but in an absolutely perfect manner, because *in undivided and indiscrete unity*.

God could not impart this positive eternity of being to any essence besides Himself; for thereby such an essence were God, and would nevertheless be apart from God and dependent upon God, which is self-contradictory. But in so far as He wills personality out of Himself, He also wills the self-grounding of personal essences. This self-grounding, as we have seen, is only possible out of time. If accordingly there is contained in the Divine Will, that there should be personality in the sphere of created being, the will that it shall have an extra-temporal beginning of its being, this extra-temporal beginning must clearly be something else than eternity. This timeless self-grounding cannot of course be so thought of, as if the back-ground of our moral development fell apart into two moments, first a determining

[1] When *Strauss, Dogmatik*, vol. i. p. 562, objects against the reconcilability of the eternity with the personality of God:—a self-consciousness ever equal and the same we are obliged to think would be just as little a real one, as that an individual tone remaining ever equal and the same could be heard, we find both errors in the conception of eternity in this one sentence. The "self-consciousness ever equal to itself" belongs to the representation of eternity as to that of a boundless duration of time, while the individual "single tone," which could not be heard, belongs to the merely negative representation of eternity.

of the indeterminateness, then a non-determining of the indeterminateness or a determining of the determinateness. Much rather that back-ground, in so far as it is our own act, is just nothing else than the self-determining from the indeterminate. But this non-temporal being, *as such*, has, in so far as it must surely be distinguished from the eternal being, not the power of unfolding itself to a full reality. For this purpose, the essence dependent in its essential existence requires *in any case* the transition into time and its successive development, in order thus in gradual procedure to add one step to another in the self-realization of its idea. But just in this its negativity and indeterminateness this non-temporal being presents the possibility of a self-grounding beginning, of a primitive deciding volition for personal essences, without which the character of the unconditioned, which must also be shown in the root of *creaturely* freedom, can never be maintained. Just by this being having, so to speak, only half a reality in comparison with the earthly time-life, it is the sphere suitable for the most powerful decision of freedom. This definitely expressed reality of the time-life, these fixed laws in which it moves itself, this close attachment to each other of its steps of development—as, on the one hand, all this presents to man the conditions for the growth and maturity of a determinate formation of life, of a concentrated, kernelled, solidified peculiarity, so, on the other hand, it equally limits its freedom, and brings it into a narrow, confined space. That created personality does not yet in its origin possess this full reality, allows to it the power of giving to itself any fundamental, ground tendency, which it chooses, and then again it must suffer the loss of this unbound, unhindered ability of self-determination in order to arrive at full, determinate reality.

Almost all thinkers, who have either darkly foreboded or clearly recognized, that our time-life is conditioned by an extra-temporal self-decision, from *Empedocles* to *Kant*, in part even *Schelling*, have been led to err, by one and the same ungrounded presupposition, in the more exact determination of that justly recognized It is this, namely, that they conceive of the sphere of the timeless as that of a *higher, ideal being* of the soul, where, in the possession of all the highest goods and participating in the undisturbed, vision of the eternal ideas, it leads a perfect and blessed life,

where it, itself thing in itself *(ens per se)*, cognizes God and all truth as they are in themselves.[1] Of course the transition from a primitive being thus conceived of, into the time-life, from the intelligible into the empirical, could not then otherwise be imagined, unless one altogether abandoned the idea of discovering the transition, than by a *fall* and *downfall*. We will not here repeat, what has been said in other parts of these investigations as to the impossibility of deriving our time and space-existence from evil. But as to the origin of personal essences from the kingdom of the intelligible, the representation can have no other significance than this, that there is thereby furnished to them the *necessary condition of their full creaturely essential existence as personal essences*. This silent, timeless, shadowy kingdom is as it were the maternal womb in which the embryos of all personal essences lie enclosed. Here we find the simple, undetermined beginnings of our being which precede its concrete contents; therefore one is not in this kingdom to look for the fulness of the Godlike life, but only the power of deciding either in favour of voluntary union with God by subordination to his Will or for the persistency of self-hood in itself. Whichever way this primitive decision may take place, it forms for these intelligible existences the transition into space and time, into corporeity and development, however little we may be justified in regarding this present character of our corporeal nature, this method of development, in which becoming *(Werden)* is ever at the same time a passing away *(Vergehen)*, as the only possible one. As the perfect life of man after the resurrection, in which the depths of the eternal and the temporal, of God and the world become opened up to him, in which the limiting powers of inward heaviness (of the *vis inertiae*) and of outward hindrances, and beyond all the disturbing, per-

[1] Certainly *Kant's* lectures (*Vorlesungen*) on Metaphysics would conduct us to a more restricted representation, if one may admit these lectures, which only made their appearance long after his death (1821), and were printed, manifestly with little care, from a college manuscript, as a valid source of the doctrine of *Kant*. According to these Lectures, p. 232 seq., on the "Condition of the Soul previous to birth," it is taught, that it was one without consciousness of the world, and of itself, and it was only *Kant's* spiritualistic contempt of nature and of the human body which moved him notwithstanding to regard this "pure spiritual life of the soul," as a higher being.

verting power of evil, are completely overcome, incomparably surpasses in fulness of reality this present existence, so does his present existence incomparably surpass that primitive germ of our essential nature hidden in itself.

We may here also consider the question, how it is that we have *no consciousness* of this intelligible being and its primitive decision conditioning our time-life. First of all we have more exactly to determine what it strictly is of which we are here deficient. In our moral consciousness, as our earlier considerations have already in part shewn, but which our investigations hereafter of the doctrine of original sin will still further shew, we meet with undeniable facts, which are absolutely not otherwise to be explained than by a self-determination timelessly preceding this time-life. These facts express themselves in the ingenuous consciousness pervaded by moral earnestness just as if man were really conscious of such a primitive act conditioning the moral formation of his temporal life. Consequently the intelligible self-determination does not by any means lie so far removed from this our present consciousness, that it has no relation to it, but it reflects itself in the same in a determinate manner. But certainly not immediately; an empirical consciousness of that extra-temporal primitive act as such there is not and cannot be, but only by speculation can it be recognized.

To the above question *Schelling* answers: that free act could not appear in the consciousness since it precedes it as it precedes the essence, first of all makes it.[1] That the present mode of our consciousness is conditioned by that act, that this therefore cannot be within the same as an individual fact, is not for a moment to be doubted. But therefore too it cannot in this way become cognized, because the timeless being, in which it takes place, is not at all as yet the *full reality* of personal essences. A real world-connection is for them, at this point of their existence, as non-existent; the freedom of their self-determination necessarily precedes the same. Just as little do they distinguish themselves from each other; not as though, they were not yet, in the sphere of their primitive being, distinct from each other, therefore also not in the radical determinations of their essential constitution, but they

[1] *Philosophische Schriften*, vol. i., p. 469.

do not yet distinguish themselves from each other; for as yet they have no reciprocal relation whatever, and cannot have one before their entrance into their corporeal nature and therewith into that real world-connection. If they had such a relation, their essential existence would no longer be a merely spiritual one, but at the same time one definitely expressing the limit immanent in them as individual essences, *i.e.* a material one—contrary to the supposition. But their own essence they can scarcely otherwise be conscious of, prior to their distinguishing themselves from an objective world, prior to their essential existence in the peculiar determinateness of each individual essence, than in this way, that they perceive in God, in the infinite fulness of His essence, the moments, whose reflex, under the presupposition of the creative will of God, is the idea of man. They cognize themselves, *i.e.* humanity according to its general nature, *in the mirror of God.* It rests upon this that in their life developing itself in time, they are on the one hand, immediately and originally conscious of God, on the other, that their knowledge of God is always mediated in some way or other by the notion of man (whence atheism takes its pretext for reducing the idea of God in the human spirit to the mere potentializing of that notion and the making it objective, and thus exposing religion as a psychological misunderstanding.) Every real consciousness of the God-consciousness, as it occupies and fills a moment of the inner life, every elevation of the soul to God, is therefore at the same time an entering in of the same into its own ground and extra-temporal, primitive condition, where it has no other object than God. But in that it, in this primitive condition, finds itself in God, without being on this account deprived of the consciousness of its self-hood, and consequently of its distinction from God, it perceives it to be an *unconditioned immanent imperative (Soll)* to abide in the fellowship of Him in whom it has its origin.—

It will here be of interest to compare the method of representation, by which *Leibnitz* in his *Theodicee* endeavours to establish the assertion: that man has not to consider God, but only himself as the cause of his sins. For this purpose *Leibnitz, Theodicee,* part 2, § 151, says: "Man is himself the source of his evil; such as he is, he was in the ideas; moved by the unalterable grounds of His wisdom God has decreed that he pass into

existence such as he is." And in the remarkable allegory at the conclusion of the *Theodicee*, Pallas convinces the Dodonian priest, how that her father had not made Sextus Tarquinius evil, but that much rather he had been evil from eternity, and that too from his free choice. Certainly Sextus is also said to be an essential part of the *best world*, and that Jupiter lent to him existence on this account, and transferred him from the region of the possible (in the Divine understanding) into that of the real, because his wisdom could not deny existence to the world in which he was contained.[1]—Now, according to this *Leibnitz* assigns to the extra-temporal being of personal existences, which precedes and conditions their time life, on the one hand, *much more*, and on the other hand, *much less* than is here the case. Much more, for according to him, man with the entire of his temporal existence, is already perfectly completed in that region of the eternal ideas, with which then the monstrous thought stands connected, that the evil actions and natural qualities of man are to be taken up into the idea, which he has to realize in time. Much less—for this extra-temporal being of man, by which his empirical life is determined, is only in the Divine Understanding, which *Leibnitz* expressly distinguishes as the *cause of essences*, from the Divine Will as the *cause of existences*.[2] Therefore it is not at all to be seen, with what propriety *Leibnitz* is able to derive from such a mere ideal pre-existence any ground for his maintenance, that man is himself the source of his evil, that he, who is evil here, has been *voluntarily* so from eternity. Much rather is he, as he is, by the eternal necessity of the Divine understanding, and even from the Divine Will the causality of evil can only be just so far removed as the determination of its relation to the Divine Understanding approximates to *dualistic* representations.—

Weisse, holding the correct opinion, that there must be shown to be in this region conditioning the time-life of man, if it is to explain anything at all, a relatively independent ground of self-determination, has recently laid down a singular theory of creation, according to which the creative activity of God is only the *sufficient ground of the possibility* of creatures, but not of their *reality*, for which the ultimate, determining ground can only be

[1] *Theodicee*, pt. iii., § 416.
[2] *Theodicee*, pt. i., § 7.

contained in themselves, in that, by free self-determination they work themselves out from the essence of their Creator as from a basis.[1] This now is not a mere modification, but an entire destruction of the notion of creation, on the place of which we have distinctly enough the idea of a *fall* as the ground of the existence of the world.[2] That we are just as little able to recognize the reconcilability of this doctrine, which, entirely apart from the question of existence, derives the particular essentia of creatures from their freedom, with a notion of man conformable with experience, as we are able to recognize the irreconcilability of free self-determination in its own peculiar sphere, with the notion of an independent, Divine Creation, must be manifoldly evident from our previous investigations.

It is only personal essences, which have a root of their being in free self-determination. One can scarcely more prejudicially curtail the significance of the notion of freedom than by extending it to natural existences. Still we may very well say with *Schelling*, that all reality, also nature has for its ground, activity, life, and freedom,[3] namely, in reference to the Divine freedom, therefore in the sense of the notion of creation. Only personal essences have a ground *in their own act*; it is the possession of freedom in this their non-temporal root which distinguishes the spirit absolutely from nature; for everything, which otherwise belongs to this distinction, attaches itself to this point. Theism which understands itself not merely excludes the low naturalistic degradation of man to a mere creature of nature, but no less keeps itself free from that fantastic exaltation of natural existences to the sphere of humanity, which regards the same, at least the living, sensationally susceptible among them, as depo-

[1] *Idee der Gottheit*, p. 295, 296, 366, with which the discussion in the earlier adduced recension, *Heidelb. Jahrbücher*, 1836, p. 991 seq. (where the discussion is more definitely attached to *Leibnitz*), as well as the development of the notions of temporal and external creation in *Weisse's* work: *Das Philosophische Problem der Gegenwart*, may be compared.

[2] *Idee der Gottheit*, p. 365, 368.

[3] L. c., p. 420.

tentialized personalities, and therefore allows them a participation in immortality of existence. For if there is anything incompatible with its nature, it is surely so with those immature, nature-philosophic theories, in which the determinations of spirit and of nature, the ethical and the physical are confusedly confounded together.—As to that conditionality of any created essence by its own original, therefore extra-temporal act, we may not forget what the nature of the grounds were, which led us to the cognition of the same. They were not contained in the supposed necessity of any other principle of explanation, for the manifoldness of finite being, and especially of the graded distinctions of *more perfect* and *more imperfect* creatures therewith given, than that of the specificating Divine Understanding. One must honour the deep earnestness of *Origen* in his finding himself compelled to reduce the distinctions of creatures to perverted moral primitive decisions; but objectively considered a speculative opinion of the world, which can only understand those distinctions by regarding them as the result of an arbitrary disturbance of an original equality, and deems a series of essences which are only numerically distinguished as being the creation most worthy of God, is still a very insufficient and mistaken one erroneously arrived at by empty abstractions, which, in the ingenuous Christian consciousness and in the sphere of science already in *Augustin's* better understanding of the notion of the world, finds its correction.[1] That which in the sphere of experience drives us out of the sphere of experience to the adoption of that extra-temporal beginning, is the existence of *moral evil* and its undeniable *self-imputation* in the conscience; but these we do not meet with in natural existences, but only in *man*.

Neither can it be said, by virtue of this qualitative diversity, that nature is a constant *producing of personality*. Certainly entire nature presses onward in its progressing process of development towards man, just as even the history of the creation in the book of Genesis significantly intimates. But what

1 In his books *de ordine*, *de libero arbitrio*, in the *civitas* (especially l. xi., c. 16, 23), and elsewhere: compare the *Summa* of *Thomas* on the question: utrum sint plures ideae—i. qu. 15, art. 2, and on the question: utrum inaequalitas rerum sit a Deo—i. qu. 47, art. 2, where also the opinion of *Origen* is refuted.

it struggles to bring forth from itself, is not imperishable *personality*, conscious of itself and God, determining itself and thereby capable of uniting itself with God—for in this respect it does not even once present, in the dark kingdom of its perishable imagery, approximations and analogies;—that which it seeks is individual existence, which is not merely an example of the species, but which has *peculiarity* absolutely for itself. Therefore the individualization augmenting itself at every step of its development, the process of formation ever more manifold and of fuller character, the ever richer determinations and ever sharper distinctions of classes, genus, species, races, and so on. But, however far it may progress in its individuation, it does not attain to individual peculiarity; even upon its highest stages of development its individual productions remain thoroughly determined and bound by the character of the more general sphere to which they more immediately belong; as the existence of nature-individuals entirely spends itself in carrying out and perpetuating the general determination in the natural design of the species, so on the other hand they are also nothing more than individual, single manifestations of the species. Nature is not able to solve its problem in its own sphere; what it seeks in its blind impulse in the way of potentializing, is first of all found by the entering in of an absolutely higher principle; only by the Ego, by self-consciousnesss and self-determination is the infinitely deep middle point given, about which the elements of a peculiar existence in the individual may unite themselves together, to a compact whole complete in itself. It is impossible to overlook the immanent teleology of nature in relation to man; and still man, which solves the enigma of nature, is not the highest product, the most beautiful blossom of nature; he much rather precedes it, and indeed not merely ideally, which would be already contained in that teleology, but also *really* by virtue of the extra-temporal origin of every Ego. But in the temporal development nature only prepares for personality the basis of a natural existence; and in that nature is just thereby taken up into the concrete notion of the conditioned, personal essence, does it first of all become truly intelligible, how it, in itself considered the blind Being neither conscious of itself nor of God, is able to exist by the will of *the* God, who, because He is love, when he creates,

also reveals Himself.—If, according to *Schelling*, nature in its relation to man, is the Old Testament, the comparison also holds good in the sense, that the Messianic prophecy of the Old covenant becomes *fulfilled* and at the same time *infinitely surpassed* by the Incarnation of the Son of God. As the Old Testament is a preparation and education for the New (*παιδαγωγὸς εἰς Χριστόν*), but not the principle of the same, so that the New were its product, so is nature in relation to man. It is a correct insight into this relation, which the Gnostic *Valentin* in his own way thus expressed, that the angels of Demiurge fell into consternation when they saw in the likeness of the same, in man, a principle exalted over the entire kingdom of Demiurge, which had been given him by Sophia.

That *initial possibility* of falling away from God, which we have regarded as negatively conditioning creaturely freedom, is as such not appointed to remain, but to *become cancelled*. When the Church Fathers, the Schoolmen, and the old Protestant theologians apply the axiom: *πᾶν κτιστὸν τρεπτόν* without hesitation even to the will and the moral being of man,[1] they are perfectly right in doing so with respect to the commencement of this being as well as in relation to the course of its development, so far as our experience goes; but we cannot allow it to hold good entirely without limitation; at the close of the process of sanctification the *τρεπτὸν* is to become the *ἄτρεπτον*, without the being ceasing on this account to be *κτίσμα*. Now in a mechanical manner, by a direct seizing upon the inner life-process of the

[1] They lay down this partly in connection with the Originistico-Augustinian opinion, that evil as privation is a tendeney to Nothing. Natural existences were susceptible of this tendency just because they were created from Nothing. *Gregory Nyssen* had already significantly expressed this in the *orat. catech. magna*. c. vi.: *Τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς κακίας οὐχ ὡς δύο τινῶν καθ' ὑπόστασιν φαινομένων ἡ ἀντιδιαστολὴ θεωρεῖται· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἀντιδιαιρεῖται τῷ ὄντι τὸ μὴ ὄν—κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἡ κακία τῷ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀντικαθέστηκε λόγῳ, οὐ καθ' ἑαυτήν τις οὖσα, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ νοουμένη τοῦ κρείττονος.—Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἡ ἄκτιστος φύσις τῆς κινήσεως τῆς κατὰ τροπὴν καὶ μεταβολὴν καὶ ἀλλοίωσίν ἐστιν ἀνεπίδεκτος, πᾶν δὲ διὰ κτίσεως ὑποστὰν συγγενὼς πρὸς τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν ἔχει· διότι καὶ αὐτὴ τῆς κτίσεως ἡ ὑπόστασις ἀπὸ ἀλλοιώσεως ἤρξατο, τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι θείᾳ δυνάμει μετατεθέντος.* Comp. c. xxi.

personal essence, in which this latter only held itself positively, the removal of that possibility cannot take place; this is already excluded by the notion of organic life, and much more so by that of personality, and would contradict everything which our previous investigations have taught us of the significance of freedom. If that possibility is to be cancelled, it must be effected by the self-activity of the essence, in which it is found. For this reason, this possibility, as it is objectively attached to the freedom of its self-determination, must also become subjective in the consciousness in order that it may be cancelled by the decided and persistent denial of its realization. From the *οὐ γνῶναι τὴν ἁμαρτίαν*, which the Apostle Paul ascribes to the relative innocence of the unconscious child before the awakening of the inward variance, Rom. vii., man is to ascend up to the *μὴ γνῶναι ἁμαρτίαν* by a conscious rejection of evil, by which, 2 Cor. v. 21, the perfect Holiness of Christ is denoted according to its negative side. This can only in every instance take place by the possibility of evil contained in the freedom of the creature being brought to the consciousness.

The question is, how this possibility comes to the consciousness? —In so far as the possibility of evil is from the first attached to the self-dependent principle of motion in the personal creature, it cannot be destitute of a *norm*, which determines the activity of this principle of motion and denies the realization of that possibility. Even for the working of the powers of nature there is such a norm, namely the *law of nature*. Now this law of nature realizes itself *immediately;* the powers, whose working is determined by it, are bound to it by physical necessity; so far as its function extends any deviation of the powers subordinated to it is impossible; and if this to many methods of consideration appears otherwise, it surely only arises from the notion of the law of nature being unclearly[1] or indefinitely, either too broadly or too narrowly conceived of. Certainly deviations from particular laws of nature are everywhere to be met with—*e.g.* when the projected stone, contrary to the law of gravitation, ascends,—but ever

[1] Such an unclear notion is that, lately introduced and applied to the miracles, of the elasticity of the laws of nature. Of the moral law it may be said in a sense which we shall soon see, that it is elastic; but the law of nature distinguishes itself from the moral law just in that it is not elastic.

only by the reaction of other laws of nature, and thus the result of the combined action of both, in which each will be partially cancelled and partially contained, remains subject to an infallible law of nature. If now the norm of the will just as immediately realized itself as the law of nature does, therefore excluded the physical possibility of an action contrary to it, it were just a mere law of nature, and the working which it regulated nothing more than the vitality of nature, blind impulse. But this working is much rather said to be that of a self-dependent, self-conscious principle of motion, that of the free will. In order, therefore, to afford room to the will, that it may be able to determine itself, consequently *from* itself, but *according* to the absolute norm, this norm must, as law of the will, *step back*, as it were; the Must *(das Muss)* spiritualizes itself to the Ought *(das Soll)*, the physical to the ethical necessity.

But whither does the law step back? Whither else than into that inmost of the essence, whose volition it norms? Seeing that in this sphere it is not as in the sphere of nature, where the expression of power immediately determines blind obedience, the law takes its seat in the *consciousness* in the form of a *requirement* of unconditional authority, and makes itself in this way even then valid, when the conduct is in disagreement with it. Were it not so, if the conduct corresponding to the law of the will were necessarily given in the same, we should have just as little an immediate consciousness of this law, as we possess such an one of the laws, according to which the organic functions of our physical life are carried on; just for the very reason that because this necessity is indissolubly one with the factual reality, because we are entirely held and borne by these laws, they cannot become objective to us in our immediate consciousness, but only by reflexion. And inversely: if the powers of nature *could* in their working also separate themselves from their laws, as the will is able to break away from its law, then too in the sphere of nature there must be an *inward place*, a consciousness into which those laws withdrew themselves; how should they otherwise be *laws*, in what way give themselves validity as such?

Certainly the *ethical* necessity is said to become equal to the *physical* in the certainty of its agreement and coincidence with the reality, notwithstanding its abiding distinction in relation to

the sphere of its dominion; but it can only become so by the mediation of the human freedom of will. If its coincidence with the reality has become perfect, the function of the *law* of the will has absolutely ceased; if its contents has become fully and entirely subjective, if it has passed into the life of the subject in a perfect and unchangeable manner, then it can no longer make its appearance in the consciousness as an objective norm, therefore as a law; the distinction is cancelled. We have therefore in the consciousness of the law of the will as such, on the one hand, an evidence of our *moral non-perfection of being*, on the other, an evidence of our *formal freedom*, by virtue of which, obedience towards the law proceeds from our own decision in such a way, that we have also the ability to resist the law. Consequently it is necessarily together with the consciousness of this norm of the will, that the possibility of evil comes to the consciousness of the personal creature. But the root of all ethical obligation is contained in the consciousness of the absolute obligation to be the possession of God, which we must also ascribe to the extra-temporal primitive being of personal essences.

Up to this point of our investigation by the way of *necessity*—certainly by no means a mere metaphysical necessity,[1] but one furnished by means of moral ideas—we are able to arrive at the opinion, that evil must be *possible* to personal creatures, and that this possibility must be to them a matter of which they are *conscious*. Anything further than this, the *realization* of this possibility, the actual existence of evil, is a *matter of fact*, and only to be known by *experience;* it cannot be derived by any kind of necessity from the moments preceding it, although, inasmuch as it is existent, it of course becomes very much more intelligible from its connection with them.[2]

But the dialectic of *Hegel's* system will not suffer us to remain

[1] *Billroth* is also of this opinion (*Vorlesungen über Religionsphilosophie*, p. 93), with whose opinion of freedom and of its relation to evil, as well as with many other important and influential points, we are in agreement.

[2] Compare the discussions between *Julianus* and *Augustinus* on necessity and possibility in relation to the origin of sin, *Op. imperf.* l. v. c. 45—64, in which, moreover, *Augustinus* fails just as much by his not properly distinguishing between the validity of these determinations

standing at this point. *Vatke*[1] is of the opinion that if one admits that the cognition of evil and the possibility of the Ego's making it the contents of its will (or, according to his order of these moments, the possibility of evil and the cognition of the Ego as to this possibility), form the indispensable condition of the energetic freedom of the good, it is only a deficiency in dialectic acuteness of thinking, if one hides from himself the necessary consequence of that presupposition, namely, the reality of evil as necessarily conditioning our moral consciousness. This maintenance is grounded as follows: "As sin is essentially a determinateness of the subjective will, it can only become cognized, when it really exists in the will, can only therefore through the reality become known as being inwardly possible, in so far as this knowledge of the possibility includes that of the actuality of sin."[2]

We have not of course here to discuss the way in which, in the present condition of the human race, the actualization of sin in the life of the individual stands related to the entrace of the consciousness of its possibility, but how we are to conceive of this relation with respect to a *pure primitive condition* and the *disturbance* of the same. But it follows from the very nature of the moral in general and applies to moral evil in common with moral good, that it absolutely cannot make its beginning from a *being* but only from an *act*. If now we call to mind quite generally, in so far as we are here able to do so, from our closer investigations of the actualization of sin, a *first* act of evil, we shall certainly find contained in the notion of the act, that a subjective idea, something mentally presented to the view becomes realized. Therefore as applied to evil there precedes the act according to its notion, a mental representation or idea of something which ought not to be. Since further a pure primitive condition of the personal essence can only become disturbed and impure by self-decision, it follows that the commencement of sinning must necessarily be *conscious* sin.

for the sphere of nature and for the sphere of the will, as *Julianus*, on the other hand, by an abstract separation of the two spheres (the *necessitas* he exclusively defends in relation to nature, the *possibilitas* in relation to the will; of a *possibilitas*, which by the will becomes a *necessitas* for the will, he knows nothing.)

[1] *Die menschliche Freiheit in ihrem Verhältniss zur Sünde und zur göttlichen Gnade*, p. 272.

[2] L. c. comp. also p. 142 seq.

Sin often generates, when it has once become a power, a condition of unconscious stupefaction (*Taumel*), in which it ensnares the individual by vices and crimes. But originally one cannot fall into sin in an unconscious stupefaction, otherwise sin were not a perversion of the will, but merely a disturbance of the consciousness.—But if the act of sinning is consciously begun, then that representation before the mind of something which ought not to be done, is also necessarily a representation of the same *as such*. And still, as others have already properly observed, such a thought of the evil is by no means the evil thought, consequently no commencement of the reality of evil in the subject of the same. If now we add thereto that this latter, this something which ought not to be, must of course also be presented to the subject as *possible* to it—for how could it otherwise undertake its actualization?[1]—we shall then have denoted the point at which the subject can withdraw from the perverse decision, so that the possibility of sinning present for the same has also become a matter of consciousness, inasmuch as it has shown itself to be possible,[2] and yet did not become elevated to reality. And this point is not one which is merely possible, but one which forms the necessary presupposition of all primitive realization of evil, and therefore quite of universal significance. The narrative in the book of Genesis, of the primeval sin of our first parents, makes it in the most determinate manner prominent, that the consciousness of the forbidding law—therefore the consciousness of a possible act which absolutely ought not to be committed—precedes the resolve to sin, not merely by Gen. ii. 17, but still more expressly by Gen. iii. 3. And Rom. vii. 7—9 says the same, of the beginnings of real sin in us. Even in the midst of the disturbed course of our moral development we still meet with this relation, although of course in a modified form. Or are we to say that the *particular kinds* of sin would not be possible for us, and that we should not become conscious of them as possible, unless we in some way really committed them?—that we could only succeed in rejecting them by in some way appropriating them?—With this it is unhesitatingly to be

[1] Compare *Ulrici, über Princip. und Methode der Hegelschen Philosophie*, p. 178 seq.

[2] So much we are able to say with *Vatke* l. c., although, as is clear from the connection, in quite another sense.

admitted, that the consciousness of the nature of evil cannot quite at the first have its full and deep significance, that it is capable of a progressive augmentation, to which *for us* the experience of actual sin in us essentially co-operates.[1]

But he who will not admit this possibility of evil to be such an one, as is by no means necessitated to pass into reality, in other words, to be one which the will, in itself considered, completely has in its power, ought only to remember, that, in this sphere at least, he must maintain the notion of possibility in general to be invalid. For a possibility, which is obliged to realize itself, is not a possibility but a *necessity*. But if evil necessarily proceeds from any momenta whatever of the human essence and its temporal development, then, the resistance of this Must (as affirmation of evil) against the Ought (as negation of evil), which, conceived of as original, would not suffer us in real earnest to hold fast to this Ought, cannot be avoided. *Marheineke*, whose "*System of Theological Moral*," follows in its doctrine of evil the *Vatkian* determinations, gives us the following advice: The doctrine of the necessity of evil in relation to practical life must be very cautiously handled, and on account of the possible, practically pernicious consequences, be limited to that which is the doctrine of religion, namely that God has suffered evil.[2] But although every sufferance, according to the universal acceptation of the term, does not make its object a necessity but only a possibility, we are told, according to this advice, that the theologian must certainly hold in his own mind the necessity of evil, but preach the opposite, the mere possibility, to the people, in whose presence the affirmation of the necessity is to be "limited" to its negation!—

Vatke of course finds himself necessitated by his presuppositions to place in Christ at least a *minimum* of sin. "And indeed every one must make this experience (of real sin), because it is a *moral* one, in the deep of his own self-consciousness, if it is only in sinful thought."[3] "If we instance the ideal human development, the

[1] With this discussion, the investigation of the question, standing in close connection with it and discussed in the first chapter of the first book, may be compared—namely, whether sin precedes the consciousness of the law or *vice versa*, whether the consciousness of the law precedes sin

[2] Ibid. p. 149.

[3] So in the above quoted Recension—*Hallische Jahrbücher*, 1840, p. 1134.

evil only advances so far in the will as is necessary to bring about the moral self-consciousness and for the awakening up of the conscience; then it remains a merely possible which never becomes real."[1] If now according to this "the ideal" must be once vanquished and fall in temptation, in order then immediately to arise never again to fall, one really does not know at which to be most surprised, whether at this conception of moral ideality or at the short-sightedness as to the significance of a first step in sin. The *minimum* here tends immediately to the *maximum*; indeed in comparison with perfect purity it is a fall of immeasurable depth.[2] And if from this presence of sin in the will, only for this once, any secondary influence whatever had remained behind co-determining its further development,—what one indeed would so much the more certainly be obliged to suppose, if the moral consciousness of such an individual is said to have in the same its immanent mediation[3]—then Christ Himself were in need of a redemption, and were obliged in humility to place Himself among us sinful men as being with us in need of cleansing and sanctifying. Now in that Jesus does not do this, that He much rather offers Himself to men as their Redeemer, that He requires of them an unconditional surrender of themselves to Him, and attaches to their compliance exceeding great and immeasurable promises,—by all this, under that supposition, Christ had laid upon Himself the load of a new sin, which we must consider, if our development of the essence of sin in the first book has not placed the nature of *pride* in an entirely false light, as one of the greatest and most damnable of sins of which a man can be guilty.

On the contrary, it is clear from the above developed determinations how Christ, in His perfect purity and entire freedom from sin, could have the *consciousness of the possibility of sinning*, without which the temptation had been for Him a perfectly indifferent occurrence, void of significance,[4] and His development

[1] *Die menschliche Freiheit in ihrem Verhältniss zur Sünde und zur Göttlichen Gnade*, p. 291.

[2] Compare, on the moral significance of such a minimum of sin, which the theologians of the Kantian-rationalistic school supposed themselves obliged to attribute to Christ, the striking remarks in *Daubs Judas Ischarioth*, part 2, p. 233 seq.

[3] Vol. i. p. 548, seq.

[4] In this temptation, it is well to note, especially for those who make

not really a human one. The three different forms under which the old dogmatists, from different opinions or points of view, designated the Holiness of Christ according to its negative side: *peccare non potuit, potuit non peccare, non peccavit,* are in fact all correct. The truth of the last formula is the first and most general; it expresses a purely factual judgment. The second formula, which clearly has for its inverse side *potuit peccare,* is, under the presupposition of the first, the correct expression, when we look at the *beginning* and progressing development of the earthly human life of Christ. The first formula denotes the *completion* and conclusion of this life, the result of its development conditioned by self-determination. It is of the deepest and most real significance, that Christ, as the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews says, cap. ii. 10, v. 8, 9, in order to attain the completeness, in which he could be to us the author of salvation, was obliged first of all to learn the highest, greatest obedience—the: not as I will, but as Thou wilt—by his own experience of the heaviest and deepest suffering.[1]

With the determining of the boundary up to which the derivation of evil is able to be arrived at from speculativo-religious cognition, the question as to the *comprehensibility* or *incomprehensibility* of the origin of sin stands closely connected. This question carries us back to this other, whether in the results of our previous investigations, especially in that of the freedom of the human will, we have found the sufficient ground for the origination of evil. For if evil were a result of freedom, if accordingly it proceeded from it with inward necessity, then, since we have seen this freedom to be an essential condition of the absolute world-purpose, the existence of evil would be one perfectly understood.

We are allowed in the sphere of nature to look upon the power as the *ground* of its expressions, and indeed in the strict sense,

the existence of evil the presupposition of the immanent, obligatory imperative of the good, that Christ rejects the temptations by the presentation of the absolutely commanding Will, with the: *thou shalt! thou shalt not!* of the Law of God.

[1] Compare on this subject *Neander's Leben Jesu Christi,* p. 119 seq. (4th ed.), further *Ullmann's* remarks in his *Polemik in Betreff der Sündlosigkeit Jesu,* p. 63, 64, and on those forms his *Shrift von der Sündlosigkeit Jesu,* p. 25 seq. (ed. 5th.)

that these, the individual, natural phenomena, proceed from it with physical necessity. If accordingly the working power, the law immanent in its working is cognized, then the phenomenon in its very inmost is understood. Nevertheless, that even here, by virtue of the conditionateness of every finite working power, a fall may take place, where the phenomenon corresponding to it remains absent in spite of its working, cannot be prejudicial to the physical necessity in the connection of its phenomenon with this determinate power. In the latter is contained the essential tendency to the production of this phenomenon, and it everywhere really produces the same, so often as the external conditions are given and the result is not prevented by the reaction of another stronger power.[1]

If now evil followed in the same manner from the free will of created essences, we should certainly, since the existence of creaturely freedom has its origin in the creative will of God, be obliged to say, according to *Schleiermacher's* intimations in his *Dogmatick*,[2] that just in so far as evil springs from the freedom of the creature, God is its author. But we could not even once give expression to this idea without contradicting ourselves by the immediate cancelling of the freedom presupposed therein. There essentially belongs to freedom in the formal sense, the sense in which we here speak of it, the ability of also otherwise determining, therefore the self-determination of self from the indeterminate. If this is the case, *nothing* whatever *determined*, neither good nor evil, can follow from freedom, but what it comes

[1] *Hegel* calls this the formal ground, *Logik* vol. ii. p. 90 seq. (*erste Ausg. der Werke*), while he satirically ridicules the endeavour in this way of explaining phenomena; and if the satire does not hit the category itself, it is nevertheless applicable to an unskilful application of the same, often to be met with in the natural sciences. As to the true sense of the ground in this respect, we may observe in reply to the objection of *tautology*, that the power, conceived of as ground of its expression, never exerts itself merely in one phenomenon and its constant repetition, but always stands related as a general power to a manifold variety of phenomena. If now one should resolve to apply to the relation of the freedom of the will to the actions which spring from it, the categories of the universal, particular and individual, it must of course lead to determinism.

[2] Vol. i. § 81, 2. 3. comp. *die Abhandlung über die Erwählungslehre* p. 95.

to be as determinate volition and action, it becomes by its own decision.

But the free will, as such a power of self-determination, paralyzes the immediately determining influence of all potencies which are external to it, to which, in the sphere of nature, the grounds co-operating in the production of the determinate phenomenon correspond, and by thus paralyzing the power of all external influence, the self-determination shows itself directly as a *power*. The immeasurable chain of grounds and consequences, which are connected together by the necessity of nature, arrives here at a chasm, on the other side of which a new principle with self-dependent causality makes the beginning of a new development. What the free essence is as such, we learn from its self-revelation in its act, which is again a matter for experience. The working grounds of that sphere are here spiritualized to *impulses* and *motives*, by which the free will, as the producing cause of the act, mediates its decision. What the motives are, which present themselves, with preponderating efficiency, in the individual resolve, is again dependent upon the tendency, which the will has already given itself by its preceding proximate self-decisions, and these again by those more remote, and ultimately by its primitive decision.[1]

Now freedom in this its formal sense contains most certainly the possibility of evil, but only the *possibility*. How little one can make this notion equal to that of an *innate endowment* or disposition *(Anlage)*, is at once seen in that freedom contains just as much the possibility of the good; but a disposition to two diametrically opposed directions of life is just a self-contradictory notion, and were in such a case no longer *one* disposition or innate tendency.[2] Against this too the words of the Apostle James quite strictly hold good: *μήτι ἡ πηγὴ ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς ὀπῆς βρύει τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ πικρόν*; cap. iii. 11. The Pelagian notion of freedom falls into this absurdity inasmuch it represents the same, really as a root of good and of evil, which God has implanted

[1] Comp., on the categories: cause, ground, which we have here used, the appendix to this chapter.

[2] Compare what was earlier said (vol. 2, p. 30) on the notion of innate tendencies and their relation to that of the ability.

in man[1]—a conception, which in its strict consequences would of course lead to a pantheistic indifferentiating of good and of evil.

While now according to this, the conception of the freedom of the will, as of an equal, innate, disposition both to good and evil, and in so far, as of the positive ground of the reality of both, directly contradicts itself, it nevertheless appears to be *equally related* to each of the two, as the possibility of good and evil. And certainly such were the case, if freedom as *formal* were already completely determined. But we have already seen that formal freedom is only a *moment* in the concrete notion of freedom. But *real* freedom, in which the design of formal freedom is contained, to which formal freedom is said to be elevated by the mediation of its self-determination, is inseparable from the good. Thus then the will as this formal freedom is not given up to the Blind and the Void, but is accompanied by its own idea, as it realizes itself in real freedom, as an immanent imperative, an ought. Evil therefore by no means springs from formal freedom in the same manner as the good, for it does not originate from it in the tendency or

[1] *Augustinus de gratia Christi c. Pel. et Caelest.* c. 19 quotes from the work of the former *de lib. arbitrio* the following explanation: habemus possibilitatem utriusque partis a Deo insitam velut quandam, ut ita dicam, radicem fructiferam atque foecundam, quae ex voluntate hominis diversa gignat et pariat (by this conjunctive, strictly taken, there is attributed to freedom the production of the opposite expressly as determination), et quae possit ad proprii cultoris arbitrium vel nitere flore virtutum vel sentibus horrere vitiorum. Comp. on this, the striking remarks in *Jacobi's* doctrine of *Pelagius*, p. 35 seq. However one must not lay too much stress upon this definition of *Pelagius*, since it is essentially corrected by other elements of his mode of thinking, and still more so by *Julian*, who in general has a much more enlarged consciousness of the connection and consequences of these notions. *Julian* refuses to denote the mala voluntas as fructus libertatis not merely in a passing manner, comp. *Augustin's op. imp. c. Jul.* lib. vi. c. 11, but also expressly controverts that way of representing the relation of freedom to the good and evil acts of the will, and with great acutenes, *op. imp.* lib. v. c. 56, in several places throughout: although his isolating conception of the individual act of the will from another point of view, holds him fast in superficial and incorrect determinations.—Among the modern elaborations of the doctrine of sin, the work of *Kern* conceives of freedom as ground of sin, in the sense above denoted, and then immediately also derives therefrom the tenet that evil maintains its place, in the connection of that which God has ordered, *by freedom*, *Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie* 1832, No. 3, p. 110.

direction for which it is determined, and which is predelineated to it by the accompanying consciousness of the moral necessity, but by an *abruption from this determination or destiny.*

Now, in so far as freedom in its self-movement severs the connection with its determination, does it become *arbitrariness.* Arbitrariness is in itself by no means the perverted will, but in the sphere of an action, which, objectively taken, is morally undetermined and without significance, it is the playful self-motion of the will, regardless of any purpose and indifferent towards the contents of its determinations. But this very self-severance of the will from all relation to any *design,* is, in a sphere, where everything is determined by the absolute purpose, directly self-perversion; arbitrariness is here immediately the evil will, still always only conceived of according to its negative side, in so far as it is the departure from the truly rational connection of conduct, the self-separation from the law of the will arising out of that highest purpose. But the arbitrariness in its breaking away from this connection immediately forms for itself out of the deformed, disordered elements of the same, a connection of its own, a world of impulses, motives, tendencies, in which everything is based upon the principle of *limitless egoity,* and for this reason divided in itself and destitute of a truly comprehending purpose.

From this we see how the category of the *ground* in this higher, spiritually ethical sphere is to be elevated, and in what sense the predicate of *groundlessness* will then be peculiar to evil. The true ground of an act is contained in its *purpose or design.* If this is taken up into the will, there then follows from the same with moral necessity the determinate mode of action. Every morally good decision of the will is one, which, in this teleological sense, is well grounded, because its immediate design is in agreement with the Absolute design, with the realization of the perfect harmony of the world with God and with itself, in which the perfectly sanctified will in union with God, is the chief moment. If one on the contrary asks after the wherefore of the perverted determination of the will, this latter is never found to be wanting in manifold motives, even if it were only to gratify the desire, the titillation of arbitrariness, but must ever be deficient of an objective, truly sufficient ground, because it does not correspond with the Absolute purpose. We may also in this way express

this contrast: The good, considered as attribute of the personal creature, is an idea of the Eternal, Divine Understanding; the evil on the contrary is no idea and no moment of an idea, much rather the contradiction of the factual reality against the idea.[1]

Now this cognition, that the possibility of evil is co-contained in the freedom of the will with the possibility of the good, but that this possibility can nevertheless only realize itself by an arbitrary severance from the true and only justified self-development and exercise of freedom, is also expressed in the formula which, according to the precedence of *Origen* and *Augustin*, has been much used by the Scholastics and old Protestant Theologians: evil has its origin in the *misuse of the free will*. Nevertheless this formula can scarcely be said to be happily expressed. For if it is the free will which is able to misuse everything else in man, even that which is highest and most spiritual, if it has altogether the decision, as to the proper or perverted use of all other powers: what then is that within us which again *misuses the free will?* It lies in its very notion that it could only misuse itself—if this expression were not altogether inadmissible.—

Let us now turn back to the question above started as to the comprehensibility or incomprehensibility of evil. *Kant* concludes his "*Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*" with these words: "thus we do not certainly comprehend the practical unconditioned necessity of the moral imperative, but still we comprehend its *incomprehensibility*, which is everything that in justice can be required of a philosophy, which seeks to arrive at the very bound of the human reason, at its very ultimate principles." If the critical philosopher was able to say this of his categorical imperative, need Theology be ashamed, if in relation to evil it is obliged to content itself with the comprehension of its incomprehensibility? But however, it follows from our previous investigations that we may by no means maintain an unlimited incomprehensibility of evil.

All comprehension is dependent on the continuity of the connection for our thinking. Now, according to this, it may

[1] It is certainly one of the worst consequences of the system of *Leibnitz* next to the absence of freedom in the same, that its author finds himself necessitated in the *Theodicee* to assign to the individual man, just as he is, with all the moral defects which belong to the empirical contents of his life, a place in the region of the eternal ideas.

appear as if we should be obliged to regard *the good* too as an *Incomprehensible*, by virtue of the inexplicability of freedom from the connection of nature. Thus *Kant* finds good and evil equally incomprehensible on account of their common origin in the transcendental freedom.[1] But although an essentially new principle, inexplicable from all the temporo-empirically preceding, is first of all called into operation by freedom, there is nevertheless shown in this principle, in so far as it produces the good, a higher connection; the physical necessity sublimates itself to the ethical, which in a corroborating manner attaches itself to the manifested order and arrangements of nature.—As now that higher order essentially precedes in the consciousness the exercise of freedom, the good cannot at all appear to the spirit conscious of its Divine destiny, as that which is incomprehensible, but only as something which is perfectly clear and transparent, as that which is entirely in order and self-evident. If the comprehension of the individual good from the connection of the necessity of nature is denied us, because it can only become real by freedom, we have in its stead its most perfect comprehensibility from the connection of a higher order of the world, to which man belongs as to his true home. Only when he entirely forgets his true nature, and finds himself at home in sin as in the natural element of his existence, can the good become to him that which is unintelligible and foreign to his nature. And just because we all participate in sin, do the acts of moral heroism, of self-denying love, place us in astonishment and surprise.[2] But in that, this astonishment and wondering is essentially admiration, do we show, that we very well understand the connection of such acting with a principle recognized as absolutely valid.

Then too, evil does not remain uncomprehended by us, in so far as we have recognized the *possibility* of the same *in its necessity*, and as it has displayed itself to us, in the investigations of the first book, in a manifold variety of strivings, which are *inwardly connected* together by their being collectively related to one and

1 *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, p. 71.

2 When also Christ, Matt. viii. 10, wondered at the faith of the Centurion, his own words show us that the ground of the same was only in the contrast with what He had otherwise been accustomed to find in those about Him.

the same principle, although to such an one, which, according to to its very nature, sets those who are governed by it at variance with each other and with themselves. But with all that, the deciding point, the *actualization* of evil, its *becoming a reality* is by no means understood. Much rather are we obliged to acknowledge that evil in this respect, since it only attains reality by an act of arbitrariness, and the arbitrariness is an abruption from the rational ground and connection, is, *according to its essential nature, incomprehensible.* It is that which, over against the exclusive prerogative of the good, only has its existence by assumptive usurpation. We understand the connection of its particular tendencies with its principle; but this principle is itself the perverted one, that which absolutely ought not to be. We know how that as an act it is everywhere mediated by motives of some kind; but these motives prove themselves in the presence of the Divine necessity of good to be false and deceitful, as a sphere of untruth, which nevertheless has essential existence, and in which, that very perverted principle continually obtains factual reality in the world created by God. Evil is the unfathomable secret of the world;[1] in its inmost depth it ever remains an impenetrable darkness.

This incomprehensibility, strictly speaking, holds good of *every sinful action.* The comprehensible character which the individual sin has for us is only so to speak a subjectiv-aposterioric one; it depends upon this, that we find sin to be in us and others as a co-determining element of human existence. If we direct a closer attention to how one seeks to make intelligible the originating of an immoral action in life, of course most frequently his own, for the sake of excusing it, we shall soon be convinced that he in some way presupposes in the same, the all-pervading influence of that element, the strength of perverted motives, and the existence of selfish maxims, and consequently only explains sin by means of sin. If therefore sin

[1] When *Ritter* l. c. p. 23, observes, that we may not call evil a wonder, for that it is much rather the very opposite of the miracle, I perfectly agree with him. The miracle as miracle, God works without the world, evil as evil the creature works without God. As the miracle is the secret of God, so is evil the secret of the world. The miracle, in fact, only happens on account of evil; God presents His holy secret to view, only that the world may forsake its unholy mystery and turn itself believingly to Him.

remains here in its inmost kernel uncomprehended, we must expect of course to meet with this incomprehensibleness in all its severity, where we find sin in its *primitive* and *initial* form in the strictest sense, where a pure will becomes impure by its self-determination. The old saying, that Satan is an ape of God, has here its most significant truth. It is the presumptuous assumption of evil to be in its way *causa sui* as God, absolutely to make its beginning from itself and only to presuppose itself.

Therefore it cannot place one, who finds the origin of evil in a falling away, in very great perplexity, when it is objected to him that the transition from a pure condition into one of sin is *inexplicable*. For in this there is nothing said which is not already contained in the notion of evil. The incomprehensibility of the origination of evil is not perhaps a limit which only attaches to our *subjective knowledge* of the same, but one which is grounded in the *very nature of evil*. It is on this account that it does not become less so by the growth of our knowledge, and that at no stage of its development do we attain to an insight into the higher necessity of evil. Much rather the more perfect and pure our religiously moral knowledge becomes, the more anxiously it attends to the earnest voice of our deepest consciousness and to the holy word of Divine Revelation, so much the more do we perceive evil to be contrary to both nature and reason, and therefore groundless. If in the highest moments of our life, in which we become conscious of our purest fellowship with God, our eye falls upon evil and its power in the human race, we are pervaded in the most powerful manner with that consciousness of the nature of evil; we understand it then better than at other times, in that we most sensibly perceive it in its perverseness and arbitrariness, in its incomprehensibleness. We are only able to think of the absolutely perfect cognition of evil, of the Divine cognition, as of that which looks upon it most completely as that which is arbitrary and in opposition to every rational connection, still the Divine cognition of evil is infinitely different from that of our own, in that God not merely looks upon it in the world as that which is absolutely separate from Himself, while we find ourselves entangled in the same, but in His beholding from eternity the victory of His kingdom over it, as one that is complete.—

This incomprehensibility of the reality of evil, as contained in its very essence, is in an especial manner exhibited, with thorough earnestness, in *Daub's Judas Ischarioth*,[1] and however great a failure and embarrassing in its consequences it was, that *Daub* applied the notion of the *miracle* to evil, further that he classified together with evil, just as Manichäism at one time did, all kinds of natural phenomena which have no moral significance, it is certainly not to be looked upon as any progress in the cognition of the same, when, as *Rosenkranz* intimates in his "*Recollections of Daub*," that the logical category of negation in later years had for *Daub* consumed the incomprehensibility of evil. For that which in this way becomes intelligible is not the evil itself, but something else, a necessity in whose notion that of evil only becomes resolved by arbitrariness.—Moreover that *Rosenkranz'* report is true is clear from the "*Exhibition and Examination of the Hypotheses in relation to the Freedom of the Will*," published in 1834. For in this there is not even the attempt to make evil comprehensible, yet it is said to be at least a disgrace to philosophy to allow it in any manner to pass as that which is incomprehensible.[2] Is it then to be an honour to philosophy *to deny* the evil as such, consequently as arbitrariness, as a contradiction against God, Nature, and Reason?[3] If it seeks its honour therein, it will surely no longer be ashamed to thank Eve, "an animal capable of arriving at understanding and reason, that we are no longer sheep in the meadow."[4]

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[1] Namely, in relation to the nature of its origination in the conditioned good, in the originally innocent and pure creature of God, while *Daub* regards the origin of the absolute evil, of the archenemy of all Being, as quite intelligible, comp. with part ii. p. 94 seq. 108 seq.—p. 245 seq., where he more fully developes these determinations, truly without bringing them into agreement with those earlier laid down.

[2] L. c. p. 147.

[3] Comp. *Daub's* own judgment passed upon such a denial of evil, *Judas Ischarioth* ii. p. 109.

[4] *Vorlesungen über die philosophische Anthropologie*, p. 232. Comp. his lectures published since—*Ueber das System der theologischen Moral*, part ii. division 2 (1843), where the sin-fall is denominated the humanization of the animal. This horrible humanization from the deep below is taught in a separate appendix to his Theological Ethics, which also contains a detailed treatment of the doctrine of sin and of the nature of evil. But while it communicates much that is striking and full of deep thought in its examination of the different theories of

Rothe takes great offence, in his *Ethics*, vol. ii. p. 185 seq., at this incomprehensibleness of evil; he is of opinion that the idea of sin, and that too in its very beginning, being an act of pure, groundless arbitrariness, cannot be maintained together with the unconditioned condemnation of sin; for in such a case it could not be in fact any longer sin, but absolute folly, madness, and that the non-imputability of insanity would apply to it. On the contrary, with the necessity of sin, the cognition of which is included in every comprehension of sin, its unconditioned condemnation is said to be perfectly well able to be maintained.—We shall certainly be obliged to maintain of these sentences that they only become true when one directly inverts them. Sin is, if *Rothe* wishes to retain the word, folly and insanity, and how should it not be so, when the merely apparent satisfaction which man pursues in it, irremediably separates him from the source of his true life, and from his own higher nature? To seek rational order and necessity in it is not merely vain, but from its very outset rests upon a deep misunderstanding of its notion. But if sin were necessary, if it executed in its actualization only—by mediation of the human will—a Divine arrangement in the development of the world, it were, provided the Divine arrangements are said not to contradict each other, absolutely not to be seen, how, in such a case, man could become condemned before God on account of his sin.—Certainly, if insanity is taken in its strictly psychico-somatic sense, in which alone it destroys responsibility, it is clear that the notion does not at all belong to the sphere of our consideration; for it has never been maintained, that in sin the connection of the sensational consciousness and the legitimate course of the formal activity of the understanding is severed. Sin, as

the origin of evil, in the development of the doctrine itself, it so overloads the consideration with lengthy explanatory remarks on formal determinations, that one cannot properly get at the real gist of the matter. As to *Daub's* own opinion of the origin of evil, he confesses his attachment to the *Hegelian* theory, but without, in the smallest degree mediating the same with the externally collateral "doctrine of sin" from the standpoint of the Bible and that of the universal moral consciousness.

arbitrariness, breaks away from the true connection of life, which alone is agreeable to the nature and appointed determination of man; but it sets up in the same moment another connection of grounds and consequences, which has its source in Egoity making itself valid as being unconditioned.

To what end, inquires *Rothe*, are scientific investigations concerning evil, if, according to its very notion, it is absolutely incomprehensible? My honoured Friend has himself refuted this objection by the thoroughly penetrating interest which he has devoted to these investigations of the doctrine of sin. For that they have run away from this incomprehensibility of sin in its ultimate origin *in the sense*, in which the same is here maintained, while treating of its individual questions, will certainly not be capable of proof. Still in that question an important difference of opinion makes its appearance, a diversity in the principle of our theory of cognition, respecting which, reference may be made to the introduction to this work, p. 6 seq. *Rothe* will therein see that I am certainly far removed from excluding everything, which will not enter into and form a part of the necessary process of the development of the world, from the subjects of scientific investigation, or indeed from denouncing the same as folly and madness.

APPENDIX TO THE FOURTH CHAPTER.

As the determination of the categories: *Ground*, *Cause*, which have been earlier, as well as in this chapter, p. 182 seq., employed, is one which differs considerably from that found in the logic and metaphysic of the different philosophical schools, and not knowing any exposition to which I could unrestrictedly refer for the conception which here lies at the basis, I am obliged expressly to supply this deficiency of the same, in so far as it is practical to do so within the limits of a few sentences.

The *notions*, *cause* and *effect*, are presupposed as the general

determination for the relation of the *will* to its *acts*. Now it is a matter of course, that the way, in which the cause produces the effect, is different in the sphere of the spirit and freedom, from what it is in the sphere of nature. First of all, the causality which we find in the sphere of nature, appears in the sphere of the spirit in a sublimated form. It is no longer bound down to the narrow law of identity, as in nature, but here the relation of the effect to the cause is a vitally progressing one. The spirit is able, as free will, to produce a really other, which, although according to its existence, dependent upon it, has nevertheless a certain self-dependency over against it. This holds good in a perfect manner of the Absolute Spirit, but also in a limited degree of the finite spirit.

Or are we, on account of this distinction, to exclude the category of causality from the sphere of the *spirit* and *freedom* as such? *Kant* has done so in the *Critick of Pure Reason*, and after his example the principal modern systems of philosophy have done the same. But when *Kant* only finds rigid necessity of nature in the conjunction of cause and effect, subordinates to this everything existing in time and then seeks to save freedom by his so-called ideality of time in a sphere in which causality is not at all to be found, his procedure, in relation to our question, appears to us to be nothing more than a *petitio principii*. Then too from these grounds he only will be able to banish causality from the kingdom of the will, who altogether agrees with the results of that Critick of Reason.

When the *Hegelian* polemic against the use of this category in the sphere of the spiritual, first of all places over against the same the category of *reciprocity (Wechselwirkung)* as the higher (as *Kant* in the *Critick of Pure Reason)*, the further determination of the one-sided, simply progressing causality to this reciprocal relation returning back again into itself, it is certainly a progress in the right direction. Indeed we must vindicate on the behalf of the same a more extended significance than the *Hegelian* logic allows us, in that we perceive that the *Absolute Essence*, perfectly secure of His Absoluteness in Himself, enters in His external working, by virtue of His love, into reciprocal relation with created personality. Only we cannot find therein anything really

transcending the category of causality, since this reciprocity is itself a given mode of causality. On the other hand it may appear still more strange, when this logic resolves substantiality in its ascendent process through causality and reciprocity into *notion*, just as then this resolution forms the transition from the objective into the subjective logic, compare his *Encyclopedia*, § 155—159. The question here is of *real* conditioning and producing, of course in science of the cognoscence, comprehension of the same; if now we have found the notion of the causal relationship, how are we to understand, that now this understood determination of the reality regresses into the notion as such or cancels itself? This is a transition which *Hegel* himself finds hard,[1] everybody else besides his own scholars finds it perfectly absurd. Nevertheless we will not by any means deny that this transition forms the very kernel in the system of this logical pantheism resolving the universe into a schema, in which the notion sets (presupposes itself) all nominal reality, in order to become possessed of it again.

If this is the connection, every theistic philosophy will have well to think of the matter before it adopts the *Hegelian* cancelling of causality, perhaps so much the more, as this method of thought when real relations are to be judged of, will ever with difficulty resist the temptation of quite simply *turning back (e.g.* with *Strauss)* from causality *to Spinozian substantiality.* We are obliged much rather to consider it not merely a good right but also a duty of philosophic theology, to hold fast to the notion of causality for the relation of God to the world, as well as for the *relation of the will to its acts*, until metaphysics shall have something truly better to offer it. Undoubtedly causality in the sphere of the Spirit is one different from, and higher than, that in the natural sphere; this diversity stands in connection with the distinction above touched upon, namely that in the sphere of the will the causation is everywhere taken up into the *purpose*—the *final* cause—as one which is present to the consciousness of the determining subject, just as it is only a will which is able to set

[1] *Encykl.* § 159, where however this transition is at the same time, since the *notion is freedom*, said to resolve the hardest, namely, necessity.

itself purposes.—But therewith the general essential nature of causality, namely the conjoining of a real determining agent and an object being determined, is by no means destroyed; for the purpose is not immediately really determining but just becomes so in that it takes working powers into its service.

If now the effect arises from its cause according to a general rule, and consequently the conjunction between both assumes the form of necessity, then the cause becomes the *ground* (the real ground, namely in distinction from the cognitive ground) of its effect, and the effect the *consequence* or result of its cause. If on the contrary the cause so produces the effect, that it was also able not to produce it or to produce another, different effect, the cause is then *free will* and its (immediate) effects are not consequences, but *acts*. This conception of the notions appears also to be justified by the general use of language, in so far as it distinctly enough associates with the consequence the idea of a *necessary proceeding*, therefore with the corresponding notion of the ground, that of a *necessary producing*, while the same is not the case with the notion of the effect. We are here only able clearly to find our way within the sphere of the spiritual, since according to the above determinations in the natural sphere all effects are consequences. If one says to another: your evil actions are only the consequences of your perverted disposition, the meaning is clearly this, that the evil actions necessarily make their appearance under the presupposition of this disposition, and no, in any degree, precise use of language would allow itself here to use effect, instead of consequence, and just for this reason, because then the necessity of the connection, with which we have here to do, would not be expressed. As however, even such actions, although in themselves considered, not dependent upon freedom of choice, nevertheless belong to the free Ego, we may call this Ego, using an expression of *Ritter's*,[1] the *transcendental ground*—still even here rather the transcendental cause—of its acts, namely in the sense, that it is the identical subject to which the same are to be absolutely referred as predicates, that the[r] in their temporal, separative development, in which each is i[n] some way conditioned by the

[1] *Ueber das Böse* p. 15, 18.

preceding, must nevertheless collectively be absolutely ascribed to the same Ego as author.

In some points these determinations will be found in agreement with *Jacobi's* conception of these categories (on Divine Things, &c., p. 213 seq. (1811); compare, his letters on *Spinoza*, p. 414 seq. (2d ed.), *Idealism and Realism* p. 93 seq.) Among the modern elaborations of metaphysics we may especially refer to *J. H. Fichte's* investigation of these notions in his Ontology (on Contrast, Turning-point and Aim of the Philosophy of the present day, part 3), in his work on Ground and Consequence, § 131—161, and on Causality and Dependence § 235—267. Compare too his work on the Conditions of a Speculative Theism, p. 12.

SECOND DIVISION.

THE RECONCILABILITY OF HUMAN FREEDOM WITH THE UNLIMITED DETERMINATION AND KNOWLEDGE OF GOD.

FIRST CHAPTER.

THE RELATION OF FREEDOM TO THE DIVINE OMNIPOTENCE.

The freedom of the will, as the ability of man to make a beginning from himself, to produce himself as moral essence, is, as a great philosopher calls it, *a power, which, according to its principle is unconditioned.* That there can be such a power in an essence which is dependent for its essential existence, the foregoing investigations of this volume, especially those in the fourth chapter, will have convinced those who did not refuse assent to their ground principles. But therewith it is still undetermined, whether such a self-dependent causality of the human will can also consist together with the *Omnipotence* of God.

Neither is the problem to be solved by the simple observation, that it is just the Divine Omnipotence which vouchsafes to man this power to condition himself; for that indeed is just the very question, whether the Divine Omnipotence is able to remain omnipotence, if it posits such a self-dependence out of itself.

If one on the other hand should say: certainly human freedom in our consciousness is such an unconditioned power as to its principle, a pure self-determining of self, but in the sight of God its self-determination necessarily proceeds from the entire connection of the Being posited by God, this were no reconciliation of human freedom with the Divine Omnipotence but a destruction of the former.

In the last place, the outlet for the rescue of man together with his freedom, by regarding him as being in the very Divine Essence

itself, his freedom therefore as being an ability of moral self-decision, but in such a way that the exercise of this ability were at the same time a self-determining of God in us, is already debarred us, because there is also contained in this ability the possibility of evil, and therefore because no conceivable gain can compensate for the sacrifice of the Holiness of God, which is nothing else than His love affirming itself and excluding from itself its opposite.—

For the solution of the difficulty, it is clear, that before anything else we must more closely investigate *the notion of the Divine Omnipotence.*

All-might *(Allmacht)* is *limitless might.* The power of an essence is limitless if in its working it is not conditioned by anything in a necessary manner which is out of itself, consequently when it is able to realize everything to which there is in it an impulse or will. When we ascribe this attribute to God, it is certainly a matter of course, that we cannot conceive of a will in God which stands in contradiction to His essence or nature; by which not merely evil, but also everything which is (logically) self-contradictory remains of itself excluded from the sphere of His Almighty Working. That God, according to the customary determination of the notion, can do everything which He chooses, belongs undoubtedly according to this to His Almightiness. But the further question arises: does it not also on the other hand equally belong to the limitlessness of the Divine Power, that it also realizes all possibilities contained in it, in other words: that God wills and works all that He can, that in Him ability, volition, and causality are identical?

Schleiermacher answers this question in the affirmative,[1] and *Strauss* appropriated this decision.[2] For *Schleiermacher* thinks that if there should be anything possible for God, which does not by Him become real, we must adopt "a self-limitation of the Divine Almightiness, which can never be given us, and for which no ground can be presented to us.[3]

We do not so much as require, with *Schleiermacher,* to call to our

[1] *Glaubenslehre* § 54, 2 (vol. i. p. 309 seq. ed. 2d.) Also *Romang, System der naturlichen Religionslehre*, p. 252 sq.
[2] *Dogmatik* vol. i. § 38, p. 587.
[3] Ibid, p. 311.

aid the unity and homogeneity of the connection of nature, in order to see, that with this idea of the Divine Almightiness, the notion of human freedom which is here developed, is absolutely incompatible. For if human freedom presupposes a sphere of the possible, in which the will determines itself, this too, according to that representation, must have been taken possession of by the Omnipotence actualizing everything possible, and in this case the freedom of the human volition and action can only express the particular manner in which the Divine Omnipotence works in this sphere. We are also not merely able to avoid that conception of the Divine Omnipotence by falling back upon *evil* as an effect of freedom, since this is in any case excluded from His almighty causation by the Divine Nature. For our development of the notion of freedom has surely satisfactorily shown that it is absolutely impossible for us to ascribe the evil in the doing and being of man to his freedom, unless the reality of the good in the inward and outward life be not also conditioned by it.—

If we conceive of a limitless power working in the manner of a *power of nature*, it must then certainly absolutely effect everything, for which there is already contained in it a potency. For in this sphere, possibility and reality are not to be really separated; the existence of natural power spends itself entirely in its working; it is essentially a developing tendency and nothing else; it does not possess the self-dependent middle-point and therewith the possibility of resting in itself, or of holding itself within itself. If now the limitless power, by virtue of the necessity immanent in it, is the cause of determinate being, which is also of necessity in some way operative, consequently the cause of other causalities, then these causalities can surely be nothing else than instruments, possessing perhaps in their reciprocal relation a certain self-dependency, but in relation to their primitive cause, absolutely determined, just nothing more than the particular determinate states, which the working of the limitless causality assumes in its self-unfolding. What this causality produces, is, like itself, necessarily working cause, but distinguishes itself from it, apart from the compass of its working, by its being produced, and thus, by virtue of that necessity, cannot absolutely effect anything, beyond that with which it is endowed by the first and universal

cause. In this sphere therefore the canon: *causa causae est causa causati*, has its full validity.

It cannot be denied that the *Schleiermachian* notion of the Divine Omnipotence as of the causality conditioning all finite being and happening has, according to its general outline, been formed in this way. *Schleiermacher* therefore approves of the formula of *Abaillard: id tantum facere potest Deus, quod quandoque facit*, which it is true in this Scholastic, stands in another connection, but, taken in itself, conducts to that mathematical necessity, with which, in *Spinoza*, things follow from the highest power of God, *i.e.* from His infinite nature. But by this representation the Divine Omnipotence becomes inevitably degraded to an equality with the working of a power of nature.

Now this is by no means *Schleiermacher's* intention in that conception of the Divine Omnipotence; therefore he determines it on the one hand, as an *eternal*, timelessly working Omnipotence, and on the other hand, he denominates the *Omniscience* as the "absolute spirituality of the Divine Omnipotence."[1] But eternity is in *Schleiermacher*, in so far as it is added to Omnipotence as its more exact determination, an entirely negative notion, since all that it contains of an affirmative character, falls entirely within the notion of Omnipotence itself. And as to the Omniscience as the spirituality of the Divine Omnipotence, *Schleiermacher* himself feels necessitated immediately to add the following limitation to this determination, namely, "that the chief purpose of this notion is everywhere much rather in order to the Divine Causality being thought of as absolutely vital, than that of fixing in a determinate manner a similarity between God and that which we denominate, according to our method of representation, as spirit."[2] We are very far from overlooking the importance which attaches to the knowledge of God as of the living One (ὁ ζῶν πατήρ, John

[1] L. c. § 55, 1 (vol. i. p. 320.)

[2] Comp. l. c. p. 294: "If by the term, Omniscience, it is said especially to become prefaced that the Omnipotence is not thought of as a dead power, the same would be accomplished by the expression, absolute vitality." But why is it not already to be contained in the very notion of Absolute Causality, that here such a so-called dead power is not to be thought of? Therewith the addition of this Omniscience to the Almightiness would be nothing more than a mere tautology.

vi. 57, θεὸς ὁ ζῶν, Acts xiv. 15, 2 Cor. iii. 3, vi. 16, and elsewhere); indeed we find this vitality not merely in His powerful external causality, but also in the infinite fulness of His own essence. But in any case, the vitality is an attribute, which in a determinate form, belongs also to nature in general and individually to each organic existence of nature; and if an essence is *nothing more* than living, it stands therewith relatively below man. Herewith therefore *Schleiermacher* has himself completely recalled that which in his determinations transcended the merely natural view of the Divine Omnipotence.

In general a theology which is not able to appropriate the idea of the Divine Personality, will always only have the choice, either of renouncing the conceivability of the Divine Omnipotence, and every other expression respecting it, than a merely negative one, or of degrading it from resemblance to the motive and working power of the human spirit to that of a resemblance to mere nature. The endeavour here too of getting above personality falls below it.

First of all in the sphere of personality does the working power receive itself under its own control, and therewith exalts itself to *ability* according to what was earlier (p. 31) said respecting this notion. Certainly it does not depend upon man whether his ability of free self-determination will or will not exercise itself in relation to other being in general—and for this reason, because personality in him is only as relative, limited, because other being independent of his will is already existent and necessitates him, in that it presses upon him, to place himself in a relation to it. But nevertheless the choice is left him as to how and in what directions he will determine his efficiency. There are no potencies in him which impel the will with inevitable necessity to realize them (if there were such their realization were not mediated by the will), but the will is master over its own efficiency.

Accordingly if Omnipotence is to be thought of as boundless power of a personal essence, therefore of a *Will* in its relation to other being, the *essence* of God, under the presupposition of the decree of the Divine Will, that also another being exist, will undoubtedly *reflect* itself in this other being in certain determinate respects. If it were otherwise, if the world were absolutely apart from God in this sense, that its essence were absolutely foreign to the essence of

God, then the fellowship with God of any creature, as a member of the world, were inconceivable; God could not in any way reveal Himself to our spirit, indeed the wish of having even the smallest conception of God were absurd, if our spirit were not itself already a revelation of God. But a *necessity* of actualizing everything which is possible to Omnipotence can no longer be ascribed to the Omnipotent *Ego*. This necessity is once for all a determination, which does very well for the working power, but not for the acting will.[1]

Assuming now, that God wills not to create, much which He could create, one can only then find in this not willing—with *Schleiermacher*—a self-limitation of God, by representing to himself, so to speak, in God a thronging tendency, of everything possible, to reality. This pressure in the direction of reality must, one imagines, if there should be anything not realized which is possible in God, be opposed by a preventing limit. And yet if we look again a little more closely into this representation, and at the same time hold fast to the idea of a Divine Will, of a conscious self-determining, we shall find that God would of necessity be sensible of a limitation, if He were conscious of the necessity of bringing everything to reality, for which He possessed a causality according to its possibility. But the true result is this, that under the presupposition of this necessity, the idea of a

[1] From the above it will be seen that the opinion here developed, of course in relation to the Divine working externally, distinguishes between *potentia* and *actus*. When *Ritter* will not allow me this, because one would then be obliged to say, God has only the ability to be almighty, Ibid. p. 42, there is contained in what he says the *petitio principii*, that the being almighty is already posited in the real production of everything possible to be produced. But in what sense I recognize in God Himself a distinction between *actus* and *potentia*, without indeed ascribing to Him a process of becoming, a development, follows from the last chapter of the former division of this volume. One will not otherwise accuse this work of even an inclination lightly to give up the determinations of the older metaphysics, on account of the protestation raised against them upon the stand-points of modern philosophy; still I must openly confess, that I regard the tenet as to the non-distinction in God between *potentia* and *actus*, upon which *Spinoza* for his part very properly laid so much stress, *Ethic* p. i. *prop.* 33, *schol.* 2, as belonging to the old metaphysical forms, which are too narrow to contain the more living, comprehensively significant idea of God, which is the aim of the noblest endeavouring of our time.

will as producing principle of reality were altogether out of the question; the so-called volition were only just the necessary passing over of the determinations already present in the Divine Essence, into outward existence.

Now for human personality, because already in itself, and still more in the individual creaturely existence, it is a conditional one, and since its freedom is also limited by dependence, this necessity of making real the possible is, according to the above, only relatively denied. In God as the Absolute Person it is *absolutely cancelled.* In the presence of a real notion of the Absoluteness of God, which is only possible, when the absolute essence is recognized as Absolute Person, those dialectical questions, by which one supposes to place the maintenance of freedom in the Omnipotence of God in especial difficulty, become answered of themselves.—Is it not then, in any case, the better, the more perfect, that also the other being, which it is possible for God to produce, should really exist, and further, that all being to which this possibility applies should become real, than that both should not take place? But is there not for God a necessity of giving the preference to the more, rather than to the less perfect, and thus if not a metaphysical necessity, still a moral one, and therefore one no less excluding the possibility of another procedure?—But if God is in Himself the Absolutely Perfect, Self-grounded, Self-sufficient One, it becomes a direct contradiction to assume that a higher perfectness arises by the production of another being. Whatever significance the world, its origination, development, and completion, may have, one thing is certain, it cannot have such a significance. And just for this very reason is it only possible, that in the development of the world, the deepest disturbance and variance assert themselves in undeniable reality, without indeed destroying the perfectness of the Divine Being, or, what moreover in this case would be the same, without infringing upon it in the smallest degree. That this idea of the Absolute tolerates no other transition from God to the world than that of *Free Love*, we have already earlier seen. This free love is the highest determining principle for the efficiency of the Divine Omnipotence. As it is an old rule not to separate the notions of the Divine Attributes from each other, so from the abstract conception of the

Divine Omnipotence the relation of the same to human freedom is not at all to be recognized, but only from Omnipotence conceived of in this union with Love.—

But does not this very *love* of God, require with rigid necessity the existence of a world, since it had otherwise no object? And must not God surely by virtue of this unenvious love bring everything to reality, for which He possesses the possibility, so that, what would not derive its being on its own account, would now follow from the Divine Love?—The first question has already (p. 147 seq.) been answered. And as to the second, it surely presents to us only a very external and merely quantitative representation of the Divine Love, when it makes its greatness and glory to consist in the necessity of its bringing every possibility to reality. Love is essentially *Will;* only personal essences are capable of love. But love as such, as will, cannot consist in merely bringing everything, which is possible to the subject, to reality. For will is the self-*determining* of an Ego, but this task were a fully *undetermined* one. The *Possible* as such is therefore, just on account of this indeterminateness, not at all *object*, but *presupposition of the free will.*—This may be said just as well of the Divine, as of human Love.

When the older Theologians have maintained in the interest of the Divine Freedom, that there *must be* possibilities for God which transcend the collective whole, of that which at all times becomes real by His will, they have certainly thereby involved themselves in a contradiction, which *Spinoza*[1] has already pointed out. For we ever obtain from formulae of this kind a possibility which can never become reality, which therefore is in truth not a possibility. The true interest of the Divine Freedom allows us, with respect to the question, whether all that is possible to the omnipotent will of God becomes reality, when we stand simply in the light of the idea of God, neither to lay down a negative nor yet an affirmative maintenance. If we should ever be right in maintaining the one, or the other judgment, we must derive the same from the revelations of God in the real development of the world and from the determinateness of the Divine Will announcing itself therein. As now, in this reality, to which

[1] *Ethic*, p. i. *Prop.* xvi. *schol.* (*Opp. ed. Paul*, vol. i., p. 53.)

the Revelation of God in Christ pre-eminently belongs, the determinateness of the Divine Will expresses itself, we learn that the world-creating, world-preserving love of God has this for its final purpose, that there shall be beings who shall partake of a perfect fellowship with Himself. In the determining of such a purpose there is revealed to us the unenvious disposition of the Divine Love to communicate itself in such an amazing degree and at the same time so determinately, that all those vague representations of the realization of every thing, for which there is a causality in God and the like, when compared with the same are thrown infinitely into the back-ground. We hereby recognize, that this determined purpose corresponds with, and expresses, the essential nature of God, and that a higher purpose is not conceivable. But if it is the will of God that there should be essential beings who participate in His fellowship, it is also His will, as we have seen in the first division of this book, that they with freedom, from which the possibility of the opposite cannot be excluded, which is consequently unconditioned in their self-decision, turn themselves to Him.

From the above the following question, upon our stand-point, is still to be distinguished, namely, whether the universe, of course conceived of in the entire breadth of its notion, is to be considered as the exhaustive self-revelation, or, as in the connection of such views it were more correct to say, self-unfolding of the Divine Essence. This question we must decidedly answer in the negative, and that too not merely on account of the constituted character of the universe, as it is presented to our empirical cognition, but on account of the essential relation of the ideas, God and universe. The finite can never by any augmentation and extension become adequate to the infinite, as it were, cover the same. If this is contradictory, then the appearance of limiting the Divine Omnipotence, which the opinion wears according to its form, when it is said that God cannot create such a universe, vanishes again of itself. Nevertheless God does reveal Himself in an exhaustive manner, but not by causing all the determinations of His Essence to be reflected in determinations of the world, but by His vouchsafing to personal creatures in their completeness the perfect vision of Himself, Matt. v. 8; 1 Cor. xiii. 12; 1 John iii. 2.—*Romang* appears to make a similar

distinction, when, in his *System of the Doctrine of Natural Religion*, p. 256, he asserts on the one hand, that the entire causality of the Divine Essence is exhibited in the universe, while on the other hand, he scruples to maintain that the entire inward fulness of the Divine Being is completely displayed in the universe.—It is here everywhere of especial importance to perceive that God is infinitely more than an *absolute principle of the universe*, which contains perhaps in itself in undivided, timeless unity that which in the universe becomes separated and subjected to a development in time, that He is much rather in Himself the truly Infinite Fulness of Being and therefore too in Himself determinate and distinguished. This view and the cognition of God as personal therewith immediately connected are also in various ways expressed by *Romang*, *e.g.* p. 255, but certainly just as definitely the opposite opinion, when *e.g.* p. 257 it is said, that His essence becomes spent in His volitions and actions, or when it is said p. 146: "An abstractly absolute Being not having (?) the finite within itself were certainly entirely empty and void of contents; the infinite only receives its determination and its contents in the finite, for this only is the determined"—wherewith the infinite is made the undetermined. Now as here on the one hand the finite receives too much honour, so on the other hand, the honour due to it and therewith to its Creator is withdrawn, when the author thinks himself obliged to sacrifice to the Infiniteness of God all and every self-dependency of the finite in relation to God, *e.g.* p. 42. Had *Romang* remained true to that first opinion, he would have arrived at a relation between God and the world, in which there is co-contained with the Divine freedom that also of the world in its central essences, in personal Beings.

Consequently not in the existence of a world of the finite in general, also not then, when in the same not all that is possible to the Divine Omnipotence really takes place, is there contained a *self-limitation* of the Divine Will. But assuredly such a self-limitation is not to be separated from a communication of this *freedom* to creature-existences. As however freedom in the world absolutely only exists in each moment of its existence

by the Omnipotent Will of God, it is clear, that this self-limitation is not a limitation of the Divine Power itself—as such it would contain a contradiction, since in such a case, the Divine Power were not really Divine Omnipotence,—but only just a limitation of its exercise and efficient activity in the sphere, which God has assigned to creaturely freedom for its self-motion.

In itself the Will of God has this aim, that, as He Himself is The Good *(der-Gute)*, so also by His personal creature *only* the good *(das Gute)* may take place. Setting out from this determination of the Divine Will, and at the same time bearing in mind the holy earnestness of the same, we should expect, that God would produce the good and only the good by His creatures. But the moral good presupposes the free self-determination of the creatures, in which it is to be realized, as is seen most distinctly, when we go back to the inmost ground of the good, namely love to God. Therefore is it that the will of God, which otherwise produces what it affirms, limits itself in this sphere to that of being a *commanding* will and of revealing itself as such to the consciousness of the creature. It limits itself from love, from which all true self-limitation and self-denial arise; and in this is sustained the ground, felt to be wanting by *Schleiermacher*, of may be realimitatio. the creature, thler that the *summum bonum* holiness and blessedness are inseparably one and in which the expression of *Spinoza: beatitudo non virtutis praemium, sed ipsa virtus*, receives fulfilment in a higher sense than that in which he understood it, a principle of self-dependency becomes possessed of such an efficiency by the creative will of God, that it is able to determine itself against Him. Thus there arises a sphere of existence, which of course is not separated from the working of the Divine Will (if it were so separated it could have no real, but only a shine-existence, and then a self-limitation of God in relation to the same were out of the question), but in which however the Divine Will does not work in a purely determining manner.

Hereby we receive the notion of a *conditioned, i. e.* of a *self-conditioning* will of God. But we must still direct a somewhat closer attention to it.

The will of God is one which *discretes or distinguishes itself in itself*, in as much as it also wills conditioned being it is true as

One, but this One not as an abstractly Simple, but as a Concrete, as a whole, in which the many are one. But however in that according to this the individual moments of the entire universe in relation to each other, the one becomes made in the Divine volition and cognition, the presuppositon of the other, there is contained no conditionateness of the Divine Will.[1] If we look at the sphere of nature in and for itself alone, apart from the created spirit, we shall cognize it in its relation to God, while the natural existences in their mutual relation just as much determine as become determined, therefore mutually condition themselves, as a sphere of pure determinateness, as one absolutely dependent, which is pervaded by the efficient will of God in its unconditionateness. Now in the sphere of the created spirit, God wills nothing else than the good, but He wills, according to the notion of the spirit and the good itself, that it shall become freely willed, He wills its realization in a given order, namely, as proceeding from the freedom of the will, which, as this formal freedom, essentially includes the possibility of realizing the opposite. In this point lies all the truth which the notion of a conditioned Divine Will has.

That the notion of a conditioned Divine Will includes in [redacted] the necessity of attributing to God a wi[redacted] which [redacted] itself [redacted], because the condition, to which it is bound is not realized, is not able to realize itself,[2] *voluntas Dei ineffi c a x*, as it has been maintained by some of the older Lutheran Theologians, still more definitely by the Armenians,[3] in their controversion of the Calvinistic

[1] In this way *Schleiermacher* takes the notion of the conditioned Divine Will, *Glaubenslehre*, p. 314, which is easy to be understood, since he could not admit it in its strict sense according to the principles of his dogmatic system. Just in this sense the defenders of the unconditioned predestination among the old reformed Theologians tolerated the *decreta Dei conditionata, e. g. Pet. von Mastricht*, in a passage of his *theologia theoretico-practica*, quoted by *Baumgarten Unters. theol. Streitigkeiten*, vol. i. p. 128, comp. *Hottinger Fata doctrinae de praedestinatione et gratia Dei exercit.*, vol. i., § 51.

[2] In this way the *voluntas inefficax* must assuredly be expressed. For if we assume that this Will is only therefore and in so far inefficient, because and as far as it did not will to be efficient, it were then just in this degree not real Will.

[3] Comp. *e. g. Episcopius institutiones theol.*, lib. iv. sect. ii. cap. 21 (Opp. ed. Amsteloed. 1650, p. 308), *Limborchs theologia christiana*, lib. ii, c. ix., § 11.

doctrine of predestination, we are by no means able to admit. In the notion of the conditioned Divine Will there is certainly this contained, that God in the relations or spheres in which His will is a conditioned one, cancels the immediate relation of the same to its consequence or result. But the appearance as if there were a necessity of ascribing to God in contradiction to His Omnipotence an inefficient Will, vanishes of itself, if we only just hold fast to this, that in the Divine Will the moment of universality which stands in relation to the taking place of good in general, and the moment of speciality, which stands in relation to its development by the mediation of our free self-determination, are not separated from each other, but are inseparably one.

We have here this conditioned will of God first of all presented to us in its most primitive determination, at the point, where it relates itself to man as the will, which requires of him the good, and yet will only receive it from his freedom. But the same relation again presents itself in the sphere of Redemption. The Divine Will, by which a part of the human race, until the time of the judgment of the world, enters into a participation of Redemption, is also a conditioned one—what indeed is only for those no mere empty word, who are of opinion that in the fulfilment of this condition there is no operative Grace which may not be resisted. The moment of universality is the determination of salvation for the entire human race—that it is not contained in the will of God, if any one remains excluded therefrom,—the moment of speciality is, that man only becomes a participant of salvation by living faith in Christ. Most assuredly the first moment is not a mere abstraction of our understanding; also not a mere velleity, a movement towards a volition, which again ceases without result, because it was deficient in earnestness and power, for that such a velleity cannot be ascribed to God is a matter of course. It is a real moment of the Divine Will exercising itself in a determinate result. In that first sphere this result is the indwelling consciousness of the Divine law in the human spirit. In the second sphere it is the completion of the work of redemption by Christ which is sufficient for the entire human race, and the presentation of the same to all men, whether here in this present life or in a manner concealed from us at some future period of time. But one cannot treat this moment in and for

itself as a real, complete will of God, without introducing irresolvable perplexity into the dogmatic consideration.

Chrysostom, and according to his precedence the scholastic and old *Lutheran* theology, have here already employed the distinction between *voluntas antecedens* and *consequens* (προηγουμένη, ἑπομένη),[1] certainly only in relation to the second sphere, in order thereby to ground the universality of the will of Divine Grace, and, resulting from the same, the universal validity of the atonement, as well as the universality of the call to conversion; but they should no less have applied it to that first sphere.[2] That there is truth at the bottom of this distinction we have recognized in what we have above said; but so conceived of, it is objectionable, apart from the appearance of a temporal relation which is easily removed, in that it represents that which is only a moment, as a totality, as a real will of God, and thereby leads, strictly taken, to the violation of the Divine Omnipotence. A popular treatment of the notions may allow itself to leave out the condition from the Divine Will and then to consider the remaining as a perfect Will, in other words, not to take into consideration the free self-limitation of the Divine Will; but in a scientific investigation, there is unavoidably associated therewith, if the real significance of that universal moment has not to be altogether given up, the appearance of an inefficatious Will of God, a Will, which has not the power to realize itself.

But just this *self-limitation* of the Divine Will is a notion at which modern theology in its predominating tendencies takes

[1] Compare *Gerhard*, ibid. tom. ii. *de elect. et reprob.* cap. i. § 78 seq. *Quenstedt*, ibid. p. iii. c. 1, sect. 1, pt. 5 and 6. *Hollaz*, *Examen theol.* p. iii., sect. 1, cap. 1, qu. 5.

[2] *Leibnitz* gives this wider significance to the notion of the *voluntas antecedens*, *Theodicee*, Pt. 1, § 22 seq. *Causa Dei* etc., § 23 seq., indeed one still more comprehensive, since he brings it not merely into connection with the relation to human freedom (comp. vol. i. p. 299); and according to his example among the philosophers of that time, *Bilfinger*, *de origine et permissione mali*, § 226—240, among the theologians *e.g. Baumgarten evangel. Glaubenslehre*, vol. i., p. 415 seq. —*Buddeus*, *instit. theol. dogmat.*, lib. ii., c. ii., § 29, quotes from *Photius* a remarkable *Platonic* expression, which certainly already contains the idea of such a *voluntas antecedens* in the wider sense.

great offence.[1] Such a self-limitation is not merely said not to be able to be a matter of our pious consciousness, which indeed is just the consciousness of our determinateness of being by God, but also in itself to contradict the idea of God.

Now as to the *pious consciousness*, it is certainly pre-eminently the consciousness of Redemption from sin by the Divinely ordered plan in Jesus Christ. Will now this consciousness again recognize itself when *Schleiermacher* interprets it as follows, "in so far as sin is real, it is ordered by God as that which makes the redemption necessary, because otherwise the redemption could not have been ordered by God?"[2] Certainly only then, after one had first of all been thoroughly initiated in the artistic theory of *Schleiermacher* as to the relation of God to sin. To one still uninitiated this consciousness certainly becomes interpreted in the directly opposite manner, namely as follows, that sin, so certainly as the redemption destroying it, just as the law condemning it, is ordered by God, cannot have been ordered by God. But if now it is something real—and if it were not, what were redemption? —then this pious consciousness must recognize a reality, which

[1] *Schleiermacher* of course in an especial manner in accordance with the entire connection of his doctrine of the nature of religion and of his notion of God; comp. especially his first letter addressed to *Dr Lücke* on his *Glaubenslehre, Studien und Kritiken*, 1829, p. 270. The real source of this lively protestation is most distinctly seen when one compares his *Dialektik*, § 216—227, and the corresponding sections C and E of the Supplement.—If the most adequate determination of the idea of God is this, namely, His being unity with the exclusion of all contrasts, *i.e.* in *Schleiermacher*, equally the exclusion of all distinctions as being the transcendental ground of all volition and thought, it must of course appear as an ἄτοπον, that a Godhead which is thus robbed of all living reality should exercise "acts of self-limitation," in order to give to the human will space enough for its free self-determination.

Most recently, *Vatke*, l. c. p. 375 seq., and *Ritter*, l. c. p. 38 seq., have declared themselves as decidedly opposed to the notion of a Divine self-limitation, as it is laid down in the first elaboration of the doctrine of sin. I will only briefly remark in reply to the axiomatically expressed sentence here laid down: no one can negative himself, God least of all, 1, that, if *Ritter* resolves the notion of self-limitation into that of self-negation, he must allow me again to re-resolve it into that of self-limitation, and then to ask for the proof of his maintenance, viz. that no one is able to limit himself; 2, that I must regard it as an inadmissible limitation of God, when the ability of self-limitation is said to be less ascribed to God than to any other essence.

[2] *Glaubenslehre*, § 81, 3 (vol. i., p. 493, 497.)

does not arise from the Divine, but from the creaturely will in its independent self-working, and which is indeed the negative presupposition for the highest decree of Divine Love. How can the pious consciousness therefore, provided it knows how to be sufficiently aware of the dualism in coming to an understanding with respect to its own contents, help being forced to the recognition of a Divine Will, whereby God furnishes to other essences the ability of determining themselves in favour of something, to which He does not determine them, therefore to the recognition of a free self-limitation of the Divine Will?—The same may be easily shown with respect to the belief in a judgment of God, and in a Divine government of the destiny of men and nations.

But that such an opinion of the Divine self-limitation is prejudicial to pious trust in the power of God no one will be able to maintain at least in the interest of Christian piety, since this does not at all require such a trust in the case of one's own resistance against the will of God—and the question here treated of is that of its possibility—but only in the case of self-surrendering attachment to God. Moreover it must of course be regarded as holding good in the Christian sphere, that, what foreign arbitrariness causes to him whose will is truly surrendered to the will of God, is taken up in its real consequences not merely by a law of nature indifferent towards the salvation of this individual, but into a Divine plan of his course of life, Rom. viii. 28.

Quite generally considered, the *Schleiermachian* appeal in this question to the requirements of the pious self-consciousness, contains a contradiction, which also elsewhere in this Dogmatick is repeatedly to be met with. The pious self-consciousness requires, as *Schleiermacher* himself in a passage earlier adduced (p. 124) recognizes, nothing so much as a *Personal God* and a living intercourse of God with the human spirit; it finds God as such a Personality in His Revelation in Christ; now the more scientific theology maintains an intimate connection with that self-consciousness, which according to *Schleiermacher* it ought to do, so much the less will it be inclined to sacrifice the possibility of a Divine self-limitation resting upon the free personality of God to a notion of God, which, by identifying the Divine working, willing, ability, knowing and being, by sinking all these distinctions into

the abstract determination of simple Oneness, conceived of as absolute causality, negatives that possibility but at the same time the Personality of God.[1]—

If we take up the question *objectively*, it is unconditionally to be admitted, that a *limitation posited from without* would directly destroy the very idea of God; for it contradicts the idea of the Absolute as of the Being absolutely grounded and compact in itself. But how can the same be maintained of the self-limitation of the Divine Will in its relation to a sphere of Being set by itself, by which the Divine Absoluteness remains altogether untouched? Instead of prescribing God *à priori* grounds, according to which in His volition He is alone able to determine, will it not much better become us to learn from the sure and momentously significant facts of reality, *how* His will has determined itself, in order then to search into the *wherefore* of the determinateness of the Divine Will and its connection with other moments of truth already known? And if these facts, namely the conscience and the religious consciousness of the Holiness of God, as well as the saving Revelation of God in Christ, as it is supported upon those ground-bases, discover to us in the essential nature of man a principle of such self-dependency, that its self-determining can neither be resolved into a being determined by God (according to the opinion of absolute dependence) nor

[1] It is still more strange, that a theological opinion, which in the most express manner sets itself in opposition to pantheism, and declares the notion of Absolute Personality to be the very kernel of all knowledge of God, should allow itself to be induced by the false depth of the abstract oneness to throw the above distinctions overboard as being incompatible with the idea of the Absolute, while it adds to the same, distinctions which are undoubtedly much more incompatible, *e.g.* that the Divine ideas, which are said to condition the Divine self-consciousness as its essential contents, flow from the depths of the Divine Being, reveal themselves in finite reality, and when their finite phenomenon dissolves, become taken up again into the Divine Being or Consciousness, vid. *Bruch's Lehre von den göttlichen Eigenschaften*, p. 154, seq. p. 135—137, comp. the beautiful confession of the author in the preface p. iv. v. If this estimable Theologian would only consider how he will be able to maintain the *self-dependency* of God, which certainly belongs to His Absolute Personality, if the Divine ideas, without which there is said to be no Personality of God, realize themselves from necessity in the world "absolutely distinct" from God, he would undoubtedly find those distinctions to possess more meaning and significance.

into a self-determining of God (according to the opinion of absolute immanence), shall we then maintain, that God could not on account of His Omnipotence will such a self-dependency without *i.e.* external to Himself?

Even apart from the Divine *Love* we are compelled to maintain, that an Omnipotent Will, which were so altogether deficient in the ability to limit its working, were itself as it were in the way of its indomitable causality. The Will of God were then hindered just by its Omnipotence from bringing His creation to the highest reality, to that, which is most in resemblance to Himself, namely to self-determining personality.[1] It would still require, notwithstanding all its limitlessness, a liberation from its own Omnipotence, if it did not allow it, the liberty of making room without itself for its exercise. It essentially belongs to the spirituality of the Divine Omnipotence, that it is not a mere power of nature working from out itself with necessity, but that it is able to hold itself within itself, and with perfect freedom to limit itself in its working. It is everywhere the character of true strength, that it is tolerant and readily leaves others unmolested in their self-dependency, because it has nothing to fear from them. And is not the strong God to permit His noblest creatures to be free, because He were then no longer the only working one? Is it to be inconceivable that He should let Himself down to admit them into a relatively self-dependent co-operation? In great form is *the* arrangement laid down which from the first does not exclude the possibility of its disturbance taking place, but which possesses in itself, in case of its failing to be realized, the means of overcoming the preventing cause. Suppose a state possessed the power so to constrain per force, that every violation of the law were impossible, it would immediately cease to be a state, and sink down to a mere machine, if it should exercise this power. Are we to think less so of the world as the creation of God, of the universal state of personal essences?

But the gravitating point of the Christian doctrine of God is not His *Omnipotence*, but His *Love*. The power in God suffers

[1] *Nitzsch* in his protestant reply to the *Symbolik* of *Möhler*, with perfect right denominates it as an error of the Reformers, "when the permissive power appeared to them a minus of power, since it thus constitutes a plus," *Theol. Studien und Kritiken* 1834, No. 1, p. 55.

every limit which the Holy Will of Love lays down for its working. Or to express it more precisely: power in itself considered possesses no moving and determining principle; God does not produce the world merely to reveal His infinite power, His absolute causality, but His love is the moving principle of His power in that it appoints the *end* to which the efficiency of the Divine power is related.—But in that God has eternally beheld this end—the completion and perfection of the personal creature in fellowship with Himself—as attained, and consequently looks upon the free self-determination without Him as having immutably become one with His own Will, He regards that self-limitation of His Will, so real as its significance is, nevertheless as being removed. Moreover we learnt from an earlier consideration, that the volition of man even in the midst of his self-perversion ever remains sustained by the all-embracing co-operation of God.

But we do not conceal from ourselves, that, while we think we have solved this problem, our very solution gives birth to a new one. If God has not conditioned the efficiency of His Will in the world by the free self-determination of the personal creature merely in appearance, on what does the certainty rest that that purpose will be attained? Why is it not to be *possible*, that *all* those beings turn themselves away from God and *persist* in this their departure?

We might here perhaps help ourselves by attaching the question entirely to the moral condition of the human race in this present time-life. That which is in itself a fact, appears in it, by virtue of its conditionateness through the extra-temporal primitive decisions, from the beginning as determinate moral constitution. On the ground-basis of this determinateness we can conceive of the appointment of means which possess a spiritual power over the human mind, as it is even constituted, sufficient for the certain attainment of its purpose. However this would be only going round the difficulty, not meeting it. We first of all perceive where it really lies, when we refer the self-conditioning of the Divine Will to that extra-temporal origin of our self-decision from the condition of moral indeterminateness.

We do not feel in the least disposed to deny our principles even in the apparently hard determinations which follow from them, and therefore unhesitatingly admit the possibility, as in itself a possible fact, of all creaturely Wills turning themselves away from God. No creaturely will can by virtue of that indeterminateness be secured against a fall apart from its own decision. But whether it is also possible for all fallen beings to *persist* through all future aeons in their fall? We cannot shut our eyes to the fact of the will being capable of an incalculable self-degradation in evil. Then too as God does not prevent a fall by His Omnipotence, so neither does He restore any one from his fall by His Omnipotence. On this side of the view that possibility is not to be excluded. But the evil suffers in itself, as we earlier recognized as opposed to dualism, from a double inward contradiction. It has a tendency in it to destroy the nature, which is its necessary basis, so that if it succeeded in its endeavour, it would in the same moment have annihilated itself. But it is also necessitated, in order to obtain and maintain existence in this Divinely ordered world, to attach itself to certain elements, which have their real appointed place in the realization of the good, consequently to oppose itself at the very moment it seeks to make good its claim. Now there is not at all contained in this contradiction, which never allows rest and satisfaction to those abandoned to evil, a necessity for their ever forsaking the evil and turning themselves to the good. Just because they have a root of their being in freedom, they are able to hold out in an existence most fully contradictory. If this is possible to man throughout his earthly life, on what does the necessity depend, that it should be impossible for him to do so throughout any period of his existence? The inward contradictions of evil may very well have the power to separate man from the sin which governs him, when he is obliged to be sensible of their torment; but they cannot possibly have the power to unite him to the good. But there is surely contained in these contradictions a *negative point of attachment for the saving efficiency of the Divine Love and Grace*, and we may unconditionally trust to this Love, that it will know how to use it. If these contradictions have their ultimate ground in the inability of the evil to become substance, although it ever strives after it, in that it can only arise and extend itself in a being, which is and remains

a creature of God, then we perceive on what the limit rests, which is appointed to the development of evil, and the guarantee, that by it the complete realization of the world-purpose may indeed be retarded, but cannot be ultimately frustrated.

At this point of our investigation we may reply to the more general question, which *Töllner* answers in the affirmative, in a treatise[1] which, although sagacious, does not touch the very root of the problem, namely whether God can have purposes, which He does not attain.

It cannot for a moment be doubted, but that God has implanted powers in the development of the world, which, because He has not subordinated them to the conditions of the historical development, do not in part attain, that whereto they appear to the religious consciousness to be determined, not according to an arbitrary imagination, but by virtue of a relative necessity. *Töllner* makes much of the example of the command given to the first parents of our race. But we must say quite generally, that the law, strictly taken for itself, does not attain that, for which it is absolutely appointed, namely to conduct man to righteousness. We are necessitated to the same judgment, if we consider the development of humanity since the appearance of Jesus Christ in the world, and especially when we contemplate the Divine guidances, by which the work of the Redemption of Christ becomes brought near to man. When the message of the Gospel proclaims to an individual or to a nation the salvation which is in Christ Jesus, are we not there to maintain, that the presentation of the same is made in order that it may become accepted? And yet, if now in innummerable cases the message does not become accepted, are we then to say a purpose of God has been frustrated? The Omnipotence of the Divine Will, according to its true notion, however little it is to be considered as the all-determining middle-point of the Christian doctrine of God, is nevertheless an absolutely essential moment of the same, whose violation becomes a deadly attack upon all that the Christian religion promises and vouchsafes to man. But to ascribe to God a vain endeavour, a volition, which transcends its ability—and what more determinately deserves the name of a Divine Volition than the

[1] *Vermischte Aufsätze, zweite Sammlung*, p. 1—32.

purpose-appointing, determining principle of a volition producing everything?—is manifestly not reconcilable with this omnipotence, and moreover would necessitate the severance of the omnipotence from the omniscience. Not even a man is able to set himself purposes, of which he is perfectly sure, that he will not attain them,[1] to say nothing of God.

Assuredly one must here carefully avoid making that moment of the Divine Will, from which the Divine command, or the Divine requirement in general arises, a complete Divine Will and decree. Consequently we may neither directly place in the Divine Consciousness as real purposes the higher determinations, which our religious consciousness necessitates us to ascribe to certain essential existences, conditions, events and arrangements. We cannot prevent Him, according to the Apostolic warning, Rom. xi. 34, from also having His own secret thoughts, besides those which He reveals to us, which are perhaps only to be made manifest in the more advanced earthly development of His kingdom, or, if even not there, perhaps in its completion.[2] Thus the determinate appointment of the law, before the redemption of Christ made its appearance, could scarcely otherwise, than in the above denoted manner, have been conceived of by the human consciousness; but when faith in Christ came it was clear, that in the present condition of the human race its real purpose was, that of being παιδαγωγὸς εἰς Χριστὸν. Just so, the presentation of the redeeming work of Christ to this or that individual, however certainly it may have the purpose of making all those who accept it in faith, participants of eternal life, may have for its particular purpose the bringing to light the bitter enmity of his heart to God; and what John the Baptist says, of the vocation of the Messiah being that of cleansing His thrashing floor and of separating the chaff from the wheat, Matt. iii. 12, and Simeon, of His being set for the fall and rising of many in Israel, and for the revelation of the thoughts of many

[1] The examples, by which *Töllner* endeavours to prove the contrary, are too weak, that we require to spend time in their refutation.

[2] *Luther* quite correctly says, *de servo arbitrio*, p. 96, ed. of *Seb. Schmid*: multa facit Deus, quae verbo suo non ostendit nobis, multa quoque vult, quae verbo suo non ostendit sese velle, although we by no means consent to the further extension of this thought, which brings the velle and ostendere into contradiction with each other.

hearts, Luke ii. 34, 35, and what He Himself says of His appearing in the world for judgment, that those who see not might see, and those who see might become blind, John ix. 39, and of His double function, namely, that of His being the corner stone of salvation and also the stone of stumbling and the rock of offence, Matt. xxi. 42 seq., comp. Rom. ix. 33, 1 Pet. ii. 7, 8, 2 Cor. ii. 15, 16, and of the power of His Church through the efficiency of its faith in Him, the Son of the living God, not only to loose in a manner which shall be valid in heaven, but also to bind, Matt. xvi. 19,—all this is to be firmly maintained in its entire strictness of meaning.

But for us at present, before the close of the earthly development of the human race, there ever attaches a greater or less degree of uncertainty to our cognition of the Divine purposes in particular, in so far as they are not made known to us by the revelation of God in Christ; we are only sensible of standing upon perfectly firm ground, when we hold fast to the highest all-embracing purpose of history, the Divine Kingdom, which in its completion is nothing more than the perfected fellowship of man with God. As we look upon this purpose as being undoubtedly the purpose of God Himself, so we also certainly know that it will be attained, because, if God had not from eternity looked upon it as attained, man would not have existed.

It follows of itself from the view of the self-limitation of the Divine will which we have above obtained, that we may not consider the notion of the Divine *sufferance*, as a mere make-shift of popular discourse, but must vindicate it a place in the scientific exposition of this relation of the Divine and human working.

This notion is by no means the full complement to that of the Divine self-limitation, so that, where the Divine Will ceases to be a producing will, just there it became a merely suffering one. It is true that modern dogmatists, *e.g. Bretschneider*,[1] have so conceived of the notion of Divine sufferance, but quite contrary to all use of language; for when that occurs, which God commands, but does not himself effect, who thinks of saying with respect to the same, God only suffers it? It is clear that the

[1] *Handbuch der Dogmatik*, § 55 (vol. i., p. 413 seq.—3d ed.)

Divine sufferance stands over against not merely the Divine *effecting*, but also over against the *commanding* of God. In so far namely as God brings forth by an act of His will, which is just as much the most exalted and greatest revelation of His glory as it is the freest self-limitation, the sphere of the spirit determining itself in freedom, does His Will in relation to this sphere as essentially existing come out of its causative and possesses a merely authoritative character, it ceases to be a causing and becomes a commanding will. For the will only becomes commanding, in so far as it wills that a given event shall be brought about, not by itself, but by another will.[1] But if now this other will, is a will which is free and self-determining, and if it be really an earnest matter with respect to the self-limitation of the Divine Will, by which in this sphere it ceases to cause the immediate realization of that which corresponds to it, there is directly given with this commanding will the possibility of the very opposite to its requirement taking place.

Now the Divine Will stands related to the realization of this possibility by the free will of man not as compellingly—for the very existence of this free will is grounded in its self-determination,—just as little permittingly *(erlaubend)*—otherwise it would not command the opposite, namely obedience,—but *sufferingly (zulassend.)* Although it absolutely has the power to hinder the arising of evil, since only under the presupposition of this power can we speak of a sufferance of evil, still it will not prevent it, because this could not be done without the exclusion of that from the creation, which is the very condition of its highest completeness and perfectness.

There is nevertheless contained in this suffering of evil not merely a negative, tolerating procedure of the Divine Will with respect to the same, but while it suffers it, it at the same time imposes upon it certain limitations, certainly not in its internal progression, for in this respect it is able to aggravate itself unhindered to the most fearful degree, but to its workings in the outward world, which become continually swallowed up and destroyed by the powerful course of the Divinely ordered development of the world. The notion of the Divine sufferance certainly

[1] Nature may be subjected to laws, but not to commands.

includes this, that God does not prevent real disturbances, retarding hindrances of the realization of His world-purpose, because this world-purpose according to its nature can only become realized just by the mediation of free existences; but disturbances which really frustrate the attainment of the Divine purpose in the world, God would not suffer.—On the other hand the Divine punishment precisely corresponds to the Divine sufferance, in so far as the suffered evil does not again become destroyed by forgiveness, so that the creature is not able to withdraw itself from the Will of God as commanding, without immediately falling back under the dominion of this will as punishing.

If these determinations respecting the notion of the Divine sufferance are conceived of in connection with the other moments of doctrine previously developed in our investigations, we shall have no necessity arising from the modern controversion of this notion, especially from the Schleiermachian,[1] of proving, that it is not able to disturb it. The ground of this controversion rests entirely upon presuppositions respecting the essential nature of God and His relation to the world, the inadmissibility of which we have already sufficiently shown. We are perfectly agreed with *Schleiermacher*, when he says, that which God only suffers must elsewhere have its ultimate positive ground of determination.[2] However a negation of the Divine Omnipotence is so little contained therein, that His Omnipotent Will rather becomes denied by the opinion that a mere sufferance in God is not conceivable. But when *Schleiermacher* draws the consequence from the adoption of this notion, that, what in God is sufferance will be predetermination of the Devil, and further, that what in God is predetermination will be sufferance in the Devil, we can only look upon it as a joke which is certainly somewhat wide of the mark.[3]

[1] *Glaubenslehre*, § 81, 4 (vol. i. p. 497), and especially his treatise on the doctrine of election (*Abhandlung über die Lehre von der Erwählung*), p. 70 seq.

[2] The old Lutheran dogmatists also recognize this in the most definite manner, *e.g. Quenstedt*, Ibid. P. ii. c. ii. sect. 2, qu. 5, object. διλ. 11: ubi nuda est permissio, ibi locum non habet causalitas.

[3] Still wider it appears, when *Sigwart*, l. c. p. 131, imagines to derive

We cannot at all be surprised at this decided dislike in *Schleiermacher* to the notion of the Divine sufferance; it is indeed grounded in the entire connection of his dogmatic system. But when theologians, who decline the unconditioned predetermination as well in the Calvinianan also in the Schleiermachian form of the same, and are not satisfied by the manifest contradictory or unnaturally complicated formulae, with which both of them ward off from themselves the Divine Authorship of sin, when such theologians, who do not, with *Schleiermacher*, make the Efficiency, Volition, Ability, and Being of God, all to coincide in one undistinguished identity, in an identity void of distinctions, but who nevertheless do not feel permitted to appropriate the notion of the Divine sufferance and its more general presupposition, the self-limitation of the Divine Will in favour of creaturely freedom, we are only able to regard it as arising from a deficient consciousness of the grounds and results of their dogmatic convictions.

the concession from the notion of sufferance by means of an artfully deduced consequence, that evil is in the world by the Will of God. The notion can never be made to express more than the tautological admission that evil is only just in so far in the world by the Will of God, as it is suffered by the same. The necessary correction of that argumentation is already to be found in *Hollaz*, l. c. p. 495, anm.** (ed. of 1750.)

SECOND CHAPTER.

THE RELATION OF HUMAN FREEDOM TO THE DIVINE OMNISCIENCE.

In endeavouring to explain in the previous chapter how God in an eternal manner looks upon the self-limitation of His Will in favour of creaturely freedom as being removed, we employed the opinion without establishing it, that God from eternity cognizes the self-decisions of the human will. Neither will we now, in turning to the celebrated question of controversy, namely, whether the freedom of these self-decisions is reconcilable with such Divine cognition, stop to prove the truth of this tenet, but will consider it as that which is self-evident, and in the investigation of our present question make its recognition a presupposition. When *Socinus* and his school denied an infallible cognition on the part of God with respect to the future, free actions of man, on the ground that the Divine cognition, although omniscient, can nevertheless only refer to that which is cognizable, and therefore not to the future, free actions of man, which, as *contingens*, cannot be cognized, they ought certainly to have screwed up their courage to the further maintenance, that God in relation to the human race has made neither a decree of redemption nor sketched a plan of its development, *i.e.* that He does not trouble Himself at all about the same, because so to conduct Himself is much more becoming Him, than to allow the eventual plans which He might project to be constantly frustrated by the unknown and absolutely incalculable decisions of the will of man, without even being sure of the possibility of carrying out the altered decisions.

It is just as much self-evident, that the Divine foreknowledge of free actions is one which is perfectly certain and undeceivable, so that they can never fall short of, nor be altered even a hair-breadth with respect to, the foreknowledge which God has of them. If the Divine cognition in this respect were only a conjecture, although clothed with the highest degree

of probability, it were notwithstanding in the highest degree probable that under millions and millions of instances the probability would now and then prove deceptive, and God would then have to correct an error. On the other hand it is void of influence in the reply to our question, whether one excludes from the objects of the Divine cognition that which appears to us in human conduct trifling and insignificant, or not. The decisions of the human will, to which the interest of this question pre-eminently attaches, are none other than those upon which the eternal salvation and destruction of man are dependent.

How are we now to account for it, that the freedom of these decisions of the will is said not to be destroyed by the Divine foreknowledge? By virtue of the freedom of the subject these decisions might *also* have been *otherwise*, by virtue of the indeceptibility of the Divine foreknowledge they could *not otherwise* have taken place than they have; is not this an open contradiction?

By older as well as by more modern theologians great importance has been attached to *analogies drawn from the human sphere.* No one indeed imagines that the freedom of his future actions becomes transformed into necessity by his own foreknowledge of them. But is there then really an undeceivably certain prescience of man with respect to his free act? The certainty, which we may be able to have of our own future decision of will in a given case, without our feeling thereby limited in our freedom, we must here leave out of the question. Concerning this relation there is for this reason no certain judgment possible, because we can never be certain, that there is not already contained in this foreknowledge a pre-determination, a previous decision of the will, for this instance. But as to the decisions of the will of another, we have of course nothing to do with prophetic predictions by Divine illumination, because these furnish no analogy drawn from the human sphere. It is clear that from the character and circumstances we can only with certainty foreknow the action of an individual, in so far as there is not applied to it, strictly taken, the freedom of the ability of also otherwise acting. Thus therefore there is only left us a foreknowledge by direct intuition in virtue of a power of divination peculiar to many individuals. But even here the facts of a perfectly certain prognostication of

future events or much rather *actions* (the second sight of the Scotch and the like, are really only the presentiment of an impending *calamity* with respect to another individual) cannot be regarded as sufficiently established to justify any conclusions from the same with respect to our question. Accordingly the sphere of human knowledge furnishes us with no real analogy.

However, the approximation to the perfectly certain foreknowledge of the decision of the will of another, which is often to be met with in life among those living in close and confiding intimacy, furnishes us with a favourable prejudgment for the reconcilability of human freedom with the omniscience of God. We do not deem ourselves to have been less free in any given decision, when we hereafter learn, that a friend definitely predicted our decision. Or is perhaps this unshaken consciousness of freedom, so to be explained, that we, however necessarily our decision may have proceeded from our moral constitution present at the time, look upon this constitution itself as being grounded in our freedom? Be it so, but so much still in any case remains certain: it never occurs to us to look upon this foreknowledge of another as the *working cause* of our resolve.

Others adopt the very opposite method for the solution of the problem, since they endeavour to deduce the union of human freedom with the Divine foreknowledge, directly from that by which the Divine cognition of the future, upon our stand-point future, *distinguishes* itself from our cognition. They admit, that the freedom of human action would be destroyed, if there were a real Divine *pre*science of the same. But the Divine cognition is not like the human, bound to the temporal succession, but is an absolutely *extra-temporal* cognition; there is in God as on the one hand no remembrance of a past, so also on the other no prospect of a future, but everything happening in time and therewith separating into past, present, and future is looked upon by Him in an eternal manner as a co-existing whole. If now *the vision of a present* occupies the place of the Divine foreknowledge *(praescientia)*, the difficulty of uniting human freedom with the Divine Omniscience falls of itself away.

This solution of our problem has, since the time of Augustine[1] and Boethius[2] down to the most modern elaborator of the doctrine of the attributes of God,[3] so often been brought forward and sometimes in such a decided manner, that it is well worth while to examine it somewhat more closely, to see whether it really furnishes that which it promises.

The question first of all is this, whether it necessarily follows from the eternity of the Divine cognition, that *time* and its constant transition from the past through the present into the future is altogether non-existent for this cognition.

This problem only treats of such events happening in time, which arise from freedom and become for us subjects of empirical cognition. The most perfect cognition which we are able to have of facts of this kind, apart from the immediate consciousness of the precedents of our inner life, is that furnished us by sight, *testis ocularis*. Now this our cognition of that which is happening in time is limited by the time in a twofold manner. The one limit consists in that it only embraces an infinitely small fragment of that which is temporally taking place, the other in that even within this small section the knowledge is only gradually acquired and in that the knowledge which is thus acquired becomes again just as gradually obscure and at length entirely vanishes. That which one might perhaps mention as the third

[1] The principal passages are: *De civitate Dei*, l. xi., c. 21. *De div. quaestionibus ad Simplic.*, l. ii., qu. 2, § 2. Without the Christian Church the same thought is to be earlier met with, although less clearly expressed, especially in *Philo, quod Deus sit immutabilis*: *ὥστε οὐδὲν παρὰ θεῷ μέλλον—καὶ γὰρ οὐ χρόνος—αἰὼν ὁ βίος ἐστὶν αὐτῶν (αὐτοῦ)· ἐν αἰῶνι δὲ οὔτε παρελήλυθεν οὐδὲν οὔτε μέλλει, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὑφέστηκεν* (*Opera ed. Pfeiffer*, vol. ii., p. 402.)

[2] *De consol. philos.*, l. v. pros. 3—6.

[3] *Bruch*, l. c. p. 166. *Strauss* too seems to make much of this solution: he is of opinion that all the trouble one has had in attempts to reconcile the Divine foreknowledge, with human freedom, has arisen alone from the distinguishing the Divine knowledge as *reminiscentia*, *visio*, and *praescientia*, *Dogmatik*, vol. i. p. 570. Comp. on the history of the question *Dähne, de praescientiae divinae cum libertate humana concordia*, 1830. *Petavius* has collected a series of expressions from the Church Fathers and schoolmen respecting the relation between the Divine prescience and human freedom as well as on the extra-temporal character of the Divine cognition, *Dogmata theol.*, tom. i., *de Deo Deique proprietatbus*, lib. iv. c. 4—7, comp. tom. iii., lib. iv., c. 11.

and principal limit—that we are seldom, or strictly speaking never, able completely and with thorough certainty to look through in its inward accomplishment the action of another which is before us,—is no limitation *by means of time.*

Now the cognition of God embraces the entire course of time, and all its individual moments are absolutely present to Him, without increase or diminution. If God were obliged first of all to experience something which He had not previously known, or could anything which He had once possessed, again escape His cognition or even only in the least become obscured, then the consciousness of God were drawn into a process of becoming and again passing away.

Does it follow now from this, that for the Divine cognition also the succession of time-moments, the separation of the same into past, present, and future, is *not at all existent?*

We must here distinguish things which often become confounded with each other. Past, present, and future are not, as one often confusedly denominates them, the dimensions of time, which are perhaps just as essentially attached to the notion of the same, as to the notion of space its three dimensions, without which this latter cannot be at all conceived of. Time has only *one* dimension; it arises in our inward perception by a movement from any given point in one and the same direction, just as space by motion in three different directions; it is, if we keep in view, apart from all contents whatever, purely the form of time as such, the absolutely equal succession of individual moments, in which those of the past in no way whatever objectively distinguish themselves from those of the present and future. The distinction between past, present, and future, in so far as they are understood according to the general use of language, in a purely formal sense,[1] is not merely a relative one, momentarily changing, but also an absolutely subjective one. It only arises in the consciousness of existences whose very being is one essentially existing in time, *i.e.* a Becoming, and which are thereby necessitated to conceive of the constantly equal progression of time, from the

[1] In a more real sense one may say, *e.g.* of the natural course of a human life that the period of its rise is its future, that of its decline its past, consequently the point of its culmination is its present.

individual point at which their own development stands, in opposite directions.[1] Consequently for the consciousness of an essence, which in its being is exalted above time, this distinction in itself is not present.

Are we now to maintain the same of the *succession* of moments in general? It certainly appears so upon the stand-point of the Criticism, where time is regarded only as a subjective form of human intuition, but not as anything equally attaching to things. But he who wishes to place himself with respect to our question upon this stand-point, must not conceal from himself, that he must also allow the further consequences, and therefore not merely admit that every free determination of the will by a *salto mortale* is transferred into the kingdom of the intelligible, but also, that we are able to cognize nothing of the essence of the thing, as also of our own essence, to say nothing of God, since we are neither able intellectually to conceive of ourselves nor anything without us, without alas the object presented to our inward perception being transformed into a form, of which it is absolutely impossible to determine, how it stands related to the "thing in itself." And yet, so long as this stand-point in its practical faith holds fast to the objective existence of God, *i.e.* so long as the *Kantian* stand-point has not yet passed over to the *Fichtian*, it will notwithstanding not be obliged to adopt the opinion, that God, inasmuch as He is said to possess a perfect, thorough perception of the human soul in its inward percipient activity, also has just this form of perception by which everything becomes temporal, and that in this form as in a mirror He cognizes all human doing *as a succession of time.*

If on the contrary time is not merely the subjective condition of our perception and experience, but equally the *objective form of the conditioned being* as such, and if therefore the succession of moments is something real, then it is easy to see what must be deduced from the maintenance, that time is non-existent for the Divine cognition, *i.e.* that it is not object of the same. Nothing less, than that God does not cognize the world in its reality.

[1] Two dimensions of time can only then follow therefrom, when one may ascribe two dimensions to a line, because one may look upon it from a point in the middle.

Or are we perhaps not at all to be shocked at this result? It is perhaps just the very perfection of the Divine cognition that it cognizes the world absolutely in its universal notions, and therewith *sub ratione aeternitatis*. Then in such a case the ideas of genus and species as well as the metaphysical general notions, which like those of genus and species have nothing to do with time, were contained in the Divine understanding, but would have no relation to this individual reality, which is not and cannot absolutely be conceived of without time. Whatever the reality of finite being may add to the universal notions, the same conceived of as a world consisting for itself, the Divine cognition would have only these for its object. One may also then see how God is exalted above all cognition of objects, which were distinct from Himself, how He only cognizes the world in that He cognizes Himself, indeed how His cognition of the world and His self-consciousness are absolutely one and the same.

But then so much stands fast: if this reality is not at all existent *for the Divine cognition*, it can neither be so *by the Divine Will*. Accordingly if the essential existence of this reality in time and space can no longer be derived from a Divine Creation, whence is it to have its origin? For in the connection of such a method of consideration, which will know nothing of dualism, there can hardly be anything left for it than to explain this temporal reality as being a phenomenon which arises only in the finite consciousness, *i.e.* essentially returning to the Kantian stand-point in contradiction to the presupposition, that the time is something real. But if therewith the tenet, that God looks upon the things as existing without the bounds of time, is to be earnestly maintained, then that phenomenon inevitably sinks down to mere *shine*. For as *God* cognizes the things so undoubtedly they *are*, and the human mental perception of them so far as it deviates from this Divine cognition, is just nothing else than deception.

Neither would it alter anything in this matter, if one should call to his aid the representation of a *fall of the ideas*, wherein this lower region of temporal being has its origin. For if this fall and its consequence are non-existent for the Divine cognition, God looks upon the ideas as not fallen, and thus their fall is a mere shine which is so much less able to explain anything,

nce it is itself, its arising in any consciousness, the least of all apable of being explained.

It will be more correct to say that God *has Himself willed* the leas, in which, as their moments, the world-idea of the Divine nderstanding discretes itself, *as the principles of the development f a reality in time and space*, and on the other hand, that these eas are only in so far in His Understanding as it is the eternal Vill of God that there should be a world.

The ideas are principles of the real development not as the nmediately working causes of the same, but in a *teleological* sense, nce they contain the *ends* of all these developments, from which ıe beginnings disturbed by that fall prior to time, the present ›rm of our existence, are far removed. But if this world moving self in time and space exists as such by the creative Will of God, is also as such present to the Divine cognition in an objective ıanner. By this cognition being *in itself* the *eternal*, it does ot exclude the cognition of the succession of time as a mode existence of its objects, but penetrates through it without being mited by it.[1] As everything existing in space is embraced by ıe Divine consciousness together with the space itself, so also in similar manner everything developing in time together with ıe time. That which is to us the past does not pass from Him, nd that which is to us future does not first of all come to Him; evertheless He sees each event in its determinate place in the ıccession of time, in this close connection with the preceding nd succeeding, taken out of which it would no longer be

[1] *Vatke* otherwise determines l. c. p. 479: The cognition of that hich moves itself within the limits of time—and such a cognition *Vatke* scribes also to God,—is also directly a cognoscence of the limit, and is ıerewith itself a limited cognition.—This, "and therewith" *Vatke* has ot learnt from his master at least, who indisputably with better right ıaintains, that he only can know a limitation as such, who is in some ay already beyond it. But this deduction is precisely of the same ıaracter as that blunt begging of the question which immediately makes ıe thinking and knowing of evil to be evil thinking and knowing. Moreer, if *Vatke* from the stand-point of his own principle could only ›nduct us to such groundless results as are exhibited in this doctrine of ıe limited cognition of God, and in that on the following pages of a ivine Will which operates against the Divine Will of Holiness and reedom, he surely might have devoted so much attention to the ›inion of another as not to have exhibited it so entirely confused, as the case p. 475 seq.

according to our intellection, that which it is, but something else, something completely undeterminable.[1]

If now it were at all supposable, that the cognoscence of God as to the conduct of man, makes the same necessary, while it were otherwise free, how should this eternal cognition embracing everything in an equal manner make it less so, than if there applied to God in relation to that which is future to us, a real foreknowledge, which, when this future arrived, become converted into a sight of the present, and when this had past away again became changed into the remembering of the past? If the eternal cognition of God is not negatively related to the succession of time and the reality transpiring in it, but so that it embraces the whole of the same, then this determinate event is present to the cognition of God not merely when it happens, but also in each earlier moment on which we may fix our attention. And thus there ever breaks forth from the *eternal* cognition of God that which is for us a *fore*knowledge.[2] Or is this relation of any given event to the Divine cognition before it really appears only perhaps an arbitrary representation? That it is not this the prophetic function wrought by the Divine illumination in the human spirit may call to our remembrance. But the chief matter is, that it is altogether absurd to consider an eternal consciousness in any way as the *minus* in relation to a consciousness which is bound to time.[3] If

1 Here too we find *Bruch* anything rather than in agreement with himself, and vacillating between two extremes directly opposed to each other. On page 162 it is said: The world—although according to the immediately preceding connection "essentially distinct from God"—does not lie without the self-consciousness of God, but most strictly within the same. On the contrary on p. 165 it is denoted as a problem not entirely to be solved, how an absolute Being can at all consist together with a conditioned and finite Being. Certainly the problem is perfectly insoluble, when one first of all sets a conditioned Being and then asks how an Absolute Being can consist *along with* or *together* with it *(daneben)*.

2 Therefore *Augustinus* in spite of his insight into the super-temporality (*Ueberzeitlichkeit*) of the Divine method of knowing, is accustomed in his latest writings just as little as in his earliest reflections to speak of a *praescientia* Dei.

3 Thus *Strauss* thinks, *Dogmatik* § 37 (vol. i. p. 570, sq.), that this supposed Divine prescience of an action is not more dangerous for freedom in ascending from the notion of a temporal to that of an eternal Divine knowledge, than is His co-perception of an action that is present. He much rather ought to have said, that this supposed co-perception of

a *fore*knowledge has the power to necessitate the conduct which it objectively sees, an eternal knowledge must *still more perfectly* have this power.

It follows from this, that human freedom cannot be saved by the Divine cognition being regarded as an eternal cognition, therefore absolutely exalted above the limit of time. It is certain that many have thought by this distinction to have solved the difficulty, just because they have thereby pushed the entire problem into a dark sphere where they find themselves no longer qualified for or necessitated to determinate thinking, and where therefore the question ceases to disturb them. The author of this distinction in Christian theology has here looked deeper than many modern ones, and makes no use whatever of the same for the purpose of bringing human freedom into agreement with the Divine Omniscience.

That opinion only appears to furnish decided help against the objections of the Socinians to the possibility of God foreseeing our free actions with certainty. Against this possibility *Joh. Crell* adduces the following proof. Because the contingent things as future are still undetermined, God can only foreknow them by virtue of the truth of His knowledge as *indeterminata et in utramqae adhuc partem flexibilia*.[1] This objection is removed when the cognoscence of God is recognized as an eternal act and therewith as above the sphere of time. For then it cannot be limited to a view of the same which precedes the origination of the free act, but it essentially transcends the same.—More

an action becomes fully as dangerous to freedom by that ascent as the Divine prescience.—*Boethius* too considers the absolute presence of the Divine knowledge in comparison with the foreknowledge as a minus, l. c. pr. 6: Num quae praesentia cernis, aliquam eis necessitatem tuus addit intuitus? Minime. Atqui—uti vos vestro hoc temporario praesenti quaedam videtis, ita ille (Deus) omnia suo cernit aeterno. Thereby is also overlooked, that our perception of an event taking place under our eyes, ever *follows after*, is subsequent to the same, strictly speaking, were it perhaps only for the thousandth part of a second. Are we also to say the same of the eternal cognition of God?

[1] Compare in *Baumgarten's Untersuchung Theol. Strietigkeiten* vol. i. p. 94 seq. the quoted passages from *Crell's* work *de Deo ejusque attributis*. *Socinus* similarly argues in his *praelectiones theol.* especially c. 8 *de Dei praenotione s. praescientia* (*Bibliotheca fratrum Polon.* t. i. p. 545) with which the determinations of the preceding chapter concerning the relation of the Divine *Will* (according to *Socinus* much rather *desiderium* Dei) to the future decisions of man, may be compared (l. c. p. 543, 544.)

closely however considered it is seen, that also in this respect the distinguishing between eternal cognoscence and cognoscence going before hand in time, has no real influence on our question. If that objection recognizes a divine foreknowledge of the future, of the indeterminate as the indeterminate, of the determinate as the determinate, then it is surely mere arbitrariness to make *only* that moment the very centre of this foreknowledge, where the will is said first of all to decide itself. Why not also the moment where the will has already decided itself? But if this *and* that moment are objects of the Divine foreknowledge, then it cognizes the human will just in its transition from the indeterminate to the determinate by its self-decision *i.e. in its freedom.*

When according to the opinion of Socinian theologians just discussed the following formula is found in their writings: *God foreknows the free action as free*, it has this sense, that God does not foreknow the free act according to its determinate contents. Others, after the precedent of *Augustinus*,[1] have used the same formula, but in a sense more adequate and favourable to the Divine foreknowledge, as a way of escape from this strait, and have then deduced therefrom, that the Divine foreknowledge much rather furnishes security for the freedom of the decisions of our will, than the ground of its destruction.

We are in perfect agreement with this sentence and regard it for instance as quite right when *Anselm* of Canterbury directs attention to it in this sense, viz., that God surely does not merely foreknow, that an individual in a given case will or will not sin, but at the same time foreknows, that he will or will not commit the same, without thereto being necessitated.[2] But if in this formula the notion of freedom is really an earnest matter, which we do not for a moment doubt in relation to the discussion of

[1] *De lib. arbitr.* lib. iii. c. 3, 4. Similar in form *de. civ. Dei* lib. v. c. 10, § 2, still upon an altered basis, as is seen from c. 9. Here the freedom of the will of man essentially belongs to the ordo causarum, which is object of the Divine cognition; therefore the free will is guaranteed its causality in its place directly by this Divine cognition. But this causality is perfectly homogeneous to that of other finite causes; determinate workings are deposited in it, which proceeded from it with infallible necessity.

[2] *De concordia praesentiae et praedestinationis nec non gratiae Dei cum libero arbitrio, quaest.* i. cap. 1 (p. 123 *der Gerberonschen Ausgabe.)*

Augustinus in his work on the free will, then the problem instead of being therewith solved, is only laid down. For that is just the very question, whether God is able to foresee or indeed know in an eternal manner with infallibility the free actions of his creatures, without thereby making them necessary; and those who deny this, as the Socinians do, will quite simply declare the formula: God foresees the free act with indubitable certainty but as free, to be a *contradictio in adjecto*. Sometimes, however, by this method of explanation, "the Free" is taken in another sense, namely then, when one forms the other analogous formula: God *wills* the Free just as Free, in order to reconcile human freedom with the Will of God as the absolutely conditioning cause of all that happens. Thus *e.g. Anselm* in the work just quoted quaest. ii. cap. 3. with the superscript. *praedestinatio cum libertate conciliatur eodem modo quo praescientia;* so also *Schleiermacher* in his *Dogmatics* § 55. comp. with § 49. the two expressions: God wills the Free as Free, God knows the Free as Free, have in *Schleiermacher* the same sense, namely this, that the Divine causality, determining everything, in itself simple, produces its effects in the sphere of intelligible essences in such a manner that these intelligent essences become conscious of the same as self-determinations. This is just that freedom which only has reality in relation to other finite causes, but none in relation to God.

In order to arrive at the proper solution of this problem, we must again go back to the notion of the *Divine cognition*.

We have already touched upon the opinion, which supposed the Absoluteness of God to be violated, if it should ascribe to it an *objective cognition*. Neither is this opinion to be set at rest by the maintenance that the object of the Divine cognition is not one which is given for God without His concurrence—certainly in such a case it would as object of the Divine cognoscence exercise a determining influence upon Him, which would not have the self-determination of God for its principle,—but that He Himself by His creative will has placed this object over against Him, so that His cognoscence with respect to the same is at the same time His cognition as to the power of His will to set

another being. It still remains in its maintenance that it would destroy the idea of the Absolute to ascribe to God the consciousness of another object, which, according to some, were not He Himself, according to others, were not in every respect in which he knew of it, at the same time by His absolute determining. Therefore it is also inadmissible in any way *to distinguish* in God His *cognizing* from His *determining*. Both His thinking and cognizing are essentially creative and therewith at the same time determining. In so far as God thinks anything He sets it, but not as that which is distinct from Himself, but as moment of His self-realization in the finite or as immanent effect of His absolute causality.

It is easy to see how that this opinion can make no distinction whatever in the doctrine of election between *foreseeing* and *foredetermining (praescientia, praedestinatio)*, and how there can only remain to it, if it has a doctrine of election at all, the choice of putting up with the same in its rude supralapsarian form, which *Calvin*, *Beza*, and others have given it, or of turning to the *Schleiermachian* form of this doctrine, in which it is softened down by its hypothetic conjunction with the *ἀποκατάστασις πάντων*. We perceive the deep insight of *Augustinus* into the conditions of Christianly Theistic doctrine, in that he does not allow himself to be misled by his rigid dogma of predestination to make it equal to prescience. According to him the sphere of the latter notion is the wider, that of the former the narrower. Predestination only refers to that which God Himself will do, prescience to that which He will not Himself do.[1] It stands in close connection with the same that *Augustinus* does not at all give up the notion of a suffering *(Zullassend)* Will of God; he places it precisely in the same relation to the working Will, as the foreknowing of God to his foredetermining.[2]

What is now the real meaning of the formula that there can only be applied to God a cognition which is not distinguished from His Will, therefore only a will which is one and the same with His cognition? Clearly none other than that in reality *neither cognition nor volition* can be ascribed to God—what

[1] *De praedest. sanctorum* 19 (x.) *De dono perseverantiae* 46. 47 (xvii. xviii.)

[2] Comp. *e.g.* the *Enchiridion* 95, 96.

Spinoza in his dry shrewd manner thus expresses, that if *intellectus* and *voluntas* belonged to the nature of God these could have nothing beyond the name in common with the *intellectus* and the *voluntas* of man—*non aliter scilicet quam inter se conveniunt canis, signum coeleste, et canis, animial latrans.*[1] For the distinction of cognition from volition is the ground-determination of the former notion; if we blot out this distinction, we take away from the notion of cognition not merely a part of, but its entire contents, and have then no longer any right to speak of a *Divine cognition.* But the question which we proposed to ourselves to investigate in this chapter, was this, how human freedom could consist together with the Divine Omniscience; this question can manifestly only become proposed when one recognizes the notion of the Divine Omniscience as real; he who denies God cognition, for him our problem no longer exists.

If now God is an intelligent, cognitive God, *how is His cognition distinguished from His volition?*

Every real volition is a real determining of a Self, a conscious causing, the stepping forth of an Ego from its being resting in its own self-hood, in order to set something in the reality, the external or internal reality. An empty movement of the desirous Ego, which is able to effect nothing, is a velleity, but no volition. That we can least of all ascribe such a velleity to God, was seen in the previous chapter.

Are we now also to maintain the same of the Divine thinking and knowing which we maintain of the Divine determining? In order to reply to this question we must more closely examine the development of a distinction already touched upon. God produces, by the Will of His Love, in His thinking the idea of the world in an eternal manner. But He wills it not merely as a thought immanent in Him, but as that which is also to become *real existence,* to attain the highest reality, of which a derived being is capable; and this Will is inseparably one with the Will by which the idea of the world is at all in God. Now in so far as God gives to the world outward existence, that it may have a being distinct from Him, there arises another kind of Divine cognoscence with respect to the world, the *objective cognition* of

[1] *Ethic.* i., prop. 17 schol.

the same—we say, it *arises*, namely according to its notional sequence, not according to its sequence in time; for God beholds the world from eternity as also really existing although the world itself is not from eternity. This second mode of the Divine cognoscence as to the world rests entirely upon the Will of God; His cognoscence in relation to the world is an objective cognition, because He has creatively made the world objective with respect to Himself, has placed it overagainst Himself.—

Herewith we receive still more definitely in its real possibility, what we were before (vol. i. p. 239 sq.) obliged to adopt with respect to the world, in connection with our distinguishing between the Divine creation and preservation, namely, that the world has a *beginning*, although the idea of the world is in God *eternal*. If one makes the world to proceed so immediately from the Divine thinking into its objective essential existence according to the earlier quoted axiomatic saying: He thinks and it is done, its being can only be thought of as without beginning although temporal. For the eternity of the idea of the world in God can, for itself considered, only lead to such a being of the world; this eternity would exhibit itself, in so far as the idea enters into the temporal reality, in a boundlessly extended duration of time, if the real existence of the world by the positive *act* of God were not conditioned by the Will of God appointing it determinate bounds. The dependency of the world upon God were no creation, but a necessary procedure of the same from its idea in God, if a Divine Will were not the principle of its existence. Yet more closely considered, without this Will it would never come to a real existence, but at the most only to a reflection of the Divine thought void of all reality, to a shadow of the idea cast upon the Nothing, just as much without bounds in itself as without consistency. The real principle of the world were then the inexplicable deception, by which the Absolute Being as divided and relative reflects itself—in what sort of manner it were impossible to say, since our own mental representation would first of all by this deception and only in it have existence.—If the world is to have a substantial temporally real existence, then it must also have a determinate beginning, and this beginning can only be given it by the *Divine Will*, the creative principle in God, the marvellous power to set another being.

Now this Will in God is in itself undoubtedly also an eternal Will; but this Will in itself eternal is at the same time the will, that the real existence of its object, of the world shall take a determinate beginning, in other words that the world-time—and apart from the world in the entire compass of this notion there is naturally no time—be in some way *a parte ante* an admeasured one.[1] In this there is just as little contained a contradiction, as it is contradictory to teach with the Apostle Paul, that *the decree of Redemption* is in God eternal, but that its *execution* first of all took place when the time was fulfilled.

In so far now as God wills the objective existence of a world, the idea of the world dwelling in His intelligence becomes the *end* which the developing of the real world strives to attain, *i.e.* strives to bring into real existence. This idea consequently is the impelling power of the development of the world, by which all its moments and stages of progress explain themselves, and to which they all stand related as to their terminus and purpose, although they may ever be at the same time in themselves, self-purpose and end. If now the Will of God is at the same time in this idea whole and undivided, then this very Will is our guarantee, that the end will be *attained*, that the reality of the world will become perfectly adequate and correspondent to the Divine idea—namely the *kingdom of God in its completion*. Hereby the view which is developed in this work distinguishes itself according to its inmost principle from the *Straussian* and many others of modern time, that it regards the *full realization of the world-idea* as on the one hand a requirement of speculation never to be relinquished, so on the other as a certain promise of religion. For as a true realization of the idea we can never regard one which in each of its moments just as much negatives the idea as it affirms it, does

[1] *Romang*, who is just as little able to discover freedom in God as in man, of course thinks otherwise on this point, comp. his *System der natürlichen Religionslehre*, p. 330: "The Will of God is always directly efficient, the Divine thinking immediately productive, as the thought becomes willed," therefore surely in an eternal manner, since *Romang* recognizes this Divine willing or thinking as eternal, just as he also, p 329, calls the creation expressly an eternal act. One can only then be surprised to know how he can immediately, p. 381, in contradiction to the above determinations, maintain that the world has nevertheless necessarily had a beginning, a moment in which it arose together with the time.

not realize as realizes it, in which the idea is said to gather itself together out of the dissevered members of its body, but only such an one, which stands in a purely affirmative, absolutely adequate relation to the idea. Certainly if one seeks the realization of the idea only in the earthly temporal This-side of being, he can arrive at no other idea of this realization than at that self-cancelling one; however it nevertheless does not appear just to make an objection to Christianity from that very moment of its doctrine by which it is decidedly preserved from being drawn into this contradiction, from its eschatology and from the importance it every where attaches to the same. This realization of the world-idea in the kingdom of God may for us lie in the most distant future and be an object of hope, which just as such we are not at all in a condition to determine according to all the moments of its contents; but for the eternal and all-embracing cognition of God it is absolutely present. Nevertheless the cognition of God with respect to the idea as immanent in His understanding and with respect to the idea as brought to reality in the real existence of another being do not at all coincide; for the idea of the world in its being objectively realized is, just in relation to itself as a Divine Thought, however little anything can thereby accrue to the absolute Being of God, assuredly a progress to Another and a Many.

But if one says that to God such a cognoscence as to Another, which is not Himself cannot be ascribed, because this is only conceivable in a finite essence,[1] it is nothing less than making the Divine Consciousness, so far as in such a case a Divine Consciousness can still be spoken of, an entirely pantheistic one,

[1] As *Strauss* does, *Dogmatick*, § 37, (vol i. p. 567) quoting the determination of *Thomas:* Deus alia a se intelligit intelligendo essentiam suam, still without concealing, that this sentence becomes qualified by other passages of his *Summa*. That *Thomas* is in this respect vacillating cannot be denied; but when *Baur, die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit etc. vol.* 2 *p.* 655 *seq.*, seeks to reduce *Thomas'* doctrine of God as later, vol. 3, p. 341 seq., also that of the old Lutheran Dogmatists to the notion of the substance, of substantial Being, the thought is purely therewith driven to such an extreme point, that it snaps asunder of itself, but it is true, that neither *Thomas* nor the old Protestant Theologians, notwithstanding their holding fast to the doctrine of the trinity, were clear as to the significance of Personality in God.

from which then, since the Divine Consciousness it is hoped will be the measure of all truth, all the rest easily follows of itself, namely, the entire banishment of theism from the kingdom of modern culture. There lies at the bottom of the above assertion that merely quantitative and extensive notion of the Infinite, which, when one has only once adopted it, becomes the sword of Alexander for cutting asunder at a stroke the Gordian knot of the problems which refer to the relation between God and the world.

This cognoscence of the world as objective to Him, although it entirely rests upon the world-creative Will of God, nevertheless *distinguishes* itself from this Will, if it be only formally. That which is here set out by the Will of God in an existence distinct from God, returns back in the cognoscence of God in an eternal manner into the consciousness of God. In so far as that which His Will makes objective to Him becomes at the same time viewed by His absolute cognoscence as objective, His cognoscence exercises not even the smallest determining influence upon its object but takes up the same into itself in this its real existence, as into a clear mirror, which reflects even the minutest trait, the smallest movement. In this respect the determination, by which one commonly denotes the truth-fulness of the cognition, namely, the perfect agreement of the mental representation with the object may be entirely applied to the Divine cognoscence. But while the perfectness of the cognition entirely depends upon its being absolutely adequate to the objects viewed, its notion is altogether wanting in the motive to an activity whereby it might make the objects to correspond to itself. Accordingly the question concerning the cognition of God as to the world objective to Him, whether it as such at the same time causes its object, we shall be obliged decidedly to negative; just in its not being causative in relation to its object, does it distinguish itself from the Divine Will.

That now which holds good of conditioned being generally, will surely also hold good of the *human will* and its decisions. But by the Divine Cognition preceding its object—whether in a temporal or eternal manner, is here a matter of indifference—by its cognizing the self-decisions of the will, without being obliged

to wait for their arising in time, there cannot possibly accrue to the same a determining power, which it does not possess as the ability of cognizing an object at all. The Will which is embraced in all its decisions by the eternal cognoscence of God, does not for all that seize its decisions, because God knows them, but God knows them, because it will seize upon them. So *Origen* has already said in a passage preserved to us by *Eusebius*:[1] *χρὴ λέγειν οὐ τὴν πρόγνωσιν αἰτίαν γινομένων,—ἀλλὰ—τὸ ἐσόμενον αἴτιον τοῦ τοιάνδε εἶναι τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ πρόγνωσιν.* In the same sense *Leibnitz* shows, that the future-being of the accidental cannot become an unconditional necessity by the infallible foreknowledge of God,[2] although we must confess that his system has not the power to ward off the breaking in of this unconditioned necessity from other sides.[3] To whom would it ever even occur, to make prophesy which cannot fail, the cause of the event, which is its object? Or was Peter obliged to deny his Lord, Judas to betray Him, because Christ, as infallible prophet, foreknew and foretold the same? In such a case indeed Peter might easily have spared himself his tears and Judas his remorse of conscience. The truth is much rather that Christ foretold both, because it stood present to His view, that Peter and Judas by their own unconstrained free Wills would thus act, the one by denying the other by betraying Him.

And it is just here, in relation to the sphere of the creaturely will, that the distinction between the Divine Cognition and volition, first of all receives *real significance*. From *nature*, strictly and for itself considered, nothing can proceed and become object of the Divine Cognition than what is posited in it by the Will of God perfectly conscious of its activity and its design, just because as mere nature there is as yet no will in it; and thus it

[1] *Praepar. evang.* lib. vi., c. 14. Similar expressions of other Church Fathers may be found in *Petavius* l. c. cap. 7.

[2] *Theodicee* part i. § 36 37; then according to these determinations of the *Wolfian* school, *e. g. Baumgarten, Glaubenslehre*, vol. i., p. 296 sq.

[3] This presents itself very clearly to view in the way in which the just named Theologian, entirely according to *Leibnitz*, explains the inner possibility of such an infallible Divine foreknowledge of free variations —from the perfect insight into the sufficient grounds from which the same proceeds, comp. l. c. p. 90. 98.

is, although even here the Divine cognoscence as such is not causative, that there is nothing in this latter which were not also in the producing volition of God. But in relation to the *self-determining of the creaturely will*, the Divine Will is not really determining, because it wills not to be so; but in this respect limits itself to be commanding, and just thereby sets the possibility of a determination of the creaturely will opposed to its command, but not that it may become realized, but on the contrary that it may become negatived. If notwithstanding it becomes realized, then there therewith arises a reality, which is foreign and in opposition to the Divine Will, but not the less on that account present to the Divine cognoscence.

But not merely is the creaturely freedom, in which the possibility of this contradiction is contained, by the Divine Will, but by virtue of the Divine cognoscence embracing all time, God from all eternity views the opposition against his Will as one absolutely overcome at the termination of the development of the world. Thus the volition and cognition in God only separate from each other and become distinct in relation to the temporal development of created personalities and the timeless self-determining of the same as the ground of this development; in principle and in result this distinctness from each other is, in an eternal manner, lost by being taken up into a higher unity.—

Limborch[1] and *Baumgarten*[2] have already directed attention to that which, in this question, as to the reconcilability of human freedom with the Divine foreknowledge, undoubtedly perplexes many. Namely the confounding, quite common in the popular use of language, of the contrasts between the *Necessary* and *the ability of also being otherwise* (Nothwendig und Auchanderssein-könnend [necessarium et contingens]), and between the *Certain* and the *Uncertain*. *Limborch* very properly finds the ground of this confusion in that to *us* with respect to the future the necessary alone is certain, and clearly and simply develops the distinction of both determinations.[3] Strictly taken the action

[1] *Theologia Christiana*, lib. ii., c. viii., § 21.

[2] *Unters. theol. Streitigkeiten*, vol. i., p. 99 sq.

[3] L. c., § 19, 20. On account of the importance of this distinction for our question I will transfer the principal passage. Distinguendum est

can very well otherwise take place, than God from eternity cognizes it, but it *will* certainly not otherwise follow, for if it should otherwise follow, God would cognize it in this other determinateness.

If now God communicates in any way to the human spirit His cognition preceding the action in a manner transcending time, it becomes quite natural that for the human spirit it should assume the form of a necessary one; not as though it regarded the nature of the becoming, the developing process of the actions, as changed by the Divine Cognoscence, but because it knows that God, by virtue of His Omniscience, cannot otherwise represent human actions than as they really are, by which it is then in its subjective judgment justified in the inference, that the actions of man cannot be otherwise than God cognizes them. Upon this are dependent the forms ἵνα πληρωθῇ, δεῖ πληρωθῆναι and others similar to them, often recurring in the New Testament, especially in the Gospels. If indeed a necessity is here said to take place, it can only be a hypothetical one, which distinguishes itself from the unconditional just in its not being at all causative, and therefore can in no way be prejudicial to the freedom of the action. *Hypothetice necessarium est contingens.*[1]—

But many will meet us with the reply, that is not at all our meaning, that the foreknowledge of God itself exercises a causative influence upon its object, and in this way makes the conduct of man necessary. Much rather the necessity of that which is infallibly foreknown by God appears to us directly to follow from this, that only just that can become foreknown with perfect certainty, which with necessity proceeds from its causes.—But

inter affectiones rei absolutas et respectivas. Absolutae sunt, quae rei in sese et in natura sua spectae tribuuntur. Tales sunt necessitas et contingentia; res enim in se et natura sua spectata vel est necessaria vel contingens, id est, ejusmodi habet essentiam, quae vel potest non existere vel non potest non existere. Respectivae vero, quae rei non tribuuntur in se et natura sua consideratae, sed cum respectu et denominatione ad alterum. Tales sunt certitudo et incertitudo, quae semper ineludunt respectum ad alterum, qui de re aliqua certus vel incertus est.

[1] Compare—concerning the way in which the *Leibnitzio-Wolfian Metaphysic* distinguished between necessitas absoluta and hypothetica and applied the same to our question, especially *Belfinger, dilucidationes philisophicae de Deo, anima humana, mundo*, § 47 sq., 52 sq., and the same, de origine et permissione mali, § 164 sq., 180 sq.

with this turn of the question we find ourselves carried back just to the very point where the notion of the Omniscience of God in its relation to the free actions of man has to defend itself against the attacks of the Socinians, and therewith prior to the beginning of this our investigation.[1] The question in this case to be considered would be the following: Is the Divine Cognition of free human actions as that of ours, one coinciding with their taking place according to time, or, strictly taken, a perception which is momentarily subsequent to the happening of the same, and just thereby one which is a constant transition from non-knowing to knowing, or is it exalted above that limit and therewith above this change? To what we have above said as to the nature of the Divine Cognoscence, we will here only add the following: Man intuitively cognizes only temporally present occurrences and events; he is only able to cognize the future, unless he knows by Divine Revelation or by means of a natural gift of divination, in any case in the highest degree seldom, by a *kind of calculation from its preceding causes.* But since an action, which in a formal sense is free, does not arise with necessity from that which precedes it as its causes, an *infallible* calculation of the same is impossible; consequently as a future action it is not at all an object of certain human cognition in the strict sense. If now one assumes, that also the Divine Cognition could only by such calculation know an event in time in so far as it were still future, then in such a case God could not certainly foreknow the free actions of man; for His foreknowledge were then the very proof that this action necessarily followed from causes preceding

[1] It is a singular misunderstanding of this sentence, when *Rothe* in his *Ethik*, vol. i., p. 119, praises the honesty with which I had renounced the claim to have refuted the grounds, which here held good. The above words refer back to what was said at the beginning of the chapter, namely, that the inadmissibility of the Socinian limitations of the Divine cognoscence must be regarded as the presupposition of this our investigation, for which reason a few remarks on the same appear to suffice. There is contained in the same "no presumptive disdainful nonconsideration" of these Theologians, for whom in their place I have no less esteem than my honoured Friend has, but directly this, that I looked upon the Socinian treatment of our question as one no longer defended in the present time. But however, since such a Theologian as *Rothe* assumes to himself its representation, I will not remain indebted in the following pages for a further account of the ground upon which it is so decidedly declined.

it, consequently for itself considered were not free. But if the Divine Cognoscence is at all recognized as an *intuitive* one, there is contained in the same the recognition that it stands just as immediately related to the individual event as to its connection with all other moments; wherewith this difficulty is removed.

And herewith we perceive what importance *for this question* the knowledge really has, that the cognoscence of God is essentially *eternal*, and one *transcendent with respect to time*—not that, of being able to remove from the same the determining influence on its objects, if as foreknowing it possessed such an one, but only that, of making conceivable the inward possibility of an all-embracing visible cognoscence.

Rothe in his *Ethik*, vol. i., p. 118, seq., does not hesitate to ascribe to the infallible *foreknowledge* of God a necessitating influence upon its objects, and makes valid therefore as ground against such a foreknowledge of all human actions, that God would thereby become the author of sin (p. 120). In order, therefore, to avoid these and other consequences, *Rothe* requires us to conceive of the foreknowledge of God, which according to him is identical with the predetermination, with the world-plan of God, as an eternal vision of the abstract formula, for the course of the development of the world, expressed in indefinite quantities, so that the concrete realization of this abstract formula is committed to the free play of the conduct of personal existences, but just for this reason also is not foreknown by God.

Against this separation of an abstract Divine Cognition from its concrete fulfilment we will not make valid that there is thereby attributed to God a very imperfect, humanly limited mode of cognoscence; for *Rothe* with the Socinians would meet us with the reply, that in this sphere the concrete does not at all belong to the, in themselves, possible objects of cognition, as precognition conceived of. But by the destruction of human freedom, especially in sin, being thereby avoided, does the cancelling of guilt also become really avoided by the same? *Rothe* recognises that the decree of Redemption in God is an eternal one, indeed that there is in God an eternal predestination of single human individuals for the Salvation found in Redemption, vol. 2, p. 254,

256, although ever as "of indefinite quantities." But in this case not only must it be undeceivably foreknown by God, that sin will at all arise—which, moreover, since sin can absolutely only be in a will, therefore in a personal essence, makes the Divine foreknowledge, according to *Rothe* = predetermination to include in itself some or other individuals as subjects of the predicate of sin, —but also this, that the human race as a whole will be the bearer of this abnormal development. It is to be regretted that *Rothe* has not been pleased to intimate how he resolves for himself the manifold contradictions which arise from different points of his own view. For in the second volume, p. 215, 219, he maintains the absolute distancing of the causality of sin from God, while here a Divine Predetermination of the human race to sin, as to a moment to be removed or cancelled in the developing process of the creature is manifestly taught, and the work becomes assigned to the Divine Government of the world, namely that of effectuating the real entering in of evil and its vanquishment (whereby this is still a stone of the greatest offence for the *Rothian* opinion, that according to [vol. 2, p. 216] "the human individual and the personal creature in general *may*, in its transition through sin, for ever remain in the same," and [comp. p. 243 seq., 325 seq., 332 seq.] in innumerable cases *really remains* therein.) Indeed this Divine fore-knowledge, that the whole of the human race has to pass through sin, absolutely includes in it this also, that there is posited in each human individual by this Divine foreknowledge = predetermination, some participation in sin. But in so far as it is thereby posited, it has not its ground in the free self-determining of man, and consequently carries with it no offence of man. If therefore *Rothe* may according to this say (p. 320): "wherefore, no one condemns himself, and least of all a Christian, that he is not altogether free from sin, that there is some degree of sin in him," he has so much the less right to continue so confidently: "but therefore do we judge ourselves, that we have relatively *so many and such great* sins, far more and of far greater magnitude than we need have." Much rather *Rothe* from his premises will not be able to avoid the adoption of the opinion, that sin is also unavoidable, in so far as it appears as an universal determinateness of human life, that the participation in sin, which on an

average is found even in the better class of men, must just rest upon that necessity laid down by the Divine plan of the world—according to that Vatkian mediation mentioned vol. i. p. 427, 429, between the universality of sin and its self-imputation in the conscience, of which it is not necessary to prove, that it just as essentially violates the moral consciousness as the fundamental truths of religion, comp. below, p. 336 seq. When *Rothe* also imputes to those better men a more humble confession, we allow all justice to the earnestness of the moral consciousness evidencing itself in the same, but to such a judgment we are not able to attribute the smallest objective significance, so long as it is not shown how the foreknowledge of God, which equals His predetermination, is able to set the abstract notion of sin without at the same time setting some realization or other of this notion.—*Rothe* leaves us too without any information as to the possibility in such a case of prophesying future events which are conditioned by freedom, *e.g.*, the perfectly definite and determinate prophecy of Christ with respect to the betrayal of *Judas* and the thrice repeated denial of *Peter*, Matt. xxvi. 23—25, 34. According to *Rothe's* tenets these free actions, as being at the time still future, were absolutely not objects of any certain cognoscence; but if they became certainly foreknown and foretold, they were no longer really free, but became thereby unfree, necessary, comp. vol. i., p. 119.

If, on the other side, we set out in the interest of preserving the idea of God in its purity, chiefly according to its metaphysical determinations, will *Rothe* really in earnest resolve to adopt the opinion of a steadily progressing growth of the Divine Cognition, conditioned by the determinations of the human will? Nay still more: if even man has some foreknowledge of the free decisions of others, only not an undeceivable one, is the Divine cognoscence herein to be more limited than the human? This it would clearly be, if the future, in *so far as it is conditioned by human freedom*, were perfectly closed against Him. If now *Rothe* will certainly not maintain this, there remains upon his standpoint nothing over, than to ascribe to God a foreknowledge of our free decisions in the imperfect form of deceivable probability, a foreboding and conjecturing of the same which is not free from deceptions!—

Rothe is of opinion that it is only possible to conceive of the foreknowledge of God as thinking in the narrower sense, and this thinking has, according to him, absolutely only the necessary for its contents, l. c., vol. i., p. 119. However he himself nevertheless recognizes in God another mode of the Divine Cognition, for which "the play of the free, creaturely causes" as such is object (l. c., p. 124), without its becoming in any way impaired in its freedom by the clearness and certainty of this cognition, which therefore will stand, in distinction from that necessary thinking, in some sort of analogy with our empirical cognition. The task will be therefore also to cognize the *pre*cognoscence of God as to the free acts of the will of man as such, *i.e.*, to cognize, that the Divine Cognoscence is exalted above the limits to which *we* with our cognoscence of that which is only empirically cognizable, are bound.—But thereby the investigation will undoubtedly continue to revolve in a circle, if that becomes made the axiomatic presupposition, the proof of which we in the very first place require from our opponents, namely, that from the certainty of a future event for the Divine Intelligence, the necessity as to the mode of its accomplishment is inseparable.

TRANSITION.

We have first of all considered sin in its *reality*, learned its *nature* in its principle and directed our attention to the *guilt* which attaches to it. In the next place we have found, after an examination of the different theories for the explanation of sin had convinced us of their insufficiency, *the ground of its possibility* in creaturely *freedom*. If we have now succeeded in showing, how this freedom as formal is necessarily with its determination to good at the same time the possibility of evil, and how it is able to be this without prejudice to the cognoscence of God as to the world, as well as to His almightily present working in the world, then, taking into account that the presence of sin is a fact in human life, is its origin explained, so far as the notion of sin is at all capable of an explanation as to its origin.

If now sin, although a deep inward disturbance and perversion where it at all exists, were nevertheless only sporadically met with in the human race, so that only a part were seized by it, while another part were free from it, then our further task were perhaps only to describe its development in the individual; which being done we might regard our exhibition of the doctrine of sin as completed. But as the case is otherwise, which will be seen, since we must much rather recognise sin as universally characterizing human life, we receive therewith a new, and not the easiest problem for our investigations. It is clear that its very kernel is the notion of the primitive sin *(peccatum originale)* attaching, according to the doctrine of our Church to all the descendants of Adam with one exception. This designation would in itself still leave open the possibility of distinct opinions respecting the origin of this primitive sin in all those, in whom it is found; however it is well

known, that, since the Church development of doctine first formed the notion of the *peccatum originale*, it has always understood it in the signification of a sin transmitted by inheritance from the first parents of the human race to their descendants, therefore as being equal to *hereditary sin*. We have now candidly to investigate how far we are able, according to the results of our previous inquiries, according to the sure facts of experience and according to the guiding teachings of the Holy Scripture, to appropriate this notion.

FOURTH BOOK.

THE DIFFUSION OF SIN.

FIRST CHAPTER.

THE UNIVERSALITY OF SIN AS FACT OF EXPERIENCE.

If Religion according to its inmost significance is an entire surrendering to God, that all variance of nature, divisions and misdevelopments of human life may resolve themselves into the one absolute direction, it is very easily understood, that an inward religious disposition of mind will not from the very outset be inclined to ascribe to man, prior to this entire surrender, of which it is conscious as of a being drawn by the Divine Grace, any other possession in the sphere of his relation to God and His Holy Will than that of *sin* and *guilt*. Where this religious inwardness is found in conjunction with a less energetic moral consciousness, there those merely negative conceptions of the natural condition of man will develope themselves as a condition of absolute *weakness, powerlessness and nothingness;* where on the contrary it is united with more earnest and deeper moral views and with a stronger susceptibility of feeling for the contrast between the principles of selfishness and Divine Love, there the natural condition of man will represent itself to it in a more positive light, as one which in all its elements is nothing but *resistance and enmity against God.*

And the understanding seems to confirm what the disposition

declares; for everything which seems at all like division between the infinite and the finite, presents a difficulty to it and involves it, if it has to determine the relation, the nature of the co-operation of the Divine Grace and the energies of the human Will in the work of renewing, in the most difficult tasks, while everything is much more simple and runs more smoothly, if the understanding is only allowed to follow out its consequence regardlessly and to consider the volition of the creature, in so far as it is not one produced by God, only a form for the realization of His Will, as entirely nothingness and sin.

And yet it cannot be denied that in this way the religious interest only goes further off from that which it here really seeks. It seeks to find a pure expression for the consciousness of the absolute value of Redemption and its inward appropriation. But this consciousness just as much contains the recognition of human *capability of Redemption (Erlosingsfahigkeit)* as of human *need of Redemption (Erlösungsbedurfniss)*. If now the consciousness of Redemption requires the equally firm maintenance of both these moments, then not merely the *Pelagianizing* representations are to be excluded, which enchance the redemptive capability of man to the cost of his redemptive need, but just as much so every approximation to *Manichaeistic* views which is betrayed into an enhancement of human redemptive need at the cost of the redemptive capability. And this equally firm maintenance will be so much the more necessary, since, as it is easy to be seen, any pre-eminence given to the one moment must tend to the prejudice and suppression of the other. For a redemptive capability without redemptive need would be a power of self-redemption, which, because it cancels altogether the state of bondage, is certainly an inner contradiction; but a redemptive need without redemptive capability were a need, for which there were no help whatever, consequently hardly a real need.—

The *Konkordienformel* adduces in its article *de peccato originis* different *Pelagian*, *Semipelagian* and *Synergistic* representations of human depravity and then in order more correctly to denote the extent of the same, continues: *Haec—dogmata—rèiiciuntur, quia verbo Domini docemur, quod corrupta natura ex se et suis viribus in rebus spiritualibus et divinis nihil boni, et ne minimum quidem, utpote ullas bonas cogitationes, habeat. Neque id modo,*

sed insuper etiam asserunt, quod natura corrupta ex se et viribus suis coram Deo nihil aliud nisi peccare possit.[1] Accordingly in its article *de libero arbitrio* it lays at the basis of its further exposition on the inability of the same for an active participation in the work of conversion, the following sentence: *Credimus, quod hominus non renati intellectus, cor et voluntas in rebus spiritualibus et divinis ex propriis naturalibus viribus prorsus nihil intelligere, credere, amplecti, cogitare, velle, inchoare, perficere, agere, operari aut cooperari possint, sed homo ad bonam prorsus corruptas et mortuus sit; ita ut in hominis natura post lapsum ante regenerationem ne scintillula quidem spiritualium virium reliqua manserit aut restet, quibus ille ex se ad gratiam Dei praeparare se aut oblatam gratiam apprehendere aut ejus gratiae (ex sese et per se) capax esse possit, aut se ad gratiam applicare aut accommodare aut viribus suis propriis aliquid ad conversionem suam vel ex tota vel ex dimidia vel ex minima parte conferre, agere, operari aut cooperari (ex se ipso tanquam ex semet ipso) possit.*[2] Further on the unregenerate individual is, on the one hand as to his state in relation to his conversion and regeneration set down on an equality with stocks and stones, on the other hand he is distinguished from these, in that by all that is in him he shows himself to be perverse to and inimical against the Divine Will.[3]

Here now the results which will follow from these determinations respecting the magnitude of the universal human depravity in favour of the doctrine of predestination, become evident. If, namely, experience teaches us, that among those to whom salvation becomes offered by the efficiency of Divine Grace some become participants of the same, others not, then this opposite result appears in no way capable of being derived from a *different* bearing *of the human will*, since this prior to its new birth is said everywhere to be deficient in the capability of laying hold of, or of attaching itself to the offered grace. Wherein consequently can this different result have its ground save in the Divine Will, which has not been pleased, in the instances where the individual persistingly despises the offered salvation, to communicate to him the gracious aid without which he cannot accept

[1] Sol. declar. art. i. p. 643. ed. Rechenb. [2] Ibid art. ii. p. 656.
[3] Ibid. p. 662, comp. 672. 673.

but only despise and reject Christ?—wherewith we had arrived at the *gratia irresistibilis* and the *decretum absolutum* of the most particular doctrine of predetermination.

But from this goal the Konkordienformel wishes at any cost to keep itself far removed; and therefore it maintains the universality of the Will of Divine Grace,[1] rejects the way of escape by that contradictory contrast between a secret and a revealed Will of God,[2] and will not allow it to be deduced from the Divine foreknowledge or predetermination that a part of the human race becomes lost, but solely from its own perverse conduct.[3] If now, according to this, the Divine Decree concerning the salvation of man is one *conditioned by the conduct of the same*, the question is: what is this condition, the non-fulfillment of which excludes a portion of mankind from the possession of salvation? To this question the Konkordienformel itself furnishes no express answer, but the old *Lutheran dogmatick* in the further development of those symbolic determinations answers: *Faith* in the Gospel of Christ *foreseen by God*. We will here pass over untouched the difficulties which accrue to this dogmatic opinion according to the inner connection of its moments, from the fact that all men are not placed in a condition to experience anything from the Gospel; but when we call to mind the deeply inward nature and vitally productive power of this faith in the sense of the evangelical doctrine, how, according to the above description of the condition of man, can there be ascribed to him the power *to bring forth this faith from himself?* From such an assumption, which goes beyond not merely the synergistic trope of doctrine, but would sanction a Pelagian principle specifically distinct from it, the *Lutheran* theology and the Konkordienformel itself are far removed; as on the one hand in the above adduced passage from the second article and also in many others it decidedly denies to the unregenerate man the *credere posse*, so on the other hand it everywhere ascribes the effectuating of all that which belongs to our conversion, consequently especially the production and preservation of faith to the efficiency of the Holy Spirit in man.[4]

[1] Ibid. p. 805. 818 sq. [2] Ibid. p. 807. [3] Ibid. p. 809. 818.

[4] Just to quote one passage from among many others—Art. ii. p. 676: Deus—fidem aliasque pietatis virtutes in nobis accendit, ita quidem ut haec omnia solius Spiritus Sancti dona sint atque operationes.

But if now accordingly God must Himself by His own efficiency bring about in man the fulfilment of the condition in the general bearing of man, to which He has attached the election to eternal life, then the non-fulfilment of the condition necessarily follows from the failing of this efficiency and of the Divine Will with respect to the same, and inversely it follows from the non-fulfilment of the condition, that it could not have been the Divine Will to render to this individual the necessary aid for the acceptance of salvation; wherewith then the *gratia universalis* and the *decretum conditionatum* resolve themselves again into the *gratia particularis* and the *decretum absolutum*. For it were not at all in the sense of the *Konkordienformel* to answer, the Holy Spirit does *not immediately* produce in the inward of man the saving faith, but by the *means of Grace of the Divine Word* as its organ, and it is dependent upon man himself, whether he will use or reject these means of Grace. Therefore the *Konkordienformel*, quite at the commencement of its article *de libero arbitrio*, points out as dangerous cliffs, which the right doctrine of the participation of human freedom in conversion has to avoid, namely, not merely the synergistic opinions, but just as much so according to the other side, the opinion of the enthusiasts, of the spiritualistic sects of that time, that God converts man by His Spirit, without any creaturely means or instrumentality, without the outward preaching and hearing of the Divine Word.

And certainly with perfect right the formula in accordance with the Augsburg[1] confession and the Smalkaldian articles[2] as well as other confessions of the Reformed Church,[3] maintains that the converting efficacy of the Holy Spirit is everywhere mediated by the Divine Word, and it were here only to be wished that the old Protestant theology had allowed more room for variety in the forms of this mediation. But does it not necessarily follow therefrom that man must be susceptible of an *attraction towards and desire for the eternal goods*, which the Divine Word offers, before his conversion and prior to the efficiency of the Divine Grace? For what else than such a desire is then to be able to induce him

[1] Art. v. xviii.

[2] P. iii., Art. viii.

[3] *E.g. Conf. Helvet* ii., art. xiv. (*Coll. Conff. ed. Niemeyer*, p. 491.) art. xvi. (l. c. p. 496) *Conf. Belg.* art. xxiv. l. c. p. 375.

to give heed to the Divine Word? And under this presupposition, it is also easy to see, how that all those to whom the Divine Word is offered are only capable of losing the salvation therein proclaimed by their own guilt, namely by their suppression of that Divine drawing. But it is no less clear, that then the above determinations of the *Konkordienformel* on the extent of human depravity and on the destruction of human freedom by the same, must suffer themselves to be reduced and qualified in the sense and spirit of the *Melanthonian* Synergism, which they reject.[1]

However, the acuteness of the *Konfordienformel* has also against this deduction, and everything which will further follow from it, furnished the necessary provisions. So much then is said to remain fixed, that man has by original sin entirely suffered the loss of freedom in spiritual things, in that sphere of life which has to do with his relation to God. On the other hand there remains to fallen man *a freedom in outward and natural things*, by virtue of which he is not in a condition to contribute anything to the direct attainment of true spiritual righteousness, but may very well attend to the acquirement of a just manner of life (*externa honesta vita*—by the Apology termed *iustitia rationis*—elsewhere *iustitia civilis.*)[2] But certainly according to the dogmatic notion of the *Konkordienformel* an inward desire for the Divine Word cannot induce the natural man to occupy himself in the reading of the same or lead him to attend its ministry, since indeed he is said to have in his heart only aversion and enmity towards the Divine.

[1] Of course without its requiring to appropriate the formula of the *tres causae conversionis* or the designation of the human participation by συνεργεῖν; for both certainly express the relation of the Divine and the human in this process in a distorted manner. It is only just the susceptibility for Redemption which manifests itself in that desire, but this susceptibility is neither a cause of conversion, nor in the strict sense a co-operating with the Divine efficiency.

[2] Art. i. p. 640, ii. p. 663. The older Dogmatists of our Church distinguish in the sphere of the free Will according to the completeness of its notion a *hemisphaerium superius* and a *hemisphaerium inferius.* They teach that the free Will has suffered the loss of the first in the natural man, but that on the contrary in the latter, in which that *iustitia civilis* falls together with other things in connection with the same, he still possesses *aliquo modo* his freedom, *e.g. Quenstedt, syst. theol.* P. ii. c. iii., sect. i. p. 7 seq.

Word.[1] Every inclination to the contents of the Divine Word, even the smallest, can much rather only be an effect of the Holy Spirit by the Word. But it is still in the power of the unregenerate man to decide, whether or not he will allow himself to be induced to listen or to read the Word of God, by impulses which fall within the sphere of that striving after *external reputation* or in that of his *natural thirst for knowledge*.[2]

Accordingly therefore the point, on which the conditionateness of the Divine Decree rests with all its weight, in which the decisions crowd together respecting eternal salvation or destruction—were the use or non-use of the means of Grace, arising not from a distinction between being inclined and disinclined to Divine Things prior to the same, but from motives, which, according to the strict requirement of the dogma itself, may have absolutely *no internal* relation to the offered good. But just because according to this, this internal relation is wanting that point is not at all able to bear such a burden. That the efficiency of the Divine Grace is conditioned by an inward resistance or yieldance of man and therewith concedes to this opposite treatment in relation to the same a deciding significance, is very well reconcilable with the earnestness of the universal will of Divine Grace, which the *Lutheran* theology zealously and very properly maintained against Particularism; on the contrary it is contradictory to this earnest will of Grace, that

[1] Art. ii., p. 660, 661.

[2] Art. ii., p. 671 and elsewhere. The *Konkordienformel* certainly nowhere determines the nature of these impulses; nevertheless what was above remarked is manifestly contained in the connection of its tenets. At any rate it is not at all in the sense of the *Konkordienformel* to attribute to the hearing or reading of the Divine Word such motives as *Strauss* does, *Dogmatik* vol. 2, p. 446. More exact determinations in the above sense are found in *Aegid Hunnius, providentia Dei et aeterna praedestinatione*, p. 235, 243, and according to his precedence in the Dogmatists of the seventeenth century. Thus *Quenstedt* ascribes to the natural man the ability of externally holy actions, of the *actiones paedagogicae, e.g.* of going to Church, of hearing the word of God, of conversing with others about the same, of reading the Holy Scripture. But he immediately —according to *Hülsemann*—limits the sentence by the following, that if there be added to the general desire to know Divine Things a desire for eternal salvation or a desire, arising from reverence for God, to forsake the habit of sinning, it does not belong to nature but to the *gratia praeveniens*. c. sect. i. th. 6.

such a deciding importance is to be ascribed to a human procedure which is stripped of every religo-moral dignity. Man remains even in his fallen condition a spiritual creature, and if he is to become a participant of the efficiency of the Divine Spirit, this cannot take place mechanically by a mere suffering, passive bearing, but only in the manner of a spiritually vital reception of the same, which directly includes in it an active state of being. If this spiritual susceptibility, the active capability of Redemption, is said to be destroyed by sin, where in such a case were a bond of connection to be found between the old and the new man, a guarantee of the identity of the subject in both conditions, which the notion of Redemption requires in distinction from the notion of Creation in the strict sense of the word? In order to exclude the *Flacian* representations with their *Manichaeistic* consequences, it is by no means sufficient to maintain with the *Konkordienformel*,[1] that in the unregenerate and regenerate man, as in man before and after the fall, the nature is the same in the metaphysical sense, that the rich sources of their manifold energies and gifts have not ceased to flow even in the condition which has arisen by sin; but for this purpose the identity of man *as moral essence* before and after Redemption must be preserved, what that ability to an *externa honesta vita* does not yet furnish.[2]

[1] Art. i. *de pecc. orig.* p. 643, seq.

[2] The formula appears in one passage decidedly to go beyond this simple negativing of all *vires spirituales* with respect to the natural condition of man, art. ii., p. 657: Etsi humana ratio seu naturalis intellectus hominis obscuram aliquam notitiae illius scintillulam reliquam habet, quod sit Deus, et particulam aliquam legis tenet: tamen etc. But if this recognition exercises an influence upon the connection of its doctrine of the natural state and of Redemption, it is only this, that the gleam of this knowledge first of all makes that outward (historical) understanding of the contents of the Divine Word at all possible to man. Then from these determinations the strange trope of doctrine is developed by the orthodox dogmatists, that the Divine Likeness—according to the conception of the notion—had been completely lost in the depraved nature, but that nevertheless a few fragmentary vestiges of the same had remained over (divinae imaginis amissio et quidem totalis, remanentibus saltem quibusdam sive ruderibus sive vestigiis, says *Quenstedt* l. c. c. ii. sect. i. pt. 25), which condition the ability of man for those *actiones paedagogicae*. The Augsburg Confession merely denies in its 18th Art., that the free-will has the power without the Holy Spirit to bring forth spiritual righteousness; indeed in the immediately following words one

Indeed in order only to make intelligible how any one is able to resolve upon the outward use of the means of Grace, without which the Holy Spirit does not begin His inward work, there must be adopted an inward point of attachment for the renovation of the natural man. For if he is only inwardly able to resist the contents of the Gospel,[1] and if the impulses to the hearing of the same only come from that outward and lower sphere of life, in which he has still a certain freedom, although only a very enfeebled one,[2] how should these weak impulses help being overpowered and suppressed by that much stronger resistance?

As now, on the other hand, according to the testimony of experience we do not see all those who do not deprive themselves of the use of the Divine Word, of the reading of the Scripture, and of attendance on the ministry of the Word of God, attain a true and living faith, the acknowledgment cannot be avoided, if one here too would cut off access to the most particular doctrine of predestination, that the real entrance of the efficacious Divine Grace into the soul of man is also attached to an *inward condition.* The interest of the dogmatick system, having once excluded the synergistic view as a turning aside towards the Pelagian side, appeared to be content, when it had succeeded in conceiving of this inward condition in an absolutely *negative* manner.

Certainly the *Konkordienformel* does not contain on this problem any definite and in itself harmonious fixation of opinion, but the dogmatists of the seventeenth century are the first to enter upon its consideration with greater exactnesss. *Gerhard* for this purpose distinguishes between a *nolle privativum* and a *nolle positivum*, or even between a *malitia originalis* and an *actualis pertinacia.*[3] But *Quenstedt* treats this point, after the precedence of other dogmatists, with greater precision.[4] Every-

might find a favouring of the semi-pelagian representation—in the limiting *aut certe peragere* of the passage communicated from (Pseudo-) *Augustinus*—if the confession may be made responsible for every indvidual word of a citation apart from the intention of the quotation.

[1] Art. ii., p. 660, 661, 672.

[2] Art. i. p. 640.

[3] *Loci theol. loc. de lib. arbitr.* § 81. *loc. de elect. et reprob.* § 139.

[4] *Syst. theol.* P. ii., cap. vii., sect. 1, pt. 25, seq. Comp. *Baier, comp. theol. posit.* P. iii. c. iv. § 38, 39.

thing here depends upon the distinction between the *natural* aversion, *i.e.* the aversion springing of itself out of the depraved human nature, and the *obstinate, intentionally cherished* resistance against the Divine Word. The first kind of resistance sets itself everywhere against the Divine Word, and can only be overcome by the efficiency of the Holy Spirit—as *gratia praeparans.* The second kind of resistance the Holy Spirit does not overcome, because His operation is not an irresistible one; the overcoming of this is a matter for the individual subject, and the ability for the same is contained in his natural powers. By the aid of this distinction it became possible to reconcile the apparent self-contradictory teaching in the *Konkordienformel,* namely, on the one hand its teaching, that man resists the Word and Will of God until God awakens, enlightens, and renews him from the death of sin,[1] on the other hand its declining the maintenance that the Holy Spirit becomes given to those resisting Him.[2]

Thus then the condition on the side of man to which his conversion is attached, were merely this negative one of refraining from this wilful and obstinate resistance against the grace presenting itself to him, which gives us the notion of an absolutely passive capacity of being redeemed *(capacitas passiva.)* But is this condition really *so entirely negative,* as at the first sight it appears? If the human heart prior to, and apart from, the effects of redemption in it has absolutely no other relation to the contents of the Divine Word than that of aversion and resistance, this resistance must surely, when and so often as the Divine Word comes in contact with it, assert itself and thus of itself and everywhere—for what is there in the human heart which would hinder the same?—enhance itself to that higher degree, to that obstinate and malicious resistance. It avails then nothing to say that that natural resistance becomes surmounted by the efficiency of the Holy Ghost; for if it begins its conflict against the same—which indeed can only take place in so far as the Word has been already offered to the individual—it no longer finds merely this natural resistance purely for itself, but as enhancing and deepening itself to obstinate wilful resistance. The result, therefore

[1] *Sol declar.* art. ii., p. 673.

[2] L. c. p. 679.

were that no one would partake of salvation. If now this is contradictory to all experience and all presuppositions, the question is, how this enhancement of the natural resistance, which, in itself considered, is overcome by the influence of the Holy Spirit, to that of obstinate, wilful resistance, which the Holy Spirit does not overcome, is to be prevented? We cannot escape this difficulty by saying that the efficiency of the Holy Spirit itself hinders this enhancement in a part of those who hear the Word; for the task here is first of all to fix that general bearing of man, by which the first entrance of this efficiency into his heart is conditioned. Or if the matter is so meant, that the fulfilment of this condition is itself said to be strictly the work of the Divine Spirit, then we are directly led back again to the opinion of an unconditioned predetermination, and indeed, in the opposite results of the presentation of Grace, to that horrible theory of the double Will of God. But to appeal to outward circumstances and Providences by which many men are prepared for the efficiency of the Holy Spirit, and that in this way the development of that natural resistance to wilful resistance becomes hindered, is only of avail, as is of itself clear, when one presupposes some *inward susceptibility* of the human heart for the saving intention of these outward Providences.

And it is just the recognition of a susceptibility of the human heart still present in the natural condition *for the operations of the Divine Grace*, of a susceptibility whose notion certainly contains more than that *capacitas mere passiva*, to which the *Lutheran Dogmatick* is driven with greater force by its own consistency in so far as it wishes to ward off from itself unconditioned predestination and the *Flacian* exaggeration. But then this necessarily leads back again to a limitation of the above determinations on the extent of natural depravity. For that susceptibility presupposes together with those resisting tendencies the presence of an element disposed towards the contents of the Divine Word, which therefore the general dominion of sin must have still left remaining. If it is possible for that enhancement of the natural to wilful resistance to be avoided, there must be something in the natural condition of man which altogether reacts against that resistance. From this it further follows, that moral freedom, the ability of obeying or of disregarding the higher drawings in our

nature, upon which that element of inclination to the Divine Word rests, although hemmed in and thrust into difficult complications, can nevertheless not be destroyed.[1]

And what meaning could the adoption of such a destruction of freedom have other than that the conscience and Divine consciousness had either been entirely effaced in the natural man, or indeed absolutely deprived of all practical efficiency, so that they were now only present as the shadowy form of an absolutely theoretic consciousness of God, of the good without any inward impulse whatever to corresponding action? Shall we in earnest maintain, that the matter really is thus? How then are we to understand innumerable facts from the sphere of life uninfluenced by redemption?—The unmeasured judgment of the Reformers (even of *Melanchthon* at an earlier period) on the degree, in which the moral capacity of the unregenerate is disturbed by sin, is for the most part explained by a confusion, which was all the more difficult for them to avoid, since the entire method of consideration of their great teacher *Augustinus* is involved in the same. They supposed that, because apart from its connection with the redemption in Christ the true principle of the moral life, the humble self-denying *love to God* is nowhere to be met with, the noble moral elements which we meet with in those other spheres of life must ultimately be derived from *selfish motives*. They thereby overlooked, that, where love to God has not yet entered into the consciousness as the highest principle of the moral life, the *law*

1 This result and its establishment form the reverse side to that proof adduced by *Schleiermacher* in his treatise on Election, p. 10 seq., that the Lutheran dogma, if it would hold consistently its anti-synergistic determinations, must adopt the doctrine of unconditioned predetermination. *Schleiemacher*, it is true, goes still further; he is with *Calvin* convinced that the non-recognition of this predestination would by consistent procedure necessarily lead to Pelagianism. In order, however, to make ourselves understood, how the Church contrasts in *Schleiermacher's* sense have really arisen, we may call to mind, that he accedes to the Calvinistic dogma only under the condition of its correctur by the ἀποκατάστασις πάντων—still manifestly in order to avoid the deviation towards the opposite side, namely the *Manichæan* side.—Moreover, with the above explication may be compared the masterly treatise of *Nitzch* on hereditary sin in his *protestantische Beantwortung der Möhlerschen Symbolik*. (*Theol. Stud. u. Krit.* 1834, No. 2, p. 249 seq.

in the conscience and the impulses of moral feeling corresponding to its different moments, the *συνήδεσθαι τῷ νόμῳ κατὰ τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον*, are able to exert a determining influence. That in such a case obedience to the law is as such never really a dominant principle, must be most fully admitted; but we may just as little deny the experience on the other hand, that man apart from his participating in redemption allows himself in individual instances to be determined by the consciousness of his duty and of its unconditional command with respect to actions in contradiction to the requirements of his selfish passions. This is the *ἐργάζεσθαι τὸ ἀγαθὸν* or *δικαιοσύνην*, the *φύσει τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιεῖν*, the *φυλάσσειν τὰ δικαιώματα τοῦ νόμου* which Peter and Paul expressly attribute to the heathen.[1] The notion of *iustitia civilis*, as formed by the Reformers in order thereby to embrace those elements, is by no means sufficient for this purpose.[2] We will offer no resistance if the free course of our investigation should lead us to the recognition, that the original judgment of Protestantism as to the moral-religious value of Heathenism and of the natural life in general is in its ultimate ground and consequently in its last result, conformable with the truth. But to defend the particular determinations, by which the Reformers upon their standpoint arrive at this judgment, no one will undertake in the present day, who has not wilfully shut his eyes to the more comprehensive investigation and more thorough moral estimation of Heathenism by modern science.

Nevertheless it is just modern science, truly not in the historical sphere which we just now had in view, but in the sphere of

[1] Acts x. 35; Rom. ii. 10, xiv. 26.—To this sphere also belongs that example employed by Christ Himself of the compassionate Samaritan, Luke x.

[2] With which *Harless* seems to be agreed, *christliche Ethik*, p. 54, 55. On the other hand *Sartorius* appears to think otherwise, *Die Lehre von der heiligen Liebe*, p. 143.—The question here is of course not so to be laid down: whether this notion suffices, in so far as it embraces all the elements of life, which are to be met with there, where the *iustitia spiritualis* is not; but in this way: whether it, as the Reformers positively determine its contents, is adapted to embrace all these elements. The designation by *iustitia rationis* is certainly favourable to a more satisfactory development of the notion; but the old Protestant interpretation of the *iustitia rationis* lowers the same down to the mere *iustitia civilis*.

philosophy and theology, which has not seldom adopted these dogmatic determinations, according to which, man in his natural condition does not possess even a trace of freedom, in respect to his relation to God and His Holy Will, and therefore also no positive susceptibility for the influence of Divine Grace, as genuinely speculative, and on the contrary has found the synergistic opinion and every approximation to the same very unphilosophical.

Certainly a very unexpected help for the rigid judgment of our Reformers and the symbolic books with respect to this natural condition and the real contents of all virtue and cognition of heathenism! However it would be more than precipitous, if the friends of this judgment should begin to rejoice over such alliances. For is the subscription to this judgment by those philosophical opponents of Synergism and its remains of moral spontaneity of the will, really a matter of earnest? This least of all; for its strong negativing opinions, in which they appear perfectly to agree with the old Protestant orthodoxy, when more closely considered are not at all directed against the real condition of the human race apart from Redemption, but against the abstract naturalness of man. But this is to them by no means the complete expression for that condition, but only just an abstraction. For partly by the aid of the old Church representation of the λόγος σπερματικός, partly by an extension of the notion of the *preparative Divine Grace* they are able with respect to the condition of the human race and of the individual, which those theologians understood by the natural condition, to boast of so much that is good, noble and Divine, that they destroy the contrast between nature and Grace, in the very moment in which they appear to conceive of it in the strictest qualitative sense. But this treatment of the notions furnishes the advantage, that one can maintain with the most exact Protestant orthodoxy against catholic, synergistic, and other heterodoxies, the absolute helplessness and rejectableness of the natural condition, derive every genuine religious excitation in the sphere of heathenism from the efficacy of Grace, nay more of the same vindicate, going beyond that orthodoxy, also the *iustitia civilis* as the Reformers determined its notion, and nevertheless for all this stand upon a speculative height from which the contrast between nature and Grace sinks down to the distinction of necessary developing moments of the human essence.

If however nothing further is said to be maintained than this, that absolutely nothing good is able to arise from the abstract naturalness of man, consequently from the naturalness of man alienated from God and His Will, or that the flesh and what proceeds from it cannot be at the same time an endeavour of the natural man to escape from his sinful condition,[1] it becomes so much a matter which is self-evident, that even the most decided Pelagianism may admit it, without sacrificing itself even in the smallest degree.—According to the theological treatment of this question in the sixteenth century in all its different forms, the Catholic and Lutheran with its different schools, the Calvinistic and Socinian, its affirmative and negative maintenances entirely relate to *real temporally separative conditions*, to the condition of man without or in participation of Redemption, apart from or in attachment to the historical Christ, but not to moments or sides of the human essence conceived of in abstract isolation. The real problem therefore comes before us in the question, whether man in the natural condition is absolutely flesh, or whether along with the principle of the flesh still another principle belongs to him, which, although oppressed by sin in the natural condition, is nevertheless not entirely suppressed. If one will consider this principle as *σπέρμα τοῦ λόγου*, nothing essential becomes thereby altered in relation to the controverted point under consideration, so far only as the thought on the one hand is not interpreted in the pantheistic sense of an identity of essence between God and man, and on the other side it is firmly maintained, that this *σπέρμα* itself belongs to the original nature of man, and that it has formed, since the fall of man from God has not been able entirely to destroy the moral nature of the same, the limit for the destroying violence of sin and the point of attachment for human restoration. But as to the expediency of considering those moments of the unredeemed life, which condition the susceptibility of the same for Redemption as an *effect of preparative Grace*, it is well known, that Pelagianism occasionally comprehended under the notion of Grace even the law, the reason by which we surpass the merely sentient essences, the free will as the possibility of not

[1] What *e.g.* Baur, *Gegensatz des Katholicismus und Protestantismus*, p. 197 *(zweite Ausg.)*, has found necessary to defend against *Nitzsch.*

sinning belonging to our nature and even our createdness of being out of nothing,[1] still scarcely with a view of so much the more glorifying the Divine Grace as much rather in order entirely to wipe out the distinction between nature and Grace and therewith to predict its own future completion by pantheism. The Biblical notion of Grace is a much more determinate one; that which belongs to the original constituting of human nature, is, although free Divine Gift, nevertheless not *Grace*, wherefore the old Protestant theology would not allow the validity of the Catholic conception of primitive Righteousness as of a gift of Grace; the Divine volition and influence, which the Scripture designates as Grace, always presupposes a service incumbent upon man in himself as being deficient; it is essentially a something *additionally added* to that which is still able to spring from human nature and its powers in its sinfully conditioned state. We will by no means deny, that a wider sphere may be maintained on the behalf of preparatory Grace in the connection of Christian Doctrine than is allowed it by our older theology; but if the notion of Grace becomes extended beyond the bounds just denoted, it is thereby dis-severed, in its peculiar significance destroyed. In the Babylonian confusion of language of our time the sentence: *Everything is Grace*, has from the lips of many only the sense of: *Nothing is Grace.*—

If it may be said of the *Konkordienformel* in general, that it is too much of a dogmatic treatise—and as such certainly a masterpiece of thoroughly substantial and discretional development of doctrine—in order not to be manifoldly disturbing as a confessonal work of the Church, the same may be equally said of its treatment of our subject. In overstepping the bounds of the determinable in an ecclesiastical confession, which the other symbolical books of the *Lutheran* and Reformed sides have here generally well observed, it has made the individually tinged expression of a Christian fundamental conviction the norm of dogmatic orthodoxy. If its determinations: *hominis naturam et personam—peccato originali—prorsus et totaliter—totam esse coram Deo infectam, venenatam et penitus corruptam*,[2] so that it *ex se et viribus suis coram Deo*

[1] Comp. *Augustinus de gestis Pelagii*, c. 22. *Op. imperf.* c. *Jul.* l. i. c. 95.

[2] Art. i. p. 639.

nihil aliud nisi peccare possit,[1] do not become taken according to the manner of the ascetic or oratorical use of language, but in the rigid *dogmatic* sense,[2] then there therewith is decidedly denied to the natural condition of man every element of really moral significance.

We have already (vol. i. p. 224) directed our attention to the fact, that in general there are even for the determined villain still deeds of crime at which, if only for a passing moment, he shudderingly turns away, when the temptation to the same presents itself to him. This is an unambiguous testimony, that even such an one is still capable of *aggravating his state of moral villainousness*. But where aggravation is still possible, there must also exist a remnant of some power of good to be overcome, however deeply buried under the ashes of an unbridled life of crime the sparks of the same may be smouldering.[3] Neither shall we be able altogether to deny the deeply debased man in general the ability of delaying or of hastening the progress of his debasedness. The will as the governing middle-point of the inner-life does not even in abandoned obdurate debasedness of life become entirely lost in its own complicate entanglement with sin, but there ever remains, so far as we are acquainted with human conditions, and in so far as the human, has not yet passed over into diabolical evil, down in the very deep of the soul an unvanquished remnant of moral, self-determining power, an ability, if ever so limited, of self-decision between the moral requirement and the impulses of wicked lust. And if this must be admitted in the most degenerate phenomena of the natural condition, how much more shall we be required to do so with respect to its better forms! Human nature has been created by God so noble that it is not easily possible, even in its aggravated and deeply fallen state

1 L.c. p. 643.

2 It is on account of this distinction not unhazardous when a dogmatic treatise supports its tenets upon the expression of a Church-hymn, as the *Konkordienformel* in the passage just quoted appeals to the hymn: Durch Adam's Fall is ganz verderbt menschlich Natur und Wesen (By Adam's fall is quite corrupt the inmost deep of man.)

3 Quamdiu natura corrumpitur, inest ei bonum, quo privetur, says *Augustinus im Enchiridion* c. xii., certainly in a somewhat different sense from the above, since he also here mixes up the metaphysical and ethical notion of good.

entirely to destroy the traces of its origin which exhibit themselves in the power of the good.—That Rom. vii. 14—25 does not, as our older theologians, ensnared by their dogma, almost unanimously supposed,[1] describe the condition of the regenerate, but that of the *unregenerate*, who have nothing higher than the law, cannot be a matter of doubt after a careful examination of the remoter connection, in which this section stands. Now the exhibition of this condition, regarded in itself, undoubtedly furnishes us with an entirely negative result; there is no moral power in the same, which is able to free the Ego sold to the power of sin, but it remains captive under the law of sin, which governs his phenomenal life. But this deep self-variance and conflict, this *συνήδεσθαι τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ κατὰ τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον*, this *θέλειν ποιεῖν τὸ καλὸν*, which is constantly prevented in its realization by the predominant principle of the flesh—all this is surely not the behaviour of a stone in relation to the Will and Law of God. Such an abstract consideration of the natural condition necessarily conducts to a certain unproductiveness in the conception of its particular determinations; it is deficient of everything capable of explaining the manifold moral distinctions, motions, and alterations of the same. The expression for the natural condition of man in which *Neander*[2] sums up the Pauline exhibition of this condition, is undoubtedly in greater conformity with Scripture and experience—"two

[1] Comp. *Chemnitz, Examen conc. trid.* P. i. p. 219 seq. *Hutter, Loci comm.* p. 337 seq. *Gerhard, Loci theol.—loc. de imagine Dei* § 127. *de pecc. actual.* § 42. *Quenstedt, Syst. theol.* P. ii. c. ii. sect. 2, qu. 9. ἐκδικ. *Baier, Comp. th. pos.* P. iii., c. vi., § 4. Comp. on the history of the interpretation of this section *Tholuck's* Commentary p. 353 seq.

[2] *Pflanzung der Kirche durch die Apposteln* p. 680. Compare the remarks of *Nitzsch* in his *System der christlichen Lehre* at § 114 (4th ed.).—Essentially the same result is furnished in the first half of the *Steudelian* article *über Sünde und Gnade* (*Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie*, 1832, part 1, p. 125 sq.), although we miss here a more exact designation of the limits which are set to all moral renderings of the natural man.—Moreover it is therewith a matter of course that the mechanical divisions between the power of the good and evil in the natural condition, as well as between the work of Grace and human freedom in convertion—just as *Sartorius* l. c. p. 183 sq. makes them a matter of objection against semi-pelagianism and Synergism, and in relation to the first certainly not without reason—are to be kept out of the question of this relation as completely inadequate.

mutually conflicting principles, the principle of the Divine offspring, the God-alliance in the endowment of the God- and of the therein grounded moral self-consciousness, the re-action of the religio-moral original nature of man and the principle of sin, Spirit[1] and Flesh—so however that the former principle is impeded in its development and efficiency and therefore held captive. Man in his natural condition, without the peace of Reconciliation, is, just because this peace is the truth of his very life, not an essence which is compact, restful in itself, but one which is *in itself disunited, disquiet, and full of contradictions*, which, just because it can never cease to seek for peace and inward quiet, is restlessly driven about hither and thither. Peculiarities of temperament, youthful consciouslessness, extraordinarily propitious outward circumstances, an uncommon degree of obtuseness of spirit may hide the inward variance, but it everywhere lies buried in the deep, waiting the occasion of its outburst; and in innumerable men it co-determiningly exercises its influence upon all the conditions of their existence, and impresses itself in decidedly marked lines of the countenance as expression of insecurity, discomfort, of care and anxiety. The highest activity therefore of the still existent power of the good in the human, natural condition, is not to determine to produce from itself an activity corresponding to the Divine requirement—for that it is by no means able to do,—but to drive man to the humble and self-surrendering attachment to the salvation of Jesus; and that which in itself is excellent, becomes in the reality the very worst perversion when it self-sufficiently and perversely sets itself up over against the offered Salvation.

Nitzsch in his treatise against *Möhler* on original sin directs attention to the *moral distinctive value*, which subsists between individuals even apart from their participation in redemption.[2] Experience everywhere attests to us this distinction, and the Holy Scripture so decidedly confirms it, that its recognition deeply pervades the entire Old and New Testament. Indeed this distinction appears to be so great, that it may make us

[1] Comp. on the term which Paul chooses for this moment of the contrast in relation to the natural man (vol. i. p. 357.)

[2] L. c. p. 257, seq.

doubtful, whether we are indeed justified in classifying this manifold variety both in kind and degree of the moral life under one and the same negativing judgment in relation to its inmost principle.[1] There is not merely a contrast between the life which is and that which is not in the participation of redemption, but within the latter sphere of life we find again standing over against each other noble natures, predominantly directed to the Spiritual, to whom therefore it is easier to curb their sensationalism, and common natures, devoted to the Material, sometimes in the form of wild libertinism and sometimes in the form of slothful abandonment to the slavery of sensualism, men of well intentioned, mild, appeasable disposition of mind possessed of lively sensibility for truth and rectitude, and hard hearted men of hating disposition, to whom, over against their own interests, truth and rectitude have become matters of indifference. Although it may ever be capable of proof, that the second class is by far the more numerous, the fact, that there is still in this sphere a selection of more noble and upright men, loses thereby none of its importance for our question.

We are only too glad to avail ourselves of the turn which is given to our consideration by this distinction irrefutable in its truthfulness, in order thereby to free ourselves from a burdensome obligation—the proving of sin in those spheres, in which every one apart from any proof recognizes its presence. But as to the better and more noble of mankind the immediate question is only, whether also in their life *sin is in any way present.* The question here is still purely directed to the mere fact of actual sin, and the answer can only be given us by *experience.* But he who has devoted any attention to this side of human experience, will, although according to the nature of the case a rigid inductive proof cannot be given, nevertheless consider it as

[1] In this sense for example *David Schultz* employs this distinction in the appendix to his *Christian Doctrine of Faith*, p. 235, seq, while he supports it in the "doctrine of original sin judged of in the light of Scripture," by a series of declarations and examples derived especially from the Old Testament. Similarly *Bretschneider, die Grundlage des evangelischen Pietismus*, p. 49 seq. Moreover that our old Theologians in their explication of the doctrine of original sin have by no means overlooked this distinction, one may easily convince himself *e.g.* from the work of *Hunnius de providentia Dei*, p. 239, as well as from *Gerhard* and *Quenstedt.*

an indubitable fact, that every human life, which has passed beyond the earliest period of childlike consciousness, is also one which is stained with real sin. To maintain the opposite must ever be regarded as a testimony of inexperience and unacquaintance with life, which one excuses in the youthful enthusiasm for honoured individuals, but not in the maturer consciousness.

Even those theories, which by their attenuations destroy the true significance of sin, must nevertheless in their own way admit its universal presence in human life. We have already abundantly convinced ourselves with respect to *pantheistic* modes of thinking, that they are ultimately necessitated, upon their speculative stand-points, to deny sin as such. But thereby they by no means deny, that, what the moral consciousness must reject as sin, is found in every human life. Indeed as pantheism possesses the means to a richer and grander view of the world than theological rationalism is able to furnish and as, just by virtue of this wealth, it more easily takes a demoniacal direction than theological rationalism does, it also knows how to conceive of evil in the energy of its contrast against the good, and how to express the same much more energetically, than the latter opinion. And just because it fancies it has found the magic formula, in order to incorporate evil in its very extremities as a necessary element of its world, it has no longer any interest in indulging in fairy, rosy-tinted illusions, by which theological rationalism so readily conceals the real form of human life.

Nevertheless even this *deistico-pelagian* view, which forms the fundamental basis of our theological rationalism in the narrower sense, cannot help conceding to us the truth of our maintenance. It commonly, in the question as to the universal existence of sin, attributes great importance to the distinction between enormous violations of duty and crimes, and bad vices and degeneracies on the one hand, and the manifold impurities and in their object insignificant sins of weakness on the other hand, which, they themselves know not how, are mixed up in the disposition and conduct of man. For the former it has in general a lively feeling of detestation and horror; it will not at all tolerate that one looks upon them as the results of a natural weakness or

corruption of the human race, which under certain circumstances are unavoidable; it maintains the full freedom of every individual to refrain from the same, and considers them in reality as only exceptions to the general rule of conduct. Of the errors and defects of the other kind it is quite ready to acknowledge that no human life is free from them; but so far as it acknowledges this, they are only to be looked upon as just unavoidable consequences resulting from the finiteness and limitedness of man, for which therefore it is impossible that a moral reproach can earnestly apply to him.[1]

But if this were the significance of that distinction, what would follow from the same? Manifestly this, that only that could stand in conflict with the moral ideal and its requirement, which, strictly speaking, lay on the other side of that boundary, consequently that just so much must be omitted from the requirement of the moral law, as transcends this virtue, which cannot hide from itself the strong admixture of weakness and infirmity. But who, we ask, to whom moral truth is really moral truth could bring himself to that? It is also sufficiently evident, how that in this explanation of a distinction not groundless in itself, just that very thing is presupposed which was to be proved. That sin, so far as it falls on this side of that boundary, is alas! something entirely *common* in human life, so that it no longer surprises any one to meet with it either in himself or in others, is just the very *evil fact*, which is to be investigated in its deepest grounds, of course without sacrificing its nature, consequently the notion of sin. But if this notion is to be maintained, it must then stand immovably fixed that it is absolutely blamable to stir even only a finger against the Will of God. Instead now of holding itself to this, that view immediately deduces from the universality of a class of sins the derivation of the same from the essence of man, and therewith negatives in this class of sins the notion of sin, which it only knows how to affix to those vices going beyond the common rule of life, in that according to its notion these alone really spring from voluntary offence. Is there anything more purely relative than this rule of judgment? Certainly we are

[1] In this form and application of the distinction in question it essentially coincides with a *Valkian* mode of thought, which is otherwise foreign to him, comp. vol. i. of this work, p. 427 sq.

only surprised by those transgressions as being detestable, which considerably go beyond the share which we think ourselves to have in moral errors and infirmities; but if a pure spirit came down among us, he would undoubtedly find in the highest degree rejectable the great amount of untruthfulness and petty selfishness, of intolerance and self-exaltation, of uncharitableness and inertness to good, which is to be met with in the lives of even those better and more noble natures. The universal weakness and infirmity of the human race is just its infidelity towards that, which it ought to regard as the absolutely Holy. And he who acknowledges the universality of weaknesses and deficiencies, acknowledges that no human life can declare itself free from contamination with real *sin*, with sin condemnable before God.

Still nearer viewed this fact so forms itself, that, even among those better, more noble natures, inasmuch as they are certainly at the same time the more honest, according to all the testimony of experience there is hardly one to be found, who would venture upon the earnest assurance never to have sinned, at least *in determinate conflict with his conscience.* "I go down into my heart," says a noble theologian, whose religious convictions otherwise incline with decided predominance to Pelagianism,[1] "and penitently recognize that I have to accuse myself before God of all the above indicated kinds of offences"—and he only sought to indicate known offences. "He who does not recognize himself as similarly guilty, let him too descend into his heart."

Indeed we must go still a step further, and maintain, that just in the life of those better natures, sins, which are not committed without a heavier or more definite warning of the conscience, are in general oftener to be met with than in the life of others. The wild horde, which allow themselves to be entirely governed by their untamed selfishness, only seldom rise so high as to sin against their conscience, because their conscience still *slumbers* in relation to the corruptness of their common impulses; their sinning bears in general the impression of rudeness and licentiousness. With the awakening up of a moral endeavour the moral cognition and judgment become quickened and sensitive without

[1] *Töllner* in his treatise on the dividing of sins into premeditated and unpremeditated, *Theol. Untersuchungen*, vol. i. p. 247.

this endeavouring, this better determining, obtaining a proportionate degree of power to become master of its own house. Thus it is then, that transgressions continue abundantly to stream forth from the dark ground of the perverted volition and its still unbroken dominion, but can no longer easily pass before the shining light of the conscience without being struck by some of its beams. It rests upon this, that man must be already in a certain degree awakened, in order to become susceptible of a more vital consciousness of sin, by which again the desire for salvation is conditioned. His slavery does not first of all arise, when he begins to strive against it, but he then first of all feels it. That is the double countenance of the law and of the self-variance, which the law in itself alone so much the more certainly produces as the life becomes more earnest in its strivings to bring itself into conformity with it. The countenance directed toward the past testifies of the deep disturbance of man, that he is able by sin to pervert that which in itself ought to have tended to life, into a power of death. The countenance of the future announces the existence and the movement of a Divine germ in the soul in that the entering in of the law is able to bring it into variance with itself, and to put it to death.—Thus then it is the developing and deepening consciousness of the law, which directly and in itself only leads to the committal of *more sins against the conscience.*

But it must appear upon this stand-point as something very enigmatical, nay more perfectly incomprehensible, that, so far as experience is here able to judge, no human life which has passed somewhat beyond the stage of childhood, is entirely pure from sins against the conscience! The Pelagianizing modes of thought discover in the essential determinations of sins against the conscience, and empirically considered justly so, the full warrant for the origin of the individual act from the freedom of the will and therewith the guarantee for the possibility of its unlimited imputation; the warning consciousness before the act seems here directly to witness that the act also may, as it should, be left undone; and yet this sin, this positive evil doing is said to be present in an universality from which the necessity nevertheless appears again inevitably to result. This is so hard a contradiction, that scarcely anything else remains for those modes of thought if they will maintain their principle of the unlimited ability of the will absolutely

to refrain from every sin against the conscience, than to deny the universality of such transgressions, let experience say what it will.—

But if we are to denote the *collective character of the moral life destitute of Redeeming Grace*, then we may say that it reveals itself in its having no deep penetrating consciousness, just of this radical relation of the insufficiency and rejectableness of itself before God and of the need of its attachment to a stronger, to a Divine power. And just because the radical nature of the disease is so hidden from it, or if not this, still the radical nature of the healing by the denial of the self-life and the appropriation of a new Divine principle, it imagines itself able, in so far as it is possessed of a more earnest moral striving in general, to help itself by individual services and partial self-betterings. But the real source of these obscurations and perversions of the consciousness and its further consequences is to be sought for in the practical principle, which governs the unredeemed life, in the self-hood persisting in itself and unbroken in its inmost ground. There is undoubtedly compatible with this general character of the natural condition, not merely that external honesty and reputability, but also many kinds of more earnest virtuous striving in particular; many a one may even make pleasing progress in such endeavourings; but they are not able to break through the essential limit to this condition, they are not able to open up the source of a new life, in which man becomes severed from himself and free in the fellowship of God; the moral *arbitrium* remains in all relative freedom and power of self-movement *servum* in its inmost principle.

But if such is the condition of the self-established moral life, that will certainly hold good of it by virtue of those weaknesses and infirmities, which has not been said by the Christian doctrine of sin, but by political experience and which the philosophy of the autonomatic reason has corroborated, namely: Every man has his price, at which he sells himself.[1] Or if the principle sounds too harsh in this form, it will be allowed to hold good when perhaps expressed in this way: Every man has his weak

[1] In a similar sense an acute observer of human nature says: Il y a des gens, de qui l'on peut ne jemais croire du mal sans l'avoir vu; mais

side, on which sin only need make its attack at the right moment, in order gradually to involve him in vice and crime. The beautiful soul in *Göthe's Wilhelm Meister* must according to her confession at least have felt, that, if an invisible hand had not environed her, she might have become a Girard, a Cartouche, a Damiens and whatever other monster may be named; the innate tendency to the same she distinctly felt in her heart.[1] The lovely innocence of youth, especially in the sex of woman, may sometimes well make the impression upon us that the deeper stains of sin could not attach themselves to it. And yet there is scarcely a charming blossom of human life more perishable than this. Only a short time of confiding fellowship with deeply depraved individuals, who in other respects are its superiors is needed in order to befoul this tender innocence, if only destitute of a higher protection, in the filth of low sensuality of mind. Indeed how often is it said and how seldom felt in its fearful truthfulness: not years, not months and days, a moment is sufficient, in order to involve a highly praised virtue in vice, by the ensnarements of which it becomes irresistibly carried away. In *Lessing's* outline to a *Faust*, among seven fleet spirits of Hell, he is recognized as the fleetest, who is so swift as the transit from good to evil. After the results of earlier investigations it can never occur to us to call in question with respect to this human virtue, the share which freedom has in it; but according to the above the limit of this virtue and freedom will just be, that the sufficient price, in order to throw around it the chains of sin has not

il n'y en a point, en qui il nous doive surprendre en le voyant—or *Aristophanes* in *Plutus:*

φεῦ!
ὡς οὐδὲν ἀτέχνως ὑγιές ἐστιν οὐδενός,
ἀλλ' εἰσι τοῦ κέρδους ἅπαντες ἥττονες.—

At the limitation of the above proverbial words to the sphere external to that of Redemption, which is clear from the entire connection of our consideration, *Doctor Zeller* observes in his *Journal* (1847, p. 65): within the same of course not, otherwise the sentence would hold good of our pious theologians. I can't prevent it if *Doctor Zeller* here and in other places is pleased to let himself down to such a polemic, which reminds one of the weapons of the school of *Br. Bauer*, but I will not at least be necessitated to follow him in this respect.

[1] Comp. what *Schleiermacher* truly and strikingly says, *Glaubenslehre* § 73, 2 (vol. i. p. 450.)

yet been offered. Thus upon this stand-point the protection of our youth against a power lurking in our hidden inward parts, the breaking forth of which would be its overthrow, is *the favour of the accident.* He who will not admit this, has only to make clear to himself, what might very well have become of him, if in his early youth all influences surrounding him had only been adapted to poison his soul; or he may fix his eye upon the passages of his real course of life, where it did not depend upon him, that awakening evil inclinations did not grow to fearful passions, that a momentary joking with an apparently trifling sin did not imperceptibly subjugate him to a power, from which it is impossible to say, to what crimes it had not been able to lead him. By such considerations we shall better learn to understand, why Christ taught his disciples to pray: Lead us not into temptation.

We may regard ourselves as no longer under the necessity of proving in detail, that also the Holy Scripture regards the presence of sin in the human race as that which is *absolutely universal.*[1] The matter here is not one of a few individual passages; the entire Old Testament and still more so the New Testament is pervaded by this presupposition. A few modern theologians to whom the maintenance, that all men are sinners, is a matter incomprehensible, have given themselves much trouble to overthrow and remove it even from the Scripture by the aid of interpretation.[2] However we may look upon this attempt as already set aside by the progress in the last decennary of New

[1] Comp. *Klaiber's neutestamentliche Lehre von der Sünde und Erlösung*, p. 47 seq.

[2] Thus namely *Bretschneider*, especially in his work on the *Fundamental Basis of Evangelical Piety.* However he nevertheless admits on Rom. v. 12 so much as being the conviction of the Apostle and as fact of experience, "that no man escapes entirely without sin," but is of opinion, that therewith it is only denied that man is perfect as God, p. 184, 185. If we herewith compare the sentences before laid down, p. 126: "Such a perfection as God has, nothing out of God can have, least of all man consisting of *body* and soul. Consequently that even in the best men there is here and there a deficiency and error in conduct, does not make them evil"—it is clear here too, how this stand-point in so far as it admits the universality of sin, just to this extent destroys the notion of sin.

Testament exegesis; even the thorough interpretations of the epistle to the Romans from the so-called rationalistic school, as *e.g.* those from *Rückert*, *Reiche*, and *Fritzsche* candidly admit the presence of that presupposition in the writings of the Apostle Paul.

The most important passages of the Old Testament, which designate the universal condition of the human race as sinful, have still a side, according to which they can only first of all find a place in the sphere of our later considerations (in the following chapter.) Among the remaining passages that tenet cannot be proved from Gen. vi. 5, Psalm xiv. 1—3, because their declarations have not according to their connection an absolutely universal character; on the contrary 1 Kings viii. 46; Psalm cxliii. 2; Proverbs xx. 9; Eccles. vii. 20 expressly maintain the unexceptionable unversality of sin.

As to the New Testament, the presupposition of this universality already announces itself, in that Christ everywhere attaches the participation in the Kingdom of God, to which all men are said to be called, to the *change of mind* or *new birth* as its preceding condition, Matt. iv. 17; Mark i. 15, vi. 12; Luke xxiv. 47; John iii. 3, 5. If the moral condition in which the Saviour finds man, is hereby exhibited as one in need of changing and renewing, then it can only be maintained in the consideration of some entirely magical view of the value and power of outward church fellowship, that, since such has been in existence, it has otherwise stood with those born and grown up within the same. It further rests upon this sinful constitution of the human race in general, that the gate which leadeth to life is strait and the way narrow, Matt. vii. 14, that it leads through spiritual death and crucifixion of the old man, Matt. xvi. 24; John xii. 25; Rom. vi. 4—6; Gal. v. 24, and that Christ felt it to be necessary to commence his sermon on the nature of the kingdom of God and the conditions of its possession by declaring as blessed the poor in spirit and those who mourn, Matt. v. 3, 4. These contrasts which pervade the entire New Testament, can never become truly understood without the presupposition of an universal moral disturbance of human life. It has the same import, when Christ designates the Gospel, which He will have proclaimed to all nations and to every creature, as a Gospel of *the forgiveness of sins* in His name, Luke

xxiv. 47 (John xx. 23), or when it is expressly testified both by Him and His Apostles, that no one can come to the Father *otherwise than through Him*, that only in His name is there salvation, that only by being born again and having faith in Him can man become a child of God and obtain salvation, John xiv. 6; Acts iv. 12; Mark xiv. 16; John i. 12, 13, iii. 14, 15.—Expressions, which have collectively for their negative reverse side the declaration, that the condition of all men apart from fellowship with Christ is one which is insufficient and rejectable before the Holiness of God. This is also expressed by John in the strongest manner, when he not merely says of him, who does not believe on the Son, that he will not see life, but also, that the wrath of God *abideth* on him, John iii. 36; from which it inferentially follows, that every one to whom this choice of believing or not believing on Christ is offered must already be *in himself an object of Divine punitive justice*. Therefore is it that the Holy Scripture considers the objective ground-basis of the forgiveness of sin, the *expiatory work* of Jesus Christ, to be such an one which, according to its inward determinations has been accomplished *for all men*, 2 Cor. v. 14. 15; 1 Tim. ii. 4. 6; Rom. v. 18; Heb. ii. 9. The declarations which refer the design and virtue of the work of Redemption absolutely to the saving of the *world* have the same significance, John iii. 16. 17; vi. 51; xii. 47; 2 Cor. v. 19; 1 John ii. 2. But man is in only need of a Saviour and Propitiator, inasmuch as he is affected with sin and laden with guilt.—As now the acknowledgment, that all men are sinful and guilty before God is not only most definitely expressed by terms in the writings of Paul, Rom. iii. 9, 19, 20, 23; v. 12; Gal. iii. 22, but also forms the essential, fundamental basis for the entire connection of his doctrine, it would be superfluous trouble to prove the same, especially after the modern elaborations of the Pauline doctrine and of his epistle to the Romans. We will only in passing call to mind, that the expressions of the Apostle on the negative result of the law, namely, "that no flesh will be justified by the deeds of the law," that the knowledge of sin arises by the same, that thus the law worketh wrath and tends to put man to death, Rom. iii. 19; iv. 15; vii. 10, are not at all to be understood without that presupposition.—Christ occasionally designates even his disciples, although they

are distinguished from the corrupt mass by their upright endeavouring, and placed under the influence of His personal society, directly as *evil*, πονηροί, Luke xi. 13. For he alone is not evil before God, in the strict sense, in whose life *only* evil is found, but also he, whose life is still in any way poisoned by the element of sin. The foresight that even among the members of His kingdom in its earthly development sin will not have vanished, Christ has expressed by the petition for the forgiveness of our trespasses being placed in the prayer which He communicated to His disciples as an expression of their peculiar relation to God. And according to the same the Apostle John also requires of Christians, who stand in the fellowship of God, the confession of their sins, manifestly of those which still continue to be committed in their present condition, and calls it self-deception if they should say they had no sin.[1]

But now Christ is nevertheless said to have expressly admitted that there were even beyond the sphere of Revelation those who were whole and in no need of a physician, Matt. ix. 12, 13: Luke v. 31. 32, and Peter, that independent of Redemption, in every nation he that feareth God and worketh righteousness is acceptable to him, Acts x. 35.—Now those whole ones, the righteous, to whom Christ did not come to call them to repentence, must have been according to the connection the pharisees and scribes, who murmured among themselves that Christ went about with publicans and sinners. Can it now be supposed that Christ looked upon these as being really righteous? If any one among the legally righteous with whom he had to do had been regarded as really whole and in no need of the physician, it were certainly rather than those pharisees that young man, who undoubtedly could say in a better sense than in that of the most complete external pharisaism, he had kept the commands of the law from his youth up. And yet Christ designates his turning back from His requirement as a *self-exclusion from the kingdom of heaven*, admission to which therefore that legal righteousness could not obtain.—Those who are whole, and who do not need the physician, are just those who are whole in their own estima-

[1] Comp. the true and beautiful remarks on this passage in *Lucke's* Commentary on the epistles of John, p. 137 seq.

tion; assuming their stand-point Christ, the Saviour of sinners, the Physician of the sick says to them, that so long as they have such satisfaction in their own righteousness, Rom. x. 3, He could not be anything to them.[1] From the same point of view Luke xv. 5 is to be conceived of. But as to Acts x. 35, the sense in which the predicates herein contained are to be attributed to man out of Christ, most simply follow from the consideration of the fact that Peter himself hastens to announce to this God-fearing and righteous-working man the Gospel of the forgiveness of sins in the name of Jesus Christ, v. 43. From this, just as from the baptism administered to Cornelius and his house, it is clear in what sense such a sincere endeavourer is acceptable (*angenehm* [δεκτός]) to God—namely welcome to the reception into the community of His Son. Most assuredly such a man hungering and thirsting after righteousness, Matt. v. 6, may be regarded as already one whose developing being is from God, John viii. 47; it is a God-allied and Divinely impelling principle in the human nature which moves him. But it nevertheless just impels him in such a way, that he hears the words of God in the mouth of the Saviour and keeps them and thus first of all in the power of this hearing and keeping really surmounts the death of the natural life, John viii. 47, 51.

[1] A striking interpretation of Scripture by Scripture Paul furnishes for this passage. Phil. iii. 4—9.

more or less to yield to certain inclinations and under currents of feeling, which do not appear in directly definite offences but still imperceptibly induces in the one direction or other a state of inertness, of selfish pusillanimity or a prevailing tone of sharpness and bitterness of disposition of mind; it would be a thousand times successful in admixing in works and activities, which in themselves arise from a moral motive, an impure, selfish motive, and thereby in adulterating their contents. And this is just the way in which sin generally announces its presence in a life, in which the work of sanctification has been already commenced.

Thus, then, we are obliged to recognise within us an *abiding root of sin*, the shootings forth of which are only, on the one hand, partially to be perceived as something distinctive, on the other hand, our observation not being able here to effect a determinate separation, they are entwined and involvedly grown into all impulses and developments of our life, so that no production of the same, even were it the noblest, is entirely free from this element. If sin were no longer existent, at least in those renewed by the Redemption which is in Christ, as a persisting potency, co-operating in constant connection with all the activities of life, but only as an element present in given portions of time, with them passing away and then returning again at any too powerful temptation, then every such repeated return must be looked upon by the subject of the same, as an entirely new and original fall, which suddenly transferred the regenerate individual from a perfectly pure existence into a sinful one. As now this is most certainly not corroborated by experience, so also in its practical consequences it would only tend to impede deeper self-examination, and to turn us away from exploring and combatting the hidden, inward grounds from which the individual acts of sin arose. Indeed we should then only have a consciousness of sin in so far as it became excited by determinate transgressions, which the experience of Christian life by no means confirms.

If we further call to mind the disturbing and obscuring influence which sin exercises on the *moral cognition* of man, and how again from these unclear, perturbed states and errors of the consciousness manifold errors of conduct proceed unrecognised by us, how dare we then venture to trust ourselves, to draw forth with absolute certainty from this entangled mass in which every end

is again a beginning the threads, which belong to the moral disturbance of human life, so that we had, in a given moment of life, the elements of sin purely for themselves ?[1]

Therefore, if our consciousness, even by the most subtle analysis of such a moment is able to discover no trace of sin, not even in the smallest degree an improper excitation, we are notwithstanding not to regard ourselves as pure, and even in such a moment of life not to doubt of the latent presence of sin, where an influence of the same upon the real consistence of our moral life is not to be discovered in any individual section of the same.

Let us extend the sphere of our consideration beyond the individual moments of life to the *persisting tendencies and attributes* of those who earnestly strive after a sanctification of life. In directing our attention here not to the errors but the virtues, we are struck with the remarkable phenomenon, that their very virtues are generally in indissoluble, complicated connection with their faults, indeed so entirely grown together into one whole, that the latter only appear as the reverse side of the former. This is not able to disturb the objectivity of the idea of moral good and the power of its self-dependent manifestation in the empirical life ; but it ought to admonish us as to the deep inrooting of sin in our very inmost, by virtue of which even the noblest tendencies and directions of our life are constantly inclined to degeneracy. Thus strong earnestness imperceptibly glides into hardness and mildness into pusillanimousness ; energetic activity into unreflecting multifold busyings, and quiet moderation into idle indolence ; thorough decisiveness, which gives validity to one's own convictions, becomes intolerant narrowness and conceited arbitrariness, and regard to the rights of the peculiarities and convictions of others tends to a crippling indifferentism, to sceptical inactivity ; lively confidence degenerates into insolent obstinacy and arrogance, and wise caution into pusillanimity and vascillating anxiety. And as now human life is once constituted, we must ever be prepared, while we are planting and fostering these virtues both in ourselves and others, to reap together with them the elements of their degeneracy.

[1] In the same sense the *Konkordienformel Epit.* art. 1, p. 575, says : Sane affirmamus, quod hanc naturae corruptionem ab ipsa natura nemo nisi solus Deus separare queat.

SECOND CHAPTER.

SIN AS CORRUPTION OF HUMAN NATURE.

If we more closely reflect upon the nature of our participation in sin, it is easily set aside as an altogether superficial and untrue representation, to behold sin only in the *individual actions or omissions of conduct.* Even he who ascribes to the earthly life of the individual an entirely pure beginning, must surely admit that the moral acting generates a moral condition in the actor, that when an individual receives the principle of sin factually in the maxims of his decisions, sin cannot remain with respect to him that which is merely external, but that it therewith insinuates itself into his inner being, into his principles and dispositions of mind. And in fact, if the inward of man, as that representation would have it to be, were really always pure, then the very first good resolve earnestly made would be perfectly sufficient, in order for ever to banish from the conduct every trace of sin; it were then not man himself, as he inwardly is, who became revealed in his conduct, but some other essence.

In the entire untenability of this method of representation the prevalent view as may be easily understood is, that sin is something *inwardly indwelling,* that it has not its seat merely in our conduct but also in our sensibilities, inclinations, radical principles and dispositions. The Scripture teaches us to look upon sin not merely as something falling in the outward phenomenon, but also as that which disturbs the inward life and again in this latter sphere, not merely as that which enters into and passes away with a given section of time, as perhaps is the case in Matt. v. 28, but also as an abiding impureness and corruptness of the heart which manifests itself in the manifold variety of actual sins which proceed from the same. The proofs of this already furnished (vol. i., p. 193) may be easily increased by a series of such passages, which designate an habitual constitution of the inner life as evil and condemnable, as Matt. vi. 23; Luke xvi. 15; John xvi. 9; Rom. i. 21; 1 Cor. xvi. 22; Eph. iv. 18. How

the Pauline notion of the flesh in its ethical contrast against the Spirit, just conducts to the same, may be seen from the development of this notion in the second Book of our investigations.[1]

But *in what manner* is this element of inward impurity and corruptness in us? Can it be definitively fixed upon as a complex of determinate inclinations, strivings, and maxims, and in this way separated in our consideration from the pure elements of the inner life?

That *in notion* it is not merely possible but necessary to separate the corruption from the pure *essentia*, sin from the nature in itself good, must of course be decidedly maintained. A more careful self-examination imagines that it will surely be able also to complete the same separation even with respect to the *real life* and its constitutional characteristics and activities. But the more deeply it penetrates into it, so much the more indubitably will it perceive, that this task is not to be purely, but only *approximately* solved. Behind every successive separation, new elements of impurity discover themselves to the accustomed eye, which are still to be separated from the manifold inclinations and activities of human life, which in themselves are justifiable. Especially where the work of sanctification has made a real commencement as the development of a new life, of a new personality generated by God, which, although subject to manifold hinderances and apparently retrograde movements, nevertheless, considered as a whole, steadily progresses, in such a life sin is more seldom met with as a particular individual transgression, occupying for itself a given moment of time, especially in men of less active temperament and more moderate energy of mind. But if in this form it were no longer not at all to be met with, it would nevertheless by no means have disappeared therewith from the life of such an individual. It would still continue to work within as a disturbing and perturbing potency, which detracts from the proper freshness and vigour of the moral zeal, which misinfluences man

[1] Even the Rabbinical Theology in its doctrine of the יֵצֶר הָרַע in the human heart (according to Gen. vi. 5, viii. 21) has disclosed in spite of the absurdities with which, according to its custom, it ornaments the thought, a better understanding of the inwardness of sin, than the veriest extremes of Pelagianism in our modern theology. Comp. *Nitzsch's System der Christlichen Lehre*, §. 106. Anm. 2.

Modern moralists (especially *Tzschirner* in a singular work on this subject) have searched for the *affinity between virtues and vices*. That which is true in this thought, rests upon the ground just above brought forward. Upon every human virtue there constantly creeps its degeneracy and strives to set itself up in its place, and this exchange, although according to the inmost sense one which is diametrically opposed, is accustomed to take-place both for the perception of others as well as our own as in twilight by such slight deflections and altogether flowing transitions, so that by the apparently insignificant alterations of a few lines the noble countenance is transformed into a repulsive caricature. As the organic life is ever exposed to the danger of a double death, that of the hypersthenic and the asthenic, so virtue in its empirical development becomes threatened from opposite sides, from the one side by the positive or active forms of selfishness, from the other by the negative or passive forms of the same, and in opposing the one degeneracy with all its might, it easily falls into the other. Virtue like beauty and higher truth is a delicate bounding line. The pure mind would everywhere easily and certainly preserve this line, delicate as it is, because it is simply the unfolded expression of its own principle. But it is just on account of sin and its power which has deeply penetrated into our inmost that we require the most watchful attentiveness, and that the neglect of the same with respect to one side or the other infallibly allows evil seed to spring up, the eradication of which must hereafter cause us severe conflicts.

In the last place we may still add, how here too the practical limitedness of one's own stand-point impedingly and disturbingly operates upon our *cognition* and thus enhances that perplexity. How few are there, who for only a moment hesitate to make their individual onesidedness the absolute measuring rod of their judgment with respect to the onesidedness of others! We may daily experience how even men of earnest disposition of mind, when they with especial zeal strive after the moral attributes of the one of those two series commonly have a deadened state of feeling with respect to the violation of the requirements arising from the other side, while they are not only delicately sensible of the smallest variance with the moral claims of their side, but also often think they see such a moral violation in others in the avoid-

ance of their own onesidedness. If we are lively conscious of how deep this limit penetrates into all moral judgment, even in that of our self-judgment, we shall surely be obliged to abandon the idea of being able, by a chemical process, purely and clearly in our own life, to separate, for our cognition, the dross from the pure metal.

But *how did we come into this deeply disturbed condition?* We should very easily be able to answer this question, if, in any moment of our life, a transition from a pure, sinless existence into this condition of self-division and variance by sin, had taken place. That such a transition does not exist we have already been convinced. Neither will any one find it in his own remembrance, which were it there he could not help finding on account of its incomputable significance, nor are we able to observe it in another. Man is in sin, he himself knows not how. So soon as his moral consciousness awakens, he finds within him the contrast with its requirement; indeed, that very awakening seems to mediate itself, in general, by this factual contrast. Certainly, the first real act of sin, according to its notion, presupposes the inward representation of an opposing, immanent imperative in the subject, but first of all by one's own experience of sin is this consciousness intensified, and becomes a moment deeply penetrating into the development of the inner life. It is dependent upon this, that children of a more passionate nature and of a more independent peculiarity are accustomed earlier to awaken to a determinate, moral consciousness, than the quieter peculiarities of more pliable stuff; the deeper shadow more readily and more powerfully calls forth the light-ray of conscience from the ground of the soul.

In modern time, frequent use has been made of the representation of an *individual sinfall*, and we will by no means deny its relative truthfulness. Why we are decidedly obliged to decline the representation of our older theologians, which ascribes even to the new-born child *peccata actualia*, has been already shewn in vol. i. p. 39, 40. Real sin is only to be found, where some moral consciousness has been awakened, although it should still be entirely hidden in the feeling of reverence for the person of the parents. Now, in the existence of every man, there must be accordingly some moment in which the first real sin was committed by him, and the form, which this first act of sin takes

in him and the attitude which the freedom of his will assumes against the tempting desire and against the prohibition of the arousing conscience, will indisputably exercise a significant influence upon the particular direction, as well as upon the more or less evil character of the impression, and upon the speedier or slower progress of the sinful development within him. But in any case, this individual fall does not present itself to the individual as the entering in of an entirely new element into the youthful life, but much rather as the developing and revealing of a hidden potency, as the awakening of a power slumbering in the deep. Sin does not first of all *originate* in him, it only *steps forth*. The Apostle Paul, Rom. vii. 8, 9, describes this sinfall of the individual entirely in this way. For if he previously calls sin dead, it nevertheless only requires the excitant by the contrast in the consciousness in order immediately to revive and to carry on all manner of perverted lust; from which it follows of itself, that this death is just nothing more than a condition of unliberated efficiency, in which the already existent principle does not yet develope itself in determinate expressions of life.

And herewith the Apostle at the same time decides the controversy often raised in this question, as to the *innocence of the age of childhood*. It were in fact a very rude conception of human life and of the Christian doctrine of its universal sinfulness, which could overlook, the great distinction between the way in which evil exists in the child, namely, in a comparatively unconscious and undeveloped state, and how it reveals itself matured, developed, and elevated to conscious maxims in the grown up individual, who willingly serves it. It is upon this that the relative innocence of the child depends. It by no means consists merely in sin still having in it more or less the form of unconsciousness, neither merely in its being still impossible, that according to the limitedness of its experience, of its spiritual powers, of its desires as well as according to the nature of the relations of its life, that heavier offences are not committed by it, but it essentially and from those other moments inseparably includes in itself a *lower intensity of perverted, selfish volition*. It is especially its unacquaintance with lies and falseness and the open, self-surrendering, confidence arising therefrom, which gives to that innocence of childhood its peculiar impression, and is even able to impart to the

quickening germs of perverted inclinations of the will presenting themselves, a gleam of naive attactiveness. And just to this relative innocence of the age of childhood, to the ingenuous confidence and the ready unreserved capacity of attachment, of the childlike disposition of mind, the declarations of Christ refer, in which He presents the disposition of the child as a pattern to His disciples, and designates it as qualified for a participation in the kingdom of God, Matth. xviii. 3, xix. 14; Luke xviii. 17.[1] And even here, as is evident, only the moral physiognomy which generally belongs to the age of childhood is considered; for however inexplicable it may be for many theories, an observation of the world of childhood, which is in any degree comprehensive, can never more deny, that the life of childhood, in not altogether seldom exceptions, shows even in the third, fourth, and fifth years, a decidedness of perverted tendencies, a degree of temper, falseness, and hate, which only requires greater mental and physical means, in order to reveal themselves in acts of greater wickedness.

But if now some are of opinion, that something more is to be found in those declarations of Christ, as well as in experience, namely, an *absolute innocence*, a perfect purity of the early age of childhood, then this original freedom from every innate disposition to sin,[2] must of course belong to all men without distinction. But then how do they explain, if they do not also deny this, that all men, who survive the early age of childhood, become in some manner polluted by sin, however different the degrees and directions of the same may be? Certainly this result can, in any case, be derived from external causes, bad education, evil examples of those around, and the prevalence of corrupt principles in society, only in so far as one assumes as present in the child, a susceptibility coming in contact with all these external influences; which indeed would just be that bad disposition, an innate sinfulness. Then too those evil influences would not surely be everywhere found, unless one should explain that fact from another, which would contain the same problem, in an incomparably

[1] Comp. *Neander's Pflanzung der Kirche durche die App.* p. 700 seq.

[2] Comp. the distinction of the innate endowment or disposition from the mere possibility, as it is contained in formal freedom, p. 30 of this volume.

harder, in fact, exaggerated form; how is it now to be understood, that even where those influences are favourable, and that too in a decidedly preponderating manner, perfectly sinless life does not proceed from the same as their result? Thus indeed this result would scarcely be secured, if one, according to a proposal of *Socrates* in *Plato's Meno*, should keep this youth good from nature, whether it be only a part as is there hypothetically assumed, or as here the whole of human youth, in a fortress, far more carefully sealing them than one would gold, in order that no one might corrupt them.

But if one refers us to *the freedom of the human will*, in which lies the possibility for every one to admit sin into his originally pure inward nature, it must nevertheless be remembered, that, according to the presupposition, there is said to be contained in this freedom, just as much the possibility for each ever to abstain from every contact with sin. If now the case stood thus, that one part of the human race presented itself to us, affected with sin, another part, free from the same, then that freedom might certainly suffice for the explanation of the fact according to its ultimate, deciding ground. But if it is acknowledged, that sin appears in every human life, which has been awakened to moral consciousness, then, that freedom of the will is not merely not qualified to explain the fact, but this fact becomes first of all entirely unintelligible by it, especially if we call to mind, that freedom, in the equal ease according to the presupposition with which it is able ever to determine itself for the good as for the evil, is notwithstanding not abandoned to blind chance, but finds itself obligated to determinate decision by the requirements of that consciousness.

Becoming sensible of this difficulty, the advocates of the above opinion have recourse to another principle of explanation, namely to the *dualism of human nature*, by virtue of which, the spirit strives upward, the sensational nature towards lower things, or, as they would perhaps rather express it, to the sensational weakness of man, by virtue of which, he is not always able to resist the desire of the sensational impulse, even where it points to what is forbidden. We will not here repeat what has been earlier said, against the reduction of all sin, to the predominance of the power of the sensational impulse, over the spirit. But

supposing it were possible to derive all sin from this so-called weakness of man, as of a sensational essence, then every one to whom sin is really sin, and who recognizes the fundamental tenet, that the tree may be known from its fruits, the nature of the principle from its consequences, will see in this weakness a bad disposition, a sinfulness of man preceding the individual acts of sin. The distinction, between the view here considered and the Church doctrine which it controverts, seems in the end to amount to this, that the latter considers this disposition to sin which is found in every man, as a *disturbance* and *corruptness* which are foreign to the original essence of man, as created by God, and as that which can only have arisen by falling away and degeneracy, while the former finds nothing in this disposition which is not compatible with the *good order* of human nature, and which might not follow from the necessary laws of its development.[1] But therewith, in order not to be obliged to admit an impurity which has arisen in human nature, it not only receives the burden of placing at the very ground of human nature, an impure notion, which does violence to the Holiness of the Creator, but it is also then not at all to be seen, how, by any consistency of thinking, it will be able to consider *real sin*, which indeed is said to be sufficiently explained from that natural weakness, as a *disturbance* of that good order.

Accordingly it cannot be denied, that the idea of an absolute purity of the early life of childhood, must be given up, if the presence of sin in every developed human life, is to be retained. We must much rather admit, that in every human individual there is a moral disturbance, an *innate propensity to evil*, that consequently—as the radical evil—it is fast-rooted into the very nature of man, however immovably fixed it must, on the other hand, remain, that it can only have its ground in a free falling away, in one's own offence.

By these determinations the Church expression *peccatum*

[1] Comp. the striking remark of *Sartorius* l. c. p. 85. Somewhat otherwise this alternative is presented *e.g.* in *Töllner*, in that he recognizes in that weakness of man a corruption of his nature, and notwithstanding derives the origination of the same from the necessary laws of its development, comp. *die Abhandlung von der Freude an den bösen Handlungen, Theol. Untersuchungen* vol. i. St. 1, p. 97 seq.

originale, becomes of itself justified, in so far as, in itself considered, it only just says this, that sin—as innate disposition and propensity—is already present with the origin of every individual human life, without deciding anything, as to the further question of *whence*, whether it is to be conceived of as continued inheritance or otherwise. *Luther* has the same in his mind, when he says of original sin, it is *de natura*, *de essentia hominis*, when he names it *peccatum substantiale* or *essentiale;* he is of course far from making sin a nature and from ascribing this to man in his present state, as if it had stepped into the place of the original nature, but he wishes thereby only to express this, that sin prior to and apart from its existence in the conscious volition and action of the individual, already attaches to his nature as a disturbed constitutional character (*Beschaffenheit*) of the same, which will not fail in due time also to manifest itself in perverted determinations and actions.[1]

And certainly, one may deviate from the representations, according to which *Luther* determines the origin of this natural sin[2] in the individual, but it must be admitted that a long series of indubitable facts of human life, ascertained phenomena of our moral consciousness, cannot at all be explained, if sin is not also a *disturbed constitutional characteristic of our nature*.[3] We judge in a thousand cases according to this tacit presupposition, and even those who deny the same in their theory, are not able to set it aside in life. Such facts were those, whose consideration forced us on, in the earlier investigations of this book, from step to

1 Thus then we shall venture to consider the use of language, which denotes sin as peccatum originale, *nature* of man, because it is just an abiding constitutional character of human nature, as an entirely unprejudical one, with a proper distinguishing of the notions; just as no one hesitates to designate habit a *second nature* of man. Comp. on these forms of expression the thorough discussion in the *Konkordienformel*, *Sol. declar. art.* i. p. 650 seq. *der Rechenb. Ausg.*

2 *Luther* calls this natural sin also *personal sin*, while elsewhere *e.g.* by *Thomas* a distinction is made between natural sin and personal sin, and then by the latter the peccatum actuale is understood. This use of language seems at first sight more judicious, however it will be seen to follow from the investigations of the 4th chapter, that we are nevertheless obliged to agree with that adopted by *Luther*.

3 Perpetua naturae inclinatio, interior immunditia naturae hominum, according to *Melancthon's* expression in the Apology art. i. p. 51, 53.

step, to the recognition of an innate sinfulness. There are many facts of the same kind, which may still serve for confirmation of this doctrine. To bring more closely under our consideration, the significancy of a phenomenon of universal consciousness, which we have already touched upon: how are we to understand, apart from that presupposition, the certainty with which everywhere, whenever a human form meets us, we know that we have to do not with a holy, but with a sinful being? Whoever presumes to have merely a little knowledge of men, commiserates him as a good-natured fool, who would work upon them, or with them, in the relations which attach themselves to human life on every hand, without taking into account *their moral weakness*, the frailty of their virtue and the possible alternatives and disturbances thereby conditioned. Who would deny, that nevertheless that view of man, which wishes to teach us everywhere to expect only evil from others, is itself of evil? We must much rather look upon it as a duty, to meet every one upon the common moral basis of human intercourse, with confidence in the integrity of his disposition of mind, who has not already given us proof of the contrary; but will it ever occur to us on that account to call in question the truth of that universal conviction? Indeed so sure is the certainty of the same that, if any one in its refutation should profess to be absolutely sinless, our only conclusion would be, that his participation in human sin was doubled by an extraordinarily augmented degree of arrogance and pride; and only there should we find ourselves necessitated to acknowledge an exception to our presupposition, where the entire moral appearance of a man, who announced himself to us as holy, was altogether another and a higher than that of all other men, even of those, who stood out from among their fellows, by distinguished virtue.

In what now is this certainty founded? That it cannot rest upon a necessary derivation of sin from the notion and nature of man, follows from our earlier investigations. By such a derivation, which indeed would make the existence of a holy man impossible, sin is not derived, but denied. That certainty originates immediately in experience, wherefore it is not to be found in the inexperience of the child, on the contrary this is inclined to regard

the sin, of which it is conscious, as something befalling it alone, or as only extending the sphere of its participation to its playfellows from whose selfishness it has occasionally to suffer. Nevertheless, experience within the narrow limits which are here everywhere affixed to it, in relation to the compass of the sphere in question, is not of itself at all sufficient for the grounding of a real certainty as to the universal presence of sin; that a rigid inductive proof is not here to be thought of, we were obliged to acknowledge in the previous chapter (p. 272.) This certainty, which is possessed not merely by a few, but by all men of more earnest mind, even by the most resolute disciple of *Pelagius*, and without which, the origination and wide extension of the erroneous opinion of the *à priori* necessity of sin for every human life would be perfectly incomprehensible, can only in this way be explained, that an immediate consciousness of sin being deeply rooted in human nature, according to its present constitution, becomes excited by those experiences, in order to develope itself in them, to a determinate inward idea. But how again this immediate consciousness is to be understood as being possible will hereafter be shown.

Further, if we consider the *universal course of the moral development* of man, it is one of the most known and acknowledged facts, that, in order to progress in good, everywhere toil, exertion, and conflict are necessary, while, on the contrary, progress in evil is easy and without difficulty. The seed of sin grows and ripens in the human heart quite of itself, without any especial care; one only needs just to leave himself to himself, to apply no restraint to himself, and he is at once deep in sin. But that any man is only able to advance in good by constantly renewed conquest over himself, has no meaning, unless there is something in the natural constitution of man, which must be combatted as resisting the good, and which consequently is a propensity to evil. And who that has paid any degree of attentive consideration to the history of all time, also of the most modern, has not learnt, that every truly great idea, every holy endeavour, must be prepared for the decided aversion and rude resistance of the great mass, or, if it is to lay hold of the same, must put up with its being miserably misinterpreted and degraded? This is the truly tragical character of history, which is even reflected by nature, that everything which is truly beautiful and glorious is

only for a passing moment, while the mean and the ugly have the most tenacious existence. Therefore, he who will hold himself unspotted from the filth of lies and of the lower dealings in the world, must be every moment ready to part with all his wishes, purposes, and hopes in the sphere of this earthly life, to abandon, to sacrifice himself. But because this is the most difficult of all things to do, we behold even the most exalted of history stumbling at some point or other and falling from their true task.—Christ himself was sufferingly subjected to this fundamental characteristic of human life, while he actively surmounted it; His death of the cross was the act of free self-surrendering, but from this side also equally an inescapable necessity; therefore, because He is the Holy one, He must die. And that which the inward, unbroken naturalness has at all times made of the Gospel, is the most powerful confirmation of its testimony, as to the Redemptive need of human nature.

If the natural tendency of our nature, when we quietly give ourselves up to it, constantly leads us into sin and corruption, are we not thereby necessitated to recognize, that just in our very nature the propensity to evil *predominates*, and that the impulse to good, contained in the same, finds itself to be in a state of bondage? And in fact, those, in their way, confirm us in this, who will admit merely a natural predominance of the power of sense over the spirit. It depends upon this resistance against the good, contained in human nature, that in every education there must be embodied the negative element of *discipline and punitive chastisement.* But here too there are many grades of distinction which are conditioned by the difference of the naturel, of the character of the temperament, as well as by the mystery of the free, self-determination commencing with its first act; but, quite in general, every education, in any direction, finds something to negative and suppress, and even the most pliable, morally mouldable natures, by no means form exceptions, to this degenerative tendency. And what an unfavourable and yet irrefutable testimony of the constitutional character of human nature it is, that an education, which surrounds the pupil with examples of sin and sinful principles, furnishes the sure result of a deeply corrupted character, while a considerate, and careful moral education, in innumerable instances, fails in its purpose!

This brings us back to a more general notion, of which we have earlier made use, to the notion of what man is *by nature*, to the notion *of his natural condition*. This notion has manifestly no meaning, unless the life of man, apart from its connection with Redeeming Grace, bears a general moral type, and indeed a type, which is co-determined by the power of sin, as yet unbroken in its principle. When we drew this condition under our consideration in the previous chapter, we were then able to leave undecided, whether this condition is an universal one, only in this way by either assuming that every man places himself into it, by his own free will, at some time or other of his life, or that he finds himself to be in it from the very commencement of his earthly life. According to the preceding discussions of this chapter, we shall now be decidedly obliged to admit, that of these assumptions, provided that universality is to be maintained, only the second one is possible. But if such is the case, then all the evidence furnished us in the previous chapter, from the sphere of Scripture and experience, for an universally sinful condition of the human race, in need of Redemption, are just so many grounds of proof for an *innate* corruptness of nature. And it is on this ground, that the dogmatic designations: natural condition, natural man, first of all become fully justified.[1] *Natura* comes from *nasci;* the state disturbed by sin is, strictly speaking, only thereby the natural condition, in that it is that into which man of himself grows, when, and so long as, he follows these tendencies constitutionally found in him from his very birth.

1 The direct biblical ground for the expression: natural man, is certainly not to be found in 1 Cor. ii. 14, in which *Luther's* translation employs it. The ἄνθρωπος ψυχικὸς is man devoted in his thoughts and strivings to the phenominal world and in it lost, comp. vol. i. p. 355; this notion, taken alone, does not say whether all or only a part of mankind, are in need of renewing and regenerating, in order to the attainment of the higher life in the fellowship of God, still less, as to whether the condition expressed by it is one in which we are born, or one which has only later origin. But the expression is assuredly indirectly the ground-basis for the dogmatic notion of the natural man, since the πνευματικός, *i.e.* according to v. 12, ὁ λαβὼν τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ is opposed to it, as that which alone is able to understand τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ χαρισθέντα ἡμῖν—manifestly in Christ. As direct biblical ground for that notion one may rather consider Eph. ii. 3, of which we shall soon have to speak.

One of the most convincing testimonies, of how deeply sin is inwoven in our nature, is, that it is universally still present even in the life of those who, by virtue of the new powers arising from redeeming grace, are striving after their sanctification. Certainly, in such a life the *dominion of sin* has been broken; the personal will is, with full inward purpose, devoted to the Divine Will; this unity is the strictly impelling and determining principle; sin is deprived of its power progressively to develop itself; it is now only, as *Schleiermacher*[1] correctly determines this relation, as declining and vanishing, as the after-working of the old life, *Ephe.* iv. 22 seq. And one should not be led to err as to this by those individual progressive movements, by which sin sometimes in the life of the renewed, seems to recover again a sphere which it had lost. Every such result, inasmuch as it is not able entirely to sunder the continuous connection of the new life, calls forth a stronger and more deeply penetrating reaction of the Divine principle; and thus, when one takes into consideration the entire condition, it nevertheless remains true, that the power of sin is one which is on the decline. Therefore too, is the other determination of *Schleiermacher* perfectly correct, that sin, so far as it is still in the life of the redeemed, no longer exerts an infectious influence.[2] It is not able to do so; for if in the consciousness of one apprehended by Divine grace and in the process of sanctification, there follows close upon the very heels of sin its own negation, this too will in some way announce itself in the outward life. We may also in this way easily perceive, how it is that the sinning of the children of the world, may sometimes appear to others like themselves, as something charming, nay amiable, on account of the appearance of ingenuous confidence and unanxious frivolity which attach to the same, while the sins of the regenerate can never make this impression, because their countenance is darkened by the deep shadow of the consciousness sensible of its own self-variance.

But notwithstanding all this, it is also a decided fact in reference to the life which is renewed by Christ, and one which, will least of all be denied, by those in whom that life really exists, that in

[1] *Glaubenslehre*, vol. i. p. 460, vol. ii. p. 225.
[2] Ibid. vol. i. p. 460.

its earthly development, it never becomes completely free from sin; that in the life of such there is still supposed a constant conflict; that constant watchfulness is required, unless, by an imperceptible decline of the principle within, which comes from God, and by a corresponding, quiet, unobserved growth of the selfish principle, it is to suffer disturbances which are difficult to overcome, or it may be, complete extinction. And nevertheless this fact when more closely considered is very surprising, and still more so, that scarcely anywhere, where this work of sanctification has been begun, is there wanting the accompanying consciousness (as if it were the consciousness of an essential necessity), that it will never *be able* to arrive at a *purity from sin* in the strict sense, within the bounds of this earthly life. If that which is sinful in a human life, only arose by a perverted volition within the earthly development of the same, then a truly decided and constant volition of holiness, such as is produced by the efficiency of Divine grace in man, and as is together with the deeply inward cognition as well of the object to which it is directed, as also of the impediment which it has to overcome, must indeed in the end succeed in the entire destruction of this contrast. Still less can it be understood by this presupposition, whence man becomes possessed of the certainty, that the end in an absolutely perfect manner is not to be attained within that sphere. This is first of all capable of explanation, by sin being regarded as from the first inwoven in our very nature, in such a manner, that it co-determines the form of its development. *This egotistic, sensationally highminded naturalness* it is, which even in the regenerate continually strives against the holy principles which the renewed volition appropriates to itself, Gal. v. 17, and would certainly seduce him back again into the old life, if he should unheedingly give himself up to every drawing of his inclinations.

And there is here still especially to be noticed the manner, touched upon at the commencement of this chapter (p. 285), in which the power of sin, overcome it is true but not destroyed, makes itself valid in the life of the regenerate. On the one hand this is effected by a kind of *involuntary excitation*, which is present, before the better volition can prevent it; on the other hand, in the manner of an unrecognized or only indistinctly

recognized *admixture of sinful element* in an action proceeding from a holy impulse. The sphere of conscious life is taken possession of, by the new, Divine principle; if now sin even then still reacts in the form of the unconscious and the involuntary, we thereby become reminded, that it has not its original seat in our temporal development, and just for this reason, it has not the seat of its ultimate defeat in a determinate resolve of the will, but in that dark nature-ground, over which the conscious life first of all becomes elevated and then gradually diffused, that consequently it attaches to man from his very birth.—

And that the Holy Scripture recognizes in every man such an innate sinfulness, we were already obliged to infer from the way in which it represents the developed human life in this respect. For if it regards the presence of sin in human life, as that which is absolutely universal, with the single peculiarly conditioned exception of the Redeemer, there is contained in the same, the presupposition, that in every other human life, from its commencement, there is a germ of sin, a sinful endowment or disposition. But the Holy Scripture also expressly designates sin as something indwelling in man from his very birth.

Among the passages of the *Old Testament*, dogmatic theology is accustomed, and very properly so, to consider Psalm li. 7 as the most important. "Behold, in perversity (בְּעָוֹן[1]) — בְּ as designating the condition as in 1 Sam. xxix. 7,) am I born, and in sin (בְּחֵטְא) has my mother conceived me." That David—for to us the reasons of *Paulus*, *De Wette*, and others for denying his authorship of the Psalm do not appear sufficient—does not express anything universally human, but only something peculiar to himself or his mother, is entirely inconceivable. Just as little can the dogmatic significance of the expression be destroyed, by the reference to other passages of the Old Testament, in which, a long habituated, early commenced conduct is, in a prover-

[1] עָוֹן is here generally expressed by "guilt." But that we are not able to find in עָוֹן the notion of guilt as a second, distinct signification of the word, was earlier remarked. It is only contained in עָוֹן, as it is contained in every designation of sin, inasmuch as it is altogether essential to the idea of sin to carry guilt with it.

bial manner of speech, designated as a conduct from the womb, Psalm lviii. 4, lxxi. 6; Job xxxi. 18; Isai. xlviii. 8. There is indeed a great difference, whether such a proverbial use of language, is occasionally met with, in a connection where every one easily recognizes the unreal character of its meaning, or whether in expressions, which have about them nothing whatever proverbial, an assertion is laid down, the contents of which, stands in determinate connection, as augmenting the thought, in the series, in which it has its place.—In themselves the words of our passage allow of a double interpretation. They may either express, that the condition of the mother, in conception and bearing, is affected with corruptness and sin, or that man, from the beginning of his existence, finds himself from his conception in a condition of sin and perversity. If one adopts the first conception, then the words: בְּעָוֹן חוֹלָלְתִּי admit of being interpreted in this way, still not without the greatest violence: I am born of one infected with corruption, but this would be contained therein: child-bearing is an act or condition which is associated with the sinning of the party so situated. And according to this analogy the meaning of the second member of the verse were then to be determined; in this the same would be said of the act of conception. But it is contrary to the ethical fundamental views of the Old Testament, especially of the Divine institution of marriage according to Gen. i. 28, that anything sinful should attach to the act of conception, therefore to the act of copulation, in themselves. From the Levitical uncleanness, which, according to the law of Moses, arises from many things standing in connection with the life of the sexes, nay more according to Lev. xv. 18, even from the copulative act of marriage life, there can never be deduced that the law regarded the same as anything sinful, but only this, that it will have the theocratic relation of the Israelites, as a holy sphere, separated from the sensational life and its strongest excitements. In the same sense, in which generation and giving of birth, form the ground of Levitical uncleanness, so according to Num. xix. death and accidental contact with a corpse and the like, do the same. This is just the limit of the Old Testament which is removed in the New Testament, namely the external separation of the holy sphere from the natural, whereby this first of all becomes common or unclean, comp. Acts x. 9, seq.—

However the very connection of the passage contradicts that conception. It would only then allow of it, in case of the contents of verse 7 having had the design of grounding a *diminution of the guilt* as motive for the sin-forgiving compassionateness of God. But the connection of the thought is much rather this, that the verses following verse 5, are to express the *greatness of the offences*, of which David is conscious, first of all in verse 6, how that thereby he has sinned against God, then verse 7, how that he is sinful from the commencement of his existence, whereby the climax of the second member of the verse in relation to the first, is not to be overlooked. If now verse 7, expresses the consciousness, of how deeply sin is inwoven in our nature, then verse 8, connects itself very suitably with the confession, that God loves truth *in the heart*, and with the request that God would teach wisdom in the *inward part*. According to this, only the second of the above interpretations is possible.

In the Book of Job the strongest passages as to the inability of one born of woman to be pure before God belong to the speeches of Eliphas and Bildad, which according to the idea-connection of the book, in themselves regarded, leave open the possibility of supposing an exaggeration. Strictly only cap. xiv. 4, allows of dogmatic use. "O that one clean may come from the unclean! Not one." This passage alludes to somewhat still more, not merely to an *innate* but more definitely to an *inherited* uncleanness. However, it furnishes us no full warrant for this sense, inasmuch as neither by the signification of the words, nor by the connection, is the more general conception excluded: That one clean might proceed from the unclean, namely the unclean nature which everywhere adheres to human life; so that this passage it is true would teach, that all men are infected with sin, without however, saying anything directly, as to whether they bear this infection from the commencement of their existence or only at a later period cause themselves to participate in the same.

More determinately Gen. viii. 21 leads to an innate sinfulness. For when it is said of the human heart that its imagination is evil from its youth, there is thereby expressed that this evil imagination (יֵצֶר הָרַע) does not first of all arise in it, but is in it from the commencement. Declarations in general of a consti-

tutional character of the human *heart* are not declarations of a distinct, determinable volition of the individual, but declarations of the constitutional character of human *nature*.

In the New Testament John iii. 6: "*That which is born of the flesh is flesh*, and that which is born of the spirit is spirit," has been for the old and is also in part for the more modern Dogmatists, a principal passage in proof of the doctrine of an innate sinfulness of man. And certainly this declaration of Christ, in its connection with what precedes, is directly demonstrative of a corruption attaching to human nature, in so far as it makes the participation in the spiritual life dependent upon a renovation of principles, upon a new birth by the spirit of God. For the universal necessity of a new birth, John iii. 3, 5, i. 12, 13, comp. Tit. iii. 5; James i. 18; 1 Pet. i, 3, 23, of the origination and development of a new life, not merely presupposes, that sin is present in all human life, but that sin has struck it roots into the very nature of man, seeing that he has it from his first birth. It belongs to the same connection of thought, when the Apostle Paul conceives of the renovation in Jesus Christ, which he undoubtedly considers as an universal law of human life, as a putting off or putting to death of the old man, Eph. iv. 22; Col. iii. 9, comp. ver. 3; Rom. vi. 3—6. For such explanations which explain nothing, as *e.g.* that the old man is the power of non-virtue which has arisen from evil habituation, no longer require refutation. But still those words in John: τὸ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς σάρξ ἐστι express nothing directly as to such a corruptness of nature. For according to the notion of John as to the σὰρξ they cannot indeed be so conceived of: that which is generated from the human nature (of the parents) corrupted by sin, is itself participant of this corrupt nature, but their meaning, in its unmistakable reference to the question of Nicodemus ver. 4, must be in this way determined: that for which man has to thank his natural birth, is indeed only for natural life; but what the moral constitutional character of this natural life is, and that, according to the same, it does not merely stand in relation to the spiritual life, as that of the lower to the higher stage, but also in the relation of contrast and resistance, this, we first of all learn from the connection of the entire discourse of Christ.

On the other hand, the Pauline contrast of πνεῦμα and σὰρξ,

according to what was previously (vol. i. p. 354 seq.) said as to its signification, certainly directly includes in itself that which dogmatists endeavour to find in this passage of John. For if the flesh, according to Paul, as it is efficient as the source of the most manifold individual forms of sin, is not something external to man, but just very human nature itself, in its state of separation from God and its self-abandonment to the world, and if, according to Paul's representation, the flesh possesses the dominion over all human life, before the same becomes sanctified by the Spirit in Redemption, Rom. vii. 5, 14, viii. 3, 9, then there is therein manifestly this contained, that the moral corruptness attaches quite universally to human nature as such.

This is just as determinately contained in a Pauline passage, whose importance, for this moment of Christian doctrine, is not in general sufficiently regarded by modern dogmatists, either by those controverting or by those defending the same—the passage is 1 Cor. vii. 14: "The unbelieving husband is sanctified in the (believing) wife, and the unbelieving wife is sanctified in the (believing) husband; for otherwise were your children assuredly unclean, but now are they holy." Although the interpretation of this passage is not without its difficulties, we may nevertheless be brief on it, since we find the same already solved by the sagacious discussions of *de Wette*[1] and *Ruckert*.[2] We are obliged with those commentators to understand by τὰ τέκνα ὑμῶν the children of Christians in general. For if only the children of those mixed marriages, on which the discourse is, were meant, then the sanctification of such children could not possibly be objected to those, who perceived in those marriage alliances an impurification of the Christian side, as a self-evident fact and therefrom become argued against them, because according to their manner of thinking they would certainly not have recognized the same. If now, according to this declaration, the Christian children are sanctified just by their fellowship with Christian parents, and if, without such a sanctifying fellowship, they must have been considered as unclean, then it follows, that Paul looks upon the natural life of man from his very birth, as one that is unclean

[1] *Theol. Stud. u. Krit.* 1830, No. 3, p. 669 seq.
[2] *Kommentar Zum ersten Br. an die Kor.* z. d. St.

(ἀκάθαρτον). Moreover, the same dogmatic result, although in a round about way, would follow, if one should only refer the passage to the children of those mixed marriages. For, of an impurity, exclusively attaching to the same, on account of this origin, Paul even under this presupposition, according to what was just above said, could never have thought, by his hypothetic: ἐπεὶ τὰ τέκνα ὑμῶν ἀκάθαρτά ἐστιν, but in any case, only of an innate uncleanness, with which they would be infected by virtue of their participation in the universal pollution of human life which was not yet removed.

But Paul denotes this innate uncleanness and the relation of man to God therewith posited, most determinately and expressly by Eph. ii. 3. After reminding the Christians, from among the heathen, of their slavery in sin prior to their being awakened from spiritual death through Christ, he gives expression to the consciousness, that even he himself and all his (καὶ ἡμεῖς πάντες), therefore the Christians from Judaism unheedingly accustomed to many kinds of sins and concludes with the summary statement: we were children of wrath by nature (τέκνα φύσει ὀργῆς), even as others, *i.e.*, as well as the other Jews and Heathen, who do not with us confess Christ. We may limit ourselves to a few remarks on this passage, as the most thorough commentator on this epistle has devoted to it an accute and detailed examination, with which, in all essential points, we are agreed.[1] The Apostle speaks of a condition, which for the disciples of Christ had passed away, in which they had been the children of wrath, without question of the Divine wrath, consequently objects of the Divine disapproval and rejection, which reveal themselves in punishment. When now he says, they had found themselves φύσει in this condition, he certainly has not in mind, the contrast to the derivation of this condition from a perversion of will later taking place, but (similarly as with the φύσει Rom. ii. 14) the contrast to that, which they, who formerly were Jews, were by the Divine Revelation and plan of Grace, namely the covenant people of God, comp. Rom. ix. 4, from which too the strange position of the φύσει is perfectly explained, as the limitation of a judgment which Paul was at the point of expressing unlimitedly. But

[1] Comp. *Harless's Kommentar* p. 165—180.

according to this conception of the contrast, the meaning of Paul's words remains this, that they, the Christians from among the Jews, even as others, had been, according to their natural, innate, constitutional character, objects of the Divine punitive justice. And in this there is contained a thought, which certainly adds a still further determination to the hitherto developed elements of Scripture doctrine. That man, when he comes to decide between believing on or rejecting Christ, has already something in him which lies under the wrath of God, is expressed by declarations such as John iii. 36, Rom. iii. 19; that a corruptness attaches to the nature of man, of which he becomes partaker with the very commencement of his existence—to this recognition we are indirectly urged, by the testimony of Scripture, as to the universality of sin, and directly, by the passages last of all considered; but that this innate corruptness is not merely an evil, a disease, but that it conveys with it, the sense of its being a *culpability* of him in whom it is, this we learn from Eph. ii. 3, since the notion of the Divine punitive justice has for its correlative that of guilt. However the Pauline expression only confirms that which already resulted to us from the undeniable facts of experience, in reference to the notion of sin. For with real sin, as the investigations of the first book have shown, *guilt* is in indissoluble attachment. But if from that innate sinfulness, there inevitably proceeds, as the absolute universality of sin proves, some or other real sin, then from this sinfulness, the condition of man, as being guilty before God, is not at all to be separated.—How also the supernatural generation of Christ has for its negative presupposition, the uncleanness of human nature, from which, by this means, the commencement of that life which should exhibit the pure and holy man, was obliged to be kept free, and how the designation of Him so generated as τὸ γεννώμενον ἅγιον, Luke i. 35, compare with the Pauline expression: ἐπεὶ ἄρα τὰ τέκνα ὑμῶν ἀκάθαρτά ἐστιν, 1 Cor. vii. 14, alludes to the same, may be here only preliminarily intimated.

In the last place, if we endeavour to determine according to the most general outlines, *wherein* this *corruption* inrooted in human nature, *inborn* in the individual, *consists*, we are here too met by

that *doctrine of sensationalism* which we have already considered in a more general respect. According to this doctrine, the natural sinfulness of man is said to have its nature solely and entirely in the superior strength of its sensational impulses, and in the insubordination of the same, arising therefrom, against the spirit. From this point of view *Michaelis* developes at length that sinfulness.[1] We must acknowledge the universality of this misrelationship, and of its deeply penetrating significance in the question of hereditary sin; but we cannot admit, that therewith this deeply-rooted disturbance in human nature has been, according to its inmost germ, correctly determined. If we only consider that side of the same, according to which it appears in *positive* form, it will be more adequately denoted as *untamed self-hood.* For that is the universal ground-character of the natural life; man is by nature, without detracting from the impulses of benevolence and compassion which he possesses, an Egotist; he is inclined to refer everything to himself, his advantage, his enjoyment, his satisfaction; and as on the one hand, it costs every man toil and labour, to confine this natural selfishness within certain limits, by respecting the general good, so on the other, it is only possible truly to break its power by means of the Divine aid.

This *natural egoism*—which even the Pelagian system might easily allow us, if we would only regard it not exactly as a *corruption* of human nature—we meet with everywhere even in childhood—certainly not everywhere just in the form of violent impulses and powerful self-will; but even where it appears in the form of predominating passivity, or where it is found in connection with a natural softness of disposition, with an easy pliability of natural disposition of character, it could only happen to a very superficial consideration, to mistake the selfish principle in this form of its appearance, softened down by the naturel. An unprejudiced observation of the life of childhood, after the first awakening of the moral consciousness—for prior to this there can be here no certain observation in a moral respect—will teach every one, how even the softest heart of childhood, most open to benevolent excitations, is inclined to an enimical disposition toward those

[1] Ibid *in dem Abschnitt über die angeborne Verdorbenheit unsrer Natur.* p. 444—550.

who hinder the gratification of its selfish wishes and desires, and how it is accustomed unreservedly to yield to this inclination, in so far as it is not held within bounds, by other powers, the instinctive feeling of the natural relationship and the influence of a well-conducted education. Indeed, even in the best naturally disposed children this twofold element may be perceived in some degree or other, namely an element of *hatred*, occasionally excited by offended selfishness, and an element of *lying*, an inclination, when in dispute with their associates and in their self-justification before their parents, teachers, or other authorities, to sacrifice, with more or less consciousness, the truth, in favour of their own advantage (comp. vol. i. p. 187.) But if now this selfish striving of the child, as experience teaches, throws itself directly into *sensational impulses and enjoyments*, so that these appear as the excitants of its temptations to improper action, and as the material of its real offences, is this perhaps to justify us in reducing the principle of selfishness to the immoderateness of the sensational desires? By no means, but this experience explains itself from an original disturbance, which has penetrated into that sphere of life which has turned aside from the will, while the experience just as unambiguous, that the selfish striving in the progress of human development establishes itself even in matters of a spiritual nature, and sometimes with such an energy, that it denies and suppresses the requirements of the sensational nature, is capable from that opinion of no tenable explanation whatever.

But in order to understand this *selfish propensity* rooting in our nature, how it outweighs the impulses opposed to it not merely in power, but how in augmenting degeneracy it endeavours to draw its very itself into its service, we may not leave out of consideration the *negative* side of this natural corruption. It chiefly consists, in the *germ of religion* in man being by no means it is true destroyed—which would be the case, if by nature there were nothing else in his heart than antipathy and aversion to God—but nevertheless by its being found in a weakened, as it were well nigh broken condition. As the *concupiscentia* of the Augsburg Confession (Art. 2.) tolerably corresponds to that selfish propensity,[1] it denotes as second—in the Latin text as first—moment of

[1] Whereby indeed one may not confound the concupiscentia in

the *peccatum originis* the *sine metu Dei, sine fiducia erga Deum esse.* And the Apology very properly complains of the perversion of the doctrine by the Schoolmen, who busy themselves chiefly with the lighter diseases of human nature—it has especially in view the loss of the *aequale temperamentum qualitatum corporis*—and therein overlook the heavier infirmities of our nature—*ignorationem Dei, contemptum Dei, vacare metu et fiducia Dei, odisse iudicium Dei, fugere Deum iudicantem, irasci Deo, desperare gratiam, habere fiduciam rerum praesentium etc.*[1]

That this sketch of our natural condition and of its inclinations and dispositions with respect to religion is the truth in general outline, will become clear from the following consideration.

In the holiest moments of our life we experience, that in the consciousness of our fellowship with God, we are not merely pervaded with the deepest peace, which is able to resolve all the discordant tones of our existence into its harmonizing unison, but also by the most powerful and inward impulse to holiness. Accordingly we cannot otherwise judge than, that according to the truth of our nature, religion is the *all-embracing, all-determining principle of our spiritually moral life*, which ought easily to appropriate to itself every new sphere of the latter, every new material, which discovers itself in the course of development, and thus generate in the disposition and cognition a rich fulness and manifoldness of form. The same is manifestly also contained in the *notion* of religion; it is fellowship with the living, personal God, who, unconditioned in Himself, absolutely conditions all other being, thus it is appointed to be the almightily governing and vitalizing principle of our entire existence. But is it this in the phenominal reality of our life? The matter here is not as to partial, if even otherwise ever so widely embracing, impediments, but as to such which are of an entirely universal significance. All vital fellowship with God, as it realizes itself in the feeling, thought, inward act of the individual moment, is conditioned by ever repeated elevations of our spirit above ourselves, above our own naturalness; it is a higher tendency, which, in order to complete itself, must do a certain violence to the bias of our nature;

the old Protestant conception with the Augustinian notion of the same.

[1] Art. i. p. 52, 53.

if we give up ourselves to this latter, the certain result will be none other than the mode of thought and practice of the absolute This-side; and he who will only have and love the Divine Blessedness as beautiful nature, will be obliged in its stead to take the unbeautiful naturalness of a worldly blest mind. Religion in itself immanent to human nature, and taking up into itself every tendency of the same, has assumed for the general consciousness the position of a *That-side*, of a *Transcendent*, from which it becomes freed only in the ever rare individual of deeply inward and practically powerful piety, and perfectly so only in One.

The superficial explanation of this fact: to us the immediately Present is the sensationally perceptible;—as now under the sensationally perceptible the object of religious representation does not belong, nothing is more natural, than that it, only attainable by abstraction, should appear to us as an object relatively distant—will scarcely satisfy any one, who has in any measure reflected upon the phenomenon to be explained. The matter everywhere here spoken of is only of determinations of the spiritual life; and that Religion does not in this sphere constantly maintain the power, which belongs to it, according to its notion and our most vital experience, is the mystery. Or if one thinks to explain it by informing us, that the sensational cognition of the soul is the only real one, and that which wishes to exalt itself above the same, is merely a phantom of the brain, he only thereby runs in the circle of making the sensualistic and materialistic method of thought, which, in so far as it may at present be natural to man, is just involved in the phenomenon to be explained, the ground-basis of its explanation.

This phenomenon has much rather its true ground, in the universally *weakened and debilitated condition of the Religious germ;* it is for this reason that it is not a match for the impulses and inclinations directed to sensational and worldly objects, but becomes suppressed by them. This debilitated condition, although it opposes the truth of our nature, is nevertheless inwoven in our nature, as it everywhere in an essentially equal manner developes itself in the factual reality. By this natural impediment the universal course of our religious development is everywhere conditioned in the most thoroughly pervading manner. All considerate morally

religious education is conscious of this impeding condition, as the negative presupposition of its operation, and from the first calculates upon its means accordingly; it is aware of the noblest germ of human nature, seeing that it is at the same time the tenderest and most susceptible of injury, requiring especial protection and anxious care, if it is not to be withered or stunted. But the noblest is the most exposed to danger, not because it is the noblest, but because it has suffered the loss of the strength and vitality for the natural life of man, which belong to it, because this natural life is involved in a state of relative estrangement from God.

In this natural weakness of the religious impulse, the general religious character of *heathenism*, and its essential distinction from the faith of the Old and New Testament, have their root. Heathenism, in its lowest form, idolatry, in the form of a more cultivated consciousness, polytheism, is the *Religion of naturalness;* human nature left to itself must necessarily arrive at one of its manifold kinds and forms, in so far as it does not entirely withdraw itself from its indwelling religious impulse. Because there is wanting to the religious principle the energy, in order permanently to elevate the human spirit above that which is worldly, to the one self-united, in Himself existing, absolutely free and Holy God, the powers of the world, of natural and human life become mixed up in its productions with the object of the religious consciousness, faintly conceived of in dim feeling. But just in this is contained the demoniacal charm of heathenism, as the people of the Old Testament had pre-eminently to experience it in continually repeated temptation, to which they were variously subjected; there is here a door opened to every untamed lust and passion of the natural life, for their entering into the very sphere of Religion and making themselves valid therein. And thus the obscured God-consciousness imperceptibly loses sight not merely of its true opponent in the natural life of man, but in its deep defilement must serve to nourish and aggravate the disease, which it should heal.

But where that essential germ of true religion maintains itself in the *consciousness*, without however being able to break the prevailing tendency of the natural life in *will and disposition of mind*, there arises the slavish fear of God. It is an erroneous or indeed in any case a very unclearly conceived of representation,

to ascribe to the human heart in its natural condition an immediate aversion to and avoidance of God; much rather the original in this very condition is a bias or tendency towards God, and upon this is dependent the prevalent susceptibility of childhood for a religious influence. Nevertheless, the natural life of man is possessed of an element of secret enmity to God; it arises with relative necessity, from the just mentioned collision, of its prevalent inclinations and endeavours with the consciousness of God *as of the Holy.*—

In the connection of this consideration we may also first of all understand, what is really meant by that *disproportionate strength of the sensational impulse*, which we by no means wish to deny, as a moment of the natural sinfulness. There is manifestly something relative contained in this determination. For no strength and energy of the sensational impulse can, in their tendency agreeable to nature, be in themselves sinful, so long as they do not disturb its relation to the higher sphere of human existence, *i.e.* so long as it readily subordinates itself to the impulses of the spiritual life, and remains perfectly subject to the unconditionately commanding requirements of the conscience and God-consciousness. But now, inasmuch as those requirements merely command, without anywhere being able to execute themselves, inasmuch as the sensational lust makes good its claims as the essential overagainst the more noble interests of the Spirit, inasmuch as this misrelation in the human development is everywhere innately deposited from the very beginning, although in different degrees and directions, there is also on this side a disturbance and corruption of human nature.

Therewith now all those argumentations of *Töllner* and others, of the necessity of the sensational impulses and susceptibilities being so strong as they are in general for the natural purposes of human life, fall to the ground of themselves. One may admit all that, and at the same time decidedly hold, that in this inclination and power of the sensational impulses to repress the impulse of the Spirit and to rebel against its Holy law, there is a *degeneracy*, which can of course only in so far appear natural, as it is certainly inborn. But that the corresponding weakness of the human spirit, of the will, is not disorder and perversion, but in itself the necessary law of human development, he only will perceive, who in this entire question lays at the basis the

lowest notion of the nature of man. This natural weakness of the human race against the sensational inclinations and desires is, to repeat a previous expression, its infidelity towards that which ought to be to it the absolutely Holy.

We have hitherto intentionally not at all mentioned a law of our existence, which reflects the power of sin in human nature in a peculiar manner, in order that we might allow the true relation of the moments, from which our results follow, to stand out as purely and distinctly as possible,—this law is that of *death* and its connection with the *inrooting of sin in our nature*. Not as if we regarded this connection as one not sufficiently grounded, or as if we attributed to it only a subordinate importance with respect to the whole of the cognition of Christian faith. But while hitherto, the determinations, which necessitated us to recognise a deeply rooted corruption of human nature, were entirely *ethical*, this connection conducts us to that side of Christian doctrine, on which the *natural relations* of the same make their appearance, which *Schleiermacher* wishes to have separated as cosmological questions, from the strict exhibition of the Christian consciousness. We regard a pure separation of this element as being just as unjustifiable as unachievable; but it is true, that theology must abandon an exact development of this element beyond the teachings of the Scripture and that which certainly results from the connection of the Christian cognition of faith, consequently, must renounce the idea of fully answering all the questions which here present themselves, unless it wishes to involve itself in difficult relations with the natural sciences and their different directions and phases of development. However, even by a treatment of these moments of doctrine which observes a procedure as cautiously reserved as it is possible to do, it will scarcely be able to avoid this involvement; and when we see, that Theologians, whose desire it is to be as little untrue to the facts of evangelical history as well as to the declarations of Christ and the Apostles as ourselves, have nevertheless arrived at results with respect to the connection between sin and death which unduly deviate from the same, we must surely conclude, that here a diversity in convictions, which belong to the sphere of natural science in the widest sense of the word, exercises a

modifying influence. If now for such views an element in the physical sphere, which is to us an important confirmation of the moral disturbance attaching to human nature, is not perhaps in this sense to be found, we nevertheless believe, that even they too in so far as they only set out with us from the same *ethical* fundamental presuppositions, are not able to avoid the recognition of that chief result.

The connection of death with sin has become in our time the subject of thorough investigations, especially in *Krabbe's Doctrine of Sin and Death* (1836) and in *Mau's* work *on Death, on the Wages of Sin* and *the removal of the same by the Resurrection of Christ* (1841); also *Weisse's* treatise on *the Philosophical Significance of the Christian Doctrine of the Last Things*,[1] has devoted especial attention to this connection. It will therefore be allowed us to limit ourselves as much as possible in the treatment of this comparatively rich and manifoldly branched problem, especially as we find ourselves in agreement in the most essential points, with the views developed with greater exactness and precision by *Krabbe* and *Mau*. In so far as both are relatively opposed to each other, one will perhaps allow the results of our investigation to hold good as a mediation between them.—

If we direct our attention to man solely as *sensational being*, certainly nothing appears more natural, than that he dies. For as such considered, there is directly presented to us the most decided analogy with the higher orders of natural existences, with the organic and among them with the sentient especially. But in all these individuals of nature, the organic process is only able to maintain itself for a given time against the general powers, which incessantly strive for the dissolution of the individual life; the vitality of that process, when the culminating point has been reached, gradually sinks, until at length the individual, unless some external disturbance brings it to an earlier dissolution, overpowered by those universal powers perishes.

And why should it be immortal? The individuals in this sphere are nothing more than individual *examples or instances of the Genus*; they have as individuals the general character of the

[1] *Theol. Studien und Krit.* 1836, No 2, p. 271 seq.

genus, species and so on, but no *peculiarity* which applies only to them, which, in itself considered, has a significance and would be deserving of preservation; they only just serve, as selfless means, the design of the genus, in order that this may appear in them and may secure itself to its preservation by their generating other individuals of like nature. But they are *therefore* incapable of a real peculiarity as individual existences, because in them the absolute *central-point of Ego-hood*, referring itself to itself, distinguishing itself from all others and giving itself a relation to them by self-determination, is wanting; only about it is able as it were to crystallize a determinate peculiarity, only such a middle-point has the power to bind together in fixed and persistent unity a manifold variety of elements, which would otherwise collect and disperse themselves in the stream of all things. Where now the individual existence possesses personality, there arises an entirely different *relation* of the same *to the genus*. While the individuals of nature in relation to the genus are only *determined, passive*, personal individuals are able, not merely theoretically to set themselves overagainst the genus by making it the object of their consciousness, but also practically and with freedom to determine its relation to the genus either as lovingself-surrendering or as selfish turning away.

But as the Being of the conditioned Ego can only be objectively explained from the Being of the unconditioned primitive Ego, there is innate in each self-consciousness not merely a relation to itself and the world, but a God-consciousness and a bias to God *potentiâ*, comp. vol, i. p. 81 seq., and only by virtue of this relation in man to the Absolute Ego, is he capable of thinking eternal thoughts as the principles of that which is realizing itself in time (the ideas) and of determining himself thereby in his activity. If now this is the dignity of the individual existence *as personal*, then it is not merely destined to exhibit the genus in an example and then to disappear, but it possesses in itself self-dependent significance and therewith a power of imperishable existence, superior to all the powers of nature. *Personality* therefore, by virtue of which man is of Divine offspring, Acts xvii. 28, created after the image of God and exalted *toto genere* above all natural existences, is the fundamental basis of immortality. In this connection that analogy of mortal, natural

existences falls of itself to the ground. It would hold good, if man were merely the highest blossom of the life nature; which, according to the nature-side of his being, according to his psychico-organic existence, he really is. But if with this culmination of the development of nature there is united in him, individual spirit, personality, and indeed so that the πνεῦμα is the determining principle of this unity, then it can never be contained in the notion of man, that he be subject to that fate of the nature-individuals. That an individual life, whose only principle is nature-principle, becomes overpowered by the natural powers is quite in order; that personal, consequently immortal beings nevertheless die, cannot appear as anything quite natural, but is a problem, which is in need of explanation.[1]—

It is well known, how the modern belief in the doctrine of immortality is accustomed to solve this problem. Death is indeed only the separation of the soul from the body, wherewith the latter becomes subject to the dissolution to which, by virtue of its materiality, it is appointed, just as well as all other organic creatures; but the soul by this separation from the body, which indeed was always something foreign to it, a load impeding its soaring flight, so little becomes hindered in the continuance of its individual duration of being with consciousness and remembrance, that it much rather, in this pure spiritual condition first of all becomes capable of an undisturbed blessedness and of an unimpeded progression in its culture.

In fact by this method of representation, death, as the end of our physical life, becomes so extremely explicable, that it makes *the birth*, as the beginning of this life, altogether inexplicable, and for the question, why indeed man becomes at all doomed to a corporeal existence, if it is just nothing more than an impediment and only fit for destruction, nothing remains over, strictly taken, than an answer from dualistic presuppositions.

The untenability of this spiritualistic doctrine of immortality, we are so much the less in need of proving, as no one of the present day will very readily wish to undertake its support directly upon the soil of philosophy, in which it supposed itself to be rooted, overagainst the Biblical doctrine of the eschatology.

[1] Comp. *Weisse's* excellent remarks l. c. p. 293.

The Christian faith in immortality is indissolubly connected with the promise of a future resurrection of the dead. But this promise essentially has this meaning, that the body of the sanctified man, which is destroyed by death, shall, at the close of the present development of the world, become restored in a glorified form. Now in this connection, death is undeniably a stone of stumbling. If the body together with the soul is destined to an imperishable existence, why this wreck and ruin of the body in death, which is almost always attended with violent struggling and pain, but even, where it has the appearance of a gentle falling asleep, there ever remains an unnaturally violent separation of that which has developed itself in living unity? If one sets out from this unity, the most natural, although from reasons close at hand not further to be determined, representation were perhaps this, that man, when the determinations of his present earthly existence had been fulfilled in him, would remove from the same not by a destructive breach, but by a sublimation of his body to more perfect existence, corresponding to the higher development of the inward life. Now that this is not the case, that the transition is only the result of a process of dissolution, which places the individual with invincible might in the condition of the most perfect passivity, to which is attached the decay of the body and for the soul a condition of deprivation, must, as on the one hand, to the natural feeling of life it is ever an object of horror, so on the other, necessarily appear to the Christian faith as a disturbance.

And in this light too the Holy Scripture looks upon human death and therefore places it in connection with the moral disturbance as a *consequence and punishment of the same;* generally it is true the Holy Scripture, where it speaks of *θάνατος, ἀποθνήσκειν, νεκρὸν εἶναι* as result of sin, has not physical death in view, but partly the disunited and enslaved condition of the inward life, which sin produces even in this earthly life, partly the unblest existence of the Godless after the physical death. But there are two passages which especially belong here, the parallelism of which cannot be mistaken, namely Rom. v. 12 seq.; 1 Cor. xv. 21 seq. In the first of these passages the subject is that of a death as the result of sin, but it may perhaps, the passage considered alone in itself, be still doubted, whether

physical death is thereby meant. In the second passage, the subject is manifestly that of physical death and its dominion over the human race in contrast to the re-awakening efficiency of the Redeemer, but it is not expressly said, that this death is the result of sin. By virtue of that parallelism each of the passages receives in the other, the completeness of the determination not completely expressed in itself. Just so is it expressed by Paul as a result of sin, Rom. viii. 10, in an entirely indubitable manner, that the body, remains subject to death, even when the spirit is life on account of righteousness in Christ. Thereby 1 Pet. iv. 6, becomes explained, where it is said of the dead, who, during their life received the Gospel, in relation to their death, that they had been judged according to the flesh. Also in the declaration of Christ John viii. 44, the designation of the devil as *ἀνθρωποκτόνος* refers to the physical death and its causal connection with sin, as will presently, in the fourth chapter, be shown, in opposition to another conception of this designation.

Those two chief passages, in that they attach the origin of the dominion of death to Adam, manifestly refer back to the second and third chapters of the book of Genesis. If we here compare the threatening of death attached to the Divine prohibition Gen. ii. 17, with the execution of the same after the subsequent transgression, cap. iii. 16—22, we find this twofold result. On the one hand, we perceive therefrom, that by that death which is said to follow sin as punishment, we have not merely to understand physical death in the narrowest sense of the word, the moment of transition, but also the manifold pains and toiling troubles of the earthly life, which rest upon the same relation, which in its most aggravated form produces death. Therewith the well-known difficulty, which is contained in the בְּיוֹם, cap. ii. 17, is most simply removed; with the day of transgression a life commences, which is equally a death.[1] It equally follows, that it was not entirely a lie, when the deceitful serpent said to

[1] Nevertheless I must confess, that, when one wishes to refer מוֹת תָּמוּת only to physical death, I cannot find it so inadmissible as many of the present day, to conceive of the thought perhaps in this way: thou wilt fall a prey to death as to an inescapable necessity. Paul Rom. viii. 10, similarly calls the body devoted to death *σῶμα νεκρόν*. At any rate this view will be more natural, than the explanation which the most

Eve; you will not die, but half a truth, but just for that reason a double deception. But on the other hand we recognize from this comparison, that nevertheless the real kernel point in this punishment of sin is physical death. For as the punitive judgment concludes with the announcement of the same and the significancy of this moment is made especially prominent by emphatic repetition, cap. iii. 19, so the account of the execution of the judgment, manifestly lays the greatest stress upon the exclusion of the fallen man from the condition of imperishable life, v. 22, 24.

The connection of death with sin *Crabbe* is justified in finding also in Psalm xc. 7, 9, 11; and Numbers xvi. 29, 30.[1] According to the first passage the disappearing of the children of men is a revelation of the anger and displeasure of God, which sets our iniquities, even the unrecognized, in the light of His countenance. In the second passage the dying of all men (in distinction from the descent of Korah and all appertaining to him into Sheol alive) is denominated the punishment, with which all men become punished.[2]

recent commentator of Genesis seizes upon, *Baumgarten*, after the precedence of *Hofmann* in his work: *Weissagung und Erfullung*, in that he understands the threatening of physical death on the day of transgression, but, is of opinion, that between the threatening and transgression, a modifying circumstance has entered in, by the creation of the woman, which hinders the fulfilling of the threatening, *Theol. Kommentar Zum A. T.* Pt. i. p. 43 seq. It appears to solve everything still more simply, if one refers the dying cap. ii. 17, only to spiritual death, to the unhappy variance and disturbance of the inward life, just as it reveals itself directly after the fall in the feeling of shame and in the shunning fear of God. But apart from this spiritual conception not being in thorough unison with the fundamental character of the old Hebrew perception, there is this against it, that the punitive judgment, which surely must correspond to the threatening, does not even allude to this spiritual death. That Paul too Rom. v. 12; 1 Cor. xv. 21 cannot have in this sense understood the second and third chapters of Genesis, is clear from what has been remarked on those passages.

[1] Ibid p. 98 seq.

[2] Num. xxvii. 3 appears to me on the contrary not to belong here. Still the most natural is, in the sentence כִּי־בְחֶטְאוֹ מֵת to take the conjunction in the undoubted significance of the consequence from the ground, and thus to make the sentence dependent upon the immediately preceding—our father was not in the company of Korah, so that he died in his sin, *i.e.* on account of a particular transgression—or according to our use of language, *gestorben wäre.*

But in order correctly to conceive of this connection in the sense of the Old Testament, we must direct attention to the imdissoluble connection of the representations *death* and *under-world*, שְׁאוֹל. As the shepherd pastures the flock, so death drives men into the under-world, Psalm xlix. 15, into the silent land, where the dead without distinction, fools as wise men, rest it is true from the struggle and anxiety of the earthly life, but in the condition of a shadowy existence in which the memory and praise of God become swallowed up of gloom and silence, Job iii. 13, seq. xxx. 23; Prov. ix. 18; Isai. xxxviii. 10, 11, 18; Psalm vi. 6, and other passages. Now where death appears to the soul of the pious of the Old Testament as a heavy fate, he certainly never thinks exclusively of the moment of the destruction of his physical life, but at the same time, of the unattractive, desolate, condition of the dead in the eternal house, into which that moment conducts. Therefore this condition itself and its place of residence, is sometimes directly designated by the name of death, *e.g.* Psalm vi. 6, ix. 14.[1]

These representations of the older Hebraism appear so much the less to allow of an immediate transference to the New Testament, since indeed the Old Testament belief becomes gradually forced beyond these limits, by the religious principles operative in it in a connection, which *Mau* appears to us correctly to denote.[2] Most certainly the general ground-basis of these representations is also firmly retained in the New Testament; the condition, into which those justified in Christ enter by death, is not yet the completion of their existence, but this they are first of all to expect from the resurrection at the end of days;

[1] Also the New Testament surely in one passage conceives of θάνατος as condition, Acts ii. 24, but in the connection of an Old Testament allusion. The οὐ πρὸς θάνατον, John xi. 4, may very well without this idea be explained; a disease is according to the judgment of Christ in general not unto death, when He knows, that in a few days He will reawaken the individual now dying. That in the designation of the departed by νεκροὶ that idea is not necessarily contained, scarcely requires the remark; they are called νεκροὶ, because they are ἀποθανόντες. More difficult is it to decide, whether Paul, 1 Cor. xv. 26, understands by death as the last enemy, the condition of the Redeemed, which will be removed by the resurrection, or the dying of the same on earth, or perhaps both.—

[2] Ibid. p. 77 seq.

indeed even for the righteous, death contains, as will presently become more clearly shown, a relatively retrograde movement. But the future condition, which the Old Testament designates by שְׁאוֹל, the New Testament by ἅδης, is now no longer ascribed to the righteous, but to others in unmistakable contrast to those, Matt. xi. 23, xvi. 18; Luke xvi. 23; compare the φυλακή, 1 Pet. iii. 19. On the contrary, the New Testament denominates Paradise as the place of abode of the departed pious, to conceive of which as a division of Hades[1] the Jewish Theology will scarcely allow, but certainly not the New Testament, the mansions of my Father's house, Luke xxiii. 43; John xiv. 2. But as to the inward nature of this condition, the New Testament designates the same, not merely as a being at home with Christ, John xiv. 3; 2 Cor. v. 8, 9; Phil. i. 23, but also in express contrast to the *condition of death* in Hades, where one can have no memory of God and cannot thank him, as a *life* in the fellowship of Christ, 1 Thess. v. 10, (in the περιποίησις σωτηρίας διὰ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ver. 9.)[2]

[1] According to *Bretschneider* (*Grundlage des evangelischen Pietismus* p. 226,) whom the endeavour, to exhibit also in the New Testament the representation of Hades, in the form which it assumed perhaps in the later Hebraism, in a measure misleads to extremely forced interpretations, *e.g.* p. 238—244.

[2] The ζῇν in the declaration of Christ, Luke xx. 38, appears to me on the contrary not to belong here. For since in this refutation of the Sadducees, the question of the resurrection is only treated of, the signification of the sentence: πάντες γὰρ αὐτῷ ζῶσι, can only well be this: God beholds them in view of their future resurrection to life as living. Fully to discuss the very difficult passage of 1 Peter iv. 6, on account of its ζῶσι κατὰ θεὸν πνεύματι would here lead us too far away; I will therefore only just state in brief how I, after careful examination, think it must be understood. It stands in closer internal connection with the thought of ver. 1 and 2, than with the intermediate thought in ver. 3 – 5. Peter wishes to say, that even to the members of the church of Christ, who have died since the Lord has seated Himself at the right hand of God, cap. iii. 22, and consequently do not live to [illegible] His return, ver. 7, the proclamation of the Gospel shall not be in [illegible] they have embraced it, in order that they, although even judged [illegible] man in their earthly existence—by the destruction of the same—li[illegible] God in a heavenly existence—namely after the resurrection, w[illegible] them is ἀνάστασις ζωῆς. If this interpretation be correct,—and [illegible] it has less difficulty than any other, even that defended by *Ste[illegible] erste Brief Petri*, etc. 381 seq.; or that which *Grimm* give[illegible]

Consequently, when *physical death* is represented by the Holy Scripture as a result and punishment of sin, we have to understand by the same, not merely the destruction of our physical life, but also, as proceeding from this destruction, *the condition of deprivation and bondage* (φυλακή).[1] From the promises of Holy Scripture last touched upon, it follows of itself, how far this death is still present as punishment of sin also for those, who are in Christ, and how far not. Most surely they are still subjected to the evil of death, according to its physical side, on account of sin—τὸ μὲν σῶμα νεκρὸν δι' ἁμαρτίαν, Rom. viii. 10;—but since the intermediate condition, in which it places them, is according to its inner nature, an entirely different one for them, than for the natural man, and since this condition is put an end to for them by the ἀνάστασις ζωῆς, death is deprived of its sting which strikes at the very heart of life, which is nothing else than the sin of the natural life remaining unremoved, 1 Cor. xv. 55, 56. Therefore the Apostle longs, not indeed to be unclothed, but to be clothed upon, that the mortal (the σῶμα as χοϊκόν) may be swallowed up of the life (of the imperishable σῶμα πνευματικόν); but he is of good confidence, if even this desire should not be realized, because he knows, that to him the departure from the body is a going home to the Lord, 2 Cor. v. 2—9.—[2]

There is especially one great difficulty, which arises out of the inner connection of the Christian cognition itself against this conception of death as of a punishment of sin.

The death of natural existences is simply the annihilation of the individual, the return of the same into the general life of nature. The human death on the contrary, is directly the dissolution of the living unity of a rational soul with an organic body. If we chiefly look at the notion of death in this universality, it can anything but surprise us, that we should regard it as consequence of

theol. Studien und Kritiken, 1835, No. 3, p. 616 seq.—,then neither does this passage belong here.

[1] According to this we shall be obliged to agree with *Mau* against *Crabbe*, when he censures in his work the neglecting of this moment in the consideration of death as the punishment of sin, while on the other hand *Crabbe* is certainly right as opposed to *Mau*, when he firmly maintains as the doctrine of Scripture, that physical death in the most limited sense, the destruction of the physical life, is wages of sin.

[2] Comp. *Neander's Gesch. der Pflanzung der Kirche*, p. 833, seq.

sin. For it is just the nature of sin to divide and isolate that which is vitally united in one. But how does the dissolution of that unity take place in death? It does not take place perhaps so, that both sides of the same continue independently to exist after the separation, but the one side, the physical, falls a prey to destruction, and just by the commencing destruction of this side, the soul is necessitated to withdraw itself into an existence deprived of its natural organism. But now the destructibility of our present body, is not at all to be separated from its essential constitution, from its earthly materiality and its relation, given with the same, to the general potencies of the earth. Are we now to say that this very essential constitution itself has *sin for its principle?* Clearly that can only be maintained, upon the fundamental basis of dualistic assumptions, upon which however, neither the notion of creation found in Christianity, nor its doctrine of our Redemption, by the incarnation of the Son of God, is able to stand.

And thus Paul too expressly denominates the first man, with respect to the original substantiality of his body ἐκ γῆς, χοϊκός, 1 Cor. xv. 48; he designates this earthly body, in which the children of Adam bear in them the image of their first parents, as weak, humble, and subjected to destruction, ver. 41, 42, 49 (compare the σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως ἡμῶν, Phil. iii. 21), and says of its material, fundamental elements, that they are not able to enter into the sphere of the completed human existence, ver. 50, without even remotely intimating a dependence of this constitutional character of the same upon a preceding disturbance. In the same sense Paul distinguishes between a *psychical* body, which is pre-eminently adapted to mediate and represent the lower, sensational life of man, devoted to the finite as such, as it proceeds from his ψυχή, and a *pneumatical* body which is said to serve the higher nature of man, his πνεῦμα, as the perfectly adequate organ and medium of revelation. But he regards it—so we are obliged to judge according to the connection of the passage—as the necessary order, that in the development of the human race, the pneumatical body is not the first, but the psychical body, after which the pneumatical first of all follows, ver. 45, 46. According to this the body capable of death appears only as the lower stage of development, not as consequence of a disturbance.

The declarations of the Apostle again send us back to the beginnings of the Genesis, to which they expressly refer. That the physical death is there exhibited as *punishment of sin*, we have already above been convinced. And yet man is from the first, destined to natural functions from which the destructability of his body is in no manner to be separated, Gen. i. 28—30, comp. Luke xx. 35, 36; indeed as his very name expresses his belonging to the earth (אָדָם, אֲדָמָה), so the material, from which his body is formed, is expressly denoted as the dust of the earth, Gen. ii. 7. If now under this presupposition, it is said to contain a contradiction, still to consider the return of our body to the dust, as the consequence of a disturbance, then we have the contradictory judgments, Gen. iii. 19, immediately together. In this passage it is announced to man as a punishment, that he is to return to the dust, and nevertheless, he is at the same time reminded of his origin from the earth.[1] The contradiction becomes resolved if we attend to the significance of the tree of life in Paradise. To the partaking of its fruits is manifestly attached, in the sense of the narrative, the participation of man in imperishable life, comp. Gen. iii. 22. If we more attentively consider the words of this passage, we shall still on account of the גַּם find it most natural so to understand the representation, that man had not yet partaken of the fruit of this tree. If it be so, then we shall be justified in conceiving of this tree, and the partaking of its fruits, as a symbol for the immediate transition into a higher, imperishable life, which was intended for man not merely as spiritual, but as spiritual-physical being. This sublimating transition is withdrawn from him, as the exclusion from the tree of life after the sin-fall teaches us, on account of the sin. According to this it may very well stand in agreement, that the punitive judgment, Gen. iii. 19, refers back to the origin of the human body from the dust and to the therefrom consequent capability of the destruction of the same, and that it nevertheless, just as *punitive judgment*, expresses the real destruction of his body as consequence of sin, consequently as that, which ought not to

[1] That in the sentence: כִּי מִמֶּנָּה לֻקָּחְתָּ כִּי—is not to be taken in a causal sense, but only as denoting the relation, *Gesenius* shows in his *Handwörterbuch* s. v. I.

be. The physical death is for the nature of man, in so far as he is already originally χοϊκὸς, in itself present, namely as *possibility, which ought to become cancelled;* as to an *inevitable necessity*, as to the law of his existence he is first of all subjected to it *on account of sin.*[1]—

But in order more exactly to arrive at the real significance of this law, we must elevate our eyes from the first to the second Adam, in whom, with the full truth of human nature, is united the truly preserved sinlessness, elevated to perfect Holiness. That the essential nature of the body of Christ, prior to His death on the cross, is most entirely the same as that of all other men, we have testified not merely in the epistle to the Hebrews, ii. 14, comp. 1 John iv. 2, 3, but also the collective, evangelical exhibition of His life, can leave no doubt with respect to this matter; His body is in relation to its material, earthy (σῶμα χοϊκόν), with respect to its organic relation to the inner side of the human essence, it partakes of the nature of the soul (σῶμα ψυχικόν) as that of ours. How now are we to conceive of the corporeity of Christ *after his resurrection?* We find the risen Saviour, by His first and second revelation to the assembly of the Apostles, at trouble to convince them that He is the same, and indeed just with respect to His corporeal nature, who was with them before his death on the cross, Luke xxiv. 39, 40; John xx. 20, 26, seq., and the proofs, which He makes use of for this purpose, are of such a character, that they absolutely include in them the earthly materiality of His body. Only under this supposition could Christ require Thomas to place his hand into His side, in order to convince himself, by feeling His scars, of the truth of His resurrection, John xx. 27,[2] and under the same presupposition is the partaking of food, Luke xxiv. 42, 43, of which our earthly body is alone capable, 1 Cor. vi. 13. And are we perhaps to assume that the glorified body, which, according to 1

[1] The Socinian theory teaches similarly on this matter, only that these determinations become by it referred to the soul of man, compare the extensive exhibition and defence of the same in *Socinus disputatio de statu primi hominis ante lapsum. (Biblioth. fr. Polon.* t. ii., p. 257 seq.)

[2] Consequently, in the above question, it is perfectly indifferent, whether Thomas obeyed the bidding of the Lord, or whether he was satisfied with the evidence of his eyes.

Cor. xv. 50, we may not think of as consisting of flesh and blood, has nevertheless flesh and bone, just as the risen Lord expressly says of Himself, Luke xxiv. 39 ?

According to this we cannot doubt that to Christ, as He again appears after His resurrection, there is to be ascribed a *σῶμα χοϊκὸν*; and if in the ancient Church the opposite opinion was prevalent, the appeal to the sudden appearing and vanishing of the risen Saviour, over against those strong facts, is so much the less able to establish this conception, since, without the assumption of a glorified body, it may very well be explained for those who only at all recognize the miraculous in the life of Christ—and only for such indeed can His Resurrection be a truth. But that Paul is said, only under this presupposition, to have had any right to represent the Resurrection of Christ as objective surety for the resurrection, coincident with the glorification, of his disciples, 1 Cor. xv. 12, seq. is, as will soon appear, just as insufficiently established an opinion. Much rather Paul also designates the second Adam, in so far as he represents Him in contrast to the first Adam, the *χοϊκὸς*, as Him, whose image we are to receive at the resurrection, as the *ἐπουράνιος*, 1 Cor. xv. 48, 49, and therewith intimates, that first of all in the condition coincidently taking place with His *ascension*, the body of Christ became the *σῶμα τῆς δόξης*, in the likeness of which our body is to become fashioned, Phil. iii. 21.[1]

From this connection we perceive the great significance of the event just touched upon. The violent death of Christ upon the cross entirely belongs to the connection of His redeeming work, Rom vi. 10; it certainly presupposes the *capability of death* as pertaining to Christ, depending upon his earthly, material corporeity, Heb. ii. 14; but it is for Him no *necessity of nature*, but is conditioned by His own voluntary self-surrender, as He Himself testifies, John x. 18.[2] Now so soon as this was accomplished, He proceeded forth from the grave *with His natural body*, but in order now to reveal the *freedom from death*, which applies to human nature in itself, in its freedom from evil, which indeed does not belong to its notion—*Χριστὸς ἐγερθεὶς ἐκ νεκρῶν*

[1] *Krabbe* defends at length the opposite opinion, Ibid. p. 301 seq.

[2] It is a great misconception of the apostolic conception, when *May* l. p. 101 maintains, that the *ἀποθνήσκειν ἐν τῷ Ἀδὰμ* 1 Cor. xv. 22, also includes Christ.

οὐκέτι ἀποθνήσκει· θάνατος αὐτοῦ οὐκέτι κυριεύει, Rom. vi. 9.—For if this freedom from death did not apply to pure, human nature, Christ as very man having arisen with an earthly, material body, must of necessity have died again, as well as Lazarus, who without doubt died the second time. But this freedom from death, is, according to its true significance, the power of a progressing development, by which the realization of the possibility of death, depending on the original constitution of the human body, becomes excluded—ἵνα καταποθῇ τὸ θνητὸν ὑπὸ τῆς ζωῆς.—It is a holy mystery, of which we speak, a mystery, which, even for our cognition, which springs from faith, so long as we sojourn in the flesh, remains inscrutable; but it will be allowed us, if we are to hold fast the notion of development, to assume that here everything is not attached to the one moment of that fortieth day, but that from the Resurrection of Christ on such a development took place, which cancelled the possibility of death, *i.e.* a development of the glorified corporeal nature, the budded condition of which expanded in His ascension to the perfect bloom. This must be thought of as a process beginning from within and extending outwards, in which the Spirit progressingly penetrates through its body and conforms it to itself, so that it really becomes what according to its notion it is, namely pure, perfectly transparent phenomenon of the Spirit—σῶμα πνευματικόν.—By the preceding remarks the serious consideration above touched upon becomes answered of itself, namely that if Christ went forth from the grave with His earthly, material body, the Apostle had not been able to represent His resurrection as pledge of that of ours, which he especially does 1 Cor. xv. The justification of the Apostle in this representation is first of all contained in that Christ has arisen from the dead, *in order henceforth no more to die.*[1] But it stands therewith in the closest connection, that the *Resurrection* and the *Ascension* of Christ may not at all be separated from each other, that the Resurrection, as a deciding turning point, commences a development which completes itself in the Ascension. Therefore in the declarations of Paul, with respect to the significance of the Resurrection of Christ, for the resurrection of his disciples to a

[1] Comp. on this and on the incomparability, following therefrom, of the Resurrection of Christ with the resurrection of departed individuals, *Krabbe*, l. c., p. 295 seq.

life not earthly but heavenly, the Ascension of Christ is always implicite co-posited.[1]

However although the Resurrection must here be held fast as a deciding turning point, we are nevertheless thereby not justified, in confining that deeply mysterious process within these limits, as if it could not have been already prepared by moments in the life of Christ prior to His Crucifixion—of course without being prejudicial to the full earthly reality of His body. There is an event in the Gospel history which indicates the same in the most definite manner, the Glorification of Christ upon the Galilean mount, shortly before His suffering—a Revelation of the still concealed glory of His body, to His most bosom disciples. This is in any case a glory, which no one in his earthly life shares with Christ, because only just in the sinless man can that development in its commencement and progress take place. On the contrary in all other men this development to a glorified existence is prevented by sin, and thus the possibility of death, in consequence of sin, becomes a necessity of this existence.[2]—

[1] A judgment uncorrupted by modern hypercriticism is surely not in need of the proof, that an Ascension consequent upon the Resurrection of Christ has also its determinate place in the connection of the Pauline conception, although the Pauline origin of the only passage in the letters ascribed to Paul, where the ἀνάλημψις Christi is expressly mentioned, 1 Tim. iii. 16, is doubtful; comp. Eph. i. 20, seq. 10, Phil. iii. 20, 21.—Comp. on the connection of the Resurrection and Ascension, the remarks of *Neander im Leben Jesu* p. 784 seq. and *Nitzschs, in dem Sendschreiben an Weisse, Fichtes Zeitschrift* 1840 No. 1, p. 47 seq.

[2] The consciousness of the Synoptics, as to the peculiar significance of this event, also expresses itself in that they collectively record with exactness the time-relation of the same to the first definite prediction of Christ as to His impending sufferings. How too the oldest Church attached an especial importance to the same, the second epistle of Peter may furnish us evidence cap. i. 16—18.—If the solution here attempted of the difficulty above (p. 399) laid down is conformable to the doctrine of Holy Scripture, as we, so long as it is not refuted from the Scripture, feel obliged to assume, then the various argumentations of *Mau*, that according to Scripture the capacity of death belongs to human nature in itself, fall of themselves to the ground. With respect to this it is surprising, that his careful and cautious treatment of the subject, takes no notice of this mediation of the apparently contradictory determinations, since, as far as the main point goes, as is well known, it is not at all new; it is found for instance already in *Augustinus e.g. De peccatorum meritis et remiss.* lib. 1, cap. 5. Sic et illud

Now if we further inquire, to what kind of sin death is said to stand related as consequence, we shall find that *individual actual sins*, and the sinful condition, which may perhaps arise from them, are not at all to be thought of. For death has dominion over man, not only from the moment of time in which he becomes capable of committing actual sins, but from his very birth, indeed, while he is yet in his mother's womb. Therefore, if death is consequence of sin, then it must, and that which essentially precedes and follows it, have its ground in a sin inwoven in the very nature of man, so that now this universal dominion of death is just a powerful evidence of the *corruption of human nature*. The Apostle confirms this in that he, 1 Cor. xv. 22, designates it as a determinateness of human life originating in Adam,—according to the parallelism with Rom. v. 12, by sin—that it becomes in all destroyed by death. If now human life receives this determinateness from Adam, then it must manifestly attach to human nature in its constitutional character conditioned by sin.

Neither can Rom. v. 12, ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον be made to hold good against this more determinate conception of the relation between sin and death. As the verb ἁμαρτάνειν indisputably expresses only a real sinning, not a sinful, constitutional, character of human nature, then the universal dominion of death in the human race, if the connection with ἐφ' ᾧ is to introduce the real grounding of the maintenance laid down in the preceding words, would certainly, by the sentence in question, become solely derived from the actual sins of man, in which case, the Apostle must necessarily not have observed the contradiction of experience, that this dominion extends much wider than the sphere in which actual sins are to be found. Now we are obliged, in spite of the sagacious deductions of *Rothe*,[1] in favour of the opposite opinion, with *Neander*[2] firmly to maintain, that ἐφ' ᾧ here as in 2 Cor. v. 4, denotes a causal relation,[3] as even *Rothe* himself, while he denies it this

corpus (primi hominis) iam erat mortale; quam mortalitatem fuerat absumptura mutatio in aeternam incorruptionem, si in homine iustitia —permaneret; sed ipsum mortale non est factum mortuum nisi propter peccatum.

[1] *Neuer Versuch einer Auslegung der Paulinischen Stelle*, Rom. v. 12—21, p. 17 seq.

[2] Ibid. 671 seq.

[3] Also Phil. iii. 12, according to my opinion, while Phil. iv. 10 it may

significance, acknowledges such a relation by the translation with the obsolete conjunction "*massen*" (since.) But precisely as in that passage, so here in the one under consideration ἐφ' ᾧ does not introduce the deciding ground of the preceding maintenance, but only a ground which is additional, subordinate to and corroborative of the deciding ground, as perhaps our use of language expresses it by "*wie denn, wie denn auch*" (as indeed).[1] Paul has already given the real ground of the διελθεῖν τὸν θάνατον εἰς παντας ἀνθρώπους; it is contained in the sentences: δι' ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἡ ἁμαρτία εἰς τὸν κόσμον εἰσῆλθε καὶ διὰ τῆς ἁμαρτίας ὁ θάνατος, compare ver. 15. τῷ τοῦ ἑνὸς παραπτώματι οἱ πολλοὶ ἀπέθανον, and ver. 17. Paul might accordingly have concluded that protasis, to which the formal corresponding apodasis is wanting, with διῆλθεν. He does not do it, because he deems it proper to remind his reader, that mankind each and all had deserved this heavy fate over and above this, by their actual sins. By this conception of the position, in which the ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον stands to the preceding, it is then too quite intelligible, how Paul could express the maintenance in this universality, without taking into consideration, the self-evident limitation in view of dying infants and embryos; while, if "the real force of the entire twelfth verse decidedly rests upon the ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον,"[2] although one may then with *Rothe* translate ἐφ' ᾧ "with the more closely qualifying addition that," or with other expositors by "therefore, because," this non-consideration would remain fully inexplicable, because then the unavoidable limitation would in fact dissever the real nerve of the apostolic demonstration.

A weighty consideration against our conception of the sentence in question, appears to arise from the maintenance of many theologians, that verses 13 and 14 are to be regarded as entirely dependent upon the same, with which the subordinated significance of its thought is not compatible. But this opinion as to the connection of the 13th and 14th with the 12th verse, is just that which is not established. These verses stand in connection neither with the actual sinning of all individuals, in distinction from the power

be most natural to take ἐφ' ᾧ not at all in the sense of a conjunction, but quite strictly as relative with ἐπὶ as designation of the intention.

[1] Just so Phil. iii. 12.

[2] As *Rothe* maintains, l. c. p. 38.

of sin deeply penetrated into the development of the human race, nor with the power of sin, in distinction from the actual sinning, but they take the notion of sinning in such a comprehensive generality that it excludes neither of the two sides. It is most natural, to take the contents of the two verses so far as *Ἀδὰμ* not strictly as refutation of an objection, but as parenthetical explanation to verse 12, with which too the *γάρ*, ver. 13, very well agrees. The Apostle in this verse has maintained the universality of sin in a twofold manner, *implicite* by the sentence: *καὶ οὕτως εἰς πάντας ἀνθώπους ὁ θάνατος διῆλθεν*, expressly in the words: *ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον*. Now to this he observes: Prior to the Mosaic legislation just as well as after (what might become doubted) sin has been in the world. But men were not accustomed to impute to themselves sin, when they were not conscious of an opposing law standing over against them. Nevertheless death reigned from Adam until Moses even over those, who had not as Adam transgressed a positive law. The words: *ἀπὸ Ἀδὰμ μέχρι Μωϋσέως καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς μὴ ἁμαρτήσαντας ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμοιώματι τῆς παραβάσεως Ἀδάμ*, are only a description more closely determining the *ἄχρι νόμου*, ver. 13. By the words: *ἀλλ' ἐβασίλευσεν ὁ θάνατος ἀπὸ Ἀδὰμ μέχρι Μωϋσέως* u. s. o. that sentence: *ἄχρι νόμου ἁμαρτία ἦν ἐν κόσμῳ* is to be maintained over against the accustomed non-imputation of sin in the lawless state from the dominion of death even before the giving of the law it may indeed be deduced, that even then sin was in the world.

According to this Rom. v. 12 is so little opposed to the opinion, that death is appointed on account of *the* sin which has penetrated into human nature, that much rather the principal clause of this verse, in distinction from the thought of the subordinate clause, directly points to *this* ground-basis of the dominion of death in the human race.—

The results of this development we may now sum up in the following sentences, and in part more closely determine them.

Death is the result of sin in a twofold significance and respect. On the one hand, it is the death of *inward disunion and state of bondage* and of the unblessedness arising therefrom, the spiritual death, to which then after the judgment of the world the second death (*ὁ θάνατος ὁ δεύτερος*, Rev. ii. 11, xx. 6, 14, xxi. 8), attaches itself, which too undoubtedly has its outward conditioned state

in correspondence with the inward disturbance. This death, the spiritual, and by virtue of the plan of Divine Grace established in Redemption, also the second, can only take place where one has surrendered himself to them *by actual sin*, as with respect to spiritual death Rom. vii. 9, seq., James i. 15., plainly testify. Numerous passages of Holy Scripture denote this death according to both of its moments, as result of sin, pre-eminently in relation to the first moment Luke xv. 24, 32; Rom. viii. 6; 2 Cor. ii. 16, (in the first instance), iii. 7; Eph. ii. 1, 5; Col. ii. 13; James v. 20; 1 John iii. 14; Rev. iii. 1; with the preponderance of the second moment Rom. viii. 13; 2 Cor. ii. 16, (in the second instance) vii. 10, comprehending both moments in an equal manner Rom. vi. 16, 21, vii. 5; 1 John v. 16, 17. The Church of Christ is freed from this death, in that it has nothing more whatever to do with it as such. On the other hand, as the result of sin, in as much as *it is inrooted in human nature*, we have the death of *outward disseverance and debility*, the physical death, but not merely the moment of dissolution but also the state of a captived, bound existence, which follows it. We have this death treated of with respect to both these moments, sometimes making the second moment especially prominent, John vi. 49, 50, viii. 21, 24, 51, xi. 26; Rom. v. 12, 14, 17, 21; 1 Cor. xv. 54—56; 2 Tim. i. 10. Now for believers the bondage of this condition according to the spiritual side of their existence is removed in the inmost principle, the moment of dissolution is for them an enhancement of their higher life, and on this account is an object of longing desire, Phil. i. 21; 2 Cor. v. 8. But death remains even for them, according to the natural side of their existence, an abruption of the continuous development, a regression, not merely with respect to the moment of dissolution, but also with respect to the condition subsequent upon the same, a chastisement, which even the Redeemed must endure, whose life is one which is hidden with Christ in God, because they still carry in themselves the *sinful nature*. Therefore as in this life, so in that, they wait for the Redemption of their body, for the liberation of the same from the bonds of death in the Resurrection, which is only the revelation of the children of God in their glory, Rom. viii. 23, xix. 21. How else could the Resurrection of the dead maintain so great an importance, as is everywhere attributed to it in the New Testament

eschatology, and certainly no less so in view of the Redeemed than of others, unless it negatively presupposed a preceding condition of want and deprivation?[1] Thus they too must bow themselves to the universal law of human development on account of sin, that, as in an ethical point of view no man arrives at the goal by merely climbing the ever ascending course, but only by a lowering himself to the deepest self-denial, by an inward dying, Rom vi. 2, 8; Col. ii. 20, iii. 3, and elsewhere, so in a physical respect the seed of corn must die, if it is to live, 1 Cor. xv. 36, —a law, to which in the latter respect Christ Himself has subjected Himself not on His own account, but in order to create the fruit of our Redemption, John xii. 24.—In the last place, in a few passages the term death appears to embrace all the moments of the notion here developed, Rom. vi. 23, viii. 2.

If now we endeavour more closely to determine the *deficiency*, which still attaches to the condition of the Redeemed, between the dissolution of their life in the flesh and their Resurrection, we must be especially guided in the same by the Pauline intimation, 2 Cor. v. 3: εἴπερ (according to the reading adopted by *Lachmann*, instead of εἴγε, which I consider the correct) καὶ ἐνδυσάμενοι, οὐ γυμνοὶ εὑρεθησόμεθα. The Apostle has in verse 1, attaching to the contrast laid down in cap. iv. 16 between the advancing decay of his outward and the progressive renewing of his inward man, expressed his certitude, that, if his earthly tabernacle—this psychical body, 1 Cor. xv. 44—be laid in ruins, he has an imperishable, heavenly dwelling—the resurrection body, whose builder is God. Therewith he connects the expression of his longing desire for the possession of this heavenly habitation, which is directly only the desire for the glory of the also physically sublimated human life, precisely as in Rom. viii. 23. For Christ is essentially also a Redeemer for the body, ὁ κύριος τῷ σώματι, 1 Cor. vi. 13, 14, comp. Rom. viii. 11. But the way in which he wishes to become a partaker of the heavenly

[1] Compare *Weizel's* exposition of this point in his dissertation on the primitive Christian doctrine of immortality, in part agreeing with and in part deviating from our earlier discussion of the same, *Stud. und Krit.* 1836 No. 4, p. 913 seq. and *Kerns'* dissertation on the Christian eschatology, *Tübinger Zeitsch. für Theol.* 1840, No. 1, p. 13, seq.

habitation, he has expressed, in the hope that he should himself live to see the return of the Lord, as an *ἐπενδύσασθαι*, comp. 1 Cor. xv. 52, 53, and thereby given to the representation a nearer determination, to which now ver. 3 closely attaches: *provided that we also become clothed, we shall not be found naked*—of the day of the Lord. The sentence in this its attachment to the *ἐπενδύσασθαι* has a *limiting* intention; it is to express, that the hope of the Apostle in this respect is *not a certain one;* it will only be realized, if the day of the Lord finds him still among the living, still clothed in the earthly body, if death has not previously unclothed him, comp. the *ἐκδύσασθαι*, ver. 4.[1] If this is the sense of ver. 3, then ver. 4 stands in the closest connection. We take it with *Ruckert* as "an explanatory repetition of the sentence less clearly expressed in ver. 2." But the explanation is just contained in this, that now determinate regard is had to the distinction in the wish of the Apostle coming in between with ver. 3. The main reason of his groaning in the tabernacle is

[1] Certainly by this conception of the words, the aorist *ἐνδυσάμενοι* instead of the preterite *ἐνδεδυμένοι* is an anomaly, but an anomaly for which there are examples to be found in good Greek, comp. the references adduced by *Rothe*, from *Buttmann* and *Bernhardy*, in his interpretation of Rom. v. 12—21, p. 24. Indeed, even in the Pauline use of language we are not without explanatory parallels; neither in Eph. vi. 14 nor 1 Thess. v. 8 does Paul wish to make the momentary activity of putting on the breast-plate prominent, but the condition of being equipped, and yet in both passages we have *ἐνδυσάμενοι* (*στῆτε ἐνδυσάμενοι —νήφωμεν ἐνδυσάμενοι*). Still less can the omission of the *ἀλλὰ* before *οὐ γυμνοὶ* justify *Rückert* in the rejection of this interpretation, v. his commentary, p. 146; comp. *e.g.* Rom. ii. 29, *ἐν πνεύματι, οὐ γράμματι.* 1 Cor. iii. 2, *γάλα ὑμᾶς ἐπότισα, οὐ βρῶμα.*—If there is a difficulty contained in the *καὶ* (according to my opinion an *ἡμεῖς* is therein included), it applies to every interpretation of the passage which retains the reading *ἐνδυσάμενοι* best accredited by external and internal reasons. But to give up this and to read with *Rückert* according to a few manuscripts and other evidences *ἐκδυσάμενοι* seems scarcely to be reconcilable with just critical principles.—The interpretation laid down by *Lange, biblisch-theologische Erörterungen, Stud. u. Krit.* 1836, No. 3, p. 702 seq., and approved of by *Nitzsch, System der christlichen Lehre*, p. 339, appears to me, if I correctly understand the not quite clear exposition, to make the Apostle ver. 3 to say something, which is self-evident—namely that the *ἐνδυσάμενος* is not *γυμνὸς*—and at the same time incorrectly to conceive of the sense of the preceding verse, in which without doubt the matter spoken of is not of a provisional re-embodying of souls but of the resurrection body.

already expressed in the general contents of ver. 2; it is the desire for the glory of the completed kingdom of God. An additional, subordinate ground—ἐφ' ᾧ—is contained in the horror of human nature at death; it is a wish in relation to the particular manner of ending this life of the body—οὐ θέλομεν ἐκδύσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπενδύσασθαι. With this too vanishes the difficulty of the αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ver. 5, which *Rückert* with his conception, very justly considers as insolvable; this αὐτὸ τοῦτο is the transition into the completion of the glorified human life, which Paul, ver. 1—4, has kept in view as the chief object of his longing, and only to this too of course can the pledge of the Spirit, ver. 5, given to those who believe, refer.

Now according to this the Apostle, ver. 3, ascribes to the soul, in relation to the intermediate condition, between death and the resurrection, where such takes place—for for those who meet the day of the Lord alive, it does not take place,[1] comp. 1 Thess. iv. 17; 1 Cor. xv. 51 seq.—a γυμνὸν εἶναι manifestly in view of their corporeity. Other New Testament writers express the same, in that they designate the departed, in relation to that intermediate condition as ψυχαὶ or πνεύματα, 1 Pet. iii. 19; Rev. vi. 9, xx. 4; Heb. xii. 23.—Now that notion will in any case include in it a state of self-introversion of the soul, a preventing limit for the expression and exhibition of its life, and to this too the καθεύδειν alludes in contrast to the γρηγορεῖν of the earthly life, 1 Thess. v. 10, comp. 1 Cor. xi. 30, though of course we may only take so much from the expression, as is compatible with the ἅμα σὺν Χριστῷ ζῆν. But that γυμνότης does not indeed justify us in an opinion, which most certainly would in different directions involve us in the greatest difficulties, in the opinion namely of a complete nakedness of the soul as to all bodily mediation, of a complete repression of the individual into a merely spiritual existence in the strict sense of the word. Certainly some or other organ of its self-revelation

[1] Consequently if those on this side are excepted from that universal law of human development on account of sin, the intimations of Scripture as to the highest decisiveness and power of human perverseness prior to the return of the Lord, as well as of the severest temptations and sufferings of His Church, allow us at least to conceive of whereby the members of the same become rewarded for the discipline contained in that plan.

will remain to the Ego in death, but such an one, in which the full reality of human life cannot yet appear, which includes in itself that which, not merely in relation to the σῶμα πνευματικὸν, but also in comparison with this earthly body, is a more imperfect, and therefore a relatively uncovered, or naked state of the soul.[1] One may, as *Weisse* does, make use of the representation of the *nervous-spirit* (*Nervengeist*) in order to make in some degree evident the possibility of such a clothing of the soul even after the unclothing in death; still, theology as well as philosophy will in any case be obliged to admit, that on this question nothing certain can be laid down.—

[1] There is contained in this a partial correction of that, which the Author himself, on an earlier occasion, *Stud. u. Krit.* 1835, No. 3, p. 785, laid down in opposition to the view brought forward in *Fichte's* spirited work: *Die Idee der Persönlichkeit und der individuellen Fortdauer.* Comp. on this question the remarks of *Nitzsch* l. c. p. 368 seq. and *Lange* l. c. p. 700 seq.

THIRD CHAPTER.

THE CHURCH DOCTRINE OF HEREDITARY SIN.

The investigations of this book have hitherto led us from the universality of sin to the recognition of a *sinfulness inwoven in human nature.* But this natural propensity to sin, however deeply it may have struck its roots into the very ground of our nature, cannot nevertheless be an *ultimatum* for dogmatic inquiry, at which it must rest; so much the less can it be so, since, if one will not altogether cancel the notion of sin, with the recognition of this naturalness, there must at the same time still further be firmly maintained, that sin does not follow from the notion of human nature.

The theology of the western Church solves this problem, of a sinfulness which is contradictory to the notion of human nature, and which nevertheless has become its abiding constitutional characteristic, by the dogma of *hereditary sin.* That we are able fully to appropriate the Church designation of this sinfulness, as *peccatum originale,* taken in its literal sense, has already been remarked; the question now is, whether the matter stands the same, with the determination of this sinfulness, as *peccatum haereditarium.*

The connection of the dogma in its old Protestant form is this. God has created man in His own image, that is to say, He has pre-eminently created human nature in its first parents in the possession of the attribute of an original righteousness *(iustitia originalis),* the elements of which are Holiness of Will and Wisdom of understanding. These glorious attributes belong to human nature, so that, if they are wanting, the purity of the nature is therewith directly lost.[1] Therefore God bestowed them upon the first of mankind not merely as a personal possession, but

[1] In contrast to the Catholic representation of a *pura natura,* which in the first of mankind is at least in thought separated from the *justitia originalis* as from a *donum supernaturale* and *superadditum*—from which there certainly follows in this connection, that also after the *loss* of this *donum superadditum* the *naturalia pura* must remain.

with the determinate purpose, if they should faithfully preserve them, of their transmitting them by generation to their descendants, of course in such a manner, that in the latter they should at first be only as innate disposition, as ability of producing these attributes with unimpeded facility.[1] But primitive man fell by disobedience to the Divine command, and thereby not only lost the Divine image, but also poisoned human nature, as to both soul and body, with a lust to all iniquity. This loss of the Divine image together with this dominant evil inclination, passes over from them to all men, who are descended from them in the way of natural generation; and in these two moments (the negative—*defectus iustitiae originalis*—the positive—*concupiscentia*) consists the original or hereditary sin, the inexhaustible source of all actual sins. But original sin is by no means to be regarded merely as an evil, which brings no guilt to him in whom it is found, but as it is really sin, so it makes every man from the beginning of his existence *guilty* before God and deserving of eternal damnation. Hereditary sin is at the same time essentially *hereditary guilt.*

The tenets, which the dogma further lays down on the extent of this innate corruption in the individual human life, as well as the limitations, which the same receive from Scripture and experience, we have already, in the first chapter of this book, become acquainted with. The side of the dogma, which, according to the connection of our present consideration, we have more closely to examine as to its tenability, refers entirely to the relation of *hereditary sin* to the notion of *guilt.*

If we set out from the last of the determinations of the dogma just mentioned, it manifestly rests upon the presupposition, that, where there is sin, there guilt must also be, and further, that a constitutional condition of human nature, from which all kinds of actual sins necessarily arise, is itself indeed to be regarded as sin. The second presupposition directly proves itself by the logical nature of the categories: Ground and consequence; but the first, the correlative relation between sin and guilt, we are obliged, according to the results of our investigations on the

[1] This follows by inference from the tenets of the *Apology*, Art. 1, p. 51.

notion of guilt (in the second division of the first book), to regard as being no less well grounded.

But if this correlative relation holds good, it may be inferentially concluded from it, that where, in relation to actions and states which appear as sinful, it is altogether impossible for the subject of them to be himself guilty, there those actions and states *cannot be really sinful.* The question is, whether the dogma is protected against this inverse application of its own presupposition. Only a personal essence, and not a mere creature of nature, can render itself a subject of guilt. This arises from the fact, that only a personal essence is able to be the real author of its actions and states, so that they may be imputed to it. Where there is no personality, consequently no freedom of the will whatever, there the power of an original self-determination is wanting; that which here appears as a self-determining, if traced into its true causes, resolves itself into a being determined. Accordingly, actions and states can only in so far be considered as criminal, as they have their ultimate deciding ground in the self-determination of the subject. If on the contrary, the subject is in them merely the transition point, for determinations which it receives from another power,—whether it be a power of nature or a personal one—then these his states and activities are not his fault, unless that, by some preceding self-determination, he had rendered himself open to the power of such determining influence upon him. Now the dogma of original sin teaches, that the inrooted sinfulness of our nature, which—according to the canon: *Semper cum malo originali simul sunt peccata actualia*[1]—necessarily produces all kinds of sin, is in us, according to its universal, everywhere equal nature, solely as the consequence of the first sin of the parents of our race. But if this sinfulness is in us solely by the action of other individuals, without our own aid, then it cannot be imputed to us as its authors, but only to those individuals; it is then in us not as guilt, but solely as *evil and calamity.* Moreover, in all the actual sins, which arise out of this sinfulness, it is not, strictly speaking, we who act, but the

[1] *Melancthon* lays down this canon, *Loci, de peccatis actual.* at the beginning (p. 16), and the succeeding dogmatists are accustomed to make it the basis in the doctrine of baptism.

first of mankind by us; but how then should our apparent action still be real sin, on account of which we may become reprobated?

Thus the indissoluble connection of sin and guilt, which, by the notion of sin being regarded as fixed should support that of guilt, much rather by the notion of guilt resolving itself, threatens with destruction also that of sin. If now the dogma requires, that nevertheless one's own guilt must, without limitation, be firmly maintained, even in the inherited sinfulness and consequently in all its effects, then there is nothing contained, at least in the determinations hitherto developed, which can make intelligible to us this forced coalition of the contradictory, in its internal possibility.

This reaction of the consciousness of guilt in sin against the notion of inherited sin is so apparent, that from *Pelagius* to the present time, the opponents of the *Augustinian* dogma have in general regarded it as one of their chief weapons of attack. But it is just as apparent, that those alone have a right, on that account, to censure the dogma, who are able better to account for the universality of sin and its ingrowth in our very nature, together with the responsibility of the individual person, in whom it is found. On the contrary, if they are only able so to help themselves, that, in order to be able firmly to maintain the guilt of the sinning subject, *they deny those facts*, or that, in order not to become untrue to the facts, *they derive sin from the notion of human nature* and thus, with one and the same stroke, cancel the notions: sin and guilt, then the Church dogma, in that it thinks to solve the apparent contradiction of those two firmly held moments, by an explanation, from the radical notion of which (hereditary sin as hereditary guilt), the same contradiction immediately in all its sharpness again breaks forth, has manifestly the preponderance of truth. For even the most insufficient explanation of a contradiction between two equally justified moments—if it only holds fast both, remains nevertheless nearer the truth, than the avoidance of the contradiction by the setting aside of one of the two moments.

Still it is only due to a theory, to which, not merely an innumerable number of deep-minded spirits have adhered for more than fifteen centuries, but which, according to its essential determinations, has also been taken up into the confessional writings of the

Evangelical Church, that we should more closely enter upon its examination in its internal connection, in the views which lie at its foundation.

It is a superficial and abstract method of consideration—somewhat in this way the fundamental view of this theory has in modern time variously expressed itself,[1]—to take the human race, in a moral respect, solely for an aggregate of individual personalities standing together, who, it may be, are only so far in connection with and dependent upon each other, as they receive from each other, in the progressive development of life, discipline, instruction and example. A deeper consideration teaches us to recognize behind this separative isolation into nothing but individual atoms, a *native substantial unity*, in which the individual human life is rooted as in its maternal soil. It were indeed a very superficial representation, if one should suppose, that upon the moral individual as such, the community, in which he stands, exercises a determining influence only in so far as he is pleased to give room to it. Much rather he grows up into it unconsciously, into its moral tones, inclinations, and interests, into its modes of mental representation and its peculiar limits, and in those instances, in which he with full consciousness decides or acts in this or in that respect, those very moments, as established constitutional characteristics of his inner life, exercise a co-determining influence upon his decisions and actions, whether he be conscious of the same or not. Indeed if the community is not merely an artifical one, and just on this account one which is easily again dissolved, but has a fixed natural ground, then the moral individual is not merely *born* in but *into* it. Thus the Caucasian, notwithstanding the essential unity of the race, has a different mode of moral sensibility, a different moral tone of life, from that of the Negro; the German, one that is different from that of the Sclavonian. But the individual receives his share of this common impress not merely by education and habit, but he becomes in an original manner borne and determined by the moral substance of the sphere of the community, from which he has sprung.

Here now the question is that of a determinateness of character, which does not attach to a particular sphere but to the *genus;* for

[1] Comp. *e.g.* the exhibition of this view in *Sartorius, die Lehre von der heiligen Liebe*, Abth. 1, p. 103 seq.

hereditary sin is such an one. This determinateness of character, although diffused over the whole race, is nevertheless according to its nature a disturbance, consequently not originally in humanity, but one which has first of all *arisen;* if now its extension over the entire race is to be brought into unison with this origination, how intelligible the dogma then becomes, when it teaches, that this corruption arose in the first parents of our race by their apostacy from God! If by the sin-fall corruption has so penetrated into the substantial nature of the genus, as this nature continually produces individual beings, and individualizes itself in them, then this corruption must of course also appear in all individuals, and indeed, not as something foreign, imparted to them from without, but as something rooted in their inmost nature, as something arising from the very ground of their own nature, as *character of the genus*, and yet at the same time, as their own possession in the fullest sense of the word, interwoven in all the determinations of their existence. The deeper conception of this relation shows itself in seizing upon these two sides in undivided unity, which is just as much within the reach of love as of speculative insight; while it is just the way of the abstract understanding on the one hand and of egoism on the other, when the individual will not look upon himself in his sin as a member of the human race, when he wills not to become sensible of the stream of its life in himself even with its impediments and disturbances, when instead of the same he lays claim to a separate ground of his guiltiness as conditioning its recognition, a ground personally peculiar to him apart from his being in the genus. Experience too, teaches us distinctly enough, how often in a family given moral vices propagate themselves from generation to generation, of course not as fully acquired, but as evil innate dispositions and inclinations, without indeed those who are under their dominion, when they become conscious of the same, feeling themselves to be thereby justified in their conscience.—

We are far from denying a relative truth to this view of sin, which we may designate as the *organic* or even the *substantial*, as it on its part, is accustomed to controvert its opponent, as *atomistic subjectivism*. Much rather must we acknowledge, although we are not able to remain standing by its determinations, that the

fundamental notion, with which we have here to do, the hereditary transmission of sinful dispositions, must have its given place, in every, not altogether one-sided and thereby inadequate, theory of sin. Although we have conceived of this notion in the form in which the most modern literature exhibits it to us, it were easy to show in the old Protestant dogmatick, parallel notions, upon the ground-basis of a different metaphysic. We have here especially in mind, the formula: *natura corrumpit personam*, which that dogmatick, after the precedence of *Anselm* of Canterbury, *Odo* of Cambrai, *Alexander* of Hales, *Thomas Aquinas*, used as designation of the *peccatum originis originatum*, of hereditary sin and its power, to which, the second formula: *persona corrumpit naturam* for the *peccatum originis originans*, the Adamic sinfall and its determining influence, forms the counterpart.[1]

If we consider the opinion in the form just sketched, we must first of all remark, that the categories of the genus and of the individual, in themselves considered, have their strict place not in the sphere of the *spirit* but in that of *nature*.[2] Now one may

[1] Therefrom would result the following combining formula: *natura a prima persona* (or strictly a *primis personis*) *corrupta corrumpit ceteras personas.*

[2] *Schaller* makes the same remark against *Strauss, der historische Christus und die Philosophie*, p. 34, although we cannot agree with him, in the application which he makes of this cognition. *Schaller* thinks the individual, in the sphere in which these notions have their peculiar validity, exhibits the genus only *one-sidedly*, in that it does not unite in itself all the determinations of the same, and this one-sided determinateness has other one-sidednesses along with it, whereby it becomes supplemented to the universality of the genus. In the sphere of the spirit, on the contrary, the individual person knows himself, *i.e.* he is independent *for himself* in his individuality, without having his supplement in another, and at the same time knows the genus in himself. If now the purport of this is, as if the one-sidedness in the exhibition of the genus by the individuals, and the necessity thereby conditioned of the mutual supplementing of the individuals, applies to the sphere of nature in distinction from the human sphere, then, according to the discussions of the foregoing chapter, we are much rather obliged to maintain the opposite. Even in the highest forms of this sphere, in those of animal life, the distinctions which appear within the genus, so far as they do not again form particular species, but attach to the individuals as such, are, apart from the contrast of sex, of a superficial and insignificant nature, and therefore in general not able to produce a relation of the individuals among each other, an association of the same for mutual completion. Only there, where the individual as such possesses a

choose the most inward expression for the unity of the individual and of the genus, and it will still ever remain, that this unity is at the same time a dependence of the former upon the latter. And this dependency very clearly presents itself to us in the question under consideration. Hereditary sin will certainly be considered, as a character attaching to the very constitution of the genus since the fall of the first parents of the race, as one which remains essentially the same and equal through all stages of human development. While this determinateness of the genus becomes realized, in every naturally generated human individual, with just as an inevitable a necessity, as those determinations belonging to its general notion, it is at the same time in each one individualized, however only so, that therewith the general fundamental basis, that, which in the original sin is said to be just the determinateness of the species, is for the individual being the absolutely given, unalterable presupposition. And the matter here treated of is just of this general fundamental basis.

Now we do not feel ourselves justified in directly declaring it an impossibility, that also defective constitutions and conditions, pain, in short physical evil in general, communicate themselves to the individual in this way, and without a further ground, than that they have just arisen from a disturbance of the genus-character. For that physical evil can only occur as merited punishment to the individual, subject to the same, can neither be shown from the notion of the Divine righteousness, nor without the most adventurous assumptions, as perhaps the doctrine of the transmigration of souls, be reconciled with the notorious fact, that not merely men, but also the sentient existences of nature suffer. Indeed if we could only resolve to consider *sin* more as a *suffering* and to place moral evil entirely under the same fundamental determinations, which belong to natural evil, then we might be able to make it conceivable, how the individual by his human birth becomes a partaker of a sinfulness, which then from the awakening of the consciousness onward, reveals itself in real sin with the same necessity, with which the evil tree bears

definite peculiarity, therefore only in the sphere of personality, does he require, in the consciousness of representing the genus only one-sidedly and imperfectly, his completion; only there does he form real fellowship with his equals.

evil fruit. But let us first call to mind, what the matter is, which is here treated of. The question is, how man becomes *guilty*, how he is able to destroy in himself his worthiness of fellowship with God, in which alone is life, and to make himself an object of His punitive righteousness. Guilty, only a being can become, which has in himself a self-dependent central-point, the power of absolutely original self-decision, whether he will surrender himself to God, or turn away from Him. Only thereby too, is he absolutely answerable for that which ought not to be, but which nevertheless has factual existence in his life.

Thus the insight into the nature of guilt, impels us beyond the reciprocal notions of the individual and the genus, to that of *personality*, whose earlier (comp. p. 315 sq.), acknowledged self-dependent significance in relation to the genus first of all presents a fundamental basis, which is able to sustain the tremendous load of guilt.[1]

Those, who imagine they are able to maintain the dogma without this ground-basis of personal self-decision, think to prove the guilt of the individual in original sin, in that the latter, cannot in any way be deducted from the individual contents of his life, that the individual, according to the entire determinateness of his particular nature, would not at all be this individual, if this sinfulness as co-determining principle of his development, had not been posited in him from the beginning. Or they appeal to the *Augustinian: non inviti tales sumus*, and ground the hereditary guilt of the children of Adam upon this, that the natural man does not experience the hereditary sin, as a power from which he only suffers constraint, which necessitates him to sin, in spite of his resistance, but that he freely surrenders himself to its impulses, that hereditary sin and its efficiency are, in this sense, a *voluntarium* in him.

But in all this, there is only denoted the *manner* in which this disturbed constitution of the genus *makes its appearance* in the individuals; there is thereby only secured, that this takes

[1] According to this it may be understood, how among those theologians, who regard the old dogmatic theory on this point, as not in need of a completive extension, there must be the defect of not properly distinguishing the notions, individuality and personality; comp. *e.g.* the exposition adduced by *Sartorius*, p. 422.

place naturally, because indeed the disturbance is rooted in the very nature-ground of the individual, not in the form of any violence which he suffers from without, but in that of a bias and propensity, which, from within, insinuate themselves into all the elements of our life. But the notion of *guilt* essentially contains the moment of *causation by self-decision*; it has that freedom for its fundamental basis, which includes the possibility of different results, which negatives therefore not merely coercion, but also inward necessity (in the metaphysical sense.) Consequently, if it be still maintained, that the individuals are the bearers of a perverted determination, which attaches to the genus by virtue of a necessity absolutely preceding their self-decision, then their hereditary sinful constitution, let it be ever so intimately inwoven in their individual natures and in its external manifestations voluntarily become ever so cherished and cared for by them, can never be imputed to them, but to the nature of the genus, to him who brought this disturbance into human nature. *That* freedom, which only excludes coercion, which rests upon the coincidence of the individual's own inclination with the impulse to a given expression of life, we must also recognize in the sentient existences of nature; if it is to justify us in considering the disturbance attaching to the individual life as the guilt of the same, we should also be allowed to impute to the beast of prey, its murderous lust and cruelty, as guilt. But this freedom of the inclination cannot, for this reason, serve to secure the self-participation of the individual in original sin, over against the determining force of the nature of the genus, because just in this very free inclination of the individual towards the sin, this determining force shows itself in all its magnitude; it would manifestly be less powerful, if the individual only with aversion and resistance followed the bias of hereditary sin; as indeed no one doubts, that the dominion of the natural sinfulness over man is at the point of being broken, when his relation to it is one of aversion and resistance.

But if this insisting upon a self-decision of the person, as the condition of the guilt, is said to be *moral atomism*, then this moral atomism must be laid to the charge of the Holy Scripture itself. For it by no means regards man in sin as aggregate genus, but makes within the same *species* a specific

distinction, manifestly conditioned by the self-decision of the individuals, between children of the light and children of the darkness, and in the last instance, in so far as the judgment of the world is the last instance, goes back entirely to the individual personalities and the estimate of their life before God. If now it is to be possible for the Christian dogmatic, firmly to maintain in its eschatology, according to this example of the Scripture, the notion of guilt in all its force and rigour, as including the self-causation of damnable sin by the individual personality, then it dare not enervate it in its anthropology. The personal individual, if anything in the world, as its name indicates, is indivisible, a compact whole complete in itself, in this sense an ἄτομον, which, as ground-stuff of the world, will absolutely not allow itself to be regarded as modus or affection of another.—We repeat it, that we by no means overlook in its importance, the moment of the *nature-determinateness* in human sin, and the relative dependence, thereby posited, of the personal individual, upon the nature basis, out of which he developes himself. But when directly that side of his sinful being, which breaks through this limit and points to a higher, self-dependent relation—and this is just the *guilt* attaching to the personality on account of its sin—is again drawn down into that nature-ground, when therefore that nature-determinateness is said no longer to be a *moment*, but *one and everything* in sin, there results from this organic view, so one-sidedly held, a certain naturalism in the doctrine of sin, which, consistently carried out, endangers not merely the doctrine of the judgment of the world, but also that of personal immortality.

Or were perhaps this the true meaning of Christianity, that humanity, in its natural condition (in Adam), is really only *nature*, an aggregate mass capable it is true of being animated to personal existence, but not yet participating in the same, the individual elements of which first of all obtain personality in Christ? If such were the case, then one would be obliged entirely to relinquish the idea of the imputation of sin in the sphere of the natural life, because as such it were deficient in the necessary fundamental basis of personality strictly taken, and be satisfied in maintaining it in the sphere of the new creation of life in Christ. But even here, more closely considered, it could

not be maintained, if only for this reason, because indeed in this sphere, we can no longer speak of a self-deciding of the individual between good and evil, but only of the decidedness of the same for the good, and because even the transition into this sphere of Redemption, in the connection of this opinion, cannot be conditioned by a real self-decision of man; for otherwise this power of personally moral self-decision must still be acknowledged in the natural condition. As now the very notion of Redemption becomes thereby in the most serious manner enervated, in its ethical significance, so in the anthropological sphere, the merely negativing conception of sin and the denial of the freedom of the will and of the Divine image in the nature of man, stand therewith in inseparable connection. Thus then that opinion too, that the sin of the natural life cannot strictly fall under the idea of imputation, has not merely the universal testimony of the New Testament decidedly against it and pre-eminently so its great proclamation of the forgiveness of sins for the sake of Christ—for where there is no sin, which can be imputed as guilt, there can be nothing to forgive—but just as decidedly the unambiguous testimony of *conscience*.—Christianity is not merely the raising of one imperfect to a higher stage of existence, but the reconciliation of the deepest variance, therefore presupposes in the sphere of life, prior to the Redemption, that energy of personal existence, by which the variance, the self-dissension, is only possible.

That the nature corrupts the person might, according to the tenor of the words, be even so understood, that the nature excites the person to corrupt himself by perverted self-determination; but if the formula in our old dogmatick is much rather to express this, that the person necessarily makes himself a participant of the sin, by which the nature is poisoned, we need not here at present more closely put the truth of the same to the test; but it is certain that, if the matter really is so, the person has no *guilt* in the sin which belongs to him. For a *guilt*, which is said to be innate to the personal individual solely by virtue of his dependent relation to the genus and its nature, consequently entirely without his aid, we shall be obliged to declare as a representation which cancels itself, until we are shown that the notion of moral guilt does not include in it the moment of causation by self-decision.

Neither are we able of course to lay it upon ourselves as *a duty of love to humanity*, to renounce a determination, which the notion of guilt irrefutably requires, and there *to impute* to ourselves sin, where according to the presupposition the conditions of imputation are entirely wanting. Truly every deeper reflection upon ourselves teaches us to acknowledge the sin of the world as that of ours, and our sin as the sin of the world; but the same deeper self-reflection also tells us, that this does not rest upon a free decision of love—in which case even the Holy one in the strict sense, indeed He most of all must declare Himself guilty of sin in like manner as the world—but that we are necessitated thereto by a real self-dependently personal participation in the universal culpability.

After the results of this discussion, we may now easily judge of the formula by which *Schleiermacher* supposes himself to have solved the problem under consideration. On the one hand, he considers the hereditary sin as the sinfulness present in an individual prior to any act, and which has its ground in the other side of his existence; but on the other hand, according to him, the hereditary sin is at the same time so much every one's own guilt who has a share in the same, that it is best represented, as the *collective act* and *collective guilt* of the human race.[1]

For the more exact fixation of the opinion, we must first of all observe, that the totality of the human race is indeed one not simultaneously existing, so that each could in any way work upon all and all upon each, although by ever so many mediations, and that now "the sinfulness preceding any act"—could possibly be "in each the work of all and in all the work of each,"[2] but this totality makes its appearance gradually in the course of time, so that each one is only able to work upon those cotemporary with and succeeding him, and upon each only those cotemporary with and preceding him (really or aitiologically.) And this necessary limitation is by no means a matter of indifference for the *Schleiermachian* opinion, in so far as there follows therefrom, that the causative participation of the individuals in this sinfulness increases the further back one goes towards the beginning, and diminishes in proportion as the development of

[1] Compare *die Hauptsätze der* §§ 70 *und* 71 *in der Glaubenslehre.*

[2] L. c. § 71, 2 (vol. i. p. 421.)

humanity progresses, and that, when indeed even science necessitates us to adopt the opinion of some one first generation as well as of some one last, then this sinfulness preceding any act can be in the former only causative, in the latter only caused—with which the maintained equality of all is completely destroyed.

However as to the chief determination, which designates the universal sinfulness, as *collective guilt*, the expression alludes to a deep truth, which however *Schleiermacher* does not recognize; but in the way in which we are obliged to understand it in the connection of the *Schleiermachian* opinion, it does not furnish the solution of the problem, but only that, which is to be explained by distinction and separation of the elements, namely, the manifoldly mixed and conditioned fact, from which the investigation has to set out. We find the individual in his sin by no means absolutely individual and alone, but manifoldly in in human society, so that with all others, he partly sh certain defective fundamental characteristics, partly rece birth and propagates by generation determinate modific of this universal sinfulness, as they gradually proceed in several spheres of human society from real sin as natural di sitions to this or that form of sin, and lastly partly experien during his conscious life, from other individuals an influen promotive of sin and giving it a determinate form and exerts a similar influence upon them. Here now the question arises, what in this complicated working is to be considered as *guilt of the individual*, and especially how those defective fundamental characteristics, to which everything further manifestly attaches, are able to be his guilt; and if now *Schleiermacher* meets us in reply to this question, with the notion of the *collective guilt*, that is only just the *laying down* not the *solution* of the problem. There is therewith shown as it were the aggregate mass of guilt, for which the human race is solidarily responsible; but although of course no human judgment is able to fix the determinate share of the individual in this aggregate, the dogmatick consideration has nevertheless to inquire after and investigate the general principles, from which the self-dependent participation of the individual in the aggregate follows.

The deeper ground, wherefore the *Schleiermachian* treatment of this question could furnish no satisfactory result, is not difficult

to discover. Where the notion of freedom is wanting, there the notion of guilt is robbed of its real kernel, and then there is only the shell left to be retained. And is there anything more than this shell, when the right of denominating the hereditary sin, the guilt of each one, is founded upon this, that the innate sinfulness grows by the exercise proceeding from the self-activity of the individual, consequently does not continue in him without his will and therefore too would have arisen by it?[1] Besides, these sentences, with the last deduction, fall into the strangest circle, since indeed that self-activity of the individual strengthening the sinfulness, inasmuch as "real sin infallibly proceeds from the hereditary sin,"[2] is itself again the necessary result of the innate sinfulness and (according to *Schleiermacher*) is only possible under its presupposition.—It also rests upon the fundamental [illegible]iveness of the *Schleiermachian* notion of *personality*, the very [illegible]se of which is *freedom* in the significance declined by [illegible]*rmacher*, that in his Philosophical and Christian Ethicks[3] [illegible]nceives of the relation between *individual* and *genus* in the [illegible]an sphere otherwise than that which we, according to the [illegible]ositions given here and in other places of this work, are [illegible]ged to regard as the correct one. It is here especially [illegible]markable, that in the latter[4] he believes himself able satisfactorily to determine that relation according to the side of the *self-dependency of the individual* without at all employing the notion of personality.

It is principally the view of these insurmountable difficulties, which, under the given presuppositions, stand opposed to the imputation of innate sinfulness, to which a modification of the doctrine of hereditary sin, above alluded to, already essentially laid down by the Arminians and further developed by many modern theologians, is indebted for its origination and diffusion.

According to this the dogma in relation to the question of *impu-*

[1] L. c. § 71, 1 (vol. i. p. 420.) Comp. for the last sentence the observation of *Krabbe*. Ibid. p. 154.

[2] Ibid—the same place.

[3] Compare the former in *Schweizer's* edition, § 157, 158, the latter in the General Introduction, p. 58.

[4] L. c.

tation shapes itself in the following manner. It is admitted, that the sinfall of our first parents has brought not merely physical, but also moral disorder and corruption into human nature, so that the descendants of Adam are not born in the same integrity in which he was created, but from the beginning, are affected with a certain *impurity*, with a strong *inclination to evil*. But this inclination to evil cannot be imputed to them as guilt, just because it is born within them without their agency; it is in them as an *evil*, as a disease, which by that fall has penetrated into human nature, but not as real sin. This only arises by the yielding of the individual, after the awakening of his moral consciousness, to the solicitations of this corrupt inclination, whereby he pollutes himself not merely with actual sins, but also strengthens that inborn inclination to evil and enhances it to a dominant propensity, which then becomes the source of manifold actual sins.[1] Only for this *consenting to the excitations of the innate sinfulness*, and for all sinful actions and conditions which follow from this consent, is man responsible; only thereby does he become guilty before God.[2]

[1] This is what *Schleiermacher*, although under altered presuppositions, calls the peccatum originis originans of the individual, in contrast to the peccatum originis originatum of the individual, *i.e.* to his innate sinfulness as such, *Glaubenslehre* vol. i., p. 419 seq. However it is not to be seen, why the latter should not also be called peccatum originis originans, since indeed it too, and pre-eminently so, is the source of sin, and the former peccatum originis originatum, since, according to *Schleiermacher*, it has its ground in the inborn sinfulness. Besides, if in the old Protestant, as already in the Scholastic theology, peccatum originis originans is a usual expression for another thing, namely for the sinfall, it will certainly be more judicious to retain the older designation of that distinction by habitus vitiosus connatus and acquisitus (peccatum habituale conn. acquis).

[2] The principal features of this view are already found in *Zwingly*, especially in his fidei ratio, sent to the diet at Augsburgh, in the year 1530; further developed in *Limborch's theologia christiana*, lib. iii., cap. 2, § 24 seq. c. 3, § 1–4 c. 4, § 1.—still, with strong leaning to a mere distinction of degree between the corruption of the nature commencing with the fall and the status integritatis (concedimus appetitus nostros *minus* esse puros quam appetitum primorum parentum ante lapsum—Adami appetitum *magis* inclinasse in malum quam ante perpetratum peccatum). A few, among the supernaturalistic dogmatists, of the latter half of the previous century, adopt the same view, *e.g. Döderlein, instit. theol. christ.* P. ii. § 182–188. Among the more modern, philosophical and theological elaborations of our problem,

If now this distinction, according to its intention, is indeed to limit the imputation, but then, within the limits, to fix it all the more firmly, it must manifestly adopt the opinion, that it is in the power of every man *to withhold himself from giving that consent;* the freedom of his will, although impeded and curtailed by the inborn sinfulness, can nevertheless not be absolutely destroyed, and thus, in relation to his original condition, it is made, it is true, very difficult, but not entirely impossible, for man, in his conduct and disposition of mind, to meet the Divine requirements, so far as he cognizes them.[1] Nevertheless, if he often enough finds himself not in a condition to withstand the violent power of his desires and passions, and will no one presume to ascribe to himself the ability, of keeping his heart perfectly pure from all sinful excitations, this, in the connection of the view here laid down, will ever have to be regarded as a condition, which has first of all *become*, which has arisen from earlier infidelity towards the requirements of the conscience in consenting to the sin.

Herewith now the problem appears to be solved, by the recognition of a sinfulness *inrooted in human nature*, to which we are necessitated by universal experience, which at the same time obliges us firmly to maintain the truth of the *consciousness of guilt*, as it undeniably attests itself in our conscience. The inborn corruption of every child of Adam, resides in the nature-side of its being, and, in so far as one may ascribe to this in distinction from the spirit a will, in the will of the nature; an inborn perversity of the personal will, upon which all imputation proceeds, there is not, for this can only corrupt itself by its free decision.

Bockshammer's work on *The Freedom of the Human Will*, p. 119 seq., *Steudel's* dissertation on *Sin and Grace*, and most definitely and determinately *Krabbe's Doctrine of Sin and of Death*, p. 159 seq., express themselves in favour of this mediating theory. Also the article by *Kern*, on *The Doctrine of Sin*, seems in its expressions on this point to belong here (*Tübinger Zeitsch. für Theol.* 1833, p. 30 seq.) Still, it is difficult, from the vacillating, in part contradictory, expressions, to arrive at the real opinion of the author; and this article in its second dogmatic part belongs to the most unclear and unsatisfactory elaborations of our subject; a false striving, after depth of thought and energy of expression, does not allow it to bring the most simple, fundamental notions into proper order.

[1] Comp. *Bockshammer* l. c. p. 121, *Krabbe* l. c. p. 166.

In order clearly to satisfy ourselves, whether we may be allowed to abide by this mediative attempt, we will not stop to discuss the difficulties which some expressions of Paul, especially Eph. ii. 3, oppose to it. For the same reason, we only just allude, in passing, to what has been earlier (in the third chapter of the third book) said in a more general sense, what according to the connection of this opinion one would also expect, that some remembrance, of an event so fruitful in consequences as, according to this, his first sinful decision of will were, would remain to the individual, and how serious a matter it is, that, according to it, a decision must be ascribed to the early age of childhood, by which that development of moral corruption, which is able to make man damnable before God, becomes newly grounded. The great question is, whether this theory really solves the problem, which it has proposed to itself.

This problem is manifestly a *twofold* one; it relates, partly, to the possibility of a definite distinction between the corruption which is innate in the individual human life, consequently a corruption for which he is not guilty, and the sin which is connected with his own guilt, partly, to the reconcilability of the fact, that no human life which has passed beyond the period of moral consciouslessness is free from guilt, with the conditionateness of guilt by free self-decision.

First of all now as to that distinction, it would have no difficulty, if the innate sinfulness could be regarded as a disposition, which indeed contained a general excitation of the will to perverse self-determination, but, in itself considered, was not able to produce determinate movements and changes of the external or internal life corresponding to it, but lay bound and inefficacious in the ground of the soul, in so far as the will does not by yielding to it, make it the material of its individual self-determinations. But this is not the case, and it is also not at all conceivable that it could be so. Even before the awakening of the moral consciousness, and therefore before the appearance of the proper will, the inborn sinfulness exhibits itself in manifold expressions, which appear entirely of the same character as actual sins, and which we do not consider as such, simply because the consciousness and will still slumber; now, after the awakening of the same, ought not such determinate activities of the sinful nature and its

erring impulses and inclinations suddenly to *disappear*? Suppose the will were, as this theory, to be consistent with itself, must maintain, pure in every human life from its commencement, is it nevertheless to be impeded by the corruption in the nature; would it be so, if immediately upon its appearance it were so perfectly master in the external and internal life of man, that nothing whatever could move or alter itself in the same, in so far as it did not fall into the sphere of the involuntary organic functions, without its definite consent? How easy then had it been to be itself holy and to make the entire life of man holy!

But we shall be so much the less inclined to adopt the opinion of that sudden disappearance, since we everywhere in human life, besides the offences in which the will directly shares, meet with another genus of actual sins, which take place without its consent, namely the unpremeditated sins, and among them, the sins of precipitation especially (comp. vol. i., p. 197 seq.). If we are reminded that these unpremeditated sins may very well be the consequences of premeditated sins, of neglected conflict, contrary to the inward admonition, with the corrupt inclinations etc., we do not for a moment question the same, but only maintain, that they may just as well be regarded as outbursts of that original sinfulness. And here we have a web of homogeneous, sinful elements, whose distinction in relation to their derivation, according to which the individual is said to be inculpable with respect to some and self-culpable with respect to others, is perfectly incognizable, so that the consciousness becomes confused and at length does not any longer at all know, how much of the sin, which it finds in its own life, it ought strictly to impute to the subject. Indeed if we still go a step further, and, with *Krabbe* tracing back the individual, actual sins to this double source, then "only regard as guilt that element, which is contained in the individual sins as a free element and which has co-operated in their origination and completion, the remaining also as sins it is true, but not as culpable sin,"[1] we therewith first of all learn, that of the offences which our conscience will impute to us entirely, we have to reproach ourselves only on account of a part of the same; but a definite *principle of division* were therewith only then given us,

[1] L. c. p. 167.

if we did not shun the further consequence of this view, which will presently come before us—and perhaps not even then.

There seems to be a double way of escape from this difficulty. The one seeks to arrive at a definite and sharp distinction by the assumption, that only the *premeditated* sins incur guilt, and are capable of imputation, while the others, not merely the excitations of condemnable lust, prior to the consent of the will, which the Arminian, as well as the Catholic theologians, are accustomed to exclude from the notion of real sin, but also the actual sins of precipitation and ignorance, are solely expressions of the natural sinfulness, and *do not* therefore *carry with them guilt.* But this assumption first of all limits the sins to be imputed to us to a much narrower sphere, than conscience allows us. For if the unpremeditated sin according to its notion, is not directly in the moment of its committal the object of a monition of conscience, it nevertheless becomes so afterwards, when we become conscious of it. And indeed by this limitation, the purpose would never be accomplished, namely the distinguishing in any definitely cognizable manner, culpable from inculpable sin, because the boundary between premeditated and unpremeditated sin, as was earlier (vol. ii. p. 74 seq.) shown, is only a flowing one. Then this opinion leads to that atomistic method of representation, which considers the perverted decision of the will as something absolutely individual and passing in the moment, incapable of generating any condition and propensity in the inward life; for if it is able to produce such a state, then it and its activities, although in themselves considered, not at all bearing the impress of premeditated sin, must fall under the class of imputed sin just as the very perverted decision of the will from which they have arisen. And on this method of representation borders that expression, just above quoted, of an author, in whom we elsewhere meet with a deeper conception of sin; if in the individual sin we are only to regard that free element, which is contained in it, as guilt, it appears to follow that we have only those individual sins to impute to ourselves as guilt, in which a free element is contained, so that *e. g.* the crimes of blind passion were excluded; which would then lead just to that atomistic method of representation.

A way of escape in the opposite direction presents itself with the acknowledgment, that, since the definite separation of the

elements in the individual sin as to their twofold derivation, cannot be accomplished, and since on the other hand, the will of the individual, from the moment of the awakening consciousness onward, in some way participates in the conservation and development of the inborn sinfulness, even if it were only in a negative manner, in that it has not overcome it and rendered it ineffectual, the individual *has to impute to-himself* all his moral misdeeds and errors *fully and without distinction as guilt.* But, if indeed the matter here treated of is not of an ascetic counsel *a tutiori*, but of objective truth, we must ask, whether the will from that moment onward, had *been able* to prevent the inborn sinfulness in its further development, indeed whether by persistent withdrawal of all nourishment it had *been able* to prevent its continuance in existence? The affirmation of this question would make the innate sinfulness something so entirely powerless and inefficient, that it were scarcely possible to distinguish it from a denial of the same. But if the question is negatived, then, under the given presuppositions, this way of escape loses entirely its objective fundamental basis.

And this leads us to the *second* problem, which this theory has to solve, namely to reconcile the fact, that all developed human life is affected with guilt, with the conditionateness of guilt by the self-decision of the will. That this point is a very difficult one, the adherents of this opinion will not be able to hide from themselves. For if the nerve of the latter rests in the freedom of the will, to refuse to yield to the inclination of the corrupt nature, one must indeed from the first confidently expect, that a *greater or smaller portion of mankind* would remain entirely free from contamination by their own guilt. Instead of this, however, this contamination is *universally* met with, which forcibly urges the theory to the assumption of a necessity, a concealed law of nature governing the present human development, while it finds itself drawn, by the interest in the truth of the consciousness of guilt, just as powerfully to the opposite side, to the freedom of the will, which includes in itself the possibility of the continuous resistance of temptation to evil.

For the mediation of these opposite directions one appeals to that *impediment of the will* by the corruption, which has penetrated into the nature, and which is said to be sufficient to make the immutable self-determination of the will according to the moral

law extraordinarily difficult, but just insufficient, absolutely to remove the possibility of this self-determination. But if one will not maintain, it may be, in contradiction to that presupposition of an *impediment* of the will by the natural corruption, that the unlimited, self-determining power of freedom, sets all other moments on an equality, he will be obliged to admit, that with every augmentation of the difficulty a diminution of the guilt, in case of the difficulty not being surmounted, necessarily keeps equal pace. Thus this opinion falls into the unfortunate position, of being obliged on account of the universality of this state of guilt, to give up so much of the freedom of the self-decision whereby the will lays itself under this load, that the consciousness of guilt becomes thereby weakened and insecure, and still is obliged to retain so much of freedom, in order not to lose it entirely, that the universality of the state of guilt does not become really explained, and consequently the sacrifice is made in vain.

Neither is it able to release itself from this position by the truth already cognized by us (vol. ii. p. 189. seq.), namely, that according to the nature of evil, the origination of the same can only be comprehended *according to its possibility*, as contained in the nature of creaturely freedom, not *according to its reality*, in which respect, it is only a matter of experience. Here the matter to be explained, is not merely the fact that man at all makes himself guilty; but this must be explained, that all the millions of mankind, who awake to consciousness find themselves laden with guilt, with one only exception, and this one, altogether peculiarly conditioned. If evil is regarded as arbitrariness exalting itself in creaturely freedom, there is also with the notion of this arbitrariness the insight obtained, that from objective ground the comprehension of evil in its origination can only extend to the possibility, not to the reality. But here we have to do with the agreement of innumerable facts, with a rule of the most remarkable universal validity, which, as such, appears to point not to arbitrariness, but to necessity.

We may still advert to the peculiar manner in which *we become conscious of* the universality of human culpableness. The presence of sin and guilt in human life we may learn from experience; but that all men share in them, experience alone is not able to teach us, because it must ever be too limited. If

now the notion of the free decision of the will, by which alone guilt arises, in itself considered, resists in the strongest manner the universality of the culpableness, and if the view here under consideration, has no other ground for this universality than experience, which is for this purpose objectively insufficient, it will be under the necessity of giving up the maintenance of this universality, and of laying it down simply as a problematical assumption; wherewith it becomes surely for it also only a problematical assumption, that Christ is the Propitiator of the entire human race.

In order the better to maintain this universality, and yet at the same time to avoid the hard doctrine, that all human life is by the fall of the first parents of the race from the beginning affected with guilt and deserving of punishment, modern theologians have adopted the following middle course. They not merely admit that by the fall the powers of human nature are weakened and corrupted, but quite simply consider also this corruption as the *cause of real sins connected with guilt*, without introducing between the natural corruption and the real offences, in accordance with the opinion under consideration, the self-decision of the free will in such a way that in it was contained the power to permit or to prevent the transition of the former into the latter. The *Melancthonian* rule: *Semper cum peccato originali simul sum peccata actualia*, they understood, without laying that importance upon the distinction of premeditated and unpremeditated sins, in such a way, as without doubt *Melancthon* himself understood it, that from inherited sin, actual sins also follow of themselves and with inward necessity. But this inherited, constitutional character is said in itself not to redound to the guilt of the individual, in whom indeed it has arisen, without his agency, as a consequence of the sin of another, but only *those effects of that constitutional character are to be imputed to him which are brought about by his own self-activity*, therefore only his real sins.[1]

[1] This opinion is already found in the Apology of the Remonstrants where it teaches a corruption of the descendants of Adam which has arisen from the fall, which does not become imputed to them it is true, but nevertheless causes, ut—eadem justitia (originali) destituti, prorsus

It is indeed obvious, that, in the connection of this opinion, sin and the necessity of Redemption follow of themselves, as *universal* determinations of the human race; on this account, the doubt so much the more powerfully arises with respect to it, whether in it sufficient care has been taken for the *conditions of imputation*. It places itself especial importance upon this point, in that it will not acknowledge the hereditary sin as such, therefore not as guilt, because it attaches to man as something imparted to him from another, independently of his free self-determination. And yet it will not, as the theory just examined, attach the transition of original sinfulness to real sin, by which guilt is said first of all to arise, to the self-dependent deciding point of a freedom, in which the will has still before it the possibility of keeping itself free from every contamination by sin, but the transition is said to be a *necessary* one, *i.e.* unavoidable.[1]

inepti et inidonei sint ad vitam aeternam consequendum aut in gratiam cum Deo redeundum aut ad viam inveniendum, qua ad vitam aut in gratiam cum Deo redeant, nisi Deus nova gratia sua eos praeveniat et vires novas iis restituat etc. comp. *Winer's Symbolik*, p. 59, 60. As *Episcopius*, the author of the Apology, further develops this method of representation in his institutiones theologicae, lib. iv. sect. v. c. 1 and 2, the unreconciled variance of the interests distinctly appears, out of which *Limborch* seeks in the above adduced manner to find for himself a way of escape. On the one hand, the liberrima hominis (cuiusque) voluntas is made valid as condition of guilt and the evitabile and vincibile of the same maintained; on the other hand, it is acknowledged as the result of inherited sin, ut omnes ac singuli homines nascantur destituti divinae voluntatis cognitione ac proinde impotentes et inidonei ad faciendum ea, quae Deo per se grata sunt, nisi accedat nova divinae revelationis gratia. Among modern theologians this opinion is brought forward with great precision by *J. Fr. Gruner* in his *institutiones theologiae dogmaticae*, § 142 *seq.* 152 seq. comp. § 187, 188; also *Michaelis* professes it, more decidedly in his *Dogmatik*, § 82 seq., than in his more frequently quoted *Monographie über Sünde und Genugthuung*, also *Seiler* in his work on *Hereditary Sin*, p. 101. seq. All three place in conjunction therewith the well-known hypothesis of the poisonous tree in Paradise, while *Reinhard* maintains from the same hypothesis, a punishment of the original sin itself, although only a privative one, comp. *Vorlesungen über die Dogmatik*, § 83. Also *Hahn's Lehrbuch des christlichen Glaubens* appears to be attached to the above opinion, comp. 356 seq. 365, 411 seq.

[1] *Whitby* in his *tractatus de imputatione divina peccati Adami* arrives at the same result from a different presupposition, at the opinion of a constitutional character innate to the descendants of Adam, which indeed is in them as an entirely inculpable fate and therefore no object of

If now, according to this, real sin is the necessary consequence of innate sinfulness, then the canon: *causa causae est causa causati* holds strictly good of this relation, *i.e.* the sinfall is just as much the cause of real sins, as it is the cause of innate sinfulness. If, therefore, inherited sin is said to be incapable of being imputed to us because it is posited in us by the act of other individuals, of the first of mankind, then it incontrovertably follows, that also real sins withdraw themselves from imputation. That the presence of the latter in our life is *conditioned by our self-activity*, while, on the contrary, the presence of the former is not so, is a distinction which, under the given presupposition, has no influence at all on the matter itself. For if this self-activity is not to be that freedom of self-dependent decision, it is only just the *particular form*, by which, in the sphere of moral life, the transition from the cause to the effect mediates itself without prejudice to its perfect necessity, and the sinning individual remains nevertheless in all formal self-activity, really considered, perfectly determined by the operative principle of the condition, from which his sinning arises. Accordingly, therefore, real sin would also be incapable of grounding guilt.

But if the adherents of this opinion undoubtedly do not suffer the last conclusion to hold good, because there is nothing more certain to them than the conscience, which necessitates us to impute to ourselves our sin, then they cannot refuse to acknowledge also the *innate sinfulness*, the source of real sins, as object of imputation, consequently as *guilt*. For as the condemning judgment applies not merely to the outward expressions of a perverted

imputation, but nevertheless carries with it the necessity of their burdening themselves with sin, and thereby with guilt compare, Cap. 1, thes. 1—4.—th. 4, it is said: ea rerum oeconomia—those which have arisen by the fall—nos passionum impetui et affectuum motibus ita subiicit, ut vix ac ne vix possibile sit nos innocentes legique divinae morigeros per integram vitam perseverare. His presupposition has this in common with that hypothesis of the poisonous tree, that it makes the physical the source of moral evil; Adam on account of his disobedience, and in him all his descendants, by virtue of their natural connection, have become subject to the necessity of dying, and the fear of death, together with the desire to enjoy as much as possible this fleeting life, become to them the source of all sin. In the arguments, which *Whitby* in the following chapters abundantly brings forward, in controversion of the Church form of the dogma, one finds all that is required for the refutation of his own theory.

inward constitutional character, but also to this character itself, so also the imputing judgment. But the difficulty, which, in the connection of this opinion, arises from the dependence of our sin upon the perversion of will in other individuals, is, as we have seen, for both spheres, essentially the same; and if, in spite of this difficulty, it holds fast the imputation in the relatively external sphere, it may not thereby allow itself to be prevented from cognizing that sin inrooted in the inward of human nature as guilt.

Thus the negativing result, which the critick of these mediating theories has furnished us, drives us irresistably back to a point, which indeed we have already cognized as untenable. We are obliged to consider the corruption, of which all the descendants of Adam become partakers, by means of natural propagation as one grounding guilt; and yet this corruption, just in so far as it is in us by a natural process, is entirely deficient in the conditions, without which imputation can absolutely not be maintained. There is manifestly only one way of escape in the connection of the Church doctrine of original sin, which is deserving of closer examination, because only in it, if it is capable of establishing its inner possibility, the apparently contradictory determinations, and yet determinations to be maintained with equal rigour really become united, namely, the universal corruption fast rooted in human nature, as the source of real sins, and the self-incurring of guilt by the individual person. The great objection which the moral consciousness takes against the dogma, rests upon this, that according to it the descendants of Adam are said to become *guilty* and deserving of punishment *by the sin of another*; on the contrary, it will ever make valid the well-known fundamental principle of the *Pelagians: Deus, qui propria peccata remittit, aliena non imputat.* We have also convinced ourselves, that those mediating theories are not able to remove the difficulty. If it is to be removed, it can only take place, by their being shown behind the *alienum* falling in the phenomenon, a *proprium* as the concealed truth of this relation, therefore only by proving, that the will, which, by its self-perversion in the sin-fall, causes the corruption of the nature preceding all real sin in

the descendants of Adam, is at the same time our own will, that consequently our will, if in its determinations from the beginning of our individual existence it is in some way dependent upon that natural corruption, is only dependent upon its self-determination. If this is shown, the necessity is also proved, of considering this natural corruption with its results directly as being at the same time the guilt of all those, in whom it is found; for moral conditions and actions which arise from an act subject to imputation, themselves under the imputation.

This therefore is the point at which all the threads of orthodox doctrine of hereditary sin meet, in which it must dogmatically justified, if it is at all capable of such a justific It first of all appears as something quite incredible, that in fall of Adam all his natural posterity are supposed to have taken some participation. If now it may be shown, that this is only the paradox, which every deeper connection of things has for ordinary thinking, then all further difficulties of the dogma become resolved of themselves.

We must therefore regard it as a laudable testimony for the acuteness and systematic thoroughness of our older theologians, that they cognize this point in its great significance, without on the other hand, concealing from themselves that it can indeed only have this significance, as an explanatory principle of the real determinations, which, from the fall of our first parents, diffuse themselves over the entire race of their posterity. According to the *modus docendi* prevalent in the old Protestant dogmatick, the connection of our culpability with the fall of our first parents is a double one, *mediate* and *immediate*. The corruption of human nature which has arisen *in consequence* of this fall, which indeed, at the time of their fall, only has real existence in them, they transmit by generation to their children and these again to their descendants, so that all men from the commencement of their existence bear in them a constitutional character, which objectively strives against the law of God, and makes them guilty before God (*mediata peccati Adamitici imputatio.*) But also *immediately* have all the descendants of Adam with him made themselves guilty in his fall; they are regarded by God as such, who have committed the very act by which Adam fell (*immediata peccati Adamitici imputatio*, by the reformed theologians also denominated *imputatio antecedens* in

distinction from the *imputatio mediata* as *consequens*; but they are therefore regarded as such, because they have really taken part in that act.[1] This immediate imputation of the fall has its real basis in the propagation of the natural corruption; but *Quenstedt* on the other hand definitely recognizes, that the participation in the punishment of the fall, to which the loss of the Divine image and the dominion of evil lust most essentially belong, is conditioned by participation in the guilt of the fall.[2]

In this connection it also becomes intelligible how the older dogmatick (already the *Apology* of the C. A. art. i. p. 58) could think of representing the inherited sinfulness, without prejudice to its conception as guilt and as source of further culpabilities, after the example of *Augustinus*, also as *punishment*—a representation, which became zealously controverted by the opponents of the immediate imputation in the Reformed Church, by the Arminians,[3] and Placaeus,[4] on the contrary, was driven to such an extreme by the orthodox theologians, that they in part no longer placed importance upon the natural connection of the corruption by propagation, and just on that account preferred the creative theory of the origination of individual human souls to traductiv-

[1] Non posset in nos propagari reatus, nisi praecessissit imputatio actus, quippe qui illius fundamentum est, *Quenstedt*, l. c. sect. 2, qu. 7 (p. 112), and in another passage of the same quaestio: Voluntas Adami censebatur nostra; nam primus homo omnium posterorum voluntates in sua quasi voluntate locatas habuit. *Quenstedt*, moreover appears to conceive of the above connection as a *threefold* when in two passages, sect. i. th. 30, (p. 57), sect. ii. qu. 7, (p. 113), according to *Balthasar Meisner*, he expresses it in this way: tenemur (1) participatione culpae actualis; in Adamo namque omnes peccavimus. (2) imputatione reatus legalis; stabat enim et cadebat primus homo et caput, in quo et conservarentur et perderentur concessa dona et privilegia. (3) propagatione pravitatis naturalis, quia in omnes per naturalem conceptionem diffunditur. But this triplicity only arises by *Quenstedt*, without reason, separating from each other, the participation in the act grounding guilt and the participation directly therewith given in the arrest under the law requiring punishment, and thus this triplicity of itself becomes resolved into the duplicity above mentioned.

[2] In the 7th quaestio, in many places.

[3] Comp. Institt. theol. of *Episcopius*, l. c.

[4] *Thes.* xxiv. seq. de statu hominis lapsi ante gratiam, comp. *Syntagma thesium theol. in Acad. Salmuriensi disputatarum*, P. i. p. 209. Also many among the rigid *Lutheran* theologians, *e.g. Quenstedt*, conceive of the corruptness of human nature not as positive punishment, but as a naturally necessary consequence of the fall.

ism or declared the distinction of both to be a matter of indifference in relation to the doctrine of hereditary sin. From this extreme, favoured by the *decretum absolutum*, the *Lutheran* theology has kept itself far removed; but to consider the hereditary sinfulness, in the respect in which it is a determinateness of being by means of a preceding culpability (in the fall), as punishment, was under the presupposition of the entire human race sharing in this culpability then at least quite consistent, if the moral corruption into which Adam plunged *himself* by his falling away from God, may in that respect be equally regarded as punishment.

Now just therewith the trope of doctrine of the *Lutheran* dogmatick steps in between two deviations in opposite directions. The one is the ratio docendi of *Placaeus*, which thinking it has a sufficient fundamental basis in relation to the imputation of hereditary sin, in the corruption of the nature proceeding from the fall of Adam and innate in all his posterity, and therefore excluding immediate imputation, limits itself to the mediate.[1] But therewith this theory leaves that passage of the dogma, which is the most exposed to attack, and about which the doctrine of immediate imputation erects a bulwark, namely the possibility of imputing to us that which is innate and in so far not at all conditioned by the will, entirely unprotected, and therefore is under the necessity of abandoning this post and of retiring back within one of the mediating theories above discussed.

Over against this we have the ratio docendi, which after *Thomas von Aquino*[2] acquired the dominion in the Scholastic as also later in the Roman Catholic theology,[3] and which won to itself among

[1] *Thes.* vii.-xviii. *de statu hominis* etc. further developed in the disputatio de primi peccati imputatione, especially in the fourth and tenth chapters of the first division. In the first half of the former century this view became partially admitted even in the *Lutheran* theology, comp. *Pfaff's Institt. theol. dogm. et mor.* p. 236, 237. *Mosheim's Elementa theol. dogmaticae*, p. 497 seq., his own opinion and his remark on the then prevalent modus docendi of the Lutheran theologians.

[2] *Summa* ii. i. qu. 81, art. 1—3. qu. 85, art. 2—4. comp. also the *Summa contra gentiles*, which in many respects more definitely exhibits the opinion of *Thomas* than the former, lib. iv. c. 50—52.

[3] Nevertheless *Wicliffe* e. g. lays especial stress upon the determination later opposed by the Protestant against the Catholic theology, in that he thus expresses it, every one has proprium peccatum originale, im *Trialogus* lib. iii. c. xxiv.

the most distinguished Lutheran theologians a defender in *George Calix.*[1] This withdraws from the immediate imputation of the fall, the real basis of a positive corruption of the nature in consequence of the same, and leaves it, in the real condition of man affected with hereditary sin, as he is from the beginning of his existence, only a *negative ground-basis*, the deficiency of the original righteousness. For the sensational lust *(concupiscentia)*, which, in so far as it is a self-dependent power of the reason and is overagainst the will, is by this theory regarded as the material of the hereditary sin and according to it not sinful in itself, but only on the one side punishment (consequence), on the other side tinder (occasioning cause) of sin. It is true, the Tridentine Council, in its fifth decree of its fifth sitting, denies only of the regenerate (baptized), that in them this sensational lust is truly and strictly sin. Accordingly it appears as if in the natural man it might nevertheless in itself be already sin. But this addition thus as limitation taken would involve the Synod, in open contradiction with itself. For as in the same decree it teaches, that everything which bears in it the true and real character of sin, is not merely forgiven by baptism, but destroyed, the sensational lust, if it were sin in the natural man, must after baptism no longer at all exist—from which according to repeated declarations it nevertheless assumes the contrary.[2] Thus too the further deve-

[1] Comp. the *Epitome theologiae*, published by *Titius*, p. 66 seq. 71 seq. The notions are essentially the same as in *Thomas* although he uses stronger expressions and e. g. calls that malitia which in *Thomas* and Bellarmin is denominated languor.

[2] One might adduce from the history of the discussions, which preceded this conclusion of the council, against the above conception, that the large majority of its members, in their refutation of the sagacious, thorough, and controverting remarks of *Anton Marinari*, thought to find in *Augustine* at least besides the concupiscentia, which consists in the opposition of the sensational nature to the reason and since it is not really sin, remains even after baptism, still another kind of concupiscentia, the opposition of the will to the Divine law which is sin and becomes destroyed by baptism, comp. *Paul Sarpis Geschichte des Koncils* (Ed. of 1621, p. 195. seq.) But is it then conceivable, that the Synod has really in earnest meant to ascribe to new-born children an opposition of will to the law of God? Did it not shortly before (in *Sarpi* li. c. p. 192) decide, that original sin could not consist in these determinations: ignorantia et contemptus Dei aut certe esse sine timore, sine fiducia in Deum, sine amore divino, because these actiones are not

lopments of *Bellarmin* come in the end to the maintenance, that sensational lust in this its state of disseverance from the law of the spirit, is in itself not at all sin, but only becomes so by the consenting of the will. Consequently, as fundamental basis for the imputation of the sin-fall, there only remains the deficiency of the original righteousness.—However if we call to mind, that this original righteousness, lost by the fall, does not, according to the doctrine of *Thomas* (nor of the Romish Catechism) essentially belong to pure human nature, but has fallen to the lot of the same as a *donum superadditum* distinct from its creation, although perhaps not according to time, we shall be obliged to regard it as a just deduction, when *Bellarmin* draws from these determinations of the relation between original righteousness and human nature, the conclusion; *quare non magis differt status hominis post lapsum Adae a statu eiusdem in puris naturalibus, quam differat spoliatus a nudo, neque deterior est humana natura, si culpam originalem* (just the IMPUTED *peccatum actuale Adae*) *detrahas, neque magis ignorantia et infirmitate laborat, quam esset et laboraret in puris naturalibus condita.*[1] But herewith even this privative ground-basis for the immediate imputation of the sin-fall will vanish, inasmuch as now indeed no deficiency attaches to the posterity of Adam from their birth, which, would not belong *to the essence of human nature*, in itself considered, (to the *pura naturalia.*) And therein we cannot be led astray, that *Bellarmin*, after the example of *Thomas*, still speaks of a corruption (*corruptio, depravatio*) in distinction from that deprivation, indeed even of determinate *wounds of the nature* as consequence of the sin-fall. These so-called wounds would have broken out from the very essence of human nature, if God had left it without the supernatural gift of the original righteousness, by which, as by a golden bridle, the resistance of the lower powers to the higher arising from the character of the materia, must be restrained and suppressed.[2] But then there unavoidably results

in new-born children—entirely as the *Confutatio Pontifici* argues against the second article of the Augsburg Confession?

[1] De gratia primi hominis. c. 5. In the 15th cap. of the 5th Book de amissione gratiae et statu pecc. *Bellarmin* expressly controverts the sententia eorum Catholicorum, qui peccatum originis *in quadam positiva qualitate* constituunt.

[2] Comp. *Bellarmin*, l. c. That even Thomas was obliged to acknowledge

as further consequence the representation, controverted by *Bellarmin*, of the Catholic theologians *Catharinus* and *Pighius*, which already earlier prevailed in the school of *Occam*, according to which hereditary sin, as it attaches to all the natural posterity of Adam, is said to be nothing at all more than the imputation of his disobedience.[1] For what disturbance indeed should attach to the very nature, which had truly and strictly the character of sin, if after the fall the pure nature makes its appearance, simply deprived of the original righteousness which did not at all belong to its essence, and when indeed the contumacy of lust against the reason is said to be compatible with this pure naturalness? But therewith the determination of hereditary sin grounding guilt is entirely thrust back upon *the immediate imputation of the Adamic fall*, so that this imputation waves about as in the air without any real fundamental basis. Pure innocence finds itself affected with guilt, and pure nature, the undefiled creature of God, is said to look upon itself as damnable before its Creator. But will it really be able to become conscious of that primitive guilt as of its own, without finding any disturbance in itself which it is obliged to regard as sin? Certainly not, but it must ever appear to it as that which is foreign, external and merely imputed, and the bond between Adam's act and the primitive guilt, which it is said to recognise in itself, will only form in its consciousness *the unfathomable decree of the Divine Will*, the righteousness of which is one absolutely *concealed*.[2]

this deduction the *Summa*, ii. i. qu. 85, art. 3, does not leave us in doubt. Therefore there does not seem to me to be a distinction between his *modus docendi* and that of *D. Scotus* in relation to the subject-matter, as the *dogmengeschichtlichen Lehrbücher von (Münscher) Cölln* vol. 2, p. 134 and *Hagenbach* vol. 2, p. 141. assume.

[1] *De amiss gr.* l. v. c. 16. Comp. *Baur's* remarks on the relation of this theory to the opinion of *Bellarmin*, *der Gegensatz des Katholicismus und Protestantismus*, 2d. ed. p. 91 seq. That moreover *Bellarmin* is wrong in treating the theory of *Catharinus* as an isolated opinion and making good against him the decision of the Tridentine Council, may be seen, in that according to *Paul Sarpi* (l. c. p. 192 seq.) *Catharinus* not merely developed his opinion at length in the council, but also exercised a significant influence in the formation of the decrees on hereditary sin. He founded his conception of the immediate imputation of the Adamic sin upon the assumption of a covenant which God had concluded with Adam as representative of the whole human race. Comp. also *Chemnitz's Examen Conc. Trid.* p. i. p. 204 seq. *Baumgartens Polemik*, part 3, p. 501 seq.

[2] It is remarkable, how the extreme of the Catholic *modus docendi*

The superiority of the modus docendi, which has become the prevalent one in the Lutheran theology, since the middle of the seventeenth century, is not to be overlooked in the connection of this dogmatic development. For the mediate imputation of the sin-fall, it has a real basis in the positive character of the natural corruption, by virtue of which it is able firmly to maintain this *as disturbance of the nature*. And by the immediate imputation it is able to make intelligible how that which is innate may also be guilt.

Quenstedt, whom we may look upon as one of the chief representatives of this dogma of the immediate imputation of the fall, among the *Lutheran* theologians,[1] has correctly seen, that also in the conditions of the particular quality, by virtue of which the sin-fall is said to burden the entire human race with guilt in this two-fold manner, both sides of the relation, the real and the ideal unity of the race with the first parent, must be shown and related to each other. Adam is to him in a double sense the head of the human race, the *natural* and the *moral* head. When now by virtue of the first attribute he causes the inheriting evil to diffuse itself by generation over his entire posterity, but by virtue of the second attribute, which makes him the representative of all his descendants, transmits his actual sin (according to its *reatus*) to the same, he will by no means indeed have the two separated from each other, but only in so far as Adam

coincides with the extreme of the reformed opinion, which is fond of placing all the consequences of the fall for the posterity of Adam solely under the view of punishment, of the righteous judgment of God. The suppression of immediate imputation in the oldest *Lutheran* dogmatists rest upon opposition to that method of teaching, e. g. in *Chemnitz*, *Hutter*, also in *Gerhard* (comp. too the apology of the Augsburg Confession, p. 51.), and from it is it to be understood, when *Aegid-Hunnius*, to whom *Placaeus* especially appeals for his opinion, *de imput pecc. Ad.* p. 20. and often elsewhere, declares himself against the immediate imputation of the sin-fall, in the *quaestiones et responsiones de peccato* at the beginning—*Opera lat. tom.* i. p. 445. Later the position of the contrasts become altered; as the *Socinian* and *Armenian* denial of all imputation of the sin-fall began to spread, the *Lutheran* theology could not help being convinced, that it could not maintain the mediate imputation, if the immediate were given up.

[1] Strictly speaking, as I perceive from *Rivet's* collection of the *testimonia de imputatione primi peccati* (*Opera* tom i. p. 815 seq.), it is the Wittenberg theologian *Balthasar Meisner*, who was the first among the Lutherans to develope this dogma with more exactness, and whose sentences *Quenstedt* in part verbally appropriates. But his *disputationes de anthropologia sacre* are alas not at hand.

is the natural head or as he expresses it, *radix et stirps, principium naturale et seminale totius generis humani*, could he also be the moral head, the *principium repraesentativum, in quo et conservarentur et perderentur concessa dona et privilegia*.[1]

Accordingly, from the stand-point of this dogmatic theory, it will necessarily be considered as a one-sidedness, when *Thomas von Aquino* in the *Summa contra gentiles* grounds the imputation of the hereditary sin *only* upon this, that all men become reckoned as one man by virtue of their participation in the *common nature*, which the sin-fall has corrupted in Adam.[2] And in fact it is easy to see, that this method, of grounding the imputation of the fall of Adam's posterity, would necessarily lead us back to that natural view, which thinks to make the hereditary guilt intelligible to us by the *organic unity of the human race*; but that this does not bring out the notion of imputation and guilt, we have abundantly convinced ourselves. If indeed this doctrine of imputation, when one even allows it all its presuppositions, must itself acknowledge, that the posterity of Adam have not taken part in his fall *actu* and in their own person,[3] then it can never explain, how the children of Adam are to become in this fall, or according to the notion of mediate imputation *by* this fall, *actu* and in their own person guilty and damnable before God. For with many Scholastic, (even old Protestant) theologians, to appeal to the posterity being in its individual Being guilty not merely *potentiâ*, but *actu*, is not explaining that assumption but running the representations round in a circle. Also, if one resolves to ground the imputation of the fall solely on the fact of the human genus or nature being, at the time of its occurrence, exclusively in the progenitors of the race, and consequently that all individuals of the same potentially (*virtualiter* according to Thomas' expression) exist in them, he would also have

[1] Comp. with the 7th quaest. in sect. 2, the 19th, 20th, and 30th thesis in sect. 1. of the *cap. de peccato*.

[2] Lib. iv. cap. 52. 1. Comp. *Summa theol.* ii. 1. qu. 81. art. 1.

[3] According to *Anselm's* formulae in his work *de conceptu virginali et originali peccato*: In illo causaliter sive materialiter velut in semine fuerunt, in se ipsis personaliter sunt— ; in illo non alii ab illo, in se alii quam ille. In illo fuerunt ille, in se sunt ipse. Fuerunt igitur in illo, sed non ipsi, quoniam nondum erant ipsi.

to impute to the posterity of the same, not merely their sin-fall but also their subsequent sins, prior to the generation of those children, from whom this posterity may descend; indeed to the latter, there would also have to be imputed the sins of all their predecessors under similar limitation. When *Thomas* sagaciously replies against this, that only the first sin corrupts the nature, on the contrary all subsequent sins of Adam and of all his posterity only the person,[1] there is, under the presuppositions upon which this entire method of consideration rests, so much admitted, that the first sin in the temporal development of the human race must, just as turning point, exert a *more powerfully disturbing* influence upon human nature than all the following ones, but if indeed it is to be essentially of like character with the subsequent transgressions, as one among others, that corrupting influence could only then exclusively apply to it, when the corruption of the nature arising therefrom were an absolute corruption, what *Thomas* even by no means maintains.[2]—The: *in quo* (*Adamo*) *omnes peccaverunt*, supposing even it were a correct translation of the words: ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, Rom. v. 12, would indeed if for no other for this reason, render to this theory no decided help, because it would always still leave undetermined, by virtue of which attribute of the first parents of the race, we had to consider his sin as being directly the sin of all his descendants. Certainly still less can it support itself upon the act ascribed to the race of *Levi* in Abraham's loins, Heb. vii. 10, as of this passage *Bleek* certainly correctly judges, that it is only meant by the author as an *argumentum ad hominem*.[3]—

But no less must it appear from the above standpoint as one-sidedness, when in the establishment of the immediate imputation of the sin-fall, as sometimes is the case in the Federal-theology, Adam is so exclusively conceived of as *moral head*, that his attribute as natural progenitor of the human race by the Divine pleasure, which has made him the representative of the same, becomes degraded to insignificance. It is then, in itself considered, an accident, that just on the action of this individual a

1 *Summa* ii. i. qu. 81, art. 2.

2 *Augustinus* also not, wherefore, even according to his own admission in the *Enchiridion* c. 13 (47), he has no solution for this difficulty.

3 *Kommentar zum Br. a. d. Hebr.* vol. 3. p. 348.

decision should be attached respecting the blessedness and condemnation of the human race; indeed inasmuch as one must naturally expect, that with the suppression of the side of the nature-connection the side of the free compact and its conditions would so much the more prominently present itself, no one appears less suitable for such substitution as just the first parents of the race, since they could be invested with the same from no other individual.

However with this the difficulties are already hinted at, with which also the theory embracing both the sides, in spite of its relative superiority to those opinions, becomes encountered. If it is to be capable of being maintained, much will clearly depend upon showing the intimate *oneness of all posterity with its progenitor*, but such a oneness which makes conceivable a real participation of their will in Adam's decision of will. We find in *Quenstedt* the strongest designations for this unity. According to the well-known expressions of *Ambrosius* and *Augustinus*, he ascribes to the entire human race an existence in the first-created individual and considers all descendants of the same directly as the collective subject of his first sin;[1] in his will had lain all the wills of his posterity;[2] indeed he makes use of the singular mode of expression, that in the first parents the original righteousness is given to the descendants of the same, by which these were not only able to keep the law of the tree of knowledge but also the whole decalogue.[3] But on what is this unity, by virtue of which our will was really present in Adam's act, to rest? That it is grounded by neither of the two theories, neither by the physical nor by the juridical, their examination has shown; but neither does the placing together of two insufficient grounds furnish us with a sufficient one; for as the possibility of the representation of the whole race by Adam is said to be thereby conditioned, that he is the natural head of the same, everything in the end comes back to the question, whether this latter relation is able to establish that immediate participation of all human wills in the sin-fall. Or can, notwithstanding, the moral representation of the entire race by Adam, taken for itself, have a self-dependent significance, by which it may be able to supply the deficiency,

[1] L. c. sect. 1, thes. 19 (p. 53.)
[2] L. c. sect. 2, qu. 7 (p. 112.)
[3] L. c. sect. 2, qu. 7 (p. 113.)

which we have seen, of the natural relation for the establishment of that participation—as certainly *Quenstedt* in view of the immediate imputation lays the most decided stress upon the notion of the *caput morale*—? But that it could only then have, if as its presupposition there could be shown an express plenipotentializing of Adam by all other men, to represent them in this great transaction, so that then the peculiar natural relation of Adam to all other men were only the *conditio sine qua non*, but the *commission* were the positive ground, for the immediate guilt of the same by the fall. As now no one will maintain the like, so it is also impossible by the attribute of Adam as nominal covenant head of the human race really to cover the deficiency of his attribute as natural head of the race in relation to the immediate imputation of the fall.—

In order to sustain the former attribute of Adam and its consequences for the culpability of his posterity, both older and more modern theologians have appealed to the Divine Omniscience, by virtue of which God has cognized, that every other man would in Adam's place have acted just the same, from which follows the Divine right of imputing Adam's disobedience to all his descendants:[1] When now *Schleirmacher* adopts an universal imputation of the first sin, dependent on the consciousness, that, to whatever human individual the lot had fallen of being the first, sin would have been committed by him just as it was by Adam,[2] with him this stands in connection with the maintenance of a primitive sinfulness, which has not first of all arisen by a fall, but a sinfulness everywhere and always attaching to human nature, from which real sin necessarily proceeds,[3] and in this connection that assumption is well grounded. But if on the contrary

[1] Comp. *e.g. Baumgarten's evangelische Glaubenslehre*, vol. 2, p. 352 seq. Even *Seiler* maintains, that every other man, if God had made him the progenitor of the race, would have brought still more evil on the human race, than Adam has done; which he proves from God's not having appointed him progenitor of mankind! l. c. p. 106. Among modern theologians *Kern e.g.* is of opinion, that no one surely would have the audacity to maintain that another individual in Adam's place would have otherwise acted—certainly in contradiction with what elsewhere on the conditions of guilt may be found in him.

[2] *Glaubenslehre*, § 72, 6, (vol. i. p. 446.)

[3] In the same connection, p. 445.

there is laid at the ground the representation of an *originally pure human nature*, which bears in it, truly, the general possibility of evil, but no disposition thereto, no sinfulness, if therewith is acknowledged that the first man possessed the most perfect freedom to good and had been able easily to overcome the temptation to evil, then the maintenance, that among all the millions of human personalities no single individual in the same case would have acted otherwise, appears to be one which is perfectly arbitrary and groundless. One were only then justified in such a maintenance, if he might again make that condition of human nature, which indeed is said first of all to have arisen by the fall, the presupposition of the fall. Were it admissible, presupposing the notion of the so-called *cognitio media* (*mittlere Erkenntniss*) *of God* as tenable, to derive from it the imputation of the Adamic sin as guilt and condemnation, then the opinion may be just as well grounded thereby, that God, without prejudice to his righteousness, could have directly introduced men, some into blessedness, others into the state of condemnation, because he had foreseen, that in case of his leaving to their will the self-decision between good and evil, some would make themselves deserving of blessedness, and others of condemnation.[1]

Ought we now still to tarry by the dawning thoughts of modern speculation, which promise to reveal to us the deep truth of the dogma of all men becoming culpable in the fall of Adam? Scientific consideration had surely then only the right to take knowledge of these flitting forms, which as in mist appear and again disappear, when they had assumed determinate, fixed outlines, so that their true nature might be cognized and also in how

[1] Other grounds of defence for the imputation of the sin-fall, as the appealing to human relations, in which also the children are often enough obliged to be co-sufferers for the offence of the father, we need not in their entire untenability more closely examine. *Zwingli* and the Arminians have also employed these analogies, but with a correct perception of their nature, in order just thereby to show, that here the subject is not one of *guilt*, but only of *misfortune*. To these altogether untenable attempts to save that imputation, belongs also the thought, that, what then may be wanting perhaps in the rigid righteousness of the same, becomes thereby made up, in that God indeed offers to all men in Christ Redemption from the consequences of this imputation, comp. *Mosheim's Elem. theol. dogmat.* p. 498. *Seiler*, l. c. p. 101. According to this conception the Divine Redemption of the fallen race of man would be just as much a self-redeeming of God from an injustice done to man.

far they distinguish themselves from those already in being. However just a passing glance may perhaps be able to give us a general idea of what may be expected for our dogma from this side.

In the most modern time allusions have often been made to the *realistic conception of the notions of genus* as the real key to that doctrine of imputation. One must just know, that it is not this single individual, but man in general or the genus, which acts in the sin-fall; and the determinations which it there gives itself, must now of course realize themselves according to their entire contents in all individuals of the genus. This may be said in the sense, in which in older theologians, similar modes of expression are met with, namely that human nature at the beginning is completely included in two individuals, and therefore, if these by their personal wills corrupt their own nature and burden it with guilt, therewith the stamp of corruption and guilt becomes impressed upon human nature in general.[1] It may also be thus understood, just as it is to be understood in *Hegel*, that sin is contained in the notion of man, that it is essential to man to mediate the realization of his notion by sin, and that just on this account, he has to regard it as his inmost possession, and in this sense, as his guilt. In both instances, it is no longer necessary, after the results just above won, as well as in our earlier investigations, to controvert the above positions.

Still there is possibly a third interpretation of those sentences. *Göschel* finds the true significance of Realism, a significance new to the consciousness of the Scholastic himself, to consist in *real, self-dependent personality* being applicable to the genus-notion of man, prior to and independently of its temporally successive realization in personal individuals.[2] *Göschel* only applies this

[1] Beyond this, strictly taken, the application does not extend, which the sagacious Realist *Odo von Cambrai* makes of this theory in the second book of his work *de paccato originali*, in order thereby to explain the participation of the posterity of Adam in his sin. That the universale, the species humana, in itself considered, has sinned, has altered itself, he declines as an absurd representation; the two persons, Adam and Eve, have sinned, and only because there was then besides them no human nature or substance, have they by their sin also corrupted human nature. *Bibliotheca maxima Patrum*, *tom.* xxi., p. 232.

[2] *Beiträge zur speculativen Philosophie von Gott und dem Menschen und von dem Gottmenschen*, p. 58 seq. comp. with p. 100-172.

thought to the Christology; Christ is to him the primitive man, the notion of humanity absolutely, who just as such is subject, more exactly person; Adam on the contrary is according to him "only the analytic and synthetic—beginning of developing humanity, *humanitas implicita*."[1] If however the conception of the sinfall, as of an act of the race, is to have a meaning distinct and different from those two representations, and if it is to serve to remove the great objection to the Church dogma of hereditary sin, the antinomy directly present in the notion of *hereditary guilt*, between that which is foreign and transmitted to us from without and that which is our own and self-imputing, then one must be allowed to consider that notion of humanity empirically realizing itself in the totality of individuals and at the same time in itself personally existing, just as subject of the sin-fall; wherewith then surely it could not be avoided to conceive of the narrative of Genesis as a myth, which had arisen it may be from a dark foreboding of that transcendent event. But it is clear that the application of realism, so understood, to the sin-fall, while it furnishes for that difficulty a kind of solution, immediately falls into much more involved ones. For if according to this sin is a determination inwoven in the real notion of the human genus itself, be it ever by an eternal self-act of the same, which must therefore be co-posited in all temporal individualizations of the genus, then not merely the sinless Redeemer, this historical individual Jesus Christ, becomes an impossibility,[2] but *man's becoming free*

[1] L. c. p. 167.

[2] Truly the manner in which the Scholastic and the old Lutheran theology employed Realism for the explanation of imputation becomes also subject to this difficulty, since indeed even Christ must have been according to His human nature virtualiter and seminaliter in Adam, the progenitur of Mary. For if the latter for the obviation of this instance, is accustomed so to conceive of the sentence: the descendants of Adam have sinned in him, in as much as they spring from him by natural propagation, this is only just a limitation externally and at pleasure annexed to the dogma of the sinlessness of Christ, which has no inward ground whatever in the notion of the matter itself. By reflection upon this difficulty *Hugo a Sto. Victore* finds himself induced to give up the: in Adamo omnis fuerunt originaliter, as ground-basis of imputation comp. cap. 31. of the tractus theologicus in the works of *Hildebert* von Mans. (In the lack of the works of *Hugo* I cite this tractate, as its identity with his summa sententiarum has been proved by *Liebner*.)

from sin is not for a moment to be thought of; one would then perhaps be obliged to regard the contradiction as admissable, that the primitive man had posited himself at the same time as sinner and as sinless as first and as second Adam. At the inability of this thought herewith resulting, to furnish anything for the solution of our problem, we are not under the necessity of proving the entire untenability of its metaphisical ground-basis, namely of the representation that the genus-notion itself exists in eternal reality as personal subject and nevertheless temporally continues to realize itself again in all human personalities.

If accordingly the theory, of the immediate participation of all naturally generated descendants of Adam in his fall, does not satisfy the requirement of showing, that, that which is foreign and outwardly received, as is the case in the notion of original sin, is at the same time that which is one's own and thus of reconciling personal guilt with the root of all sin grown up in human nature, we are obliged to acknowledge that the dogma of hereditary sin, in the form which our older theology has given to it, cannot be maintained.—

If we call to mind the inward relation of these moments in the religious consciousness, we should suppose, the weakness of the dogma must have revealed itself at the time of its general prevalence in the life of the Protestant Church even *practically* in serious consequences. The theory of the immediate imputation of the sin-fall is not able to silence the conviction founded in the moral consciousness, that, that which lies absolutely on the other side of our own decision of will, must also lie on the other side of our own culpability. But if the moral disturbance given at the commencement of our existence and inrooted in our nature is excluded from our self-culpability, the relation becomes immediately inverted; the sin-fall of the first of the race with the corruption of the nature arising therefrom, far from grounding guilt in their posterity, becomes much rather *a moment of excuse for their real sins.*[1] And this is the point, of the practical danger-

[1] Latterly the opinion has sometimes been heard, the natural sinfulness must on the one hand be regarded as guilt and subject of self-reproach, in as much as it is a determination of our own existence, on the other hand it must be regarded as a relative ground of excuse for real sinning, inasmuch as it is nevertheless at the same time that which we have

ousness of which one may easily convince himself especially in the dogmatists, who as *Michaelis*,[1] expressly look upon the natural corruption from this point of view. And this danger must of course so much the more be increased, in proportion to the greater power and depth ascribed to the natural corruption, and the more decidedly real sins are regarded as unavoidably proceeding from it.

Nevertheless the practically religious consciousness of the older Protestant time, as its agenda, spiritual songs and devotional books abundantly testify, shows itself possessed of the power inwardly to comprehend the apparently contradictory, namely the recognition of an innate sinfulness as the source of all real sins and the feeling of its own personal guilt; and if in the expression of the first moment it does not shun even so harsh a term as the third stanza, in the hymn of *Lazarus Spengler*: "By Adam's fall is quite corrupt the very human core," etc. employs:—

> As now we all by foreign guilt
> In Adam are revil'd,
> Therefore we all by foreign grace
> In Christ are reconcil'd—

it nevertheless only extremely seldom employs this inherited sinfulness as a principle moderating the guilt of real sin, as a motive for the forgiving Grace of God, as perhaps is the case in the hymn: Turn back thy wrath etc., emanating probably from the pen of *Bartholomaeus Ringwaldt*, in the fifth strophe:—

elsewhere received. But this is a manifest contradiction; the ground of our guilt cannot be at the same time the ground of our exculpation, for those two 'Insoferns' (inasmuch as) do not express really distinct relations, but in the connection of this opinion become directly resolved into each other; this sinfulness is for us that which is really received, only in so far as it is in us, and it is only really in us, because we receive it from the determining power of general potencies, standing over us as individuals. If now one only once considers the natural sinfulness, in so far as it is in the individual as a determinateness of being without his agency, as a moment moderating the guilt of real sin, then, unless one resolves altogether to give up the idea of guilt in sin, the necessity cannot absolutely be avoided of showing a fundamental basis, independently of this natural sinfulness, of culpability in a self-act of the individual, which is not the consequence of that sinfulness.

[1] *Gedanken von der Sünde und Genugthuung*, § 61-62.

Are we burden'd indeed—with *hereditary sin*,
Weakness and need and death?
For what reason are we in anger then
To perish without grace?[1]

In that the religious consciousness thus directly conceives of that, which the dogma exhibits as something transmitted, equally as a self-culpability of the individual, it cancels the foreign element in the notion of hereditary sin by the most inward appropriation. In this way it appears practically to solve the antinomy which stands against all determinations of the dogma. And in fact the correct development of the doctrine will have to acknowledge in this solution a moment of deeper truth; indeed one really only needs decidedly and firmly to hold fast to the radical determinations of the same in order by their guidance to be lead out of the labyrinth; but the dogma in the form in which it has hitherto been presented to us, cannot be thereby helped.

[1] Also the Holy Scripture never employs the sinfulness inwoven in human nature as a ground of exculpation for the real sinning of man. On the connection of Ps. li. 7, comp. above p. 301 seq.—In Ps. lxxviii. 39, ciii. 14, the frailty and infirmity of human life are mentioned as motive of the sin-forgiving compassion of God—namely in this sense, that if His Grace were delayed in its beneficent offices towards those repenting on account of their sins, it would no longer find them among the living. The passage in the Old Testament most apparently in favour of this representation is Gen. viii. 21. However the strong expression here chosen, especially compared with cap. vi. 5, looks nevertheless very little like an excusing intention. Is the כִּי here to be taken in a causal sense and not perhaps, as Gen. iii. 19 in the first instance, as nota relationis, then the sentence grounds the preceding in so far, as it contains that, which might well move God in himself even further to smite the earth on account of man.—For the opposite view, comp. in *Cöllns* bibl. Theol. vol. i. p. 238.—In the New Testament, Paul appears to sanction the idea of the sin rooting in human nature as diminishing or indeed removing personal culpability, Rom. vii. 17, 20, (οὐκέτι ἐγώ—ἀλλ' ἡ οἰκοῦσα ἐν ἐμοὶ ἁμαρτία.) And indeed we should be obliged to conceive of these passages in this sense, if they treated of man universally. But they refer, as was earlier remarked (vol. i. p. 210), to such a condition of man, in which a sincere struggling after righteousness has been awakened and therewith, until the deliverance of the same from its impediments by means of Redemption, a variance between the inmost bias of the will and the entire form of the life, verse 15, 18, 23. The sense is accordingly this: So soon as this variance has once been realized, then our real Ego no longer stands on the side of sin, but on

However the defenders of the doctrine in this form may admit that which is dogmatically dissatisfactory in the theory of the immediate imputation of the sin-fall and the still greater insufficiency of the theories earlier considered, and nevertheless regard the doctrine as fully guaranteed by its *fundamental basis in the Holy Scripture.* Although theology should not be able to bring about a reconciliation of the apparently contradictory determinations, according to the Scripture both must in an equal manner be maintained, namely a sinfulness inwoven in our nature and arising from the fall of Adam, which makes all men sinners, Rom. v. 12—19, and a state of the entire posteritory of Adam in which each individual is affected with his own personal guilt.

The passage just quoted is not merely the principal one, but, strictly taken, *the only New Testament testimony* for the causal connection of the sin of Adam with the sin of his descendants. This connnection is said to be denoted in a peculiar manner by ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον v. 12. It has been maintained both by older and more modern defenders of the dogma in its old Protestant form, that if one even does not translate ἐφ' ᾧ: *in quo*, referring to Adam, but takes it as a conjunction and with *Luther* translates it by because (dieweil), he will nevertheless be obliged, according to the connection in which the sentence stands, to supply, to ἥμαρτον—ἐν Ἀδὰμ.[1] For, say the older Theologians, since death has also dominion over newborn and unborn children, which have not sinned in their own person, the sinning which is here ascribed to men subjected to death, must be the participation in Adam's primitive sin. If one, as has lately been added thereto, should understand, ἥμαρτον of the real sinning of the individuals, death would not appear as a consequence of the connection of all with the head of the race, which indeed is indicated by the οὕτως, but as a consequence of the actions of each individual severally. Neither could it be seen what purpose the proof, adduced in verse 13 and 14, that all men share in Adam's sin, is to serve, if the: they have sinned v. 12, is to be understood of real sins.

the side of God and His law, comp. verse 16-21; then it becomes sensible of the prevailing power of sin as a violence inflicted upon it.

[1] Comp. *Quenstedt* l. c. sect. 1, pt. 30 (p. 58). *Buddeus institut. theol. dogm.* l. iii., c. ii., § 13 (tom. 1, p. 568) and from more recent time an article of the *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung* on original sin 1831, No. 49 p. 388 sq.

If now v. 13 and 14 really contained such a proof, then certainly that determination would have to be implicitly supplied, by which the thesis first of all became complete (in Adam). But one can undoubtedly only then find that proof in v. 13 and 14, when he has already in his mind supplied to *πάντες ἥμαρτον: ἐν Ἀδάμ.* However if one abandons this entirely untenable support, the other reasons still hold good. Truly we should ever be obliged to regard it as extremely singular, that Paul in: *ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον*, should have omitted the determination, on which the force of the thought would rest, all the more surprising, the less it follows from the connection of the passage or from the entire apostolic doctrine as something quite self-evident. But so much assuredly follows from the two first grounds of proof, that there arises a contradiction of the Apostle with the most manifest experience and with himself, if one finds in the sentence: *ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον*, the real grounding of the immediately preceding and then interprets it of the actual sins of all individuals. On the contrary, if one takes *ἐφ' ᾧ* in the sense earlier (p. 330) developed, the objections to that interpretation of *ἥμαρτον*, which in itself must be regarded as being by far the most natural, fall of themselves to the ground.

Consequently if the last sentence says nothing directly on the connection of our sinful state with the fall of Adam, such expressions are nevertheless contained in the other contents of this passage. Indeed the words of the Apostle by no means justify us in understanding *ἁμαρτία* of a sinful propensity, which has entered into the human world by the Act of Adam. That there is such a propensity in man may be certainly deduced from the whole passage v. 12—21 by connecting its individual expressions; but expressly it is not taught in this passage. *Ἁμαρτια* v. 12 we take as in v. 13, 20, 21, most naturally with *Schmid*,[1] as designation of the generic notion of sin in general, to which, as we have already (vol. i., p. 193) seen, there belong, also according to Paul, just as much the sinful propensity and condition as the actual sin.

That now sin has entered into the world with the fall of Adam, Rom. v. 12, strictly taken in itself, does not necessarily express

[1] In his excellent "exegetical remarks on Rom. v. 12., *Tubinger Zeitschrift für Theologie*, 1838, No. 4, p. 174.

more than its entrance into the will of the first of mankind. But we are necessitated partly by the determination, that *by one man* sin has come into the world and partly by the relation of this thought to the deduction from both premises: *καὶ οὕτως εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ὁ θάνατος διῆλθεν*, to the acknowledgment, that in the *εἰσελθειν εἰς τὸν κόσμον* there is implicite contained, the representation of the self-diffusion of sin from the one point over the entirety. The same inferentially follows, on account of the connection in which Paul places death with sin, from the universal dominion of death, which the Apostle verses 15 and 17 derives from the sin of Adam. Also v. 16 and 18 by the *κατάκριμα*, which, proceeding from one has come upon all, we can only understand death, physical death in the strictest sense and the condition, following, and by the Apostle certainly conceived of together with the same, of deprivation and nakedness, in which the diversion of the phenomenal world of sense no longer hides from the soul its inward variance. Most modern commentators refer the *κατάκριμα* to death, although in part in such a way that they rob the notion of death, by excessive extension, of the sharp determinateness which it has in the connection of this passage. But in v. 19 *Rothe*[1] and *Tholuck* find the thought grounding (*γάρ*) the immediately preceding, that by Adam's disobedience the many *had also really become sinners*.[2] But if the Apostle had here meant to express this thought not at all contained in the preceding, one would expect on the one hand a different order of the words,[3] on the other hand, that he would have employed some other verb than *καθίστασθαι*, which is altogether little adapted to designate the development of a reality especially emphasizing the reality, but at least in the New Testament use of language, where *καθιστάναι* with the exception of Acts xvii. 15, has every-

[1] *Auslegung der Paulinschen Stelle*, Rom. v. 12-21, p. 150 seq.

[2] Certainly in this way the immediate imputation of the older dogmatic theory, grounded upon a real participation of all the descendants of Adam in his fall, is not furnished by the passage. Against the use of the same in support of that theory *Taylor* not incorrectly remarks, that it much rather contradicts it; "for if all men had sinned in Adam when he sinned, this sin would not have been the sin of *one* but of millions of men." *Schriftmässige Lehre von der Erbsünde, in der deutschen Uebersetzung*, p. 90.

[3] Comp. *Fritzsch*, *Pauli ad Romanos epistola*, tom. i. p. 342.

where the signification: to appoint any one to a function, to exhibit somebody or something in a given attribute, consequently expresses more a declarative than a really causative activity, comp. Tit. i. 5; Luk. xii. 14, 42, 44; Acts vi. 3, vii. 10, 27, 35; Heb. ii. 7, v. 1, vii. 28, viii. 3; Matt. xxiv. 45, 47, xxv. 21, 23; James iii. 6, iv. 4; 2 Pet. i. 8. Add to this, that by this conception of the first clause, one must also understand in the succeeding clause the δίκαιοι κατασταθήσονται in distinction from the δικαίωσις ζωῆς v. 18, as a really becoming righteous in distinction from justification; which, in the terms which the Apostle has chosen, appears very unnatural. We do not therefore find ourselves justified, since γὰρ in the New Testament as in the classical use of language has besides the strictly grounding, also the explanatory significance, to conceive of v. 19,[1] as if it contained a transition from the sphere of thought of the preceding, into a new one. That which the Apostle v. 18 has intimated in enigmatical and abrupt language, he says v. 19 more clearly and more definitely. The many have been thereby declared (as it were before the Divine Judgment Seat) as sinners by the disobedience of one man (as the determining beginning of the sinful development), in that they have become subject to death.

Accordingly, if we endeavour to fix the signification of this passage in relation to the doctrine of *hereditary sin*, we find, in the first place, that in an unambiguous manner it makes the *universal dominion of death over mankind* dependent upon the *fall of Adam*, comp. 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22. But in so far now as it exhibits death again as consequence of sin, it also places the sinning of the posterity of Adam in real connection with his fall; and a dogmatical opinion which denies every determining influence of this fall upon the development of sin in Adam's posterity, will not be able really to harmonize itself with the contents of these Pauline expressions. But that the sufficient causality for the dominion of sin in the natural life of the human race is contained in Adam's fall, the Apostle does not say, and had he recognized this as being true, he would, one should think

[1] *Rothe* ought to have denied this so much the less, as the second signification so easily and imperceptibly passes into the first. The explanation of a true thought serves at the same time directly to ground the conviction of its truth.

have expressly expounded the same, and not merely have cursorily introduced it as if for the purpose of setting off the exhibition of the work of Redemption in the magnitude of its gift of Grace, and in the peculiarity of its realization. Still less does the passage teach anything of the sin of their progenitors being imputed to the posterity of Adam in any other sense, than in so far as death, the punishment of the sin-fall, is suspended over all. It sets, as was said, a determining influence of that sin upon the development of sin in the human race; but of the nature and extent of this influence it leaves sufficient room for manifold conceptions. Thus *e.g.* that form of doctrine, for other reasons regarded as untenable, according to which only a powerful, still surmountable inclination to sin is said to have been introduced into human nature by Adam's fall, is in itself considered very well reconcilable with the contents of this passage. If one adduces against the same and in general against every view, which attributes to the fall of Adam a more limited signification than the orthodox dogma, that then *the comparison between Adam and Christ* would no longer strictly hold good, since undoubtedly according to the Apostle the full causality of our righteousness and of our salvation is contained in Christ, he overlooks, that the point of comparison consists only in the determining influence of the two progenitors of the old and the new race, in the former upon the natural development to corruption, in the latter upon the spiritual development to eternal life. With this, the relation of both, with respect to the nature and degree of this influence, to the development proceeding from them, may be a very different one; indeed, in the former respect, it *must* in any case be different, since the one is progenitor of his race by virtue of natural propagation, the other by the communication of the Divine powers of life to the spirit. Truly the old Lutheran dogmatick may least of all be urgent for the necessity of deducing from the comparison between Adam and Christ a complete agreement of the influence of both upon the spheres of life severally dependent upon them. For the righteousness of Christ passes over to others still not as, according to that dogmatick, Adam's sin, in the manner of a necessity of nature, but only by a free appropriation conditioned by self-decision; and while the sin-fall

involves all without distinction in sin, guilt and corruption, Redemption is offered to numberless individuals in vain.[1]

If we now turn to the section of the Old Testament, to which the Apostle here evidently refers, and which the older theology reckons among the chief fundamentals of the dogma of hereditary sin, to the narration of the sin-fall, Gen. iii., we need not enter more closely upon the difficult, critical question, as to how far a historical character belongs to this representation, since it is not essentially involved in the contrast of the dogmatic views with which we are here concerned. Indeed, if with the present prevalent assumption, we regarded the narrative as a *historically clothed philosopheme* of a reflecting Israelite or of some other orientalist, on the origin of evil from guilt,[2] then surely it were not to be seen, what dogmatic use could be at all made of it by Christian theology. But we are not able to appropriate this view, if for no other, for this reason, because then the origin of the narrative must fall in a later period of more cultivated

1 *Töllner* discusses this comparison most fairly, impartially weighing the different moments, in his *Abhandlung über Röm.* v. 12-19, *in seinen theol. Untersuchungen*, vol. i. St. 2. p. 82 sq.

2 So *Winer*, *biblisches Realwörterbuch*, under the Article *Eden*. *Gesenius*, gives the same conception in *der Hallischen Encyklopädie* under the article *Adam* (vol. i. p. 360), and calls it the *mythical* in distinction from the historical, historizing and allegorizing narrative; just so by *Cölln bibl. Theologie* vol. i. p. 224 seq. *Tuch, Kommentar zur Genesis*, p. 54 seq. However that the name of mythus cannot apply to such a didactic fable which has arisen from the conscious imagining of an individual, the most modern investigations of this notion appear to have sufficiently proved. *Strauss* leaves it undecided whether the narrative is to be regarded as mythus or poem, but finds in it this contents, that Jehovah jealously retaining the privilege of the Elohim to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, punishes man for partaking of its forbidden fruits, and in order that he might not also take possession of the other privilege of the Elohim, that of immortality, by the (continued) enjoyment of the fruit of the tree of life, banished him from the garden of Eden, *Dogmatick* vol. ii. p. 18 seq., comp. p. 34. But here just the two main points are introduced into the narrative, the one partially, the other entirely; that "the Elohim" had eaten their higher insight from the fruits of that first tree, is an unwarrantable deduction from ver. 5. 22; but the enjoyment of the fruit of the tree of life is clearly in the sense of the narrative *intended* for man, as follows already from cap. ii. 16. 17, and still more determinately from his being subjected to death expressly as punishment of his transgression, cap. 3, 19.

reflection, with which, as even the most modern investigation admits, the simple, thoroughly antique character of the representation and language is at variance. Also it is very difficult to comprehend, how the deeply meditative piety of an Israelite, if it attached its poesy to the holy traditions respecting the first parents of the human race, should have ventured to represent the same as history, or how perhaps contrary to the intention of its author such a misunderstanding was able to arise. The matter appears to present itself better when one takes the narrative as a myth, according to which directly at its origination in the religious consciousness of the Israelitish nation ideal and historic contents, truth and fiction had undistinguishably flowed together. If however the existence of a first pair of mankind is nevertheless not to be considered as a picture of the Israelitish fancy, but must be regarded as containing a primitive remembrance, a tradition handed down from race to race until its fixation in writing, then it will not be possible even in this view to conceive of the narrative solely as an unconscious exhibition of that which holds good of man in general, of the transition of every individual from the state of the so-called innocent naturalness into that of sin and guilt. Much rather even upon this stand-point a *historical kernel* will have to be recognized, to which, in the imperceptible crystalizing process of national tradition, elements of fiction had attached themselves. To such a historical kernel then, the agreement exhibiting itself in certain fundamental features of other oriental traditions of the origin of evil, clearly refers. On the other hand, the incomparable superiority of the Hebrew narrative to the allied traditions of more cultivated nations as well as the internal and external (exhibiting itself in the genealogies) connection of the former with the remaining contents of the first eleven chapters of Genesis, the entire denial of the historic character of which a considerate criticism will not be able so easily to resolve upon, justifies us in recognizing in our narrative the purest tradition of that original fact, the most faithful expression of its true significance. These historic grounds find their religious confirmation in the testimony of the Apostle enlightened by the Holy Spirit, who not merely occasionally refers to the sin-fall, 2 Cor. xi. 3, 1 Tim. ii. 14 (?), but in such a manner that it as a

historical fact, unmistakably forms a moment of his religious consciousness, Rom. v. 12—19; 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22.

If we hereby find ourselves constrained to go beyond the mythical conception to the acknowledgment of a historical, fundamental basis of the narrative, it is not thereby indeed meant, that theology must take upon itself to defend the historic character of every individual feature. It is very easy to understand, that an event, which happened under altogether peculiar relations, which relations have vanished just in consequence of that event, handed down in oral tradition through a series of generations, should gradually have woven for itself from sensationally pictorial elements a garb for its contents, which perhaps in the absence of the knowledge of those relations was scarcely capable of a direct exhibition for the following generations. If then a later investigation labours in vain purely and clearly to separate these elements from the original substance, it will better preserve its truly scientific character by an open confession of its present inability than by its setting up in boastful confidence an untenable solution of the problem in order merely not to be wanting in a categorical answer.[1]

However if we might even take the individual features of the narrative in their strict literal sense, it still contains nothing of a moral corruption of human nature which first of all entered into it with the fall of Adam, and by which his posterity are now from the beginning of their existence, affected with sin and guilt. Much rather its real import in the mind of the narrator is indisputably not for the explanation of the origin of universal *sinfulness*, but the origin of the universal dominion of *evil;* it teaches us to look upon the toils and sufferings of our earthly life and pre-eminently so death, as the consequence and punishment of sin, truly first of all in the progenitors of the race themselves, but still the contents of ver. 16—19 do not leave us to doubt, that the fate announced to them is at the same time meant as directly

[1] What *Tholuck* says in the third Supplement to the *Lehre von der Sünde und vom Versöhner*, on the narrative of the sin-fall, is in the general result in agreement herewith, just so the view, which *Krabbe* developes in the second chapter of his "*Lehre von der Sünde und vom Tode.*"

that of universal humanity. But therein, the idea of a transition of the first man from an absolutely pure condition, consequently free from every sinful innate disposition and inclination, into one of the dominion of sin, is not necessarily contained, but only this, which certainly is included therein, that the corruption of man, however it may have originally arisen, *has its ground in himself.*

And more than this cannot be deduced from its being said Gen. i. 31, after the account of the creation of man: God saw everything, that He had made, and everything was very good, and that notwithstanding after the sin-fall already in Adam's first-born sin appears in its most fearful form, and that then after a series of generations, the wickedness of man had become so great and universal, that the degenerated race is ripe for destruction by the flood. Or should this contrast lead us to the opinion of an intervening transformation of human nature according to its moral fundamental constitution? The knowledge, which the first of mankind obtain by partaking of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil is that of their own nakedness, Gen. iii. 7; this feature, candidly conceived of in its connection with verse 11, cap. ii. 25, rather indeed points to a consciousness awakened by the sin-fall of a previously existing want and deficiency, than to the entrance of a perversion into the sphere of an absolutely pure existence. And as to that Divine Judgment: everything was very good, it just indeed expressly refers only to that which God made, and is very well reconcilable with a germ of sin lying concealed in man, when it has its origin only in man, and not in God. Therewith it is a matter self-evident, that this judgment, which extends just as much to the non-intelligent as to the intelligent creatures, of everything which God had made, is not to express the moral good, but only the general fittingness of everything for its designed purpose.—

And herewith arises the question, whether then the Old Testament elsewhere or the Holy Scripture in general teaches anything of a *Holy primitive condition of the human race* at the beginning of its history, from which, by the first actual sin, it passed over into the opposite condition of natural sinfulness. That the narrative of the first sin, as well as the description of the condition preceding the same, does not necessarily conduct us

to anything further than to an initial state in which sin has not yet made its appearance, is partly in itself clear and partly results from what has been above remarked. But all this does not form the main support of our older theology for the affirmative answering of that question, but this it finds in the expressions of Genesis respecting the *Divine image*, in which the first of mankind were created, Gen. i. 26—28. By this image it understands *(principaliter)* a perfect holiness and wisdom, and maintains, that our first parents by their fall had suffered the loss of the same both for themselves and their posterity.

The Mosaic record employs for the designation of this Divine image, which man bears in himself in distinction from all other earthly creatures, two expressions, צֶלֶם and דְּמוּת, but so that it sometimes sets both together, sometimes so that it employs each of the two separately and alone, comp. with Gen. i. 26, 28, cap. v. 1, ix. 6. In this twofold designation most of the Greek Church Fathers, and according to their precedence, *Bellarmin* and other Catholic theologians, found a distinction of the notion, inasmuch as they understood צֶלֶם (εἰκών) of the spiritual-moral endowments belonging to the very nature of man, but דְּמוּת (ὁμοίωσις) of the Godlike perfection after which man had to strive as after that to which he was destined. There is contained in this distinction dogmatically considered, a meaning which is correct; but upon an exegetical stand-point the old Protestant theologians were undoubtedly right, as follows from the given use of the two expressions in Genesis, when they declined this conception and regarded the duplication merely as the nearer determination or strengthening of the notion.[1]

The Socinians, in part also the Arminians, understand by the Divine image, the dominion granted to man over the lower creatures.[2] That this dominion stands in essential connection with the Divine image, cannot according to Gen. i. 26 be doubted. But as already the expressions צֶלֶם and דְּמוּת according to their other use in the Old Testament lead one more naturally to think

[1] Comp. *Quenstedt* l. c. p. ii. c. i. sect. i. th. 9, sect. ii. qu. 4, (p. 3. and 19.) *Hollaz Examen theol acroam.* p. 463.

[2] Comp. *Fausti Socini praelect. theol.* cap. 3. *in der Bibliotheca fratrum Pol.* tom. p. 539. *Limborchs theol. Christ.* l. ii. cap. xxiv. 1—4.

of the agreement of the image with the original in an essential constitutional character, than of a similar relation to another, so also the way in which the sentence v. 26 is connected as well as the separation of both, of the Divine image and the dominion over the earth v. 27, 28, lead one to regard this connection as one not of identity, but of *cause and effect.* Just for the reason, that man by the image of God is different from entire nature, and *toto genere* exalted above it, has he also the appointment and the power to rule over it. Add to this, that the other passages of Genesis which mention the Divine image, v. 1, ix. 6, not merely make no reference to the dominion over the lower creatures, but also, especially the second, scarcely allow according to their connection of determining by this reference the notion of the image.

But while agreeing with the old Protestant theology in its refusal of these conceptions, if we search for the proofs of its own idea of the nature of the Divine image and of its loss by the fall, we shall find that it has nothing to adduce from the book of Genesis for the first determination, and for the second, only an intimation, which in any case, must be regarded as quite uncertain and, as proof, insufficient. When namely cap. v. 1 it is said: Man was created after the image of God, and then, ver. 3, we read: Adam begat a son, after his likeness, after his image, there is said to be contained therein, that after his fall he was no longer able to communicate to his posterity the image of God, but only his own image.—But the older dogmatick finds the most decisive determinations as to the nature and the loss of the Divine image in Col. iii. 10, and in the parallel passage Ephe. iv. 24.[1] For if the first of the two passages in which alone the Divine image—namely, as norm of the progressive renewal of the new man in Christ—is mentioned, contains nothing on the nature of this image, than what perhaps may be forced from the words: εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν, (the *sapientia*),[2] the second passage supplies the deficiency, in that it says of the new man, he is created

[1] Comp. *Gerhard's loci theol.—de imagine Dei in homine ante lapsum* c. 2, § 40 seq. *Quenstedt* l. c. p. ii. c. 1, sect. 1, th. 9 (p. 4), sect. 2, qu. 5 (p. 26. 27.)

[2] Thus *e. g. Quensted;* others as *Gerhard* also derive wisdom as an element of the Divine image from Eph. iv. 24.

after God in righteousness and holiness of the truth. But if now in the first passage this Divine image is exhibited as such an one, which is first realized in the renewing of man in Redemption, the theologians find themselves thereby justified in inferring, that the same must *have been lost by the sin-fall.*

It were now in vain to object to this dogmatic use of the two passages, if by the καινὸς ἄνθρωπος κατὰ θεὸν κτισθεὶς or by the νέος ἄνθρωπος ἀνακαινούμενος κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος αὐτὸν Adam prior to the fall might be understood; which however is just as much excluded by the expressions of the Apostle (especially the νέος ἄνθρωπος ἀνακαινούμενος, Col. iii. 10) as by the unclear and untenable nature of the representation itself. The νέος (καινὸς) ἄνθρωπος is without doubt the holy form of the human life which results from redemption.[1] If now this is the notion of the new man, then the κτίζειν in both passages cannot signify the first creation of man in Adam, but only as Eph. ii. 10, the second new creation in Christ, comp. 2 Cor. v. 17; Gal. vi. 15; Eph. ii. 15. But then in neither of the passages can there be discovered the smallest direct reference to the Divine image implanted in man at his creation. If Col. iii. 10, in itself and on account of the ἀλλὰ τὰ πάντα καὶ ἐν πᾶσι Χριστὸς at the conclusion of the sentence, it is most natural to understand Christ by κτίσας, then the notion of the εἰκών is also therewith given. It is the image of His Divine life, as it is to express itself ever more purely and perfectly in the life of His disciples, Rom. viii. 29; 2 Cor. iii. 18. The same is expressed in a more indeterminate manner in Eph. iv. 24.—However one might admit this and yet, by means of that inference, think mediately to determine the notion of the original image by the two expressions. But in so doing one lays down a representation for the explanation of the same, which indeed should first of all be proved from them, namely that the new creation by redemption may be essentially nothing else that the *restoration* of the condition in which Adam was prior to the fall. Indisputably the Divine image, which follows from redemption, stands essentially

[1] Compare for Eph. vi. 23 24, the commentary of *Harless*, for Col. iii. 10, the commentary of *Bähr* and *Böhmer*. Nevertheless the two first commentators suppose themselves able in the acknowledgment of this sense to retain the reference of the passages to Gen. i. 26.

in connection with the image which man bears from the creation; the former is only the true realization of the latter; man has only been made a partaker of the one in order that he may attain unto the other, if not in the direct course of faithful persistency in the fellowship of God, then in the circuitous way of redemption; but from the nature of this connection it follows that the contents of the two notions is not the same.

Accordingly, if the nature of the Divine image in Gen. i. cannot be determined according to Eph. iv. 24; Col. iii. 10, then too it cannot be deduced from these passages, so far as they denote the conformity to the Divine image as fruit of renovation in Christ, that that image, derived from the creative act of God, was lost in the fall. Just as little can this loss be derived from Gen. v. 3; much rather when it is there, ver. 1, said: God created man in his own image, and then without mentioning an intervening change, ver. 3: Adam begat a son after his own likeness and after his image, will an ingenuous interpretation conclude from the same, that therefore Adam's son also bore in himself the image and likeness of God.

If now there is such an entire absence of any Biblical testimony for the loss of *that* Divine image, which is treated of in Gen. i., we find on the contrary decisive evidence for the *presence* of the same, even after the sin of our first parents. In Gen. ix. 6, the violent destruction of a human life is execrated with severest vengeance and it is given as a reason of the same, that God made man after his own image—which manifestly presupposes that man still bears in himself this image, as the seal of his inviolableness. In a very similar connection, James, cap. iii. 9, reminds us, that men ("τοὺς ἀνθρώπους," not τὸν ἄνθροπον) were made after the image of God. It is manifestly a mere makeshift, with which every arbitrary limitation and confusion of the notions would be justifiable, when the older dogmatick seeks to reconcile its doctrine of the loss of the Divine image with those passages by distinguishing between *imago Dei late sive ἀκύρως* and *stricte s. κυρίως sic dicta.*—[1]

[1] *E.g. Quenstedt* l. c. p. 3. Just as little can the duplicity of the designation, צֶלֶם, εἰκών and דְּמוּת, ὁμοίωσις, be used for this purpose so much the less, as in that passage of Scripture which exhibits the image most distinctly as one yet present, James iii. 9, ὁμοίωσις is used.

Consequently from everything which the Holy Scripture contains respecting the image of God in which man was originally created the tenet cannot be established, that Adam by his fall implanted in human nature a new principle before foreign to it, which usurped dominion over all his descendants and ensnared them in sin and guilt.—

What we have to understand by that image, the book of Genesis does not it is true expressly state, but it lies near enough to be easily inferred. When, after the narration of how the different orders of natural existences proceeded from the creative operation of God, the creation of man is introduced in an entirely peculiar manner by the resolve of God, to create a being after His image and according to His likeness, the opinion is manifestly included therein, that in those orders of beings the Divine likeness is not to be met with. Thus then the image of God in man will be that, by which he is specifically different from all natural beings and exalted above them. He is this thereby, that he is *personal essence*.[1] Those other orders of existences may be able to reveal God and his eternal thoughts; but images of God those beings are only able to be, who are a revelation of God not merely for others, but also for themselves, who in general not merely *are*, but also *are for themselves*, who are conscious of themselves and therefore also are conscious of God.

Accordingly we find the most decisive reference to the image in which man was originally created, nay much rather to the image constituting his spiritual nature, in a passage, which does not indeed contain the name but certainly the thing, namely Acts xvii. 28, 29. For that it is erroneous, when older and more modern theologians frequently refer this passage to the general relation of God to created being (to the *concursus generalis*), that it much rather entirely treats of the peculiar dignity and destination of man, an attentive consideration of its connection places beyond all doubt. If now it is here said of man in distinction from all other beings, that he lives, moves, and is in God, we have already (p. 151 seq.) seen, that he is only able to be in God, in so far as he in the highest manner is in

[1] Comp. the remarks of *Nitzsch*, herewith in agreement, in the first article of the Protestant reply to *Möhler's Symbolik*—*Stud. und Krit.* 1834. p. 36 seq.

himself. But this being in himself *(Insichsein)* applies to him in that he is Ego-hood, Personality. And just thereby is he of Divine race; the γένος of the relative and of the absolute personality is the same over against the selfless existences. Thus the contents of this Pauline passage, so full of significance, leads us to the nature of the Divine image as its presupposition. That we live, move, and are in God, that we are of His race is represented as guarantee for the impossibility of discovering Him in His world by the sensation of touch. In that God creates, He sets by His will an *essentia* distinct from His essence; in that He produces in the sphere of created being an essence after His own image, He draws again to Himself the world, placed at an infinite distance from Him. God has willed man to be like Himself, in order that there may be a being, which should be capable of fellowship with Him; therefore the human spirit ought not to allow itself either by deistic or by pantheistic abstractions, both of which agree in denying him this fellowship, to be prevented from cognizing God in this likeness of nature with himself. God "in creating man theormorphosed;" therefore we may continue man does *not* anthropomorphose, when he thinks of God as a manlike-essence, as cognizing and determining spirit. If we found ourselves subjectively necessitated to regard, with pantheism and deism, everything which the human spirit in agreement with its own nature expresses of God, as mere anthropomorphosing, then God could not indeed have made man more incapacitated for the cognition of Himself than directly thereby that He created him in His own image.

The further development of this notion of the Divine image in man is already contained in our earlier investigations (in the fourth chapter of the third book of the first subdivision), we wish only to direct attention to the fact, how all other declarations of the Scripture coincide therewith on this subject. For if the Divine image is the spiritual personality, then it cannot of course be regarded as a passing condition, but only as a natural constitutional characteristic of man, consequently as something still present even in the state of sin (Gen. ix. 6; James iii. 9), then too the dominion over nature is its consequence (Gen. i. 26) and the image of Christ proceeding from redemption, its real fulfilment (Col. iii. 10).

According to this of the predicates, which our older dogmatick ascribes to the *imago Dei*, we have to retain those, that it is *naturalis*, also that it is *propagabilis*, in the sense namely, that no *propagatio* takes place, without the propagated bearing in itself the Divine image, on the contrary we must decline the following, that the *imago Dei* is *accidentalis* and *amissibilis*, as indeed even under presupposition of the old Protestant notion of the Divine image the latter determinations cannot truly be reconciled with the former.—

In the last place, in examining *the internal ground and connection* of the representation of the *primitive condition* of man, according to which that notion is formed, we will not here repeat, what has been already said in other places of this work against the assumption, that the personal creature made his beginning from moral perfection. We wish only to call to mind, how that the notion of morality requires its mediation by free self-activity,[1] and that we are not at all able to see how the possibility of evil for the personal creature could have been present from the beginning, of which we have the most striking proof in, the same having become a reality, if directly at the beginning he was possessed of moral perfection. And this leads us to an internal contradiction, in which the older dogmatick here involves itself. If it found for instance, as *Origen* it may be, the *possibility of the fall* reconcilable with the moral perfection of the personal creature, its conception of the primitive condition would not then indeed stand in unison with a correct insight into the notion of creaturely freedom, but still it would be in unison with itself. But this by no means corresponds with its mode of teaching, for it expressly recognizes, that in the completion of the work of redemption in the redeemed the possibility of falling *(labilitas)* will be removed by the Divine confirmation of them in the good. Neither does it mechanically conceive of this Divine confirmation, as an act of God quite externally added to the previous development—a

1 The correct cognition of this necessity is expressed in that exegetically incorrect distinguishing between εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ (צֶלֶם), the moral-intellectual endowment belonging to the nature of man, and ὁμοίωσις (דְּמוּת) the actual God-likeness, the Holiness and Wisdom, which is a task for man from the beginning.

representation, which would indeed allow of attributing to the condition of original integrity every internal moral perfection, of which the creature is capable and to which it is determined, without their following therefrom the exaltation of the creature above the real possibility of evil, but which would be prejudicial to the sufficiency of Redemption, and make the question unanswerable, why God did not bestow this confirmation at the very beginning in order thus to avoid the fall. It much rather expressly declines this idea of the Divine confirmation in the good, and attaches the latter to the completion of the fellowship with God mediated by Redemption.[1] But then it must also acknowledge, that this *state of non-confirmation in good* is the evidence of a *deficiency (Mangel)* attaching to the original condition, which, although it does not exclude integrity as sinlessness, still indeed moral perfection as holiness in the positive sense. That it refuses to acknowledge this is an internal contradiction, which is only slightly concealed by such untenable formulae, as that man possessed every perfection in his original condition with the exception of confirmation in Good.

Our older dogmatists, in agreement with the deeper theologians of the middle ages,[2] regard *the beatifying vision of God*[3] as the means of this Divine confirmation. And it is certain, that, when man has only once become a sharer in this highest good, the possibility of sin with respect to him can no longer be thought of. But just for this reason this good, which is promised him for the completion, could not be bestowed upon him at the first, because its possession is conditioned by the necessity of the self-hood

[1] *Gerhard Loci theol. de vita aeterna* § 75:—Ea ipsa natura sui status—; non tantum ex lege Dei extrinseca, ut quidam Scholasticorum opinantur, beati erunt in bono confirmati. *Quenstedt* l. c. P. i. c. xiv. sect. i. th. 20 (p. 557.) Comp. the remarks on the confirmation of the good angels, in *Gerhard* l. c. *de creatione et angelis* sect 13. *Quenstedt* l. c. c. xi. sect. i. th. 20 seq. sect. 2. qu. 6, and *T'westen's Vorlesungen über die Dogm. der ev. Luth. Kirche* vol. 2, p. 325 seq.

[2] *Thomas v. Aquino Summa* P. i., qu. 100. art. 2: Confirmatur homo in iustitia per apertam Dei visionem.

[3] *Gerhard* l. c. Quemadmodum angeli, qui semper vident faciem patris, qui in coelis est, Matt. xviii. 10, sunt in bono confirmati et a peccandi periculo liberati, sic beati, utpote futuri ἰσάγγελοι, perfecte sancti et in bono confirmati erunt per et propter beatificam Dei visionem Comp. *Quenstedt* l. c.

contained in the nature of the creaturely personality, being brought into perfect harmony with the principle of obedience towards God. The tender germ of the plant cannot bear the life-giving power of the rays of the sun quite at the first, but only after it has unfolded itself for a time in the dark shadows of the deep. The personal creature must first of all by self-development in fellowship with the *believed God* grow strong in himself and in this fellowship in order to become capable of the *vision of God*. The correlative of the exclusion of the Divine vision from the primitive condition will therefore in any case be the negation of the moral perfection from that state.

FOURTH CHAPTER.

THE ORIGIN OF INNATE SIN.

In the former chapter we were occupied with the contradiction between two determinations of sin, which we found ourselves necessitated to maintain with equal firmness. On the one side the *universality of sin* and its being *inrooted in human nature*, and on the other side the *personal culpability* of the individual—the question was, whether the *Augustinian* dogma of hereditary sin is able to reconcile these two sides with each other. We have seen that it leaves the problem unsolved, and that, while it recognises the first of these two sides in its fullest significance, it essentially violates the established claims of the other side. We have also been sufficiently convinced, that the mediations attempted upon this ground, some, by limiting the natural sinfulness and its power to produce real sin, others, by transferring all personal culpability to the primitive decision of the progenitors of the race, render no help with respect to the main matter, so long as the two sentences stand fast: all men are sinners, and where sin is, there is guilt.

We only need to look somewhat more closely at the significance of both the moments, in order to recognise the point from which the solution of the problem can alone proceed. On the one hand, we have the *sinfulness inborn* in every man, from which, in each one awakened to moral consciousness, real sins proceed, still, without the notion of sin, by virtue of which, it is that which is essentially disturbing, that which ought not to be, allowing us to explain this universality by conceiving of sin as of a necessary moment of the development of human nature. On the other hand, we are obliged to acknowledge the *guilt of the person* in sin, and in this is contained, according to the investigations of the first book on the notion of guilt, the judgment, that the person by his self-decision is the author of his sin. The Holy Scripture at least in one passage, Eph. ii. 3, directly pronounces its sentence of guilty, with respect to every man, as he is by nature, consequently as he is from his birth, and the Church has ever recognised an

inborn guilt especially in its treatment of the ordinance baptism as the baptism of children. But that in the main point it comes to the same thing, when one only refers guilt to real sin, but yet makes some or other real sin inevitably to arise from the innate sinfulness, requires no further proof after the discussions of the former chapter. An innate sinfulness, which *makes* every one guilty is itself manifestly in indissoluble connection with guilt. Thus there results to us the notion of a sinfulness grounded *in the other side of our temporally individual existence*, which, because it carries with it guilt, whether it be immediately or in its inevitable consequence, must have its origin in our *personal self-decision*. It conditions our action, our entire development from its first beginnings onward, and can only have its ground in our own act.

This were now a manifest contradiction, if there were not (timelessly) preceding our earthly temporal existence some existence of our personality, as the sphere of that self-decision, by which our moral condition from the beginning is conditioned. And thus from these undeniable facts of universal human life and consciousness the same idea presents itself to us, to which we were previously led by an attentive investigation of human freedom (in the fourth chapter of the third book), namely, the idea of an *extra-temporal mode of existence of created personalities*, from which their life in time is dependent. In the development of that notion, the imputation in the conscience was for us an important moment, since the question was, whether and in how far the freedom of the will could explain to us the origin of evil. But there we remained standing in our consideration simply by the fact of sin in general, how that man dare not ascribe it to God as its author but only to himself, and from this we were compelled to seek the root of free self-determination to good or evil in the non-temporal region of the intelligible. If we have since been convinced, that sin is something quite universal among men, indeed that it is inrooted in the very nature of man, then there arises therefrom, if we are to reconcile therewith the guilt of the individual in his sin, a new and still more determinate necessitation for the transition into that sphere. The contradiction between the universality of sin and its origin from the self-decision of the personal will vanishes, and we are justified

in regarding the propensity to evil, according to the *Kantian* expression, as a propensity "interwoven with humanity itself and rooted as it were therein," and yet at the same time as one which "we ourselves have contracted," if each one, who in this earthly life appears affected with sin, has in his extra-temporal condition turned away his will from the Divine light to the darkness of self-hood absorbed in itself.

According to this the solution of the most difficult enigma of our existence does not certainly lie directly in the very facts which contain the enigma. The most attentive consideration and most careful analysis of these facts will in themselves alone hardly lead to any other result than to the recognition, that there is here present an insolvable contradiction. The explanation lies behind the facts to be explained, and still in such nearness to them, that it immediately appears from an exact designation and vital comprehension of the same. Just a deeply earnest religious opinion perhaps finds it advisable to allow the mystery of our moral existence to remain veiled, as the image at Sais; it regards it indeed as prying curiosity when one ventures to touch the veil, and according to the word of the poet, however in another sense, to approach the truth through guilt. And nevertheless all those say in reality and implicite the very same, who only decidedly recognize that fact in its double-sidedness, the universal sinfulness innate in every man, and the personal guilt therein. One only requires to take the theologoumenon of the immediate participation of the posterity of Adam in his fall or the mystico-realistic theory of the latter earnestly at its word, in order to derive from its tenets the recognition of a primitive fall preceding the individual time-life and nevertheless for all personally free.

But if we are to exhibit the truth of this principle, we must develop it from the indeterminate generality in which we have hitherto denoted it, into a fuller determinateness. The question however presents itself, what is to lead us to the cognition of its further determinations? That the Holy Scripture is silent on this matter every ingenuous consideration, which does not wish to force its own thoughts upon it, by allegorizing ex- or much

rather im-positions, must admit; why it observes this silence will further on appear. Are we now perhaps to ascribe to every man, who reflects upon himself, an *immediate consciousness*, of this original self-decision independent of time, whereby he has become guilty, and has given place to a power of sin over himself, a consciousness not merely of the presence of an original guilt, but also of the determinate contents of the act grounding it? We have already (vol. ii. p. 168 sq.) been occupied with this question in a more general respect. The answer it then received was two-fold, on the one hand, that there could not at all be an empirical consciousness of that act, but that its cognition could only be attained by means of speculation, on the other hand, referring to the investigations of this book, that the facts indicative of this timeless self-decision express themselves, in the consciousness of the earnest minded man, as if he had a real remembrance of the primitive act conditioning the moral formation of his temporal life. This is the place to explain these sentences. A timeless self-decision in favour of evil is not able to be the immediate contents of our empirical consciousness, just for the reason, that, as timeless, it has not in itself the determination, without which it cannot at all be cognized by the same as an *act*, the determination namely, of being first of all that which is taking place, then that which has taken place, passed by. If it in any way reflects itself in our temporally conditioned consciousness, it cannot take place in the form of an *evil-doing*, but only in that of an *evil-being* present from the beginning, of an abiding sinful condition, nevertheless, in such a way, that this condition is at the same time conceived of, although the consciousness does not know it to have proceeded from an act, as one affected with guilt. And this is just the way in which conscience teaches us to regard the sins of our own life. It reproaches us not merely on account of our sinful-doing, but also an account of our sinful-being, and indeed not merely on account of such a sinful-being, which we might be able to prove as being in some way the product of our actual sins, but also on account of such an one which, as preceding all actual sins, can only be related to them as causing not as caused. Thus so soon as the moral consciousness awakens, it discovers the variance of the life with its holy law, as a condition already present, as the natural being of man generally, but

nevertheless treats the individual, without paying any regard to the exception of the universality and of the necessity apparently resulting therefrom, as therefore guilty. It has no immediate cognition of that timeless sin-fall, but its procedure is quite as if it had such a cognition.

And accordingly we may now also learn what is to conduct us in our determination of the contents of that primitive decision. If we have found by means of speculation the sphere of the being, to which the phenomena of our experience and of our moral judgment, in conjunction with each other, point, we are then able also further to cognize, how the determinate contents of that intelligible fact reflects itself in these phenomena. It is the *will*, the primitive decision of which is only possible in this timeless sphere of the being.—There is contained in the notion of the will, that it cannot *become* perverted, but can absolutely only pervert itself. If now in its entering into the temporal development of the individual there attached to it no perversion whatever as an abiding constitutional character, there would indeed not yet necessarily follow therefrom a manifestation of the same free of all disturbance; for it may be conceived, that disarrangements had found their way into the lower spheres of life, which threw around it hindering impediments. But if it was not able at once to cast off these impediments, it would, supposing it had preserved its own purity, appear as *suffering from them*, until, as the true redeemer of human life from its bonds, it had completely, although gradually, overcome them. Then too our moral development would be carried on through moments of variance and conflict; but numberless individuals, all those, whose personal will during this development had maintained an averting and opposing attitude against this disturbance, which had entered into the lower spheres, would be free from guilt, and consequently from the need of expiation and pardon of sin.

But experience contradicts all this in the most decided manner. It never shows us sin solely as a *disturbance of nature which is borne with aversion*, and which then of itself, in the progress of development, disappears by the purity of the will, but everywhere, although in the most different forms, as a *deviation of the will itself*, which is in league with the ulterior impulses. Therefore every one in whom the moral consciousness has been awakened,

finds in himself not merely an element of sin as a fatality foreign to his own will, but also finds himself involved in guilt. Thus then there attaches to us all from the beginning a *disturbance of the will*, which has arisen from self-perversion, as an abiding constitutional character, as an habitual sinfulness *of being*, which as primitive guilt and principle of all further culpability is nothing else and can be nothing else than our timeless *action*. If this might everywhere be reduced to the so-called weakness of the will against the excitations of the sensational lust, the will would not bear in itself this weakness against the excitations to its own perversion as a general constitutional character, if it had not by an original self-decision in all men taken up into itself an element of perversion.

Herewith is also understood the powerful incentive sufficiently attested from the history of theology and Philosophy, to derive sin directly from the *notion of human nature* and thus to make it in itself necessary. Conscience and Religion will never cease to protest against this derivation, and they are so much the more fully entitled to do so, since a similar protest follows directly from the notion of sin. But to discover the source of the error, and really to deprive it of the apparent support, which it has in the character of sin as that of an universal condition of human nature, speculative theology is only capable of doing by its insight into the non-temporally free self-decision, by which the temporal development of human nature is conditioned in the totality of its individuals.

This general nature of the natural corruption in the region of the will is the selfish, fundamental tendency, innate in all human life, to which the Ego independently of, and prior to, all time has determined itself. We do not wish by any means to deny the disorders of the sensational nature their deeply pervading significance; indeed it also is not able to be denied, that this disturbance in some form or other attaches to every man from his very birth, in some more as a propensity to sensational indolence, in others as germ of positive thirst of enjoyment and violent sensational passions, sometimes as inordinate fear of sensational evil, at others as immoderate inclination to sensational lust. But of that which is universal in sin, common to and thoroughly pervading all these different forms—we may denomi-

nate it as a resistance of the sensational nature to be only an organ of the Spirit—an earlier investigation (in the second chapter of the second book) has convinced us, that the real kernel of sin is by no means contained in it, that this is itself only a real result from this kernel, which expresses its nature or non-nature in a second, derived sphere, an embodiment as it were of that spiritual principle of sin. This indomitableness of the sensational nature in relation to the spirit is so far from being that which is the absolutely and under every condition evil, that it, although in itself considered a contradiction against the notion of man, nevertheless only becomes really evil, inasmuch as the will of the spirit is directed to the good, indeed that in an opposite case it may become even an hinderance of and an impediment to evil.

And any other than such an entirely *spiritual evil* cannot at all be ascribed to the extra-temporal, primitive condition of creaturely personality, which is the state of an existence as yet destitute of all corporeity, just as it is a directly self-cancelling idea, which, with *Kant* (comp. vol. i. p. 367 seq.) sets the intelligible evil in the maxim subordinating the motive of the law to the sensational impulses. He therefore who has not yet been convinced of the same by that critick of the sensational theory and the genetic development of sin in the first subdivision of the first book, will nevertheless be here obliged to admit, if he has otherwise made the further progress of the investigation with us, that the inmost nature of sin, the evil in evil, is of an entirely spiritual nature. It depends upon this spiritual, primitive evil, that spiritual elevation is anything but a sure protection against the power of sin. Not merely does man often in a moment fall from his noble soarings and most exalted inspirations down into the lowest sensuality, but what is still more appalling, at the very culmination of his highest thoughts and his most spiritual endeavours, if he does not stand under a higher discipline, the transition into diabolical pride and abandoned trifling with everything Holy, into inward wickednesses, in comparison with which the disturbances of sensationalism are verily children's sins, lies in the most fearful nearness to him.—

We have no need of seeking a ground of the solicitation to this selfish, primitive decision besides the very ground of conditioned personality itself. *The spiritual self-hood*, which is the creaturely and nevertheless non-temporal root of this personality, and without

which it would not be capable of love sanctifying and sublimating everything, is this ground of solicitation to a decision, which may be evil, consequently a ground inseparable in personal beings from their creation; but in its normal position it does not on that account cease to be, as the condition of love, a moment of the good. The possibility of its becoming elevated to the dominant principle, of its apostasy from God, should, according to the eternal order of things, only be in the extra-temporal *consciousness*, in order to exclude its becoming a reality, and that thus the spiritual self-hood might as pure self-hood enter into the life developing itself in time. But because this self-hood, as extra-temporal self-determining is from the (subjectively) undetermined, it is absolutely not to be prevented, if its primitive decision, breaking through that order, actually realizes the possibility, contained in its own ground, of disseverance from God.

If now a primitive decision of self-hood precedes the temporal development of us all in a non-temporal manner, whereby the same has posited itself as dominating principle, then we may understand, why, in the general arrangement of this earthly life, nothing is so much planned for as the *subduing and subordinating of self-hood;* in whichever direction we turn ourselves this earthly life preaches to us renunciation and self-denial; from the very first awaking up of our consciousness onward, the teachings of this hard doctrine resound in our ears; our fondest desires must bend to the commanding wills of others, we must habituate ourselves to plans and ordinances, which we have not made, to respect authorities, the grounds of which we do not see. No one of our projected plans of life, if the cognition of the necessity of resigning ourselves has not beforehand robbed it of every determinateness, becomes really carried out; what we wished above all to retain becomes torn from us by the violence of circumstances and something else thrust upon us, of which we had not even dreamt. No individual work remains truly our own; its going forth from us is just its entering into innumerable associations, in which it soon appears to us as that which is more or less foreign, indeed it often becomes a limiting impediment to us, in opposition to our deepest inclinations. In opposing and resisting these obtruding powers which force themselves upon us, we ever anew realize the fulfilment of the proverb: *fata volentem ducunt, nolentem trahunt;*

in a certain measure we can only obtain the mastery of the violence, which they do us, by giving way to their impulse, so far as the inward voice of our peculiar individuality allows it; but the solution of the variance is first of all found in the reliance upon the Divine disposition being also prevalent in circumstances as in individual peculiarities and in the cognition, that just this breaking of our own will belongs to the necessary discipline of our spirits. For as unbridled self-hood remains throughout evil, if even in its outward conduct it should tolerably well coincide with the rules and arrangements of civil morality, so is earnest discipline the soil, upon which alone true virtue is able to thrive, and obedience the grounded and bitter root, from which the glorious growth of true liberty is developed. In the moral, no less than in the aesthetic sphere, do we find the truthfulness of the beautiful lines of the poet:

> In vain, in vain will unbound spirits strive
> To climb the lofty heights of purity;
> Self-limitation gives the power to rise,
> And law alone can give us liberty.—[1]

If we further endeavour to ascertain the *degree*, in which the human will has perverted itself in that primitive decision, preceding every (temporal) act, we are immediately at the very entrance upon the inquiry met by the twofold possibility which *Kant* has already entered upon.[2] The one degree were the open rebellion of self-hood, willing only itself, against God and His Holy Law, the resolve not to pay any regard to the same. The other degree were the equivocation, of willing it is true the will of God in general, but of preferring to His will the direction of self-hood to itself. The former degree affirms only self-hood and decidedly denies the Divine Will; the latter affirms besides self-hood also the Divine Will, but so far limits its requirement as it comes into contradiction with the interest of self-hood.

The question, what degree of self-perversion is to be ascribed to human wills in the primitive ground of their existence, can of

[1] *Goethe.*—(Tr.)

[2] *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft* p. 31 seq. Still *Kant* ascribes to the higher degree really only an entirely abstract conceivability; in reality he regards it as not being possible.

course only be answered upon the ground-basis of *experience*. *Kant* requires of us to ask ourselves, whether we are even immediately conscious of an ability, by means of a fixed resolve, to overcome, every ever so great a motive to transgression (*Phalaris licet imperet ut sis falsus et admoto dictet perjuria tauro*), and is of opinion, every man will be obliged to confess, that he does not know, whether, if such a case presented itself, he would not waver in his resolve.[1] But even supposing some should find this accusation against the human race to be not at all sufficiently grounded and presented themselves to the accuser as such, who would not consent even to the smallest sin, although it were to escape the most horrible tortures, nevertheless even such would in any case admit, that this absolutely invincible, heroic virtue, was not indeed peculiar to them by nature, but that they had been obliged to struggle for the same through many and severe conflicts with themselves. And this were sufficient for the solution of the problem with which we are just now occupied; man, as he is by nature, in the noblest as in the very worst disposed of individuals, could not then indeed disavow the absolutely condemnable "maxim," namely, to subordinate in the severest instance of collision duty to self-hood. That this maxim is so completely an ingrowth in the very nature of man, that, when in such a case one acts according to the same, we are less sensible of aversion than we are of compassion, in the consciousness of the equally infirm state of *our own* virtue, cannot, after the results of our previous investigations, shake but only confirm our judgment of the same. It is just the primitive decision which lies on the other side of the time-life of us all, which, according to the determinateness of its contents, expresses itself in that maxim which is natural to us.

On the other hand, *the limit of the natural corruption*, shown in the first chapter of this book, has its principle in this determinate contents, as we have previously designated it. Manifestly this corruption is one which is not complete, is no decided renunciation of obedience towards the will of God, which consistently carries itself out. Indeed although we are not at all justified in declaring such a sole dominion of selfishness in the will of the

[1] L. c. p. 58.

personal creature, which does not leave over even the smallest inclination to good, as a representation which is self-contradictory, we must nevertheless admit, that we are not able to make an intuitive conception, consequently one which is clearly cognizable in the connection of its moments, of the reality of such a condition. The natural will of man is in dissension with itself, and in general ever remains so in this earthly life, in so far as concerns its character in its entirety, even in the augmenting enhancement of its corruption by new offences incurring new guilt. Not from the absolutely rayless darkness, but from the night, in which there still lingers a gleam of light as of dawning day, does our moral development in time arise, and just upon this rests the deep tendency to light, upon which every morally religious influence upon the awakening life may calculate, if it only begins its work early enough. This tendency, is in so far an act of man, as it expresses the bound, up to which his original fall by self-perversion extends itself. His will has not so decidedly severed itself from its eternal ground and norm, that there is not still left to this latter a determining power, from the reaction of which against the dominating principle of selfishness, there arises the strongly mixed, wavering condition in which we find the natural man in general.—

If we should ascribe such a self-perversion to *all* personal creatures in the timeless condition of their being, we should again carry the problem into the very sphere, in which it is said to become solved. The task is, to show the falsity of the extremely plausible conclusion from the universality of sin of its metaphysical necessity, or what is the same, to reconcile with that universality, the self-culpability of man in sin. If now the universality of evil is also transferred to the sphere of the intelligible primitive decisions, then that necessity directly makes its appearance where it should be overcome and transformed into pure freedom. But we have no occasion whatever for this transference, if the idea here developed is not to become confounded with the entirely different doctrine of a fall as the ground of finite and individual being. Much rather the consideration of the notion of freedom in agreement with the religious belief of most nations leads us to anticipate, that a part of the spirit-world has by its primitive decision grounded itself a moral existence in undisturbed unison with God, in order in continuous develop-

ment to exalt its creational purity to free holiness. Just as little, according to what was said just above, are we justified in denying the possibility, that another portion of those spiritual beings have decidedly and entirely turned away from God, by which for their existence in time every inclination to good would be excluded.

Even from this then it follows, that there must be at the bottom of the religious representations of *Angels and Devils*, surely something more real, than merely it may be the abstract primitive and caricatured image of our own moral condition reflecting itself in our fancy, and every opinion must acknowledge this, which, although it may think itself able to decline the extra-temporal, primitive condition, nevertheless regards in its deep significance the relation between freedom and sin. Consequently for that which Christ and His Apostles teach of Angels and Devils, although only in incidental intimations, there is by no means wanting points of attachment in the religious consciousness ingenuously developing itself from its own centre. One must only not forget, that the real root of the interest, which the Christian doctrine takes in the existence of these beings, lies in the moral fundamental constitution of the same and its distinctions from the moral condition of man; which may also be easily proved from the Holy Scripture.

But if in creation the distinctions of genus and species, especially the different orders of existences in the sphere of personal creatures, are by no means to be looked upon, as *Origen* maintains, as the product of the original fall in the spirit-world, but much rather according to the notion precede the same, the difficulty which we have just discussed meets us again at another point. If we are obliged to accept the assumption, that all beings, in which *the notion of the human spirit* is realized according to its fundamental determinations in an extra-temporal manner, so far as it is capable of realization in this sphere, participated in that original incurrence of guilt, should we then be able to avoid the conclusion, that this culpability follows from some moments or other in the very notion of the human spirit? But even here there is nothing against the assumption, that innumerable beings of the same order with us have, in their primitive act, excluded the possibility of the realization of evil, although of the relations, under which, in consequence of this decision,

they are introduced into temporal existence, we are able to know nothing more, than that they must stand in essential analogy with the fundamental determinations of the earthly human existence. Only of one human will do we know, that in the primitive ground of His self-determination He preserved unity with the will of God, from which we all have fallen; we know it, because, if an original guilt and the power of sin had also followed Him, into this temporal existence, neither the spotless Holiness of His life, surmounting all temptations, this image of a purity of His mind disturbed by no inward variance, nor the undisturbed unison of His consciousness of His relation to God would be capable of being explained.

This conducts us to the question of, *how far* the determining influence of this act extends in the empirical reality of our moral consciousness and conduct. It first of all reveals itself in the conciousness of an *original culpability*, as it attaches to our nature in its present condition. Just in that a deeper moral consciousness necessitates us to acknowledge this culpability as a disturbance attaching to our nature, and again the disturbance attaching to our nature as our culpability, does it refer back to that intelligible act. This primitive guilt, by which the same binds our consciousness developing itself in time, is accordingly not at all to be separated from our *real bondage* by our own primitive decision. We are really bound by our will being by nature one which is broken in itself, with itself in dissension.

Whether and in how far humanity had the power, in its pure, *i.e.* empirically undisturbed beginnings, to release itself from this two-fold bondage, will appear below in our subsequent discussions; in its present condition, in which the disturbance in the nature-side of our being only too well correspond to the self-variance of the will, it is not able to do so. The moral development of humanity cannot again remove the perversion of the fundamental relation, between self-hood and life in God, now that it has once pervaded the entire human nature and determines every earthly human life from the beginning, but all its movements and changes from itself take place within the fundamental direction therewith given. The liberation of fallen man from the guilt and power of sin is only possible, by God Himself being interested in him and by his leading him back, out of pure grace, through the atonement and

justification in Christ, to fellowship with Himself. And even here an annihilation of that which is done, whereby it would become undone, is not to be thought of, because such a thing is altogether inconceivable. The perverted primitive decision, in so far as it, as extra-temporal, is the negative condition of the entire moral development according to its particular determinateness, is the abiding dark ground of the human consciousness, but by the act of Divine Grace, which appoints an expiation and creates a new beginning, it is made the back-ground, which only is, in so far as it is cancelled. Even the sanctified in their state of completion, will still ever remain the saved ones of the Lord, not the innocent, in whose self-consciousness sin has no place whatever, but the redeemed who know their guilt to be covered by forgiveness.—

In the last place, as to the relation of our *corporeity* and consequently, since no corporeity is conceivable without matter, our *materiality* to the primitive sin, we scarcely need expressly to state, inasmuch as without that it so clearly follows from the entire connection of our investigations, how far we are from the *Platonic-Philonic-Origenistic* conception of the body, as of a prison of the soul, in which the soul has been shut up by God, as a punishment of its pre-terrestrial fall. The various modifications of this opinion, which better agree with the spirit of oriental heathenism than with the Religion of Revelation, agree with each other in considering matter as a principle inimical to the true reality of conditioned being, and the difficulty remains then just as great, whether one places the same over against God as a second Original, or regards it as being directly created by God. If matter in general is the expression of the boundary inseparable from finite individual existences and of their reciprocal relation necessarily arising therefrom, then indeed we may see, that God has no immediate relation to matter, but surely a mediate and therefore no less positive. For, not for God, the in Himself absolutely relationless being and therewith exalted above all sufferiffg (determination of being from without), has it significance, but only for conditioned being. But this latter cannot out of its purely spiritual, primitive condition attain to living individuality and therewith to the full reality of existence, unless the spiritual monad, which originally stands only in relation to

God, and not yet to other individual existences which are its equals, makes objective the boundary immanent in it and becomes *nature* as the soul of a body. For not as this solitary atom, which relates itself only to God and only itself to God, but first of all in its relation to a-other similar being, in the mutual completing of individual existences, as member of an organic whole, is it able to arrive at that full reality of existence. But this mutual relation and completion is not possible without the mediation of a corporeity, consequently materiality. First of all by this objective expression of its immanent boundary is it also given to created spirits to return into themselves as individual existences and to grasp their inward identity in distinguishing themselves from all other beings. If now by the Divine Will they are ordained to full reality of existence, then too the condition of this reality, matter, has the Divine Will for the principle of its existence.

If from this point of view matter, more precisely corporeity, is to be cognized as necessary mediation for the development of the finite spirit from its intelligible ground, it has indeed still a particular relation with this our *earthly material* corporeity. The ordinary understanding has never been able to find anything else in the representations of the origin of this corporeity from sin, as they have been drawn with ingenious fancy by many theosophic Mystics of more modern time, by *Antoinette Bourignon*, *Pordage*, *Poiret*, than arbitrary dreamings;[1] but a deeper and juster estimate will not overlook the manifold enigmas of the earthly life which have furnished the impulse to the development of these representations. The conditions are peculiarly difficult and narrow, under which that in itself necessary mediation is laid down for man by the present nature of our corporeity; but that less difficult ones are in themselves possible we should be especially put in mind by the Christian doctrine of the resurrection. Nevertheless we must also decidedly decline the derivation of these peculiar conditions from the primitive fall in the spirit-world, whether considered strictly as punishment for the fallen or as the means of their restoration which had first of all become necessary by the

[1] Comp. *e. g.* the examination of the same in the second part of the third volume of *Corodi's Kritischer Geschichte des Chiliasmus.*

fall. It cannot be doubted, that there are already contained in the general notion of human nature moments, by which this ponderous, hard corporeity, this σῶμα χοϊκον is conditioned as the first basis for the development of these spiritual existences in time. We may perhaps conjecture that it is the stronger self-hood, which distinguishes them from other essentiae of the intelligible world, without sin being thereby already supposed or its necessary appearance in the temporal development. But at the same time it is certainly the highest revelation of the glory of God, in the boldest world-creative combination, when He is able by the Divine magic of His Love and Cognition to conduct these beings, involved in an earthly nature and consigned within the narrowest limit, up to a sublimated, angel-like (Luke xx. 36) existence, which, as phenomenal is just the glorification of this our very earthly corporeity, consequently imperishably preserves the peculiar individual significance of the same. As by this association of the apparently most remote and irreconcilable man first of all becomes the central being of the universe in the full sense of the word, so there becomes thereby conquered and built up for the Divine kingdom a province, which must otherwise have remained to him external and foreign.

When one looks at the New Testament doctrine of the Creation and Resurrection, with the addition of its Christology, in their mutual relation, just as Paul has himself already done, 1 Cor. xv., he finds no equivocal judgment respecting the σῶμα χοϊκὸν and its relation to the idea of man. It is *affirmed* as qualified for the beginning of the human development, its qualification however to *remain* becomes negatived; it has, so far as it is even χοϊκὸν, a right to existence only as a passing stage of development. A relative inadequacy in relation to the sphere of our being, on which our capacity for fellowship with God and our specific elevation above all natural existences rest, is definitely ascribed to it by the Apostle Paul, in that he distinguishes it as σῶμα ψυχικὸν from σῶμα πνευματικὸν, 1 Cor. xv., 44; but he no less definitely denotes it as the original order of God, that the σῶμα πνευματικὸν is only the second in the gradation of development, the σῶμα ψυχικὸν the first, v. 46.

If however, in the second chapter of this book, we have been convinced, that *the mode of this development* would have been

different to that of the present had not sin intervened, there is contained in the same the acknowledgment, that general disturbances are present even in the sphere of our physical life, which have their ground in sin. But in order to be able more precisely to determine this connection, we must take up a new thread of the investigation, which conducts us to a second source of the sinfulness innate in all men. We have already (p. 118) cognized the powerful charm, which attaches to the obtaining of *one* principle for the entire contents of the human individual life, so that all particular determinations of the same may be considered as consequences and manifestations of the one intelligible primitive act. Nevertheless neither the faithful observation of experience and its unequivocal facts, which were there alluded to, nor the nature of the intelligible sphere and of the original self-determination possible in it, allows us to yield to this inducement. As the history of the human race is a mixed result of freedom and necessity, in like manner self-determination and dependence intimately intertwine and interweave themselves in the development of the individual into one indivisible whole. This is not to be separated from the determination, which the time-life must in any case have for created personality, for the unfallen as well as the fallen, namely, to enrich the Ego, which is simple at its beginning, by the appropriation of a full and manifold contents.

That no one is born as man absolutely, that much rather every one commences his development in time naturally endowed with a *determinate peculiarity*, we have already learnt from an earlier (vol. ii. p. 48) consideration. Therewith in the assumption also declined, that souls at the beginning of their existence are all alike and void of distinction, that consequently they first of all become unlike each other in the progress of their development by diversity of education and of the influence in general with which they are surrounded. For if we are to conceive of anything determinate in this theory, it must surely be understood in this way; that the individual soul innately possesses only just the general determinations of the notion of the human genus, that on the contrary the peculiar traits of the individual are only

acquired afterwards. And even if it had the meaning, that the individuals were born with an entirely determinate natural disposition, still all individuals with the same, which in the far greater majority became suppressed by foreign, external influences, but in a few maintained itself and became manifest as their spiritual *(geistig)* peculiarity, it would come to the same thing. For this peculiarity would then just belong to the general character of the human genus, only that the influence of the external circumstances upon the individual must in general be stronger than that of the genus-nature, the accidental stronger than the natural.

We may also draw the inference from those earlier expositions, that these peculiarities do not stand side by side each other in an isolated and non-relational manner without mediation of the general with the individual by the individuation. They much rather, within the great whole of the human genus, group themselves together in smaller wholes, in which a common fundamental type, which, presupposing the general human type, but more closely determining it, maintains itself in indisturbable certainty amid a thousand deviations and apparent arbitrarinesses, of course in so far as individuals from other circles do not co-operatingly enter into the series of the generations. Of these smaller wholes, taking into consideration those merely which most prominently present themselves, the most comprehensive is that of the *race*, the narrowest the *family*, standing in the middle between both the *nation*.

The mediating organ for the determining influence of these natural entireties upon the natural peculiarity of the individuals, in whom they realize themselves, are the parents. Therefore where the given type of the family, of the nation, of the race is weakly expressed or indeed supplanted by some abnormity arising from some other, it is also commonly suppressed in the children; and ultimately another occupies its place. This dependence of the begotten upon those who beget, not merely as to existence but also according to the determinate contents of existence, is seen not merely in the physical but also in the resemblance of the mind, which generally, although manifoldly diversified by many gradations, takes place between parents and children and often so characteristically appears, that it cannot

for a moment be mistaken. Neither are they merely the peculiarities in the sphere of the physical life, idiosyncracies, peculiar temperaments, and the like, which are transmitted by inheritance in families, but also given talents undoubtedly become inherited from one generation to another, as is seen from the series of artists (especially musicians), mathematicians, generals, statesmen, which have proceeded from the same families.

But according to this, how is *this determinate peculiarity to be explained*, as it applies to the individual and distinguishes him according to his innate endowment—for that innumerable individuals are in reality mere examples of their race, nation and family, is just only the consequence of a disturbance hindering the innate endowment in its development—from all other individuals? The free personal will, undoubtedly exercises upon its own basis, the natural peculiarity, a determining influence, but still only from the moment of its first appearance in reality, consequently not upon the origination of its ground-features, but only upon its further development. As a mere result from the union of parental peculiarities, the elements of which must then in children of diverse peculiarity by the same marriage have been variously combined, it cannot be regarded. In many cases this is directly obvious—especially where the child is gifted with distinguishing talents, which are neither to be discovered in the father or mother, nor to be explained by a combination of their peculiarities. But strictly taken it is ever so. No new peculiarity arises by the mere repetition of the paternal or maternal organization of spirit and mind; and only a spiritless, mechanical opinion, which strives to resolve all qualitative distinctions into quantitative, can think of understanding the peculiarity of the child as a mere composition of two other peculiarities. The real nature of the peculiarity is original, only like itself, therefore incommensurable for general notions, and only cognizable by the vision animated by love.

We have seen above, that the mediating organ for the determining influence of those more general powers upon the origination of the individuality, are the parents. In this relation there are two moments contained. An *organ* for the efficiency of a more general potency, is not a mere *instrument*, a transition point without any self-dependent significance, but it has its own

vitality in itself, which reveals itself in the production of its efficiency by particular determinations, which it receives from the same. On the other hand the organ is nevertheless quite *dependent* upon the more general power, which it serves,[1] and indeed not in the manner of an external relation, but so that the former truly works in it and makes it the means of its ever original self-manifestation. According to this it is quite reconcilable to maintain, that the working power, which ever brings new human individuals to existence, essentially mediates itself by the parents as its organ, and that it nevertheless sets determinations in the newly originating individuals, which even according to their innate tendency are not at all present in the parents. An illustrative analogy—as factual proof, that parents, as organs of a power working through them, may communicate in generation attributes, which they themselves do not possess—is furnished us in the oft-recurring phenomenon of unmistakable physical and psychical likenesses between grand parents and grand children, the common features of which had entirely disappeared in the parents of the latter.

Now that working power in its all-comprehending and at the same time precisely and firmly determined generality is the *generating power of the genus-nature*, which enters into the individuations of the character of the race, of the national peculiarity and of the family type, modifies itself by them, and at the same time is directed entirely to the individual existence, to the production of those of its attributes, by which it is more than an example of its family, nation, race. It is the genus, which, through the mediation of the generating individuals, but transcending their determining influences, creates in each originating individual the original innate disposition to a peculiarity, by which it qualitatively distinguishes itself from every other individual. But the genus works here entirely in the manner of a natural power, unconsciously serving the purposes of the Divine Will. God thus makes it, in this its activity, His organ, in order to keep in movement the world-history, to free it from

[1] *Joh. Müller* expresses this as follows: Every individual of a species generates not only the perfect copy of itself, but it generates under the laws, which govern the species in general, *Handbuch der Physiologie*, vol. 2, division 3, p. 770.

impediments and to conduct it over obstacles which present themselves. For the strictly progressive power in the historic development, rests upon great individual peculiarities which have the ability to form in some one higher sphere of life something positive. Most assuredly there is still something more requisite thereto than the eminent natural endowment, but this is nevertheless indisputably the necessary ground-basis.[1]—

The chief conductor for the determining influence of the individual and more general powers upon the originating life is *the moment of generation*. Incomparably less in this respect is the significance of the embryonic development, in which the new life, in spite of its unity with the life of the mother, already possesses a certain self-dependency, by virtue of which it only assimilates to itself, what is homogeneous with itself, and rejects what is foreign and opposed to itself. If that determining influence mediated itself either only by the embryonic development or indeed just as much by this as by generation, then in the first instance, it were not at all to be explained, that children so often bear physically and intellectually the likeness of the father, but in the second, one must expect, that the likeness to the mother would, beyond comparison, more frequently be met with than likeness to the father. Experience refutes both in the most unequivocal manner by the equally frequent likeness of children to their fathers as to their mothers. Or is it to be supposed that this fact may be explained from the *influence* of fathers on their children *in the bringing of them up?* But apart from the incorrectness of the ground opinion, which conceives of the soul in the age of childhood as being still altogether passive, to which, by external influences, any form may be given at pleasure, experience bears testimony to the contrary, namely, that such striking likenesses are often met with, where such an educating influence of the father upon the child, is altogether out of the question. Neither indeed are they merely characteristics of the life

[1] We here refer particularly to *Steffens'* deep and productive thoughts on the significance of the individual peculiarity in several of his works, especially in his *christlichen Religionsphilosophie* pt. i. p. 16—61, without its being necessary to direct the attention of those acquainted with these matters to the point, from which the view of this ingenious natural philosopher and that here developed separate from each other.

of the soul, but just as much those of the physical life, which are often transmitted from father to child, most unmistakably of course there where they have an abnormal character. Just as decidedly do the paternal attributes, which children from parents of different races generally bear, oppose the deriation from later influences, with which one may still compare the characteristics of the examples of bastard generation from the animal sphere. Accordingly we have to consider generation as the strictly deciding moment for the transmission by inheritance of parental qualities to the child.

If we call to mind the development of the embryo from its commencement, it appears to our imagination as an extremely hard requirement to be obliged to conceive of the same, especially in its very first stage, where a reality of the soul-life cannot at all be shown, as bearer of the inclinations and talents of the soul —of course according to their latent innate endowment *(Anlage.)* But the irrefutable fact of the transition of such dispositions from the father to the child ought just to remind us of keeping far removed from the mechanical representations of a first period of the embryo, as of an exclusively physical existence, upon which follows *(infundendo)* the union of a soul with the body, as altogether inadequate, and of conceiving of the relation between body and soul much rather at every point, even where the efficiency of the latter is as yet completely latent, as undivided dynamical unity of the two sides. Indeed physiology must admit this influence of the fructification working in the far distance without any demonstrable substratum, even in still more surprising phenomena out of the sphere of animal life and take it up into its notion of generation.[1]—

Now it is an undeniable fact of experience, that not merely features, which belong to individual peculiarity and just as such are normal, are transmitted by generation, but also *abnormal formations* and innate dispositions to specific diseases of the physical life, as well as dispositions to psychical derangement *e.g.* to melancholy and insanity. But if experience necessitates

[1] Comp. *e.g.* the remarkable facts, which *Burdach* collects together in his "*Physiologie als Erfahrungswissenschaft,*" vol. i. § 301 (ed. i.).

us to this acknowledgment, then too we shall neither be able to deny in the presence of its powerful testimony, that also certain *moral disturbances*, transmit themselves, by inheritance, from parents to children, in the form of *bad innate tendencies*. One may often observe this in life with respect to notorious vices. Thus one sees the vices of the lust of drink and sensuality, of uncontrolled ambition and anger, very often make their appearance in the gradual progress of the development of children whose parents have been under their dominion, as dangerous tendencies to such degeneracies. If now the children yield to these wicked inclinations, instead of resisting them, in all earnestnesss, according to the admonition of their conscience, it is very easy to see, that in them, these vices, supported by the innate bias, will generally attain to greater power than in the parents. The hateful features of the father's own image then become reflected back upon him in horrible distortion from the countenance of the son. But sin requires a certain degree of ripeness in order to be reached by the punishments, which, even in our earthly life, especially in so far as it is the prevalent sin of society, are connected with it, thus of course it very often happens, that the fathers, in whom the sin was not yet ripe, escape their destructive consequences, which then break in upon their children with inevitable power. It is a fearfully earnest thought, but from which even experience, with which our notions of Divine arrangements must necessarily accord, does not allow us to withdraw an iota, the thought namely, of the Divine visitation of the iniquity of the fathers upon the sons resembling them in hatred of God, even to the third and fourth generations, Exod. xx. 5, xxxiv. 7; Numb. xiv. 18.[1] Christ Himself confirms and explains it, when He prophesies of the generation in His day, that there will come upon them, who

[1] Certainly it seems more natural, with *Hengstenberg (Authentie des Pentateuchs*, vol. 2, p. 548) and others, to refer the לְשֹׂנְאָי Exod. xx. 5 to עַל־בָּנִים (or, as *H.* really intends, to both subjects—לְ were in any case to be taken in the sense of: in Ansehung (in consideration of, on account of), than with *De Wette* in his translation to אֶבְרֹת. However there is therewith manifestly presupposed that as a rule, the children will bear a resemblance to their sinning fathers, which is confirmed by the omission of the לְשֹׂנְאָי in the parallel passages.

are at the point of filling up the measure of their fathers who murdered the prophets, by the murder of their Messiah and His messengers, all the innocent blood which has been shed since the murder of *Abel*, Matt. xxiii. 29—35.—And here too we often meet with the remarkable phenomenon which was above observed in the non-moral sphere, namely that evil dispositions of parents which seem to have entirely vanished in the children, become nevertheless transmitted by them to the grandchildren—as a testimony, that the germs of these degeneracies, in whatever way their development may have been entirely prevented, have lain concealed in the deep natural ground of the individuality.

And just this *unconscious nature-ground* of man, not the spiritual *(geistig)* personality, is that which is the strictly efficient in the generating process, the conductor of that degeneracy from race to race, and thereby too the act of human *generation* is distinguished from that of *creation*, with which the same has been recently confounded, not only by physiologists, who, as *Burdach*, endeavour altogether to supplant the notion of creation by that of generation, but also in the theological sphere.[1] The efficiency of the individual is here in its product deprived of conscious self-determining, and carried on, as the working of every power of nature, under a law hidden from itself. But no less the paternal than the maternal bad dispositions, thus propagate themselves in the child, and just because they are both in an equally degree, it must appear as the most natural to attach this propagation entirely to the moment of generation. Manifestly

[1] Comp. *e g. Harless's Ethik* p. 30: "Every generation and birth is not as it were a repeated creative act of God, but the effect of a creative power lent to man by God."—With this there were first of all to answer, whether the same is also to hold good of animal procreation. If it were less strictly meant with the notion of creation, than the connection of the maintenance here requires, and should there be therewith only expressed that in every generation is contained the wonderful beginning of an entirely new, the production of an individual life, which, just as such, was neither in father nor mother, of course also not in both together, even latently present, and which, so soon as it, as embryo, has entered into existence, immediately begins to develop itself out of its own principle, then I believe, that many, perhaps the majority of physiologists of our day, will be therewith agreed, in such a sense however, that they ascribe this just as much to the mere animal, as to human, generation.

also Ps. li. 7 derives the initial sinful state of being from this moment (comp. p. 301 seq.)

In this we by no means find any occasion for considering the sensational sexual intercourse as something in itself *sinful*, or for the maintenance of the entirely erroneous representations, which *Augustinus* formed of the *concupiscentia*, as the punishment of the sin-fall, and through his authority, became propagated in the Scholastic, and in some degree too, in the Protestant theology. Most certainly the polluting and poisonous influence of sin has pre-eminently affected this relation; and undoubtedly the vehement violence of this sensual impulse, in numberless individuals, belongs to the particular forms in which sinfulness *as innate* manifests itself. The bond between earthly sensationalism and the Spirit, created after the image of God, is of all, by virtue of the paradoxicalness of this combination, the most violable, the point in human nature most exposed to the attack of sin, and this violability is still more especially enhanced in the sphere of the sexual, in that here the sensational and spiritual (*gestig*) relations, the gratification of the impulse and the relation of personality to personality are intimately interwoven with each other, by which, on the one hand, a more powerful excitation of the impulse is conditioned, and on the other, the danger of the spiritual only being used in order to spiritualize, *i.e.* to refine the sensational. Notwithstanding we must unconditionally maintain, in opposition to the ascetic view with its concealed manichaeistic presuppositions, the complete penetrability of even this sphere with the holy principles of the Divine disposition of mind; here too the sinful can only be the accidental, the essential of this activity of life, its legitimate course, as it is at present, *it* cannot touch.

Much rather generation is just only in so far and in the same manner the bearer for the propagation of the innate tendencies to determinate moral disturbances, as it also is for the transference from generation to generation of innocent endowments of individual peculiarities. If human nature were pure, the nature of its propagation would essentially be the same; as it entirely rests upon man's possessing, according to the notion of his earthly development, a nature-side of his being analogous to the animal life, so it is also exhibited in the book of Genesis in its analogy with the animal procreation, as an original order of God without any

reference to sin, cap. i. ver. 28, comp. ver. 22; comp. Matt. xix. 4—6. But generation would then have no moral disturbances, no perverted dispositions to transmit to the generated but only innocent nature and pure peculiarity.

From this it follows that, without touching in the very least the holiness of marriage, as if the sensational side of the same only existed by Divine tolerance for the averting perhaps of a greater evil, we must nevertheless, if the human life of the son of God is to have an entirely pure beginning, require the *exclusion of the natural generation from the same.* If this life is to be a human life, it must originate and develope itself in the body of a human woman; if it is from the beginning to be unsinful, a Divine working must take the place of the determining human activity, by which the origination of a new life is otherwise conditioned.[1] If now the account in the Gospels of the virgin-birth of Jesus confirms this dogmatic postulate, the Christian Church has certainly good ground for on no account allowing the removal of the expression, for the supernatural generation of Jesus, contained in their oldest confessions. During the embryonic development, the pure germ of the Divine, human life refuses to appropriate any thing of a nature foreign to itself, and assimilates from the elements of the maternal soil, according to the laws of organic life, only that which is suitable to it. On the contrary, if the first commencement, the moment, in which the existence of the natural individuality of Jesus was absolutely not yet self-determination, but pure determined-being, were conditioned by a natural generation, then its preservation from pollution by the sinfulness of the parents would not be a miracle, what is certainly contained in the immediate Divine efficiency to the exclusion of the masculine participation, but a contradiction, which sets and cancels in the same respect the determining action of the parents communicating their own natural constitution of being. Therefore we cannot regard the *Schleiermachian* form of the dogma, according to which, the natural conditions of the generation were indeed completely and efficiently there, but with the reproductive activity of the genus a creative activity associated itself, which

[1] Comp. *Neander's* remarks on the supernatural generation, *im Leben Jesu*, p. 10 seq.

in that generation cancelled the influence of the sexual activity conditioning a participation in the universal sinfulness,[1] as an improvement, to say nothing of its not having anything in the Gospel history to which it can attach itself.—

In the determinations just developed the acknowledgment is already contained, that the moral disturbance, which propagates itself, as evil disposition, by natural generation, has not a particular but an *universal significance*. It must have this significance, because in all the diversity of individual existences, with respect to the *degree* and *direction* of the sinful tendencies inwoven in their natural individuality, all are nevertheless alike in one respect, namely, that there universally attaches such a disturbance to the nature-ground of their personality. The transference from parents to children of *individual dispositions to sin* has just as little this significance as that of other individual resemblances; in innumerable instances it does not take place. He who will not admit this, and that which directly follows from the same, that hereditary dispositions to a particular kind of sin often die out in a family, must admit, since, without doubt, here new beginnings, as implantations of evil inclinations in the natural individuality continually take place by the will yielding to them, that the moral corruption of humanity continually advances in the most rapid progression.—But throughout this inequality of the particular determinations a universal, everywhere specifically equal disturbance insinuates itself, a disturbance communicating itself by generation, *as medium of the activity of the genus*, to the originating individual, which is well to be distinguished from the corruption of the free will, broken in itself by its falling away from God. This universal disturbance sends us back to the *beginning of the history of man;* it must here, so certain as it is that it attaches to the entire race, have arisen, unless it is to belong to the nature of man, as created by God.—

There is a threefold primitive condition of man, his primitive state in the eternal ideas, his primitive state in the extra-temporal existence of every Ego, and his primitive state in the temporal beginning of his earthly development. The subject here spoken of is of this *temporal, primitive state*. We have

[1] *Glaubenslehre*, vol. ii. p. 73.

to think of this state, according to the intimations given us in the book of Genesis and those of the Apostle Paul, as well as according to the results which follow from the entire connection of our previous consideration, especially from the moments developed from the 415 page up to the present point, as one of factual sinlessless and as yet undisturbed harmony of the physico-psychical life.

Most assuredly even the first of mankind presuppose from the very beginning of their time-life, that primitive fall in the region of their non-temporal and merely spiritual *(geistig)* existence and the primitive guilt arising out of the same, the dark ground, out of which all human personalities ascend, who come into this world, with the single exception of the Redeemer of the world. But as this timeless primitive decision as such is in no one as contents of his empirical consciousness and neither can be, so for the empirical life of the first of mankind at the beginning it is a quiescent, latent ground, which can only then enter into efficiency, when it comes to a decision of the will in temptation, in the conflict of opposed impulses.

But now as to *the relation between the different powers* of our nature in the primitive condition of the first of mankind, we have to conceive of this as a relatively undeveloped one it is true, but as a relation of undisturbed harmony, not as the Catholic theology maintains, as a *naturalis contrarietas et pugna virium et appetituum*, which must be held in restraint by a *donum superadditum*. The objects and spheres, to which the different powers and impulses refer, are of course different; but so long as the lower, in conformity with their natural determination, willingly subordinate themselves to the higher, there cannot arise therefrom a real variance and conflict of impulses. If each works in its sphere and according to its law, consequently in oneness with the whole, then the impulses of the lower order condition the healthfulness and energetic development of the life; disturbance, in which the lower impulses become inflamed to passions, first of all arises by their dissevering themselves from their state of oneness with the whole, in order to be the whole for themselves. The theology of the middle-ages is accustomed to designate this attribute of the condition of innocence as *aequale temperamentum qualitatum corporis*, and the apology of the Augsburg confession

appropriates the expression, while at the same time it strongly emphasizes the limitedness of the same as designation of the original righteousness.[1] The old Protestant dogmatists follow their precedence in a somewhat different form of the notion.[2] It is certain, that a corruption could here arise through the superior power of the sensational impulses only from a disturbance breaking out in the centre of the will; so long as the latter, although already secretly bearing in itself the disunion, adhered in its conscious tendency to the expression of its truth in the law of God and obeyed the impulse in connection with the same, the powers and impulses of the sensational life could but persist in their ready obedience to that direction of the will, and in their undisturbed harmony among each other, to which and in which they were originally ordained by God. To this, the freedom of the primitive condition from the dominion of sickness and death precisely corresponds. For as health is the harmony between the different systems of organic life, the muscular, nervous, and reproductive systems, so disease and death arise, where they are not solely the phenomena of the general sinking of the vital power, or the results of an accidental, external violence, from the egoism of one of these systems, whereby the equipoise becomes destroyed. Had the will never rebelled against the will of God, the bodily nature, although psychical and earthy (ψυχικὴ, χοϊκή), would never have lost the harmony contained in its notion, but would have preserved it until the time of its exaltation, to the higher sphere, by means of its glorification.

According to these discussions we must surely also ascribe to the primitive condition of our race a "*non-temporal primitive sinfulness*—with *Schleiermacher*,[3] still under different presuppositions and consequently in another sense, namely, without on that account, denying a change in the constitution of human nature taking place with the temporal fall of the progenitors of the race.

[1] Art. i. p. 53, comp. p. 55.

[2] Comp. the Dogmatists *Quenstedt*, *Hollaz*, *Baier*, *Baumgarten* on the puritas appetitus sensitivi and the concentus affectuum as constituents of the imago Dei.

[3] *Glaubenslehre* § 72, 6, (vol. i. p. 445.) *Rothe* in his *Ethick* vol. ii. p. 216 seq., is essentially agreed with *Schleiermacher* in the acknowledgment as of the fact itself so also of its ground.

For that non-temporal primitive sinfulness does not immediately determine the moral life of the first parents to a given course corresponding to it, but only in so far as it becomes again appropriated by a new self-decision of their will; the empirical, the moral development in the sphere of the same, has its own right and its real significance, and is by no means the mere manifestation of that intelligible primitive act. Truly, the will is from the first in itself disunited, by the false exaltation of the self-hood in it, and this self-disunion must undoubtedly become also phenominal. But since it is in itself disunited, consequently by no means entirely dissevered from the Divine will, comp. p. 408 seq., it does not necessarily follow, that its internal disunion should make its appearance in the form of a fall and of a degeneracy commencing therewith and becoming constantly aggravated. Man, by a Divine order, which is also already a plan of Grace, inasmuch as it presents to him the conditions of his self-restoration, is introduced into the narrow path of his earthly development and placed under the law; as on the one hand, the pure innocence of his nature-basis, which as yet knows nothing of any disorder of the powers, makes obedience easy to him, so on the other hand, within him a Divine bias and the impulse of conscience allure him to subordination to the order of God; he must in any case become conscious of his own self-variance, by the vacillating struggle between contradictory powers; but in this struggle he is able to be victorious, and by continued exercise in humble obedience towards the command of God, gradually heal his own hurt.—When *Rothe*, in his determinations on the primitive condition of man lays especial stress upon the absence of an educational influence,[1] we are so far in agreement with him, that one cannot picture to himself the possibility of an harmoniously progressive, moral, development without such a guidance from beings, who already possess a mature cognition of the moral nature of the particular relations and spheres of life. Accordingly, if this educational influence is to be the objective condition of a pure, moral development, it nevertheless does not follow, that sin was unavoidable by our first parents, but much rather this, that the Holy Love of God

[1] L. c. vol. ii. p. 213.

will not have allowed them to be destitute of such guidance, in whatever way it may have been mediated. For this mediation can neither be exclusively restricted to human organs, nor from the silence in the book of Genesis can a contrary ground be taken; no one indeed will regard its narrative as a complete exhibition of the primitive condition and of all its relations.

Thus the first Adam *might* have become to his posterity, if they had received from him a sensational nature, free from disturbance and an example of faithful obedience toward the Divine command, that, in a limited measure, which the second Adam has really become in the highest sense, namely the beginner of a development liberating the will from its original self-variance. But he could never become that without having proved in *temptation* this obedience to the Divine will and therewith the victory of the same over the selfish tendency of his own will. Now an element of temptation was already there for our first parents in the presence of a positive law, especially inasmuch as it met them in the form of a prohibition. Certainly, the Divine prohibition, in itself, was much rather a temptation to good, an excitant to the conscious subordination of their own will to the will of God; still it must at the same time arouse the as yet slumbering tendency of self-hood to its emancipation from the will of God, bring it to their consciousness, in order that it may be overcome. But as excitant to evil, as that which might urge the first parents to a self-decision of principles, the temptation could only come to them from a being, in which evil was already present, and which saw through the true nature of their sinless condition, the hidden variance between their factual constitution and the brokenness of their will. The *serpent of Paradise* is, in the narrative of Genesis, undoubtedly meant as a real serpent. It is introduced as one among the other beasts of the field, Gen. iii. 1, and the punishment, which is suspended over it, alludes entirely to its animal nature. On the other hand, predicates are ascribed to the serpent, which absolutely cannot be referred to the animal. And it must here appear as an inconsistency when one recognizes this from the cunningly calculated sense of the address, mixing up truth and falsehood with the finest guile, ver. 1, 4, 5, but assigns the address itself to the serpent as the consciousless and will-less instrument of an

intelligent being.[1] The internal difficulties are for both assumptions essentially the same; the narrative itself does not intimate by a single iota, that the words of the serpent have arisen from demoniacal inspiration, indeed it excludes this assumption in that the punitive judgment ver. 14, 15, is according to the character of its contents solely directed to the serpent, which cannot be reconciled with that relation of the serpent, by referring to the curse which has come upon nature on account of human sin, or to the putting of animals to death together with men, ordered by the Mosaic law in so far as it had been the instrument of certain offences. For indeed it is something entirely different, when nature or an individual existence is obliged, by virtue of its dynamical connection with man to suffer, because man has done something, than when a *punishment* is formally awarded to such a being because it has itself done something, ver. 14, in which indeed it is said to have been only an involuntary instrument of a higher power. In the last place, the conception of the language of the serpent as of a devilish miracle, apart from the question as to its reconcilability with a correctly formed notion of a miracle, has this against it, that the entire Holy Scripture contains nothing analogous, and the narrative itself not the slightest intimation, that here a miracle is said to be reported.

Dogmatic consideration has the task of reducing the symbolical elements, which this eventful occurrence gradually attracted to itself in the course of its oral tradition, and out of which it has woven itself its present garb, to their real contents, and if this, in the present form of the narrative, is not possible by means of mere grammatically historical interpretation, then dogmatic combination has perfect right to be employed for this purpose.

The being, which, by his superior intelligence, excites the potential evil in man to actus, and thus brings death and every thing which in the physical sphere is really evil, upon human existence, can be no other than Satan. The serpent of Genesis not merely in an Apochryphon of the Old Testament (Book of Wisdom ii. 24), but also in the New Testament, is referred to him, in a cursory, but not fully certain allusion, Rom. xvi. 20;

[1] Thus *Hegenstenberg* in his *Christologie des A. T.* vol. i. p. 24 seq.

1 John iii. 8, quite determinately Rev. xii., 9. But much more important for us, than these passages, is the declaration of Christ, with respect to the Devil: ἐκεῖνος ἀνθρωποκτόνος ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, John viii. 44. For the reference, defended after the example of *Cyril* of Alexandria especially by *Nitzsch*[1] and *Lucke*,[2] of the "murderer" to Cain's fratricide, stands at a disadvantage in comparison with the general interpretation, in that it does not allow of the ἀπ' ἀρχῆς being so strictly taken as the latter,[3] but still more by the narrative in Genesis not containing the slightest intimation of a seductive influence upon Cain. Nevertheless we should be obliged to give the preference to the former rather than the latter explanation, if in the latter the death of man ascribed to the devil could only be understood of *spiritual death*. For indeed it were too forced a construction and by no means to be supported by the parallel of 1 John iii. 15, if the resemblance of the Jews, who desired to put Christ to death, to the devil, should become proved from his having drawn down spiritual death upon man by means of his seduction. But it is not spiritual, but *physical death*, which the narrative Gen. iii., and the use which the New Testament otherwise makes of it, derives from the fall of the first parents of the race. Neither can the passage in the epistle to the Hebrews, which calls the devil the arbiter of death, ii. 14, partly on account of the connection with the death of Christ, and partly on account of the more exact determination immediately following, as to the way in which death exercises its power over man, be understood of anything more than physical death. Accordingly we are obliged to regard it as most natural with *Hengstenberg*,[4] *Tholuck*,[5] and *Krabbe*[6] to refer the ἀνθρωποκτόνος ἀπ' ἀρχῆς to the history of the sin-fall, wherewith the reference of the serpent to Satan receives the highest confirmation.

[1] *In der Abhandlung über den Menschenmörder von Anfang—theol. Zeitschrift von Schleiermacher, De Wette und Lucke* No. 3, p. 52 seq.

[2] *Kommentar zum Evangelium Johannis* vol. 2, p. 340 sq.

[3] This false position of the explanation of *Cyrill* strikingly appears in comparison with the parallel 1 John iii, 8: ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ὁ διάβολος ἁμαρτάνει—to which *Tholuck* directs attention, *Komm. zum Ev. Joh.* p. 228.

[4] L. c. p. 30 seq.

[5] L. c.

[6] *Die Lehre von der Sunde und vom Tode*, p. 133 sq.

As little now as we deny the possibility of a *self-perversion of the will beginning absolutely from itself*, of a falling into sin from a condition free even from a sinful disposition, so little are we therefore able to appropriate *Schleiermacher's* objections against the conception of the fall as of a primitive origination of sin, as they chiefly rest upon the negation of this possibility,[1] nevertheless we are not able to find anything in the contents of the narrative, which in the strict sense determinately indicates such a primitive origination of sin. Neither the creation of man after the Divine image, nor the Divine judgment respecting everything created, that it was very good, stands, according to what was earlier said respecting both (p. 388 seq.) opposed to the assumption, that we have here only to do with the *breaking out* of a perverted tendency of the will, which precedes all empirical development of man, with an evil already *potentiâ* present, which indeed may, by incessant conflict against its actualization, become suppressed, but which nevertheless grounds an original moral disturbance and impurity of human nature. The endeavour of the tempter is directed to this, namely to bring this potency, quiescent in the groundless deep of human life, into movement and self-revelation. For this purpose he first of all endeavours to excite in the woman doubt with respect to the Divine command and its real significance. And when in the reply of the woman, there betrays itself a correct insight into the Divine command, but as motive for avoiding its transgression, fear of the threatened death, then the master in the art of equivocally mixing lies with truth, denies that this evil will come upon man, and on the contrary promises them, gently hinting at a Divine envy as the ground of the prohibition, as the reward of its transgression, a good, the charm of which must call forth from its concealment the selfish tendency of the will estranged from God, namely the exaltation to equality with God in the cognition of good and evil. This, according to the narrative of Genesis, strikes the blow; man fell in coveting arbitrary self-exaltation. Whether, as one might first of all conclude from Gen. iii. 6, there was co-operative with the same, in a subordinate manner, a *sensational element*, is for us, according to our results, earlier

[1] *Glaubenslehre* vol. i. p. 430, 431.

arrived at, respecting the historic character of the narrative and its limits and according to the necessity therewith given of symbolically conceiving of the tree and its fruit, an unanswerable question.

As the entire narrative is directly to explain not the origin of *sin* but that of *evil*, it tells us nothing expressly of *moral disorders*, which had entered in with the first sin. Most certainly it seems, especially in verse 12—by the concealed attempt of Adam to cast the guilt of the fall upon Eve and then farther upon God—to hint at other offences which had immediately followed that first transgression; still by the uncertainty of the interpretation in the detail, which an ingenuous examination will be obliged to admit, it is also here very difficult to decide, what is symbolic investment and what real fact. But the Divine punitive judgment, ver. 16—19, does not of course suspend over man, that which, as his perverted act or as a conditioned state, he must recognize as his culpableness, but that which exhibits itself as a suffering inflicted upon him, misery, pain, and death. However if we consider that the dominion of death over man points to a disturbance of the psychico-physical life which has arisen within him, and if we add thereto the facts, that such a disturbance, which is to be distinguished from the original deviation of the will, is clearly present, that it bears the impression of its hereditary character, and indeed in such a way, that in its universal ground-determination it makes itself known as an inheritance from the progenitors of the human race, to which Paul also refers Rom v. 12 (δι' ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἡ ἁμαρτία εἰς τὸν κόσμον εἰσῆλθε, comp. p. 382 sq.): then we shall not be able to doubt, that with the fall of the first parents there entered in a corruption of their psychico-physical life, a disturbance of its original harmony, which they then transmitted to their descendants, and these again to their posterity.

The nature of this disturbance is, as natural disposition, the same in all, although it appears in the several spheres of the human races, nations, and families, modified and individualized in the most manifold forms. In what this universal nature consists, an earlier discussion (comp. p. 313) has shown us. It is, namely, "an inclination of the sensational impulses to repress the impulse of the spirit and to rebel against its Holy law." Although this

misrelation expresses itself in the most different tendencies, it is nevertheless everywhere present as an evil innate disposition—*the true inherited sin*;—it roots deeply in every human development, and co-determines the character of the same.

We may also now answer the question, whether the original sin in all men is *equal* or *unequal*. *Thomas Aquinas* treats of this question in one of his articles, and determines it as follows: *Originale peccatum cum sit privatio originalis iustitiae in omnibus oppositum habitum penitus tollens, non magis in uno quam in alio esse potest.*[1] If *Thomas* here derives the equality of the original sin in all, from the notion of the same, *Limborch*, on the contrary, supports the maintenance of its inequality from experience, according to which, children in general are disposed to the sins of their parents, and indeed in such a way, that this inclination differently forms itself according to the character of temperament manifestly inherited from the parents, and draws therefrom the conclusion, that the children had their inclination to sin not so much from Adam as from their immediate parents.[2]

Now according to what has been remarked, we must decidedly acknowledge that the *particular directions*, in which this inborn sinfulness developes itself, are deposited in different ways in different individuals. But no less manifest is it, that all these diversities, in the individuation of the hereditary sinfulness, elevate themselves, upon the ground of a sinfulness, which is *universal* and everywhere *equal*, as we have already denoted it. And it is just this essential equality which runs through all the distinctions of the individuation, this fact, that the predominance of the sensational impulses over the spirit, although it clothes itself by the modifying influence of generation in very different forms, which often entirely conceal it to the superficial glance, but which nevertheless, as sinful disposition, really vanishes in no individual naturally born, it is this fact which conducts us to a disturbance of the genus-nature which has entered into the very elements of the human race. If the parents, as organs of this genus-nature and of its generative power, are at the same time active, they are not the author of that sinful disposition thus propagating

[1] *Summa* ii., i., qu. 82, art. 4.
[2] *Theologia Christiana* l. iii, c. iii., § 4.

itself; their activity is not the cause of this disturbance, according to its substance, but only individualizes it, and even this not always, or indeed often scarcely in a perceptible manner. Therefore the contrast, as *Limborah* expresses it, is in any case untenable.[1]

If according to this, we are obliged to maintain the *specific equality* of all, who are born according to the natural order, as to their participation in hereditary sin, the question is therewith still unanswered, whether this sinfulness, essentially the same in its character, has not in different individuals *different degrees of strength*. That such differences of degree are found in developed human life, that the determining influence of this hereditary inordinateness of the sensational nature upon the moral constitution of the life, becomes in the one weakened and repressed, not merely by the Divine energies of the new life, but also by means of discipline and legitimate order, nay more, even by evil itself, namely by its *intellectual* tendencies arising from another source, while in another it exercises an unrestricted dominion—of these facts there can be no doubt. However this is not the question which concerns us here, which is simply that of the *disposition* as *innate*.

How the matter stands in this respect, can only be decided according to experience. If we candidly bring this under our consideration, we shall not be able to deny, that the hereditary corruption of nature, applies to different individuals in different degrees of strength. The succeeding races, when the fruits of their service of sin ripen, also suffer for the sins of their predecessors; whole families, nations, even races degenerate, and this degeneracy especially reveals itself in the augmented violence, which the sensational impulse acquires over the spirit, in the blind power of the passion, which governs them. These particular degeneracies, both in the narrower and wider spheres, manifestly propagate themselves, according to their innate ground tendencies, by generation; neither can they at all be reduced to a mere distinction in the *direction* of the sensational impulse, while equal in the degree of their inordinate power. Accordingly, it cannot be doubted, that the hereditarily sinful disturb-

[1] Propensionem ad peccandum—habent *non tam* ab Adamo *quam* a proximis parentibus, l. c.

ance of human nature was not directly in the first generations after Adam the same as it became later, but that it gradually developed itself and increased in energy, until at length this progress found its bounds in the ever more powerful Divine counteractings.

The moment, which in general decides, respecting the strength of the sinful dispositions in the generated, is the moral character of the parents, still, under the limitations earlier pointed out. In the consideration of this point, we set out from that which was above acknowledged, namely, that the personal morality of the individual is capable of exercising a weakening reaction upon the disturbances in the nature-side of human life. However, just by this presupposition and the deductions here drawn from it, the *universality* of this hereditary sinfulness appears to become powerfully endangered. As the same consists in nothing else than in a perverted order of powers and impulses, which, in themselves, belong to the notion of human nature, it appears, as if the diminution of the false predominance, which the impulses of the lower sphere have acquired, must be capable, by the personal morality of the parents, of ultimately arriving at a point, where, in the generated, it would be completely cancelled, and the right relation become restored *as one that is innate.* And assuredly this would follow, if the disturbance in the nature-ground of the parents, which in generation carries on its work from out its dark depth, hidden from the consciousness, were completley removed by the sanctification of the present life.[1] But this is not the case, it is only suppressed and chained down; it still remains invisibly concealed in that depth, although long since, perhaps for decennaries, it has been actually defeated and overcome, and the sanctified one need only give himself up to the feeling of security, in order again to fall a prey to the already vanquished powers. Consequently, even regenerate parents, can but propagate this disturbance, which indeed is only so far a constitutional character of the generating genus-nature, as no individual naturally generated is able to destroy it in himself, to

[1] Comp. on this side of the question *Tholuck's* remarks in the *litterar. Anzeiger* 1834, No. 23, p. 178 seq. *Augustinus* often treats of it, especially *De pecc. mer. et rem.* l. ii. c. 11 (ix.) seq. and *Contra Jul. Pel.* l. vi. c. 18 (vii.) seq. Comp. *Thomas* in the *Summa* ii. i. qu. 81, art. 3.

their posterity, of course in general under the co-determining influence of the modifications and limitations, which it has experienced in themselves.—That which is everywhere found present and in an equal manner, is that brokenness of the will, resulting from the intelligible self-decision of freedom. The disturbance of the *aequale temperamentum qualitatum animae et corporis* is on the contrary, in individuals, subject to different determinations both in kind and degree.[1] When *Thomas*, in the above adduced passage, denies the distinction in degree in hereditary sinfulness, this, as the proof of that sentence still more definitely shows, stands closely connected with his purely privative conception of hereditary sin.[2]

But this disturbance which has penetrated into the sensational nature of man and its relation with the spirit, must not be connected with the fall of the first parents by the notion of a *positive Divine punitive act.* It has been already mentioned (p. 365), that several among our older dogmatists so determine the connection between the fall and the corruption of human nature. They find themselves especially necessitated to the same by Gen. ii. 17, since they understand the death here threatened as punishment of transgression, to be spiritual death. However, provided this interpretation of the passage were correct, which it certainly is not (comp. as to this p. 319), it would still not necessitate us to assume, that this spiritual death becomes directly effected by a positively punitive act of God, to the exclusion of a natural

[1] Just so—with respect to the latter determination—*Reinhard*, *Vorlesungen über die Dogmatik* p. 311. On the other hand the opinion of *Baumgarten*, to which *Tholuck* l. c. appeals, *evangelische Glaubenslehre* vol. 2, p. 575, is indefinite by his manifestly confounding together the notions: degree and kind. Also *Weismann*, who, at the occasion of the *Arminian* antithesis, in his *institt. theol. exeg. dogm.* p. 411, 425 seq., devotes some attention to the question of the equality or inequality of the original sin, does not sharply enough distinguish the different elements, which here flow together in the result, especially the innate and that which is first of all acquired in the development.

[2] The older dogmatists of our Church, as they impute to the hereditary sin, besides that privation, also the positive quality of inordinate desires, might very well have adopted this distinction of degree, even without prejudice to their tenet, that all sins are the fruits of the hereditary sin and in themselves mortal sins, comp. *Quenstedt* l. c. sect. 2, qu. 13 (p. 148, dist. 12.) c. Still, according to my knowledge, they do not enter upon the consideration of the above question.

connection between the corruption of human nature and the fall. This effectuation is, it is true, to be thought of only as the withdrawment of the original righteousness, which God decrees respecting Adam and all his natural posterity as co-involved in his guilt (by virtue of the theory of the immediate imputation of the fall), and from which the corruption of the nature then follows of itself.[1] But even by giving this turn to the question, the idea cannot be avoided of an implantation of the moral corruption in human nature by a Divine causality, as directly contradicting the religious axiom, that God cannot be the author of sin, for if from his Divine withdrawment the origination of the corrupt nature necessarily follows, then the former is just a cause of the latter. But the idea of a positive punitive act in this sense is also quite unnecessary, as it is easy to understand, that, from the falling away of the will from the Divine order there naturally follows a weakening of its moral power and from this weakening an indomitableness of the sensational nature.

From this infection of human nature, as it is first of all in the progenitors of the race a necessary result of the fall under the given conditions, and as it communicates itself from them by natural propagation to all their posterity, there then further arises the dominion of death over human life, since the continuous development to the completed existence, to which this life in itself was determined, is interrupted by the actualization of sin in the first parents and by the disturbance of the harmonious relation between sensational nature and spirit arising therefrom. But the descendants of Adam are therefore from the beginning of their existence placed under the conditions of this disturbed constitution of nature, because the same perfectly corresponds to the character of their will which precedes that beginning.—[2]

It is of itself evident, how, from the standpoint of the opinion

[1] Comp. *Konkordienformel, Sol. decl. a.* 1, p. 643 seq. Cum seductione Satanae per lapsum iusto Dei iudicio in poenam hominum iustitia concreata seu originalis amissa esset, defectu illo—humana natura—perversa et corrupta est, ut iam natura una cum illo defectu et corruptione ad omnes homines—haereditario propagetur.

[2] As the complement of these determinations may be compared what was said vol. i. p. 170 seq., on the relation of sin in the sphere of sense to the spiritual principle of sin.

here developed, the celebrated question as to the *origin of individual human souls* will have to be answered. If in the *traducianistic theory* the tradux is said not to be the mere carrying on or extension of an already existing, but if there unites therewith the progressive principle operative in generation and producing that which is new and thus the inadequate representations of a dividing of souls, to which certainly the expression may easily mislead, become far removed, then there is nothing to prevent us from acknowledging this theory according to its real, inmost principle. All generating of beings endowed with souls is true generation of souls, which, in the animal sphere, calls into existence not merely a new life-principle, but also a psychical principle, in the human sphere, at the same time the disposition to a determinate peculiarity. The living ground of the origination of new individuals is the generating power of the genus, the mediating organ of which, the *conditio sine qua non* of its efficiency, are the parents, nevertheless, in such a way, that these in general exercise therewith, through the particular character of their natural individuality, a co-determining influence upon the form of the life of the generated, both as to soul and body. The scholastic theology, as is well known, declined the traducianistic theory, with respect to the origination of individual souls, from its dread of *materialism*. But it thereby, with its creatianistic view, fell into a worse materialism, than that which, according to its conception of the traducian theory it wished to avoid. For as it did not deny hereditary sin, and acknowledged the soul as the seat of sin, nothing remained for it, but to make souls which of course were purely created by God, become immediately polluted by their union with the body, in the embryo. Thus the material *body* was made the *determining*, the *soul* the *determined*, merely the suffering.[1]

From the other side there follows of itself the impossibility of

[1] This comes very distinctly to view in *e.g. Petrus Lombardus, Sentent.* lib. ii. dist. 31. B. When on the contrary some of the Scholastics, as *Hugo* of Rouen, in order to avoid this consequence, vindicate on the behalf of individual souls, the perfect freedom to resist the excitations to sin springing from the body thus corrupted, we can directly see in the same only the renunciation of explaining the universality of sin by the hereditary sin, and further, in connection with the ever admitted tenet, that the real seat of sin is the soul, the denial of original sin.

grounding in the same way the origin of the, according to its nature, immortal personality in the individual. That a mer nature-process should bring that into existence, which is qualitatively distinct from nature and exalted above it, the spiritual principle in the individual, must appear to us a perfect contradiction. Much rather personality as such, at the commencement of its temporal existence, proceeds from its own time-less ground, and that nature-process furnishes it the basis of its temporal development. If now thic conducts us to a certain *pre-existentianism*, still indeed to such an one, which does not understand the *pre* temporally and the essential *existence (Existenz)* not as an already complete *existence (Dasein)* of souls prior to their earthly life,[1] we need not, according to what was remarked (p. 159), first of all show, that that this pre-existentianism has creatianism just as much for its ground-basis, as it is foreign to all emanatistic and pantheistic representations.[2]

It has been our endeavour to exhibit the thoughts, in which we found the solution of the problem of the *origin of sin*—in the previous book—and of its *universality* in the human race—in this book,—as clearly ac possible in their connection, and we leave it to the reader, who was agreed with us in the points from which

[1] Therefore we can make no use whatever of the different psychological phenomena, on which the strictly pre-existentianistic theories have often thought to support themselves, least of all, as may be easily understood, of the phenomenon which is certainly remarkable, namely, that we sometimes, at some perhaps, insignificant occurrence, which, as to the circumstances cannot in a similar manner have earlier happened to us, suddenly receive the impression, as if we had precisely in this way already experienced the same.

[2] The method of representation by *Thomas*, which *Dante* also follows in the Divine Comedy, presents some points of comparison. According to *Thomas* the anima sensitiva arises it is true by generation, but not the anima intellectiva ("haereticum est eam traduci ex semine"), but it is directly created by God, *Summa* P. 1, qu. 118, art. 1, 2. The subtile determinations, by which he seeks to bring his doctrine of the culpability of the entire race in Adam, the subject of which is, according to him, the anima rationalis s. intell., into unison with this representation, one may trace in the *Prima Secundae* qu. 81, art. 1, especially in the refutation of the second objection, and qu. 83, art. 1 in the refutation at 3 and 4.

we set out in this investigation, as they are laid down in the first book, to determine, whether he has to admit the truthfulness of those thoughts, or whether he can furnish us with a better solution of the above problem.

That this view well agrees with the doctrine of the Holy Scripture, we have endeavoured to prove with respect to its most influential moments, indeed according to the different nature of the same in a different manner. If now this proof falls short with respect to a fundamental thought of our opinion, namely as to the determinations respecting the extra-temporal self-decision of created personalities, it does so, because it is not directly contained in the Holy Scripture. It is not its task to impart speculative instruction, and it can only tend to corrupt the interpretation, as experience has abundantly shown, when one resolves at all risks to confirm by individual biblical expressions, what theological inquiry upon the path of speculation has cognized or thinks to have cognized as truth.[1] For the interest of historic fidelity in the one course and of free movement in the other, but above all for the interest of scientific integrity, one can but wish, that both courses should remain properly separated from each other. The apostolic development of doctrine has assigned to it one function, systematic and especially philosophic, theology another. The religious cognition of the Apostle, which everywhere stands in the undivided centre of Christian life and consciousness, is deprived of none of its normative authority, if we also assume, that a speculative moment, in which the thinking penetration of a Christian doctrine finds its indispensable conclusion, was not contained in it. Here the proof is quite enough, that such a moment not only does not contradict the Holy

[1] Thus it is a false interpretation, manifestly contradicting the design of the Apostle, when in former, and again in more recent time, the Pauline expression, as to the preference of Jacob to Esau, before either of them were born, Rom. ix. 11, has been interpreted of their pre-existence, and an opposite procedure assumed on the part of the same as the ground of that preference. Truly it were just as false to wish to argue, from a declaration, which only refers, and can only refer, to the earthly existence of both, namely from the: μηδὲ πραξάντων τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, against the assumption of a timeless primitive decision, which, as everywhere equal, cannot at all come into collision with the design of this passage.

Scripture, but that this, in that which it immediately contains, be it as doctrine or as fact, presses on to that moment as to its presupposition.

Now although this fully applies to the here developed theologoumenon of the turning away of our will from God as timelessly preceding our temporal life, it would nevertheless develope itself in contradiction with the Holy Scripture, if it derived the innate sinfulness, solely and without all further mediation from the intelligible primitive act of the individual personality, without recognizing in this sinfulness and its consequences in the physical sphere, the moment of *hereditariness* and the connection springing therefrom, with the sin of our first parents, as it becomes prominently presented by Paul, especially in Rom. v. 12—19. But the contradiction to the Holy Scripture were here at the same time the most direct contradiction against *experience*. Now that our view quite escapes this twofold objection, follows of itself from its exhibition.

This conducts us to its relation to the authorized tenets of the old Protestant dogmatick on this point. The distinction is clear. The latter, not merely does not recognise the intelligible ground-basis of the sinful development in time, but decidedly excludes it, since it makes the natural sinfulness, according to all its determinations, to arise solely from the fall of Adam.[1] This too is not perhaps merely a dogmatic opinion of the orthodox theology in its further development, but therein is expressed the conviction of the Reformers themselves, *Luther's*, *Melancthon's*,[2] and *Calvin's*, and as these have variously brought forward the same in their private writings, so it has also forced its way into the confessional writings of the Evangelical Church, thus on the part of

[1] *Baur* remarks in his *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte* p. 272, against the "entirely failed theological theory" here laid down, that it is constructed from "orthodox-sounding" hypotheses. According to this I have in vain troubled myself, on account of this "theological theory" being much rather heterodox, and it must certainly be for me of great interest to learn the tenets of the orthodox system with which it so accords. Or did nothing else fit into the general form of the dialectic employed against a certain side, than the suspicion, only the appearance of orthodoxy is everywhere aimed at there?

[2] However, that *Melancthon's* soul felt the sting in the Church dogma of hereditary sin, we may gather from a remarkable expression at the

the *Lutherans* in the *Smalkaldian Article* (P. iii. art. 1.) and in the *Konkordienformel* (art. 1.) on the part of the Reformed especially in the *Baselian* (of the year 1534—art. 2.), *Scotch* (art. 3.), and *Belgic* (art. 15.) *Confession*, and in the *Heidelberg Catechism* (7th question.) Still, the chief confession of the Evangelical Church, the *Augsburg*, has with wise reserve, so laid down its explanation on this point that a certain diversity of dogmatic theories, and thus too that here developed, may be reconciled with the same.[1] Just as little does the first article of the Apology, which is drawn up with greater considerateness and precision, contain any determination, by which the assumption of a ground of our innate sinfulnes, which lies beyond the fall of Adam, were excluded.

And more than this *negative* favour, which affords room to Theology scientifically to explain the doctrines arising out of the fundamentals peculiar to it, that assumption ought neither to expect or desire, from the Church confession. Supposing the Reformers had possessed the notion therein contained as a link in the connection of their theological cognition, it is unconditionally to be presumed that with their clear insight into the nature and limits of the public transmission of doctrine in the Church, that they would have allowed its admission into no Church confession. That Theology fosters *esoteric doctrines*, is then as an immoral procedure to be absolutely rejected, when the same, on account of the diversity of their principle, attach to the elements of the Church doctrinal tradition, quite another meaning, than that which they can alone have for a disingenuous, historical interpretation, so that the servant of the Church,

close of his life. Among the *mira arcana*, which he had not been able to look into in this life and at the cognition of which after death he rejoiced, he enumerates, upon a paper written only a few days before his death, also this: *cur simus sic condite.* The Church dogma of original sin has, according to its true consistency, for the difficulty of this question, whether one refers it to the creation of the human race in Adam or to that of all individuals, no recognition whatever.

[1] Docent, quod post lapsum Adae omnes homines secundum naturam propagati nascantur cum peccato, hoc est, sine metu Dei, sine fiducia erga Deum et cum concupiscentia, quodque hic morbus seu vitium originis vere sit peccatum, damnans et afferens nunc quoque mortem aeternam etc. It is here to be regarded as a fortunate reservation, that the post (lapsum Adae) has not been augmented to a propter.

initiated in the art of lying, learns systematically to undermine, that which his function solemnly obligates him to build up. On the other hand, if such a theologoumenon affirms the public doctrine *in its sense*, furnishes thereto only the complement, in which the antinomies resolve themselves, which in that sphere remain unresolved, then its esoteric character is perfectly justified. Indeed if the Protestant theology resolves not entirely to banish every speculative element—which it will hardly be able, without depriving itself of its very kernel, of the dogmatick,—then it will ever have in its sphere of doctrine, some which are of an esoteric nature. For the speculative must even there, where it preserves the continuity with the empirical consciousness, immediately call forth the greatest misunderstanding by an indelicate conception dissevering the thoughts from their true connection, if it resolves to make itself popular in the strict sense; its correct understanding essentially presupposes a certain degree of philosophic culture; it belongs to the school and not to the Church.

But if one definitely asks us, how the Church communication of doctrine ought to treat the point, which we in these remarks have especially in view, we have only to refer to the procedure of the Holy Scripture, to which that has to attach itself as closely as possible. *Neander*, in his exhibition of the Pauline doctrine, directs attention to the fact, that the wisdom of the Apostolic teaching, with the exception of a very few passages, developes the need of redemption everywhere directly from the consciousness of sin, as from an universal fact of human nature, without going back to the more remote elements of such a condition.[1] If, according to this example, the popular communication of Christian doctrine, holds close to that, which every one, who respects the Divine law, may and must experience in himself, then it is entirely directed to the exhibition of the variance in our nature not as an inculpable evil, but as the *guilt of all* and *every individual*. And if according to the same example in the more exact development of the doctrine of natural sinfulness it has to unfold the dependent relation, in which we here find ourselves to the preceding generations and ultimately to the progenitors of our race, it must here too decidedly hold fast the doctrine of the

[1] *Geschichte der Pflanzung der Kirche durch die App.* S. 576.

self-culpability of every individual. That herewith there arises a contradiction between two determinations, neither of which the correct doctrine will allow us to give up, between the sinfulness as of an innate constitutional character and the personal guilt of the individual, will not escape the reflecting member of the Church. For the science of Religion this contradiction is not an ultimatum, in so far as it cognizes its solution in the extra-temporal ground of created personality; for popular communication it is the ultimatum, because this cognition is not generally communicable. From this it follows, that in this latter sphere the union of those two equally true determinations is to be treated as a *mysterium*. But if the common understanding will not allow itself to be required, here, where the most anxiously thoughtful and patiently enduring inquiry must confess that it is not able to fathom all the depths of the subject, to bow before a mysterium, it will in every instance bring upon itself the punishment of its conceit, by its being left to the most pitiable superficiality and rudeness in its representations of sin.

The reduction of the *peccatum originale* to a fall preceding in a timeless manner the temporal life of all men, has received such animated opposition from parties most deserving of attention, that I feel myself urged here to add a few remarks—not in the hope of thereby reconciling the opponents of this view to the same, but only definitely to denote the real state of the case. The romantic wish is foreign to me, of giving solutions of this great enigma of our existence, which involve us in new enigmas. If any one is able to furnish an easier and more self-commending explanation, an explanation, which regards man as a being existing solely within the bounds of time and within those bounds makes his culpability intelligible to us, he will find me very receptive for his instructions. But the explanation must be such an one, which does not lose the very thing it is said to explain. The matter here is, on the one side, the universality of sin in the human race, its being inrooted in the nature of the genus, on the other side, personal guilt and responsibility, the origin of

sin from the arbitrary self-perversion of the creature, not from a necessity, whether it be one freely ordained by the Divine Intelligence or a necessity which is given for God Himself.—If any time pressingly admonishes the fraternity of authors to a moral discipline of their thoughts, it is surely the present. The great evil, that most heavily oppresses our time, is indeed not the weaknesses and insecurity of its political regulations, not its pauperism and proletarity, but the deep undermining of the moral fundamental bases of human life, which, especially during the last decennary, has been carried on in the inward of the organism, until its effects have now, from a powerful blow from without, broken forth upon the surface. As belonging to this discipline of thought I place first and chief, that no room be given to those opinions which dissolve the moral responsibility of man and indeed more determinately of each individual man, to the speculative or unspeculative deterministic theories which make excuse for man on account of sin. For the "logical enthusiasm," which is resolved to accept every result, which the dialectick will bring it, whether it makes the voice of conscience to lie and the distinction between good and evil a delusion, is itself only a disturbance of the spirit; even science has its inward justification only upon a moral ground-basis.—The reasons, which, from this point of view, necessitate me to seek the origin of our genus-sin in an intelligible self-perversion of our free will, I have exhibited in the preceding pages as simply and definitely as it was possible for me to do. They are chiefly contained in the above mentioned double pair of facts of our moral being and consciousness which are directly contradictory of each other. Now whatever deficiency may attach to this explanation, however little it may be able to determine everything undetermined in that transcendent presupposition of our temporal existence and to answer all questions, I cannot give it up, so long as it is not shown, that those facts may also be firmly maintained by another explanation. On the contrary if other theories inevitably lead to the denial of those facts, I can only

look upon them as indirectly confirming the attempted explanation which has here been exhibited.

When now *Rothe*, in his *Ethics*, controverts the same, vol. ii. p. 222 seq., he thinks himself indeed nevertheless able to maintain the truth of the notion of guilt and gives me to understand, that I have fallen into exaggerations in my representations of guilt, p. 220. The only question then is, wherein the exaggeration really consists. So far as I see, *Rothe* himself essentially agrees with the conception of the notion of guilt which is given in this work, vol. i. p. 207, as well as with the results, which were won by the investigations on freedom, in the first two chapters, comp. *theol. Ethik*, vol. ii. p. 203, vol. i. p. 175 seq. According to that conception the great matter of importance to me is just this, that man be looked upon as the *real author* of that which ought not to be in his action or state of being, on account of which he finds himself excluded from the fellowship of God and subjected to punishment; for without that authorship, this exclusion from the Divine fellowship and subjection to punishment is to me inconceivable. But responsible author, of that which is in him as the non-allowable man is not, if he unavoidably becomes involved in sin by the course of the development of finite being; he is then, only the organ, inexpressibly to be pitied, by which sin realizes itself as a necessary moment in the development of the creature; but God can never more impute to him sin, since indeed His own creative efficiency places the necessity of the same in the natural man, in that it cannot otherwise make the transition "from the mere animal to the true, *i.e.* really spiritual *(gestig)* man," without positing the animal, sinful man, "as yet hidden by the *materia*," as a middle, transition point, vol. ii. p. 216, 217. It is also here of no avail whatever, to remind us, that still according to p. 215, "with the real cognition of evil by man there is always the entering in of the possibility of a real resistance against it, and consequently that real sin is connected with a consenting to the same." For *Rothe* indeed also

sets out from the universality of *real sinning* as an undeniable fact, which he thinks to explain by his theory, to this is also clearly to be referred, what he teaches of the unavoidableness of sin; if now this unavoidability is not to be taken back and that universality of sinning not to remain altogether unexplained, then *Rothe* can only regard this resistance and this subjection by the consenting of the subject, as the form, in which the necessity of sin realizes itself at a given point in the moral development of man, but not as proof for a *commencing point of self-dependent decision.* How is it at all conceivable, that sin, if it is an inward *habitus* in man, should not also break forth in individual sinful acts, or that the moment, in which that cognition of sin arises should have the power to nullify as with a single magical blow the ability of the sinful state of manifesting itself in corresponding actions? *Rothe* also, while he p. 229 limits the personal culpableness and reponsibleness of the naturally sinful man, it is true—according to a representation certainly untenable —to *the individual sinful acts*, but nevertheless here firmly maintains them, in other places admits this too; according to p. 215, "the evil necessarily maintains the upper hand over man;" and, according to p. 230, "there remains to man affected with the sinful propensity in order only at all to bring it to real action, nothing over than to yield *momentarily* vanquished, to that propensity, which he cannot overcome, and, in his resolving upon an action in some manner morally abnormal, to direct his whole endeavour towards an action *as little* abnormal *as possible.*" This conception of the relation between sinful condition and sinful action is certainly more correct than that lying at the basis of the sentences previously adduced; but when indeed *Rothe* himself acknowledges, that the evil, in so far as it is unavoidable, is "subjectively not yet real sin and as yet without culpability," p. 214, how can he conceal from himself, that herewith, whether we look at the condition or the act, it becomes at least entirely doubtful and fluctuating, as

to how far we are *to accuse ourselves* on account of the morally abnormal elements of our life, or are to regard them as *a suffering inflicted upon us*.[1]

And in fact *Rothe* himself seems unable to avoid the feeling that the moment of *guilt* in sin is not the strong side of his view with respect to the latter. Therefore he directs his polemic against the emphasizing of this moment in the interpretation of our moral detestation of sin. "That on which the right abomination of evil rests, is surely the objective quality of the same, not the subjective relation of man to it.—The only right hatred against evil is that, which therefore condemns and abominates it just *because it is evil, i.e.* just because it stands in opposition to God and our own nature *and only on this account*, and not therefore, because it is that which is culpable on our part," p. 214, 215. I can now on no account adopt these sentences, because they separate from each other, those things which are indissolubly one. Our abomination of evil, in so far as it is in us—and this is the matter treated of in this question indeed firstly and chiefly,—is absolutely inseparable from the consciousness of guilt and repentance; it is so, just because by virtue of the notion of the free will, evil, as opposition of the creaturely will against the Divine Will, cannot at all be understood, unless this opposition has its ground *in the creaturely will* itself. We must rigourously maintain: No one is really able to think of this selfish resistance of the free creaturely will against the moral necessitation of the Divine will without at the same time thinking of guilt.—If nevertheless we entirely separate in thought—*per impossibile*—the answerableness and guilt from moral evil (*Böse*), then moral evil remains over to us just as mere *evil* (*Uebel*=natural evil) and *suffering*; we may then very well make an abstract representation of the horror of evil; but it could only be the horror which we feel, it may be, of pest and poison, but there were then no longer a *moral* detestation

[1] Here come in the above remarks on the relation of sin to the Divine predetermining in *Rothe's* opinion, p. 247 seq. of this volume.

of evil. Indeed, under this supposition, the stronger our horror of sin and of its destroying power were, so much the more fearfully must our consciousness be lacerated at the thought, that God, who is Holy Love, has, by His plan of the world, laid upon that grade of being, which is called man, such an unendurable burden.

Another dear friend, *Dr Dorner*, in a thoroughly deep searching review of this work, *Reuters Repertorium*, 1845, vol. i. p. 156 seq. vol. ii. p. 140., seq., finds the fundamental error of my view to consist, in my setting out from an *atomistically conceived of personal consciousness* and in the injustice done to the *genus-consciousness*, p. 152. Accordingly, he makes the objection to my conception of the notion of guilt, that it abridges an important side in the nature of Christianity. "The personal consciousness, setting itself up merely for itself and isolating itself from the genus, its sin and guilt, necessarily appears from the Christian stand-point as a subordinate stage, nay more as sin," p. 148.—How now there is to be laid at the charge of the opinion here developed, an isolation of the personal consciousness from the sin and guilt of the genus, I am not able to see, since indeed it recognises both in the most decided manner as alas the common possession of the genus. But most certainly it maintains, that where there is real guilt, which the person has to answer for before God, there must, in the last instance, lie at its basis a free *self-decision of the person*, a self-perversion of the personal will. Now, that this notion of guilt has the nature of Christianity against it, that directly on which it intends to support itself, comp. vol. i. p. 254 seq., for this I miss the proof in *Dorner's* recension. Or is it perhaps therein contained, as I surely must conclude therefrom, that my conception of guilt considered as isolation from the species is indeed also designated as sin, that according to p. 149, "the highest Christian form of the guilt consciousness—identifies itself *in all fidelity and love* with the race and its common guilt?" But the matter treated of in this question is not at all as to such a determinateness of the genus, which we first of all had to appropriate to

ourselves by the free act of love, but as to such an one, which attaches to us, to all individuals of the human species, whether, (in each given moment of life) we will or not, nay more whether we are conscious of it or not. Consequently for the recognition of this universal guilt we do not at all require to invoke the fidelity and love toward the human race, but only the earnestness and truth of the moral judgment; but if we were really necessitated to adopt the opinion, that in this universal sinfulness the individual is in an unfree manner dependent upon the genus, then no faithfulness and love towards the latter could help us to discover in this dependence, our freedom, our personal responsibility, our real self-guilt.—

If now according to the above contrasted exhibition of the opinions one must admit, that *Dorner* finds the *full culpability of the individual* also included in the sin common to the genus, it is very surprising to find from his further determinations, the very opposite. Then first of all, when placing himself over against Christ, we are taught p. 151, does man with full and real consciousness come to the decision which is decisive as to his moral worth and destiny. There—in case of his rejection—is "the determining primitive fall to be looked for; all other sins are preliminary, as yet deciding nothing respecting the collective moral worth of the individual, in themselves, and if they do not become disbelief in the Saviour, not yet condemning." Consequently, *Dorner* too requires for the ground-basis of real guilt, a personal self-decision, "independent of the life of the genus," and this is to me, in the importance which I attach to the thoughts of this superior investigator, a very acceptable confirmation for the truth of my conception of the notion of guilt which he declines. Where now do our opinions part from each other? *Dorner* finds in the natural condition of man no real guilt, no sin, which makes him damnable before God, but only preliminary sins, just for this reason, because to him the conditions of that personal self-decision are first of all given when one finds himself over against Christ,

because to him until then the individual is entirely inwoven in the race. I, on the contrary, am not able to think so insignificantly of man, even apart from Redemption, and his contact with it, but am obliged to consider his sin as real, damnable guilt. And it is just this which necessitates me, by virtue of that axiom common to us both, to seek behind the apparently unfree inwovenness of the individual being in the sin and guilt of the genus, a *background of free self-decision.* I do not of course deny, that the highest offences are first of all possible in that relation to Christ; but wherever there is present the consciousness of the moral law, in its strongest fundamental outlines, and of its unconditionally obligating demand on the will, there is therewith given the essential condition of real culpability, just as the conscience also testifies to the individual. And can it be doubtful, whether the Holy Scripture is also in agreement therewith? I will not call to mind, the individual expositions which expressly assert the same, or are entirely pervaded by this presupposition, as for instance is the case in the three first chapters of the epistle to the Romans, but only this, that the essential good which Christ offers to man, is reconciliation and forgiveness of sins, but that reconciliation and forgiveness absolutely presuppose the presence of real guilt.

It is also to me a precious truth, that, by virtue of the decree, revealed in the Gospel, of the Divine Love, to redeem man by Jesus Christ, now no man is to perish on account of the sin of his natural condition, unless that he appropriates it to himself afresh by the rejection of the Gospel of Christ. But this indeed cannot certainly be interpreted to mean, that there attaches to the sin of the natural condition, just to the sin itself, no real guilt; but it follows from the universality of the Divine Will of Grace and from the universal validity of the work of Redemption. These do not indeed cancel immediately the guilt of the old sin, but in such a cancelling man must do his part by the exercise of his appropriating of faith; but because they cannot be accepted otherwise than in

the most holy seriousness, they insure that this appropriation shall be made possible to every individual by the presentation of the Gospel of Christ.—

Accordingly, whoever finds that perverted self-decision, preceding our time-life, inconceivable, will indeed be obliged steadfastly to maintain together with the universality of sin the affection of every individual with real guilt, but also to acknowledge the antinomy between the two determinations and to place himself upon the stand-point, which is above p. 443, comp. p. 401, denoted—until perhaps some other is able to give a more satisfactory solution of this contradiction.

TRANSITION.

The free, primitive decision of every personal individual, which is the ultimate ground of the universal corruption, as it now attaches to the human race, is indeed as original also necessarily an extra-temporal one. But the sinful determinateness of every human individual, therewith given, from the beginning of his empirical existence, developing itself in time, would only then absolutely exclude from this existence moral freedom and its exercise, if it were itself an absolute determinateness. That it is not this, the investigations of the foregoing book, especially of its first chapter, have taught us. Just as little did we earlier, in the third book, find in the nature of our empirical existence and in its universal relation to the intelligible ground, freedom to be absolutely excluded from its sphere, and that existence from its moral side to be considered as a state of absolute bondage through the intelligible, primitive, decision or as merely a non-self-dependent reflex of the same. Even our empirical existence is translumined by a ray of freedom, although it becomes broken in this element; it not merely reveals itself in a region transcending this, but in the very midst of our time-life, although only in a limited and partial manner. But this time-life can only be a real *manifestation* and revealing of freedom, by this latter really *carrying on* its work in it, and by that which is posited in the timeless, primitive decision, further developing itself in it, and indeed so, that the motive power conditioning the progress of this development is the self-determining of the individual from out the relatively undetermined. On the other hand, the ground-relation of the principles, as it is determined by that primitive decision and confirmed by the fall of the human race in Adam, cannot now be cancelled by the will in its temporal self-determinations; this

can only be done by the Redeeming efficiency of the Spirit of Christ, which, as a Divine power overcomes that original perversion of the will and the corresponding disturbance of the harmony between nature and spirit in man. In the natural life of man, all movements and self-determinings of the will, take place within that ground-relation of the principles. But within this persistent ground-relation there is room for very different moral endeavours, which, are just as well able limitingly to oppose the power of the natural sinfulness in the inward of the individual as liberatingly to promote it. And just from this results the possibility of an *enhancement in evil* together with the progressing development of the individual, of an enhancement, which is not merely an extension of sinful tendencies already present, over the spheres, which belong to them, according to that ground-relation, but an intensive aggravation, a growing worse, a weakening of the influence which Holy Powers exercise over man by nature in spite of the predominance of sin.

Still, a scruple may perhaps present itself, against the internal possibility of this enhancement, from the objective side, from the notion of sin, as it resulted to us in an earlier development. If each sin is, according to its nature, the violation of an unconditionally valid, practical truth, of the eternal truth of the Divine Will in man, then sin itself receives thereby the character of the *unconditionally condemnable;* but how is there to be in the sphere of the unconditionally rejectable still a *distinction of degree*, an enhancement of its rejectableness?—But indeed that truth obligating the human will is a whole consisting of many moments, so that directly and through itself only the entirety and its one, all-dominating principle bears the impress of unconditionality, while the individual moments just as moments only participate in the same, with which is very well reconcilable, that they manifoldly condition themselves among each other and that thereby there arises a different dignity of the same in comparison with each other (comp. vol. i. p. 34 seq.) Thus it is no contradiction, that each and every offence and sinful state, share in the unconditioned rejectability, which belongs to evil according to its principle as positive opposition against the good, and that they nevertheless distinguish themselves among each other as to the

degree of their perverseness, so that an enhancement in sin is possible in the individual.

How this enhancement takes place, we have now in the fifth book more closely to consider.

FIFTH BOOK.

THE ENHANCEMENT OF SIN IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL.[1]

The timeless original act, in which every human will determines itself, generates a persistent quality of constitution, a moral condition; it is that in which we all are born. At first, present only as a hidden potency, it becomes actual with the awakening of the moral consciousness.

Of all the sinful acts within our life in time, there can be none, which possesses an equal power of forming a condition; but they may very well in a less degree share in this determining power.[2] The freedom is not an absurd ability of the will to burden itself with the most detestable sins and after their commission to return back into its former indeterminateness with respect to these sins, but the self-determining of the will becomes immediately a being determined; the will gives itself a tendency to the sin which it once allows; the element of lust, contained in every sin, becomes, as motive of the will, a constant factor of the inner life, so that, when the same excitants, by means of circumstances, return, the will quite of itself inclines to the same sin.

[1] The following discussions rest entirely upon the investigation of the freedom of the will in moral development, in the second chapter of the third book.

[2] *Aristotle* shows, *Eth. Nicom.* lib. iii. c. 7. (*Bekkers Ausg.* vol. ii. p. 113—115,) how from the ἐνεργεῖν and the πράξεις, no less in evil than in good, the ἕξις arises and, when it has once been formed, no longer stands in our power (οὐ μὴν ἐάν γε βούληται, ἄδικος ὢν παύσεται καὶ ἔσται δίκαιος), but how that their effects must nevertheless be imputed to us and considered as ἑκούσιοι.

Every kind of sin, opens up in itself, in that it generates the passion, a fearful depth, which the sinner constantly strives by new sins to fill up, but the ground of the same he is never able to find.

It is the power of the Divine law of the universe, which is thus active immediately in the resisting human arbitrariness. The latter sunders itself from the moral law and God hinders it not; but also in this state of severance it remains still subject to the universal law of development and becomes by the same necessitated to a continuous connection and a certain order of progress in sin. Without this order, it is altogether inconceivable, how man could ever become perfectly free from sin and attain to immutable holiness. If this disturbing element has once entered into existence, it must then unfold its nature with a certain completeness, because only so can it be thoroughly cancelled. As the heavy vapours, which, arising from the earth, fill the air, are drawn together by the powerful rays of the sun into thunder-clouds, in order that, falling as rain, they may restore to the atmosphere its purity, so must sin obtain a definite form in the life of man, in order that it may be properly striven with and this strife be carried on and conducted to the goal of a victorious decision which shall then be perpetual—which, indeed, is not possible to man left to himself, but only through the Redemption of Christ, John viii. 36.—

If now according to this, every particular tendency of sin, into which the will enters, has the endeavour to establish and diffuse itself in the inner life of man, consequently the first sin of a given direction has in general a series of similar sins as its train, still clearly and chiefly because it begins to generate a *habitus* in the inner life, then in the sinful development of the individual we may distinguish between *causal* and *caused* sins, without concealing from ourselves, that this distinction only depends upon the preponderance of the one or the other moment. The preponderating causal sins are the epochs of the perverted development, with which a new kind of sin enters into the same or indeed a new form of a kind already present in the life of the individual and thus elevates the power of sin in the same to a higher degree. However, in so far as they all, with the exception of that timeless primitive decision, have already behind them

a perversion of the will analogous to them, they are only preponderatingly causal. The preponderatingly caused sins are such, which, of themselves proceed as natural consequences from the condition, which is grounded by the causal sins. However in so far as they in every instance contribute something to the maintenance and strengthening of this condition, they are only preponderatingly caused.[1] But because the conditions, from which the caused sins directly follow, have their ground in the causal sins, and if in no other, still in any case in the primitive sin preceding the temporal life, a deeper moral consciousness imputes to man not merely acts but also states and conditions of being; the powerlessness, of the will itself it makes our reproach, and genuine, thorough repentance, proceeding perhaps from an individual offence as its occasioning, directs itself to the entire, collective condition of our life as not corresponding to the Divine requirement.

This generation of the sinful condition by the sinful act moreover cannot be understood, unless one bears in mind therewith the influence of such an act upon the dark *nature-ground* of the inner life, upon the kingdom of the unconscious and involuntary. In it the sinful act unbridles the blind desires and awakens the insatiable thirst. The representation of sin, especially in so far as it consists in the inordinate gratification of sensual lust, fixes itself in the fancy; abiding under currents of feeling and inclinations of the psychological life become formed, which, so soon as the intellectual or physical activity directed towards a given object remits, ever again with still, seductive power protrude themselves, and by certain connections of sensations and images of the imagination, unobservedly lead on the soul, as on an already prepared way, to the very threshold of the act, so that it is often overcome and gives its consent, before it has come properly to

[1] Concerning the similar distinction which *Schleiermacher* makes, *Glaubenslehre* vol. i. p. 419 seq. still according to the connection of his dogmatical opinion in another sense, compare above p. 352.—An attractive mystical work of *Nicolaus von Cabasilas* in the 14th century περὶ τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ ζωῆς, which *Gass* has recently published, presents the same distinction. Here lib. ii. § 58, 59, sin is denoted as γεννωμένη καὶ γεννῶσα ὡς ἐν κύκλῳ. Ὅθεν συνέβαινε ἁμαρτίαν ἀτελεύτητον εἶναι, τῆς ἕξεως μὲν τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀπογεννώσης, τῇ προσθήκῃ δὲ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τῆς ἕξεως ἐπιδιδούσης.

reflect upon and to perceive the true nature of the action, to which it is excited. This is just the sphere, as appeared from an earlier discussion (comp. p. 52 seq.), in which *habit* exercises its power in the establishment and strengthening of sin.—

But the relation, in which progress in good and in evil stands to formal freedom is directly the opposite of each other. The good and holy, having their root in love to God, are the truth of the human will and when this latter actually unites with them, it finds in them no outward violence whatever, no limitation of or impediment to its original freedom as the power of self-determination, but experiences its highest confirmation. Sanctification is indeed just the *realization of the formal* freedom of the will; in it the latter becomes filled with its true contents, and thus arises to real freedom. The more closely the will attaches to the good, so much the more does man feel himself to be free and master of himself.

Evil on the contrary is according to its nature *foreign* to the nature of man, as to that of every creature, just because every creature, as such, has its being from God. It can therefore, although taken up with freedom into the will, only produce bondage;[1] whosoever committeth sin, says Christ, John viii. 34, is the servant of sin, comp. 2 Pet. ii. 19;[2] the power, to which he yields himself takes him with fearful earnestness at his word. There is only one way which conducts from formal to real freedom, the way of sanctification; every self-development in evil is at the same time a progressive self-involvment and the end thereof complete bondage. Accordingly evil remains that which is essentially foreign to the nature of man, although in his growing degeneracy by decided and constant yielding to the same, this feeling of its foreignness may become subjectively cancelled. As in the disease of the physical organism the cessation of the pain

[1] When Paul Rom. vi. 16 seq. also speaks of a servitude of righteousness, it is manifestly only on account of the parallelism in the contrast, and that which he means thereby to express, is the consistency, with which each now follows the principle in life and conduct, to which he decisively surrenders himself, whether it be that of sin or that of righteousness.

[2] *Augustinus* in the *Enchir.* c. 9 (xxx.): libero arbitrio male utens homo et se perdidit et ipsum.

caused by the disturbance is the sign, that its power is complete, that the organic energy no longer reacts against it, so man ceases painfully to feel the power of sin when it becomes no longer obstructed by any barrier in his will. But just then it has reached its height, and man must experience this despotic dominion of sin, although its opposition to the good and the Divine no longer directly causes him pain, to be such an one, which at one moment drives him into the very extreme of a half insensible, half animal existence, at another worries him restlessly hither and thither between conflicting longings and strivings.—

From these determinations it further follows, what experience also confirms, that the development of sin in man, no less than his sanctification, is bound to the *law of gradation*. However fearful may be the power of a causal sin in its full sense, yet a single decision of the will is not sufficient to make the individual, in whom good and evil still in some manner strive with each other, all at once a complete villain. Although the way downwards to the deep is incomparably easier to the human race, and more quickly reaches its end than that upward course leading to the height, still it has also its determinate steps. And indeed if one should purposely resolve to pass them all with a single leap, he would be as little able to do so, as one in the fellowship of Redeeming Grace is able by a single decision, a single act of inner resignation, to become a perfect saint. We can well imagine the horrible case—and certainly in reality it is anything but unheard of—, of men, who to a certain degree were already apprehended by holy principles, driven perhaps to despair by frequent relapses, in some dark moment forming the determinate resolve of rather giving themselves over entirely to the devil, or, if their theory knows nothing of him, to sin, and that from this moment they hurled themselves as with violence into a mad, reckless career. But in spite of this evil will, they will yet for a time experience the after-workings of the better nature within them, until the constant carrying out of their decision gradually brings about their entire obduracy.—

However the matter is not so simply conditioned with this persistency and progress in evil, that it solely depends upon these inward moments. Not merely his own inward nature, the outward world also holds man fast in his aberrations; the produc-

tions of his freedom become fetters to his freedom; his choice becomes his destiny. Thus for instance a lie obliges the liar to lie yet more presumptuously; hatred enkindles the hate of the hated and enflames itself thereby the more ardently. How often does a single act, which only appears as weakness and precipitancy, involve its author without heeding his resistance, in a labyrinth of sins; the black thought, scarcely expressed, becomes seized upon by malicious powers which weave out of it an invisible net, which twines itself most completely about the will and drags it, as with irresistible force, to the execution of the purpose conceived of; the seduced falls by sin into the power of the seducer, which this latter knows fiendishly how to use; after the first hesitating step in transgression the door closes behind the lost one, he finds himself compelled to cover crime with crime, and by new sins to impart power and strength to the works which sin has produced.[1] *One* way of return indeed there always is and from every point; but he only is able to find it, who is ready to sacrifice himself, his entire earthly existence, in order to save his soul.—If now, according to this, the external circumstances by which the committed evil act becomes seized upon, appear to control the development of sin in man, the requirement of the inward continuity also maintains its right; the power of circumstances may hasten the progress of the corruption, but its determining principle is ever the inward yielding of the will in sin; where this yielding of the will does not keep pace with the outward results of that power, there arises that irrational relation often to be met with between the phenominal disturbance of an individual and the real contents of his moral condition of soul.

In the Protestant dogmatick taking into consideration the

1 According to Macbeth's expression in the third act of *Shakspeare's* drama, which in general describes this horrible connection in which the evil thought, when lust has conceived it, becomes deed and this again becomes the mother of a series of similar deeds, with the deepest psychological truth. No less truly and strikingly does *Göethe's Grosskophta*, a work too little regarded in its ethico-tragical kernel, exhibit this fettering power of sin in the more common relations of life, in the fate of the niece.

differently modified relation, in which the collective condition of the natural man stands to the sin which has dominion over him, it distinguishes in the same different *states of corruption*. *Baumgarten* must be regarded as the author of this trope of doctrine;[1] it is not to be met with in the dogmatists before him. But *Baumgarten* treats it in a different sense from that of later dogmatists. In his conception of the collective condition of man apart from Redemption, as a state under the dominion of hereditary sin, he distinguishes in the same a state of security and a state of servitude in the narrower significance of the same, namely of the servitude of sin coming to the consciousness of man by the power of the law[2]—quite as Paul does, as he also in the determining of the first state lays Rom. vii. 5, vii. 9, at the basis.[3] The leading point of view is clearly the development of man to redemption; the law, as it produces servitude in the narrower sense, is *παιδαγωγὸς εἰς Χριστόν*; the intention is not that of exhibiting the sinful condition in its gradual enhancement. On the other hand the way in which these different states of corruption generally become classified, especially since *Reinhard*,[4] by our dogmatists, the idea of a gradual enhancement of sin becomes laid down as the basis; these states of servitude, of security, of hypocrisy and of obdurateness are manifestly conceived of as the different stages of that development.

The subject then for our consideration here is the cognition of this *enhancement*. If now in that series we must manifestly take the *servitude* in the narrower sense above denoted, to which also

[1] *S. dessen evangelische Glaubenslehre* vol. i., p. 579, seq.

[2] Just so the dissertation commonly ascribed to *Baumgarten*, but only defended under his presidency, the dissertation, namely, from *Litzmann de propagatione et gradibus peccati originalis* § 54, seq.

[3] Comp. on the Pauline trope of doctrine of the twofold servitude of the natural man, *Neander's Pfl. der Kirche durch die App.* p. 683, seq. —If *Baumgarten* does not ground the second state on Rom. vii. 14, seq., he only appears to be kept from doing so, by the interpretation of this section of the state of the regenerate which was common in our older theology.

[4] Comp. *dessen Vorlesungen über die Dogm.* p. 325, seq. Somewhat differently and in part more correctly is the order conceived of by *Döderlein, Instit. theol. Christ.* ii., p. 9, seq.

Reinhard's determination of the notion refers,[1] in the first place it surprises us, that as the *first* stage, the state of servitude is laid down, since this state is certainly always preceded in the real development of human life, as indeed it cannot be otherwise, by a certain security and consciouslessness; then, that it is impossible to place *hypocrisy* as a separate stage by the side of the other three, as indeed it can only be conceived of as a particular attribute, which characterizes the state of servitude in the sense above given, and especially so the state of obdurateness, which however even in this respect is not always to be met with. Accordingly it seems more correct so to classify the stages of this development: the first stage, is the state of *relative consciousless-ness* respecting the contrast, in which the collective condition of the individual's own life, according to its dominant principles, stands with the Divine will. This stage must be so comprehensively conceived of, as—to denote the extreme points—on the one hand, just as much to give room for the innocence, in which the little excited selfishness still lies as asleep, as on the other hand for the rudeness, in which selfishness holds unbridled sway, without any other than entirely isolated reactions of the conscience. The second stage denotes the state of the *awakened self-variance*, which the natural life is not able with its powers to overcome by the victory of the principle of holiness, consequently the state of *servitude* in the narrower sense, in which it expresses this, that the objective character of the natural condition in general has become a matter of consciousness. The third stage, under the presupposition, that in the second the individual has not passed over into the sphere of redemption, is the state of *obdurateness*, of insensibility and hebetation, arising from persistent disregard to the awakened conscience.

One might be tempted to introduce, between the second and third stages, as the abrupt contrast of which seems to require some mediation, still another stage, viz. the state of *lukewarmness* (according to Rev. iii. 15), which seeks to resolve the variance by weakening the impulses of the holy principle to such a degree as, according to its opinion, to be compatible with a somewhat

[1] Status eorum, qui scientes meliora et probantes ita vi appetitûum trahuntur, ut deteriora sequantur.

moderated dominion of the selfish principles. This were the state of a capitulation between the holy and the unholy. However, although this condition may often form the transition between the conditions of servitude on the one hand and of obdurateness on the other, its significance is notwithstanding not of so general and deeply pervading a character as that of those other conditions. There can be no doubt but that the condition of obdurateness developes itself in many cases after the first powerful excitations of the conscience, without lukewarmness intervening as a separate stage of the development.

As to the notion of the state of *obdurateness* (*status indurationis*—Tr.) just touched upon, in the Biblical conception of which especially, the representation appears of an insensibility to admonitions of the conscience and God-consciousness,[1] a twofold scruple presents itself against the same. It has been questioned, whether this condition is ever to be met with, whether such a decided and persistent resistance against the holy power of the truth can be conceived of, that there should arise from the same that condition of complete insensibility.[2] So much is at once to be allowed to this objection, that we are by no means everywhere in the Holy Scripture where it speaks of obdurateness, to assume a complete deadness of the moral and religious feeling, but often only such a degree of its suppression, that all earnest and constant regard to those admonitions and all understanding of their deep significance, are excluded. But that this complete deadness may also take place and the reasons for the same, will be seen from our investigation below on the sin of blasphemy against the Holy Ghost.

The second scruple is in relation to the *Divine efficiency*, to which the condition of obdurateness is often referred by the Holy Scripture, particularly Exod. iv. 21, vii. 3, ix. 12, and elsewhere; Deut. ii. 30; Jos. xi. 20; Joh. xii. 40 (according to Isai. vi. 9, 10); Rom. ix. 18, xi. 7. Now, so little as on the one hand, the formerly common method of escaping this scruple by turning

[1] So much at least is expressed in πωροῦσθαι, while σκληρύνεσθαι expresses more the obstinate resistance, consequently is of more positive significance.

[2] *Schleiermacher's* instances against the notion of obduracy amount to this inconceivability, comp. his *Glaubenslehre*, vol. 1, p. 458 sq.

this Divine efficiency into a mere Hebraism, as if the writers of Holy Scripture had simply meant to express by the same only a Divine sufferance, is capable of being justified before an ingenuous interpretation, so on the other hand it must just as decidedly become recognized from such an interpretation, that it cannot possibly be the intention of the Scripture in these passages to make God the real author of human sins. For so insignificantly indeed we dare not conceive of the mind of the Apostles as to make them alternate, and what is more partly in the same connection (Rom. ix.—xi.), between two methods of representation, of which the one lays down the Divine effectuation of sin, whilst the other denies the same. Much rather the interpretation owes in any case so much confidence in the authors of the Holy Scripture, as to set out from the presupposition of a thinking which is in self-agreement, consequently to search for the significance, in which, that which they say of the Divine efficiency in the obduration of man, may be reconciled with the ethico-religious ground-view of the Holy Scripture.

Now we must first of all call to mind what was said in an earlier remark (comp. vol. i., p. 421 seq.), namely, that all these passages presuppose a state already affected with that, in which the condition of obduracy arises, with sin and guilt. Consequently an original production of sin is not at all spoken of here, but only of the development and activity of a perverted principle already present. But we have already seen, that this development is not merely the revealing process and manifestation of that which is already inwardly existent, the stepping forth of determinations already prepared, but also includes a real growing degeneracy from bad to worse, an enhancement of the sinful state of being, and that the condition of obduracy forms a new stage in the same. Now that this enhancement should be brought about by God Himself, must ever remain a hard doctrine, incompatible with the Divine Will, that sin become surmounted and overthrown. For this reason the difficulty cannot be resolved by referring to the universal law of development, to which sin is subjected, and by virtue of which, each particular tendency of sin, if it is posited by a fundamental decision, strives to maintain itself and binds the will, from which it has proceeded. For here the matter treated of is not of the necessity,

that sin should also mature itself and thus fully reveal its vile nature in the spheres in which it has once taken root, but of the conquest of new spheres.

That in the hardening of the human heart, an immediate efficiency of God, whereby He might produce insusceptibility and aversion towards His admonitions, is not to be thought of, the Holy Scripture itself definitely enough intimates. When Isai. vi. 10,—a passage to which several New Testament expressions concerning obduracy refer—Jehovah says to the Prophet: harden the heart of this people, make its ears deaf and blind its eyes and so on, it is clearly not meant, that the Prophet is immediately and in a purely inward manner to bring about this condition in its mind, but the sense is this, that by his proclamation he will drive them to this obduracy of heart. And when Christ gives praise to the Father that He has hidden His Gospel from the wise and knowing and revealed it unto babes, He does not intend thereby to refer that resultlessness of His ministry in the wise and knowing to a particular working of God in the shutting up of their hearts, but simply considers it as the natural result of the contents of His proclamation given Him by the Father, and of its relation to the inner condition of those wise ones. The subject of this praise is, that it has pleased the Father to communicate His Revelation in Christ in such a manner, that it remains hidden from those, who think themselves wise, but is understood by the simple-minded, comp. 1 Cor. i. 21 seq. In agreement with this we have to look upon the obduracy of some individuals as the work of God, in so far as, under presupposition of their moral condition, it is the *result of the historic guidances and preparations of God.*

And here it must not be overlooked, that the Holy Scripture only speaks of the Divine hardening of the human heart in relation to *Divine Revelation*, partly by Moses, partly by Christ. Herewith is discovered to us the very pith of the notion of obduration, namely, that *critical* efficiency of the Divine Revelation, especially in Christ, to which we have already directed attention according to other expressions of Holy Scripture. It is this law, that no one can withdraw himself from the Revelation of God which comes near to him and have his moral condition remain as before, but the sluggish disinclination, which he

opposes to it, necessarily enhances itself to a positive hatred and an obtuse closedness of heart for the Holy and Divine. If a ray of this Light has fallen upon one, he cannot, as many would like to do, pass away from it with quiet unconcern and indifference, but if he closes himself up against the light he becomes driven to bitterness and wrath against it.[1] In relation to such an individual, the means of spiritual healing, the efficacy which he has intentionally destroyed, not merely loses its saving power, but operates in a directly opposite manner. Christ has Himself expressed this law in that passage of deep significance: Whosoever hath, to him shall be given, that he may have abundance; but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that he hath, Matt. xiii. 12.

From this it follows, that in the development of obdurateness the *first beginning* proceeds from human freedom, and that the necessity, by virtue of which such individuals are obliged to progress in obduration and to prepare themselves as instruments for the carrying out of the Divine purposes by their opposition is ever a *second*, attaching itself to a particular self-perversion of their will. Quite in this way, a passage, which treats of obduracy of heart not expressly, it is true, but still according to the subject, conceives of this course, 1 Pet. ii. 7, 8. To the unbelieving Christ is a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence, who stumble thereon, in that they do not believe the word, whereunto they also are appointed. They are, according to the preceding connection, not thereunto appointed it may be, not to believe the word, but in so far as they do not believe the word, they are obliged to stumble against it. First of all man shuts himself up, then he becomes shut up. It is certainly not without intention,

[1] Comp. *Luther's* conception of the obduration of the heart, essentially in agreement with the above, *De servo arbitrio ed. Seb. Schmid. p.* 126 *seq.* Still indeed, in order to allow the obduration to proceed not merely from the external excitation of God by His Revelations, but also from a working of God in the inward of man, *Luther* in an original, but certainly untenable manner, places together with that conception an enhanced representation of the Divine concursus, which powerfully reminds one of the later occasionalism, comp. vol. i., p. 243 seq. At the same time he conceives of the concursus as a rapere, whereas the later *Lutheran* theology speaks, with more right, of a suavis Dei influxus. Βία ἐχθρὸν θεῷ is a beautiful expression of *Clement* of Alexandria.

that in Exodus Pharaoh's obduration is first of all exhibited as self-obduration, then as obduration by God,[1] comp. Ex. vii. 13, 22; viii. 15, 32, with Ex. ix. 12; x. 20, 27. In this sense the older theologians have always considered the Divine obduration as a *judgment* of God.

This conducts us to a much employed and much controverted representation of allied, yet more comprehensive significance, to the representation, that God sometimes *punishes the sins* of men *by means of sin*. *Augustinus*, as is well known, has maintained this in a very extended sense, as also later it found its most zealous defenders among the advocates of the unconditioned election of Grace.[2] The difficulty, which is certainly not to be estimated as small, of this method of representation, first of all consists in punishment, according to its notion, being that which is inflicted upon man, a something suffered by him, while sin is something done, or indeed in the last instance something which has proceeded from the will. Still more decisively punishment and sin appear mutually to exclude each other, when we more closely reflect upon the determinate *notion of punishment*. It has essentially the purpose of maintaining the authority of the law of the will violated by sin. But for this purpose nothing seems more unadapted, than that there should be suspended over the transgressor the decree that he shall still further commit that whereby he has already violated the law; for thereby the violation already committed does not become negatived, revealed in the nothingness of its resistance negativing the law, but much rather affirmed and increased.

Hengstenberg directs attention to this, *Authentie des Pentateuchs* vol. ii. p. 462, although the relation, in which he elsewhere places the self-hardening of Pharaoh to his being hardened by God, does not stand therewith in agreement.

[2] The opinion of the Hattemists, a small party which arose in Holland towards the close of the 17th century, forms here a remarkable extreme, namely, that God does not at all punish men *on account* of their sins but *by* their sins. One might be tempted to conceive of this opinion as the reverse side to *Spinoza's: beatitudo non virtutis praemium, sed ipsa virtus i.e.* as Sp. understands it as denying reward, recompense. And against it may not be demonstrative, that this sect also taught of a wrath of God, which rested upon God's not seeing in this life His decree in relation to man, executed; for with this Divine anger it could be scarcely a matter of earnestness.

And indeed, if the punishment of sin by sin, conveyed with it an intensive augmentation of sin, consequently an inner enhancement of the corruption, the representation were not to be saved from the objection of an inward contradiction. At any rate it can only be applied to the sins, which we have above denominated as caused; for just as caused these do not ground such an inner enhancement, but are more to be looked upon as the revelation of the perversions of the will already present. If now it is not to be overlooked, that sin, immediately considered, assuredly appears in some degree, often in the most striking manner, as suffering, then the second scrupulous consideration becomes dismissed, inasmuch as the deplorable state of bondage, in which the violation of the law involves the violators, is at the same time a reaction of the order of the universe against sin, a factual exhibition of that violation in its wrongfulness (in its nature as that which ought not to be) and a confirmation of the law in its sole truthfulness and validity.

Truly at the same time there cannot be concealed the *relativity*, which ever attaches to this regarding of any sin as punishment of sin. It only takes into consideration just one side of such sin, namely that, according to which, for itself considered, it is dependent upon a moment lying in the past, which is grounded in an act of the will distinct from itself, while according to the other side, there is immediately present in it and continues itself in it, this act of the will, on which it depends, that the latter does not lose the character of guilt. Of course those methods of consideration of such a sin will especially make themselves valid, where the latter in its direct form of manifestation exhibits itself as the deep disgrace of man, as the degradation of the same to an existence sold entirely to the sensational passions, or where the sin itself in the moment of its committal furnishes the individual anything but pleasure, and appears as a madness, as a fearful bewitchery which chains him to it. It is the *dishonour* and the *displeasure* which here impress upon sin the stamp of *punishment*. And it is just that first point of view, from which Paul Rom. i. 24 seq. exhibits the abominations of degenerated lust in heathen life (the ἀτιμάζεσθαι τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν ver. 24, the πάθη ἀτιμίας ver. 26), without intending in the smallest degree to cancel their moral imputation, comp. ver. 32, as a punishment

appointed by God for departure from Him to the service of idolatry. They are the results of the law of development under which evil is placed and this law of development is also law of God. The matter stands somewhat differently with 2 Thess. ii. 11, 12. Most certainly Paul looks upon it as the punishment of those, who, from the lust of unrighteousness, persistingly refuse faith in the truth of the Gospel, that they, misled by a strong delusion, believe in lies. But the Divine causality as to their sins, in this progressing seduction of evil, he conceives of only as an occasioning, exciting one from without. By the Divine guidance of the historical development the opposition of evil becomes constrained to enhance its inner principle to ever greater decisiveness and ever more firmly to combine together all the powers which are serviceable to it, so that at the end of that development the lie comp. v. 4 and the seduction appear with a power (*ἐνέργεια πλάνης*), which those minds already estranged from the truth will not withstand.[1]—

That there attaches to actual sins *different degrees of culpability*, we have been convinced by an earlier consideration,[2] of course the same holds good of the corresponding sins of habit in which the determinate element of the actual sin appears as an abiding disposition and an acquired finishedness, as evil propensity and as vice. In relation to both forms of sin, the Church early expressed the distinction of degree in culpability, especially by its division of sins into *mortal sins* and *venial sins*.

When now the Reformers, and after their example our older dogmatists, decidedly rejected the opinion that there are, *according to their nature*, venial sins, *i.e.* sins which are not deserving of eternal death, the entire division appears therewith to be in fact rejected. But, in truth, while they declined the same with respect to the general sphere of life, they meant to retain it for the sphere of pardoned life,[3] and here distinguished between

[1] Comp. p. 437 seq., the examination of the representation, that the universal corruption of human nature in all the natural posterity of Adam is connected with his fall by a positive punitive act of God.

[2] Comp. vol. i., p. 175, seq., and the remarks on this distinction in *Schaf's Schrift über die Sunde wider den h. Geist* (1841), p. 57, seq.

[3] Still *Calvin* so expresses himself respecting this distinction, *instit. christ. relig.* l. iii., c. iv., § 28, that he appears to decline the use of the same without limitation.

such sins, which cancel the state of Grace—*pecc. mortalia*,—and such which do not cancel it—*pecc. venialia*. As, however, even the latter are also, according to their nature, said to be mortal sins, their determination as venial sins can indeed only so be understood, that, *according to their real consequences*, they find forgiveness through faith as the subjective principle of the state of Grace. But the former also obtain forgiveness as to their real consequence, in so far as the faith, which is said to be suppressed by them, but still not irrestorably so, again elevates itself out of this suppression.[1] Setting out from this possibility, we should only be able in a logically correct manner to place mortal and venial sins in opposition to each other, as different kinds of sins, when under the first must be understood the absolutely unpardonable, and therefore also, according to the real consequence, never pardoned sins, the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost. But if therewith it is not at all meant in this way, but that this sin is much rather to be kept out of the consideration, then all sins of the Redeemed will be at the same time both mortal and venial sins, only *in a different respect*, the first in view of their desert in themselves, the second in view of the overcoming efficiency of the Divine Grace in the subject of the same. Now the same, will also hold good of all sins of the natural man, inasmuch as they are all *capable* of being cancelled by forgiveness. As, however, that overcoming efficiency of Grace is not yet the real principle of his collective condition, the collective sins of the natural man will have to be considered both as to their objective nature as well as with respect to the connection of life, in which they actu stand, as mortal sins. But then the same directly also follows for sins of the regenerate of such a magnitude, that, where they are committed, the efficiency of the Divine Grace, according to the Lutheran dogmatick, immediately ceases to be the principle of the life. Consequently this dogmatick, under its presuppositions, was not after all so far wrong, as at the first view of the matter it may appear, in regarding mortal and venial sins as *different kinds* of sin.

However in the categorical maintenance, that each sin in

[1] Comp. *Schleiermacher's* remarks, l. c. vol. ii. p. 454, seq.

itself makes the subject of the same guilty of eternal death, a misunderstanding appears to prevail, as indeed, otherwise considered, it would be very difficult to bring it into agreement with Matth. v. 21, 22. The *universal constitutional character* of the natural life is such an one, which is deserving of eternal death. Its transcendental ground is a real mortal sin, as culpability of every individual person, by virtue of which, no one brings with him into this earthly life the smallest claim on the Divine gifts and goods, but, according to the principle of righteousness, in itself regarded, is only deserving of punishment, and is purely by Grace appointed to live. Still, that every individual sin in itself considered, even the smallest precipitancy or inattentiveness, however much its guilt may be mitigated by circumstances, makes man guilty of eternal damnation, is only just an abstract consequence of the school, which in life, in the practical consciousness even of the earnest Christian, has no root whatever, and which, if it took root in the same would only tend therein to degrade to insignificancy the distinction of degree as to the guilt arising from individual sins, and thus *to weaken* the detestation at conscious crime committed against the Holiest Laws of God. But that judgment, although it expressly refers to individual sins as such, can only arise, in so far as the attention, disregarding the individual offence, is directed to the moral collective condition, of the constitutional character of which, as it is otherwise known to us, even the most trifling offence reminds us. The error, then, which lies in this method of consideration, is the one-sidedness of attaching the distinction of degree in guilt solely to the present actual *collective condition* of man and consequently of regarding the actual sins according to their full determinateness, so far as they at all belong to the individual acting, solely as *product* of the already developed condition (comp. vol. i. p. 218.)

Now according to this our definitive judgment on the value of the above distinction appears indeed to be even more favourable than that of the old Protestant theology, inasmuch as we have no reason for not applying it, if it can be maintained with respect to the sins of the regenerate, also to those of the natural man. However against the employment of this division there is this quite generally to be said, that the characteristics of both kinds are in themselves of far too flowing a nature and too much deter-

mined by a mere more or less, to allow a sharp distinction of kinds really to be grounded upon them. Indeed it cannot be denied that even one and the same offence may carry with it for one individual a less, for another a greater degree of guilt, *e. g.* when the latter knows himself to be such an one, to whom this apparently trifling misdemeanour is, on account of its inner connection with worse offences, very dangerous. Thus then even the passage, from which that distinction proceeds, 1 John v. 16, 17, is not at all qualified to serve as ground-basis for the same. The sin spoken of in this passage, has by no means this wide and indefinitely bounded sphere which mortal sins have in the Church determination of this doctrine; its peculiar nature must explain and does perfectly explain, why John distinguishes it by the name: *ἁμάρτία πρὸς θάνατον*, and will not appoint prayer in the Church for it; it is the total apostasy from Christ.[1]

But on the other side, according to what has been just remarked, we certainly cannot admit, that the distinction of guilt attaching to actual sins becomes resolved into the different moral worth of the abiding conditions of their authors, but we must determine that distinction, partly according to the objective character of the offence, partly according to the nature of its inner genesis, whether the transgression may have been committed in the state of natural corruption or in the state of grace, in the latter instance with such an enhancement that it carries with it a deeply pervading disturbance of the same. According to the *objective* side, that offence is the greater, in which selfishness, the principle of sin, the more energetically exerts itself. But selfishness there exerts itself with augmented energy, where sin determinately invades moral arrangements of the most fundamental significance, or assaults the highest all-dominant principle. According to the *subjective* side, that offence is the greater, which takes place with the clearer consciousness of its condemnable nature and with the greater decision of will to pay no heed to the same.[2] But if we

[1] Comp. the thorough exposition of this expression in *Lucke's Kommentar zu den Briefen Johannes*, p. 306 seq.

[2] That which, according to the general moral judgment in the determination of this distinction in degree still comes especially into consideration, namely, the different magnitude of the temptation and

reflect, that, where the will to sin does not allow itself to be disturbed by the express opposition of the moral command in the consciousness, there too selfishness reveals a relatively greater energy, thus we see the subjective determination of that distinction in degree return into the objective. The collective condition of the agent has only so far any influence in the estimate of this distinction, as it justifies or does not justify the expectation, that he will have been conscious of his action, as of one contradicting the moral law. Still, this second, subjective moment loses its significance and in so far this influence, where the moral consciousness has been wilfully suppressed by earlier offences.—

The New Testament knows of *one* sin, which it designates as the absolutely unpardonable, *the blasphemy of the Holy Ghost*, Matt. xii. 31, 32; Luke xii. 10; Mark iii. 28, 29. As a sagacious and careful elaboration of this difficult and manifoldly related notion, the examination of which is in general a touch-stone for the understanding of the true nature of evil, has been lately furnished us, with the results of which in the essential points we are in agreement,[1] we need so much the less to enter into the entire breadth of this manifoldly branched investigation, especially so according to its Biblico-theological bases, but may confine ourselves to the discussion of its general determinations.

That Christ considers the blasphemy of the Holy Ghost as an *individual, actual sin*, is, according to the expression which He has chosen (ὃς δ' ἂν εἴπῃ κατὰ του πνεύματος τοῦ ἁγίου) beyond doubt. But therewith is not excluded, but much rather included, that it can only take place as the veriest acme of a perverted development of man making its progress through many sins, of an accumulating degeneracy of his moral collective condition. *If* it is correct, with *Olshausen*, to conceive of the declaration of

the distinction between the sin merely begun and that which is completed, may be reduced to the one or the other of these two moments.

[1] Vide the work of *Phil. Schaf* mentioned p. 471, über d. s. w. d. h. G., with which may be compared the deeply penetrating remarks of *Tholuck* "über die Natur der Sünde wider den heiligen Geist," *theol. Stud. u. Krit.* 1836, No. ii. p. 401 seq. (separately printed in the second volume of his miscellaneous writings), and those by *Nitzsch* in his *System der christlichen Lehre* p. 272 seq., further the dissertations by *Crushof. St. u. Kr.* 1833, No. iv. p. 935 seq., and by *Gurlitt* ibid. 1834, No. iii. p. 599 seq.

Christ only as a warning to the Pharisees as to this awful height from which there is no return, Christ has Himself definitely alluded to that relation of the same to a preparatory development. Consequently the actual sin, which blasphemes the Holy Ghost requires a given *condition* of the agent; it is the condition of total obdurateness. If one, who does not yet stand upon this stage of development, but upon any other whatever of moral self-variance and conflict, should in some fearful moment of despair even form the definite resolve to blaspheme the Holy Ghost, he could not then immediately fulfil his resolve. For indeed this sin is not a mere external act, as if by the secret magic of certain words, which did not proceed from the deep of the heart, one could commit the absolutely worst and irremediably abandon himself to eternal perdition.

Further, blasphemy of the Holy Ghost is not designated by Christ as a particular kind of unpardonable sin, but as the *alone unpardonable sin* in express distinction from all others (*πᾶσα ἁμαρτία καὶ βλασφημία ἀφεθήσεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις*). We preliminarily only infer so much therefrom, that the enhancement of sin in man does not attain it may be in different directions different culminating points, so that the sin against the Holy Ghost were only one among these ultimata of sinful development. Much rather sinful development must, unless prevented by Redemption, *everywhere complete itself in blasphemy of the Holy Ghost.*

What now is the *inner nature* of this sin? We may here attach the nearer determinations to the contrast lately in a peculiar manner advocated. In contradiction to the otherwise prevalent opinion, according to which, the essential characteristic of the sin of blasphemy of the Holy Ghost was hatred and enmity against Him and His efficiency, *Gurlitt*, with singular ability, has defended the conception of this sin, as contemptuous *indifference* with respect to every thing good and holy.[1] According to him it consists in the regarding everything which is a Revelation of the Holy Ghost in word and life, as absurd folly, because the reality of the good in general, also the existence of the Holy Ghost, who creates the good, are esteemed nonentities.

[1] Ibid p. 609.

If we conceive of this contemptuous indifference as only relative, well distinguishing it, as *Gurlitt* also does from the still unawakened natural rudeness, we not seldom meet with it in life, as the endeavour of deeply depraved children of the world to persuade themselves, that all religious and moral truth is only a political invention of the shrewd or an empty imagining of the weak. In so far however as this endeavour does not fully succeed, *Gurlitt* also will not have such men considered as blasphemers of the Holy Ghost. But if according to him that indifference is to be *absolutely* taken, we must maintain against it, that as such it is not possible. Truly the perversion of the will also exercises a darkening and impurifying influence upon the cognition; but it will never be able to extirpate the consciousness of an universally valid, practical truth in the human spirit. It will not be able in the earthly life; and still less will it be able to do so in the life hereafter, where the created spirit will cognize this truth, whether it wishes to do so or not, as the contents of the will, in which its existence and that of all creatures is grounded.

But just for the very reason, that the perversion of the will is not at all able to do this,—in order to meet an objection easily to be foreseen—this cognition cannot for a moment be considered as a *remnant of moral good*. Here, with respect to the essential existence of the moral in man, we must well distinguish between what is conditioned altogether independently of the will of man and what is in some way or other conditioned by the same. The moral feeling is of the latter kind, the cognition of the moral law in its fundamental outlines, the consciousness of the same as of an universal norm of the human will, of the former; as indeed even the *most abandoned villain*, who with respect to himself absolutely *resolves* not to be bound by the law, immediately regards it as a wrong, as that which ought not to be, if his property or life becomes wilfully infringed upon by another. That man has still some pleasure in the contents of the law in the relation of the same to himself, that consequently also the wish that his own life should correspond with it, is not entirely extinct in him, is not at all to be separated from the moral constitution of his will, from an inclination of the same, be it ever so *slight*, to the good, and therefore expresses a limit of his subjective corruption; that he becomes immediately conscious of

that contents, so soon as he comes in contact with it in its simple ground elements, as of a fact of the world-arrangement, is something purely involuntary, a retention of man by the strong hand of his Creator even in the most violent resistance.

If on the contrary, according to the above representation, the acme of sin were entire indifference towards the moral law, consequently the complete effacement of that relation to it, then, as has been correctly remarked,[1] sin in its highest form would destroy *the moral nature of man.* But therewith it would at the same time destroy itself, and thus become by its own potentializing the Redeemer of man from sin; not as if the unsubdued striving of selfishness were not even in itself and prior to the consciousness of the law, evil, but because with that destruction, the spiritual personality in general would have perished and the wild lusting of selfishness would then be only the fury of a rapacious beast of prey.

In the consideration of the sin against the Holy Ghost we must bear in mind, that it presupposes a higher degree of developed moral consciousness, and because the same is not able to develop itself still higher without falling back upon religion as its deeper ground, also of the religious consciousness. It presupposes it, it is true, only in so far as it must have been at some earlier period in the inner life of the subject, but if it has once been there, then it exercises upon the entire subsequent development, however deeply it may again fall away from it, a conditioning influence and makes possible a greater energy of sin, a more extensive wickedness and a fuller imputation, than would take place without it.[2] Moral rudeness as such is perfectly secure from the sin against the Holy Ghost. In order to make man capable of committing it, evil must most thoroughly have pervaded him by a process of intensifying and spiritualizing, in which its principle becomes more definitely and purely embraced. Blasphemy of the Holy Ghost, as it is the highest so also is it the most spiritual sin. But evil, by virtue of its dependence on the good as opposition to the same and according to the universal conditions, under which the earthly development of man is placed,

[1] Comp. *Schaf*, l. c. p. 84, 85.

[2] Comp. *Tholuck's* remarks in the dissertation above quoted p. 100, and in his *Kommentar zum Br. an die Hebr.* p. 367.

can only there attain to this intenseness, where a deeper contact of the inner life with the good has preceded it.

Accordingly we do not find ourselves justified to relinquish the fundamental determination in the older conception of sin against the Holy Ghost. The nature of this sin is *hatred of that which is cognized as Divine.* The blasphemy is the *expression* of this hatred, and is so in a much more deeply penetrating sense than it may appear at the first blush of the matter. He who has observed with some degree of attentiveness the heights of human corruption in its more spiritual forms, will have noticed the remarkable phenomenon, how those, who have reached such heights, cannot rest for their aversion to that which is holy and Divine, but as with irresistible violence are impelled to give vent to the same by revilings, how it furnishes them a vile satisfaction to belch forth their most horrifying blasphemies.

The inner motive of this hatred is the self-hood which will not bend itself; the self-hood hates God and His Holy Law, because it is the limit of its arbitrariness, in which it incessantly strives to set itself up as absolute, because it is the fundamental requirement of the Divine Will that it subordinate itself to God. And just therein consists the pure decisiveness of this opposition, that the self-hood is fully conscious of it and yet persists in it. It will have sole authority; but then there is a holy truth valid in itself and absolutely obligating man, which everywhere stands in its way; therefore it would desire, if it were possible, entirely to destroy this truth, which stands in direct opposition to it, and this being impossible it combats its power on earth, as much as it can.

While the evil will thus becomes conscious of its own principle in the form of an universal fundamental law, it naturally involves itself in the contradiction of being obliged at the same time to affirm the good in the most decided negation. In order only to commence the conflict, it is obliged to vindicate itself as the Right and the Able, as that which is worthy of free man, but to designate its contrast, notwithstanding that indestructible foreboding of its universal validity, as that which ought not to be, it may be as the Weak, the Pusillanimous, the Unfree.[1] The

[1] In many respects the characteristic of the devil and his maxims which *Erhard* sketches in his so-called "*Apologie des Teufels*" (*Niethammers philos. Journal*, vol. i., No. 2, p. 105 seq.) exhibits here instructive points of comparison.

sin against the Holy Ghost is necessarily at the same time the most audacious sophistry.

Now from these remarks it also follows, that in reality it is only another side of the same sin, which Paul has in view, when in 2 Thess. ii. 3, 4, he exhibits the acme of evil in the development of humanity, as the *self-deification of completed egoism.* If the man of sin, the despiser of all law (ὁ ἄνομος v. 8) is obliged in his unsubdued self-exaltation, in order to maintain his lie (for that from a real conviction he regards himself as God, no one will suppose), to oppose himself to everything Divine and Holy, v. 3, and systematically to make war upon the same, then of necessity is he at the same time the blasphemer of the Holy Ghost. But he therewith signalizes himself as son of perdition absolute, v. 3, as one, who has irrecoverably abandoned himself to perdition.

This highest enhancement of sin, the blasphemy of the Holy Ghost is *conditioned, by the highest revelation of God;* only through Christ and the efficiency of the Holy Ghost proceeding from Him has it become possible.

A few older Lutheran theologians give the most positive significance to this dependence of the sin against the Holy Ghost upon the Revelation of God in Christ, in that they directly make *regeneration* the presupposition of the same.[1] But the most avoid definitely to make this a requisite and are satisfied in making the *cognition of evangelical truth* by the illumination of the Holy Spirit the condition of this sin.[2] But as this illumination is not at all in reality to be separated from regeneration, so by the manner in which the latter, in agreement with the former, biblically ground the notion of the sin against the Holy Ghost, it is again entirely carried over to that side. The older dogmatists almost unanimously regard Heb. vi. 3—6 (with which comp. Heb. x. 26—31) as one of the chief testimonies as to the nature of that sin. And indeed it can scarcely be doubted, that the same

[1] *Hutter*, Loci comm.—de pecc. in Sp. S. p. 367, 368. *Quenstedt* l. c. sect. 1, th. 96; sect. 2, qu. 16, which carries out the thought: Nobis probabilior videtur eorum sententia, qui solis vere renatis, iustificatis et renovatis pecc. in Sp. S. adscribunt. *Baumgarten*, *Evangel. Glaubenslehre* vol. ii. p. 618, 619.

[2] E. g. *Gerhard* l. c. de pecc. actual. c. 24, § 109. *Baier* l. c. p. ii. c. 3, § 24. *Konig*, Theol. posit. p. ii. § 158. *Buddæus* l. iii. c 2, § 4.

crime passed before the mind of the author of the epistle in this passage, which Christ denominates as the blasphemy of the Holy Ghost. But just as little can its expressions leave us in uncertainty as to whether he has such in view, who have really become partakers of the Redemption in Christ by the new-birth (*γευσαμένος τῆς δωρεᾶς τῆς ἐπουρανίου καὶ μετόχους γενηθέντας πνεύματος ἁγίου καὶ—γευσαμένους δυνάμεις μέλλοντος αἰῶνος.*) The expositor would here never have thought of a merely superficial excitation, if dogmatic scruples had not misled him in the same.[1]

There is a deep meaning contained in this postulate of the new-birth for the sin against the Holy Ghost. Only the highest religious consciousness is said to be capable of committing the heaviest offence, but this highest consciousness he alone can possess, who, from his own experience, knows what true fellowship with God is. To offend the Holy Ghost as such, he only is able, who has already been a partaker of His efficiency. Truly this is founded upon notions of the nature and the conditions of evil, which have nothing in common with the opinions now circulated among us, according to which, evil is only weakness and deficiency in development, the necessary negative moment in the development of the good and the like.—Nevertheless this requirement of the new-birth rests upon the overstraining of a principle which in itself is correct. What the condition of this most fearful offence is, as to its objective side, was stated just above; in the subject, it can in general only be a deeper impression, which the same must earlier have received, of the holy efficacy of the Revelation of God in Christ, of the operation of the Holy Ghost in mankind. If the mind has once received such an impression, it is possessed of that higher degree of consciousness as the secret power which impels the resisting to ever fresh resistance, and sin is able to deepen in itself until it arrives at positive hatred against God and His redeeming work in mankind.

[1] Herewith *Bleek* appears to be agreed *der Br. an d. Hebr. Abth.* 2, p. 181, 197, likewise *Tholuck* in his commentary on this epistle, p. 251, seq., still so that he more sharply separates the possession of the objective experiences of Grace, to which he strictly refers the passage, from the fulfilment of the subjective conditions, to which the full fellowship with Christ is attached, than appears to me to be admissible according to the internal nature of the thing.

Whether Christ regarded the blaspheming pharisees as having already committed the sin against the Holy Ghost, or whether he only meant to warn them of the same, cannot with any certainty be decided from the form and connection of his declaration.[1] But he could only warn them in such an emphatic manner in view of their being at the standpoint of their inner life in immanent danger of committing this sin. If now the sin against the Holy Ghost should only be capable of being committed by the regenerate, it would follow that we must consider these pharisees as regenerate by the Holy Ghost. And in fact, the older theologians, who maintain that dogma, do not scruple to take also this consequence; but it is easily foreseen, to what a destructive enervation of the notion of the new-birth this must lead.[2]—But as to the passage in the epistle to the Hebrews, it says certainly, that the regenerate may fall into that sin, but not, that it can *only* be committed by the regenerate.—

Obduracy, as we have seen, presupposed the objective presentation of Divine Revelation in history; blasphemy of the Holy Spirit, this highest and most intense enhancement of sin, is according to the above only possible as the *suppression* of a movement of the inner life previously brought about by the operation of Grace.—

Christ designates blasphemy of the Holy Ghost as that sin, which will never be forgiven. Our older dogmatists, in agreement with several Church Fathers and Scholastics, have correctly perceived the ground of this unpardonability. It is not that the Divine Grace is refused to him, who in sincere penitence seeks its forgiveness of this sin, but that he who has been guilty of the same, is no longer able to fulfil the *subjective conditions* of

[1] Herewith *Neander* stand in agreement, whose conception of the connection, in his *Leben Jesu*, p. 418, seq., appears to me to be the only correct one.

[2] *Quenstedt* l. c. th. 95, p. 77: Pharisaei—pro non renatis haberi non possunt, quia per verbum et acceptam circumcisionem, legitimatum regenerationis media, fuerunt regeniti. Imo veritatem divinam eos agnovisse, si non aliunde vel solo ipsorum officio et cathedra Mosis, ad quam ipse Christus auditores amandat, constare posset.—Certainly this opinion was quite consistent, when once regeneration was attached to the baptism of infants as such on the one hand, and on the other "the sacraments of the Old Testament" were specifically set down as equal to those of the new.

forgiveness, namely this penitence and desire for the Divine Grace, because the enhancement of sin to this acme destroys in him the ability to do so.[1] For the way of return to God is closed against no one, who does not close it against himself. Therefore those, who have not yet closed it against themselves, in that the means of salvation, the Redemption in Christ, has not yet been offered to them, will indisputably hereafter, when beyond the bounds of this earthly life, be placed in a condition to enter upon this way of return back to God, if they choose. And this of course also refers to those, to whom, although belonging to the outer sphere of the Christian Church, the real nature of the Gospel has nevertheless not been presented; indeed we may venture to hope, that between death and the judgment of the world, many deep misunderstandings, by which numbers were withheld from the appropriation of the truth, will become cleared away. But with these hopes there is inseparably connected the recognition, that beyond the sphere of this earthly life man may also fall into that inextinguishable sin.—

But if this sin is absolutely inextinguishable, then there appears not to be a perfect solution of the variance posited in the world with the entrance of evil, inasmuch indeed as by virtue of the immortality of the personal essence evil would always be present in the will of some creatures. It is clear, that at this point, the question, as to the so-called *restoration of all things*, the re-establishment of all beings who have fallen away from God in holy and blessed fellowship with Him, enters into our investigation. We must here of course give up the idea of a more detailed treatment of this problem, and moreover in the remarks we do make, confine ourselves to the human race.

In the first place it is clear, that those apocatastatistic representations which make the restoration to take place between the death of the individual and the general resurrection, violate the New Testament eschatology in its very kernel. Such representations are opposed not merely by the fact, that the Holy Scripture,

[1] *Quenstedt* e.g. who in a *questio* investigates, quaenam sit vera causa irremissibilitatis peccati in Sp. S. conceives of this ground as follows: Distingue inter irremissibile ex parte vel Dei vel peccati in se, et sic nullum irremissibile peccatum datur, et inter tale ex parte personae peccantis, et sic irremissibile est peccatum in Sp. S. l. c. sect. 2, qu. 19 (p. 164).

as we have already seen, teaches us to expect an ever sharper separation of the kingdom of God and the kingdoms of the world as the former approaches its completion, but also therewith the *judgment of the* world which it announces after the close of the history of the earth cannot at all consist; under that supposition nothing more would remain to be separated and judged. With this then some of the passages most frequently employed as proofs for the restoration, fall of themselves to the ground, *e.g.*, 1 Cor. xv. 22, surely too Rom. v. 18, 19; if they contained the doctrine of an universal restoration, they would place the same in that intermediate state, from which it is decidedly excluded by those moments of doctrine just mentioned. Consequently this expectation must at any rate, if it is otherwise capable of being established, be referred to the remoter æons subsequent to the general resurrection.

But even with this conception, a Scripture proof for the restoration can only then be adduced, when one calls to his aid the representation not grounded in Scripture, that, with that, which in itself is *tendency and determination* of a Divine arrangement, the *real result* of the same must absolutely coincide, in other words, that God was not able to condition his arrangements by the free conduct of man. According to this the Scripture proofs Joh. xii. 32; Phil. ii. 10, 11; Col. i. 20; Rom. xi. 32; 1 Tim. ii. 4, 6; 1 John ii. 2, and similar, are to be judged of.

But as to the reasons for the apocatastasis, which arise from the inner connection of the Christian consciousness, no one will be able deeply to reflect upon it without very sensibly feeling their power. Nevertheless we are not able to regard them as decisive. It appears, according to the remarks from which we just set out, inconceivable that the world-development should terminate with an *unadjusted variance*, that the opposition to the Divine Will in the will of any creature should maintain itself. However even a correct notion of *punishment* solves this difficulty. Opposition to the Divine Will does not maintain itself, but is absolutely overcome, when the entire condition of the beings, in whom it is, is a condition of punishment, so that the enchained evil is no longer at all able to disturb the pure unison of the world sublimated to the Divine kingdom. God will certainly realize His idea of the world according to all its moments; but

whether a given individual will enter into this completed realization as a living member of the same cannot *a priori* be decided. The manifold wisdom of God (Eph. iii. 10) has at its command an infinity of ways and means, for the attainment of its ends; if the individual withdraws himself for ever from the place, in which he should be an accord in the harmony of the whole, the creative arrangement has certainly otherwise provided that nothing shall be wanting to this harmony; but even such an one by his opposition and against his will, will be obliged to affirm the same.

Still the idea of the *Divine love*, as of the highest principle appears absolutely to require an *affirmative* adjustment of the variance, which in the ultimate result of the development of the world omits no one personal being, which were not reconciled with God and made blessed in oneness with his love. But if the efficiency of this love is once conceived of in the manner of a metaphysical necessity, the development of the moral world and its Divine guidance inevitably sinks down to a mere process of nature. But that, in this form, the doctrine of restoration attacks the essential, fundamental bases of Christianity, cannot be a matter of doubt, after our previous investigations. It is essential to love, as in its own being so also in its revelation and efficiency, to mediate and condition itself by freedom.[1] It verifies its power in that, wherever there is still present a moral germ of life, it knows how to develop it[1]; but assuredly man is able to destroy this germ of life within him and therewith every point of attachment for the liberation and operation of love. It is a radically perverted, representation, a vile attempt to explain the contrast of blessedness and condemnation by a law of beauty, that some *must* be eternally lost, in order that the light may not be destitute of the

[1] If damnation were the consciousness of guilt enhanced to the highest intensity, if the entire personal existence of the lost spent itself in the feeling of the deepest moral suffering, if its condition must be thought of as that of a patient resignation and submission to the Holy Will of God, then there were indisputably still present in them such a life-germ to be unfolded by the Divine Love. Therefore the representation of this condition, developed with much acuteness in *Erbkam's* dissertation on the doctrine of eternal damnation (*Stud. u. Krit.* 1838, No. 2, p. 384—494), from which the above outlines are borrowed (comp. p. 454, 55, 58, 59,) since it has its root in an incorrectly formed notion of punishment (comp. p. 422, seq.), inevitably leads in its result to the doctrine of restoration which *Erbkam* himself decidedly declines.

shadow as its foil; but that some *are capable* of eternally perishing, is certainly grounded in the mystery of human freedom. And when now experience shows, that many *do really resist* the most holy work of Divine Love, why is it to be impossible, that this resistance against God should again renew itself in the life hereafter and continue to do so through endless ages, from which then follows of itself even for those, to whom punishment is only intelligible under the presupposition of the continuing existence of sin (of the sinful condition), the in every respect unblest condition of those resisting.

The above determinations are even then still valid and sufficient for the refutation, when this objection against endless damnation returns in a more powerful form, namely as referred to the personal *individual* and to the Omniscience of his Creator foreseeing the entire fate of the same—shaped in this way it may be, that God, by virtue of His love, would not at all have created this given individual, if he had cognized it as one who would by sin become subject to a never-ending damnation. For as to the reference to the individual, we have satisfactorily seen, in the third book, especially in the fourth chapter of the first division, that, inasmuch as he is by God, he is also in his place able and appointed to realize the idea of humanity, and that herein all individuals are conditioned perfectly alike. It is absolutely only the individual personality's own act, and indeed, as God did not reject him even after that unhappy primitive decision, only a newly added perverted act, by which he abandons himself to eternal perdition. Therewith the accusations on the ground of humanity, which modern adversaries of Christianity have raised against the doctrine of eternal damnation refute themselves. They can only hold good as affording evidence that their authors are entirely deficient in the notion of creaturely freedom. In any case the scientific elaboration of the Christian doctrine could only then enter into a further controversy on this question with such opponents, when, setting out from their conceptions, they shall have explained in a satisfactory manner, the fearful devastations which sin already here produces in the life of innumerable individuals.

As now on the one hand the doctrine of an universal restoration cannot be proved, so on the other hand it is decidedly

excluded by the declaration of Christ under our consideration respecting the blasphemy of the Holy Ghost. The *possibility* of endless damnation is, as we have seen, grounded in the freedom of the will of the personal creature; that it becomes *real* for any creature, we can only know from Divine Revelation.

Still besides this fearful announcement, the declaration of Christ hides in it great and precious promises. That the future in the sentence: *πᾶσα ἁμαρτία καὶ βλασφημία ἀφεθήσεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις*, may denote, besides the future realization also the merely possible, is certainly not to be doubted; nevertheless in the connection of these words we have no occasion whatever and therefore no justification, for departing from the strict significance of the future. Maintaining this, there is according to these words a time to be expected when all the sins of mankind, with the single exception of blasphemy of the Holy Spirit, will find forgiveness. If according to another declaration of Christ they are only few, who find the narrow way to life, many on the contrary, who travel the broad road to destruction, Matt. 7, 13, 14, this destruction indeed is not absolutely identical with the eternal damnation; many are lost in this earthly life and therewith lost with respect to the condition immediately following their death, for whom indeed there still impends a deliverance. Just as little can we regard it as legitimate to take the *οὔτε ἐν τούτῳ τῷ αἰῶνι οὔτε ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι* by laying aside the contrast therein contained merely for *οὐδέποτε*. Among all the rabbinic parallels to this passage which *Wetsein* adduces there is only one, that from the *Cod. Hasidim*, in which the expression *can* be understood in the above manner; the others definitely refer to the strict significance, which moreover even that citation does not oppose. Consequently the matter spoken of in the declaration of our Lord is, truly, of a forgiveness of sin in the *αἰὼν μέλλων*. But the *αἰὼν μέλλων* is by no means the time and state, which immediately follows the death of the individual, but the period of the manifest, consequently of the perfectly realized, Messianic kingdom, which first of all takes place after the Resurrection and Judgment of the world. Thus, the word of Christ also in relation to those, who here harden themselves against the Divine Revelations and therefore in the Judgment of the world have only to expect a sentence of condemnation, furnishes, not indeed to themselves, inasmuch as they

indeed just despise His word, but still to His Church, a hope of deliverance in the remotest aeons.

But while the declaration of Christ favours, by this intimation, the doctrine of the restoration up to a certain point, it at the same time decidedly denies the *exceptionless universality* of the ἀποκατάστασις, which it maintains. The Divine Love draws all to itself who do not resist its holy drawing; but those who obstinately and pertinaciously chain themselves to that which absolutely ought not to be, moral evil, become separated with it as dead dross from the purifying and sublimating process of the world, which, now that it has become entirely the kingdom of God, has in itself completeness as organic totality, without requiring thereto the presence of moral evil. As sanctification has for its end such a confirmation in the good, in which every further possibility of evil is cancelled, and which nevertheless, inasmuch as the sanctified possesses in the same the purest affirmation of his nature, the most perfect self-hood, is at the same time the highest freedom, so the development of evil completes itself in a condition, in which the not-willing the good has become at the same time a perfect non-ability, in which personality persistently averted from God has become as it were a petrifaction in sin. This is the worm which dies not, the fire which is not quenched,—self-hood, which will not bow itself in order to become truly exalted, which will not die in order to live, nothing but hatred and yet completely powerless, incessantly raging against God, whom it is nevertheless compelled to cognize as the almighty Creator of all being.

CONCLUSION.

The conclusion of our exhibition of the doctrine of sin leads us back to its commencement. A purely theoretic solution of the problem of the world were possible, if *the evil* were not, the evil, which does not resolve itself as a passing moment in the process of the development of the world, but is capable of being maintained, by the will of the personal creature persistently hardening itself, through endless ages. The existence of religion in general is not absolutely conditioned by the presence of sin; also without this the human spirit would require a more vital cognition than *Spinoza* it may be is able to furnish it; but without it one might well deem that methodological ground-tenet of *Spinoza* to be sufficient, which assumes to teach us to overcome the world by mere consideration. Moral evil is the hard rock on which this belief wrecks, so certain is it that no one overcomes the sin which is in him by mere reflection. For this were only possible by his learning to look upon it as a necessary moment of the idea of the world, wherewith evil does not become cognized in order to overcome it, but much rather becomes denied in order so much the more certainly to fall under its power. And yet there is a cognition which ideally overcomes the evil, so far as it is not yet really destroyed, but it is a cognition which originates from a practice, John viii. 31, 32. Religion has essentially a side in it, according to which it is theory; but in its deepest principle it is practice, the inmost act of the spirit. And directly here over against the evil, where it alone is able to solve the otherwise insolvable variance of our existence, is the point, in which also the variance of philosophy with it must resolve itself in a sincere and during reconciliation.—There is one among mankind who is absolutely free from evil and who communicates His freedom to all who

become one with Him by the act of justifying faith. But sti they have this faith only in Him, not in themselves; still thei being-in-him has not equally become a perfect being-in-self; stil their self-hood is not fully purified and sublimed; therefore ever procedure of the consciousness to be one with Him is alway conditioned by a new abandoning of self. It is the significanc of Christian hope that one day, all which they have in Him, the will at the same time perfectly have in themselves. Then th individual interrupted accords which here we are only abl listeningly to catch of the Divine order of the world, will unit themselves in a full symphonious chorus, in which every discor will have been absolutely overcome.

THE END.

INDEX

OF THE

EXPLAINED PASSAGES OF HOLY SCRIPTURE.

I. PASSAGES FROM THE OLD TESTAMENT.

Chap.	Vol.	Page.
Genesis.		
i. 26–28,	ii.	390 sq.
i. 31,	ii.	32
ii. 17,	ii.	319
iii.	ii.	386 sq.
iii. 1,	ii.	429 sq.
iii. 1–6,	ii.	432
iii. 16–22,	ii.	319. 433
iii. 19,	ii.	325
v. 1,	ii.	391
v. 3,	ii.	393
vi. 3,	i.	351
viii. 21,	ii.	303
ix. 6,	ii.	393
Exodus.		
iv. 21 sq.	ii.	465 sq.
Leviticus.		
v. 1–13,	i.	215 sq.
v. 17–19	i.	212
Numbers.		
xvi. 29,	ii.	320
xxvii. 3,	ii.	320
II. Samuel.		
xvi. 10,	i.	252
xxiv. 1,	i.	252
I. Kings.		
xxii. 22,	i.	252
Isaiah.		
vi. 10,	ii.	467
xlv. 7,	i.	253
lxiii. 17,	i.	252
Jeremiah.		
xxvii. 14–15,	i.	253
Psalms.		
xlix. 15,	ii.	321
li. 7,	ii.	301 sq.
Job.		
xiv. 4,	ii.	303
Ecclesiastes.		
ii. 3, / v. 5,	i.	351
Sirach.		
xxiii. 23,	i.	351

II. FROM THE NEW TESTAMENT.

Chap.	Vol.	Page.
Matthew.		
vi. 12,	i.	211
ix. 12 sq.,	ii.	282
xi. 25,	ii.	467
xii. 31–32,	ii.	475 sq.
xii. 33,	ii.	65 sq.
xv. 19–20,	i.	337
xviii. 7,	i.	420
xix. 17 sq.,	i.	55 sq.; 111 sq.
xxii. 36–39,	i.	108 sq.
xxii. 39,	i.	142 sq.
xxvi. 24,	i.	343 sq.
Mark.		
x. 21,	i.	55
xii. 29–31,	i.	108
Luke.		
v. 31, 32,	ii.	282
xi. 28,	ii.	282
xiii. 4,	i.	211
xvii. 10,	i.	56 sq.
xx. 36,	ii.	322
xxiii. 34,	i.	222
John.		
i. 2,	ii.	147
iii. 6,	i.	343; ii. 304
iii. 36,	ii.	282
viii. 32, 36,	i.	173; ii. 11
viii. 44,	i.	250; ii. 431
ix. 41,	i.	222 sq.
xi. 4,	ii.	321
xv. 22, 24,	i.	222 sq.
xvii. 5, 24,	ii.	149 sq.

THE ACTS.

		Vol.	Page.
Chap.	x. 35,	ii.	282
,,	xvii. 28 sq.	ii.	394 sq.

ROMANS.

,,	i. 24 sq.	ii.	470
,,	i. 21–23,	i.	131 sq.
,,	iii. 19,	i.	211
,,	iii. 24,	i.	273
,,	iv. 1,	i.	349
,,	iv. 15,	i.	102 sq.
,,	v. 7,	i.	112
,,	v. 12 sq.	ii.	318. 330 sq.
,,	v. 12–19,	ii.	381 sq.
,,	v. 13,	i.	102. 104
,,	v. 20,	i.	103. 104
,,	vi. 6,	i.	359
,,	vi. 16,	ii.	460
,,	vii.	i.	194
,,	vii. 5 sq.,	i.	104 sq.
,,	vii. 6,	i.	355
,,	vii. 17, 20,	i.	210
,,	vii. 14–25,	i.	357 sq. 370 sq.
,,	viii. 4 sq.	i.	354
,,	viii. 7,	i.	104 sq.
,,	[illegible] 21,	i.	421
,,	x. 5,	i.	46
,,	xiv. 23	i.	222

I. CORINTHIANS.

,,	i. 26,	i.	349
,,	ii. 14,	ii.	298
,,	iii. 1–4,	i.	349
,,	vi. 13,	i.	345
,,	vii. 14,	ii.	305
,,	vii. 22,	ii.	12
,,	ix. 12–18,	i.	56 sq.
,,	xi. 19,	i.	420
,,	xi. 32,	i.	264
,,	xv. 21 sq.	ii.	318
,,	xv. 28,	i.	121
,,	xv. 44–45,	ii.	324
,,	xv. 44–46,	ii.	414 sq.
,,	xv. 48,	ii.	327

II. CORINTHIANS.

,,	v. 2–9,	ii.	323 sq.
,,	v. 3,	ii.	334 sq.

GALATIANS.

		Vol.	Page.
Chap.	iii. 3,	i.	349
,,	iii. 12,	i.	46
,,	iii. 19,	i.	41
,,	iii. 21,	i.	47
,,	iv. 23,	i.	349
,,	v. 13–24,	i.	348. 355

EPHESIANS.

,,	ii. 3,	i.	104; ii. 306 sq.
,,	ii. 15,	i.	353
,,	iv. 24,	ii.	391 sq.

PHILIPPIANS.

,,	iii. 6 sq.,	i.	46

COLOSSIANS.

,,	ii. 11,	i.	350. 356
,,	ii. 18,	ii.	391 sq.
,,	iii. 10,		

I. THESSALONIANS.

,,	ii. 3–4,	i.	145; ii. 480
,,	ii. 8,	i.	145
,,	ii. 11–12,	ii.	471

I. TIMOTHY.

,,	i. 9,	i.	70

II. TIMOTHY.

,,	ii. 20,	i.	420

HEBREWS.

,,	vi. 3–6,	ii.	480
,,	x. 26–31,		

I. PETER.

,,	ii. 7–8,	ii.	468
,,	iv. 6,	ii.	322 sq.

I. JOHN.

,,	ii. 15–17,	i.	166
,,	iii. 4,	i.	40
,,	v. 16–17,	ii.	474. 481

JAMES.

,,	i. 13–17,	i.	250 sq.
,,	i. 14 sq.,	i.	165
,,	i. 25,	ii.	11
,,	iii. 9 sq.,	i.	109; ii. 393

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